Rel: August 21, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
CR-2025-0412
T.L.W.
v.
State of Alabama
Appeal from Mobile Juvenile Court
(JU-23-1374.09)
On Application for Rehearing
ANDERSON, Judge.
The Court's opinion of May 1, 2026, is withdrawn, and the following
is substituted therefor.
T.L.W. appeals her delinquency adjudication in the Mobile Juvenile
Court for the delinquent act of third-degree escape, § 13A-10-33, Ala.
CR-2025-0412
Code 1975. She claims that the juvenile court erred when it denied her
motion to dismiss the delinquency petition on double-jeopardy grounds.
This argument fails, however, and the judgment of the juvenile court is
affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
In October 2023, the juvenile court adjudicated T.L.W. delinquent
for committing the delinquent act of third-degree domestic violence, and,
as part of T.L.W.'s sentence, the juvenile court placed her on probation.
(C. 14-15.) Thereafter, T.L.W. escaped from juvenile-detention officers
during a court-ordered mental-health appointment and remained at
large for approximately one month. (R. 5-6; Supp. R. 4, 11.) Once she was
captured, T.L.W.'s juvenile-probation officer filed a petition to revoke her
probation, alleging that she had committed the new offense of escape. (C.
29, 54.) The State later filed a delinquency petition charging T.L.W. with
second-degree escape.1 (C. 5.)
The juvenile court addressed the revocation and delinquency
petitions during an April 8, 2025, hearing. At that hearing, T.L.W.
1The juvenile court later amended the charge against T.L.W. to
third-degree escape, at the State's request. (R. 4; Supp. R. 2-3, 6.)
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admitted to violating the conditions of her juvenile probation but denied
the allegations in the delinquency petition.2 (Supp. R. 2, 4-6.) The
juvenile court accepted T.L.W.'s admission, found that she was "in
violation of [her] probation," and committed her to the custody of the
Alabama Department of Youth Services ("DYS") for mental-health
treatment.3 (C. 22-23, 47; Supp. R. 6.) After admitting to the probation
violation, and during the same hearing, T.L.W. moved to dismiss the
delinquency petition under § 12-15-213(c), Ala. Code 1975, arguing that
the petition violated her double-jeopardy rights because she had
2A copy of the revocation petition is not included in the record on
appeal, but the reporter's transcripts indicate that both the revocation
petition and the delinquency petition were based on T.L.W.'s escape from
custody. (R. 5; Supp. R. 4-6.)
3The juvenile-court referee's written findings and recommendation
concerning the April 8, 2025, hearing contains a checked box reading
"adjudicated delinquent." (C. 22.) The hearing transcript, however,
indicates that the referee concluded that T.L.W. had violated the
conditions of her probation but did not adjudicate her delinquent of thirddegree escape. (Supp. R. 6.) This Court observes that the form used by
the referee did not contain any check-box option for a violation of
probation. Additionally, a later order indicated that T.L.W. denied the
allegations in case number JU-23-1374.09, the case in which she was
charged with third-degree escape. See note 1, supra. The juvenile court
did not adjudicate T.L.W. delinquent based on the third-degree escape
until May 9, 2025, when T.L.W. admitted to the charge. (C. 22, 47-48; R.
1-5.)
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CR-2025-0412
admitted to violating her probation. (Supp. R. 6-7.) The juvenile court
requested additional briefing on the issue. (Supp. R. 8-10.)
After considering the parties' legal arguments, the juvenile court
entered an order denying T.L.W.'s motion to dismiss. (C. 44-46.) The
juvenile court noted that "there are two simultaneously pending
proceedings, one in which the State alleges there is a violation of
probation terms ordered during a previous delinquency proceeding, and
another based on a new charge of Escape." (C. 44-45.) A revocation
proceeding, the juvenile court explained, "is 'not a stage of a criminal
prosecution,' " whereas a delinquency proceeding "is a criminal
prosecution." (C. 45.) For those reasons, the juvenile court concluded that
double jeopardy "does not apply to simultaneous or subsequent probation
revocation proceedings based on a new charge." (C. 45.)
During a May 2025 hearing, T.L.W. admitted to the delinquent act
of third-degree escape, see note 1, supra, but reserved the doublejeopardy issue for appeal. (R. 1-5.) The juvenile court accepted T.L.W.'s
admission, adjudicated her delinquent of third-degree escape, and
committed her to DYS custody. (C. 48; R. 5.) This appeal followed.
4
CR-2025-0412
Discussion
On appeal, T.L.W. argues that the juvenile court legally erred when
it denied her motion to dismiss the delinquency petition on doublejeopardy grounds. She specifically argues that § 12-15-213(c)'s text, when
considered in the context of other statutory provisions, expands doublejeopardy protections to bar subsequent prosecution for any offense that
is used as the basis for a petition to revoke juvenile probation and that,
in her case, jeopardy attached once she admitted to the probationrevocation petition that was based on the same act of escape for which
she was also charged by way of a delinquency petition. The State
disagrees, arguing that the same legal principles applicable to
adult-probation-revocation proceedings apply in the juvenile context, i.e.,
that a probation-revocation proceeding is not a proceeding designed to
punish a criminal offense. Moreover, the State contends that the statutes
cited by T.L.W. do not indicate that the Legislature intended to expand
double-jeopardy protections in juvenile matters in the manner suggested
by T.L.W. and that, under settled precedent, jeopardy did not attach
when T.L.W. admitted to violating her probation conditions by escaping
from custody.
5
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Given those arguments, the issues before us are (1) whether the
statutory provisions T.L.W. relies upon expand double-jeopardy
protections to prohibit subsequent juvenile-delinquency proceedings
based upon the same conduct used to support the revocation of juvenile
probation, and (2) whether our precedents concerning the applicability of
the Double Jeopardy Clause to adult-probation-revocation proceedings
also apply to juvenile-probation-revocation proceedings. As explained
more fully below, we conclude that § 12-15-213(c) does not expand doublejeopardy protections to admissions made during juvenileprobation-revocation proceedings, that our precedents concerning the
applicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause to adultprobation-revocation proceedings also apply to juvenile-probationrevocation proceedings, and that, therefore, the juvenile court did not err
when it denied T.L.W.'s motion to dismiss the delinquency petition for
third-degree escape on double-jeopardy grounds.
I.
T.L.W.'s argument on appeal has two parts. First, she contends that
§ 12-15-213(c) bars a subsequent juvenile-delinquency petition once a
juvenile admits to a violation of juvenile probation based upon the same
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CR-2025-0412
conduct charged in the delinquency petition. (T.L.W.'s brief at 12-16.) To
support that assertion, T.L.W. cites § 12-15-213(c)'s use of the phrase "the
petition," contending that, because the Legislature did not specify the
type of petition in that subsection, the term necessarily includes juvenileprobation-revocation petitions brought under § 12-15-132, Ala. Code
1975. (T.L.W.'s brief at 13-16.) Second, T.L.W. claims that § 12-15-213(c),
when read in conjunction with § 12-15-132(c) and (e), establishes that the
Legislature intended to treat juvenile-probation-revocation proceedings
differently from their adult equivalent, i.e., that it intended to treat
juvenile-probation-revocation proceedings as proceedings at which
jeopardy "attaches." (T.L.W.'s brief at 17-21.) We disagree.
Initially, we find T.L.W.'s construction of § 12-15-213(c) to be
incorrect. That provision reads:
"Criminal proceedings and other juvenile proceedings based
upon the offense alleged in the petition or an offense based
upon the same conduct are barred where the juvenile court
has begun taking evidence or where the juvenile court has
accepted from the child a plea of guilty to the petition."
" ' "In determining the meaning of a statute, this Court looks to the plain
meaning of the words as written by the legislature." ' " Craft v. McCoy,
312 So. 3d 32, 37 (Ala. 2020) (quoting Cockrell v. Pruitt, 214 So. 3d 324,
7
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331-32 (Ala. 2016), quoting in turn DeKalb Cnty. LP Gas Co. v. Suburban
Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 275 (Ala. 1998)).
" ' "Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain,
ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where
plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that
language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the
statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial
construction and the clearly expressed intent of the
legislature must be given effect." ' "
Id. (quoting Cockrell, 214 So. 3d at 332, quoting in turn City of Prattville
v. Corley, 892 So. 2d 845, 848 (Ala. 2003)). Appellate courts "review de
novo a question of law involving statutory construction." Ex parte Sacred
Heart Health Sys., Inc., 155 So. 3d 980, 985 (Ala. 2012).
"If the language of a statute is not 'plain' or is ambiguous, then --and only then -- may a court construe or interpret it to determine the
legislature's intent." Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Walker Cnty., 292
So. 3d 317, 326 (Ala. 2019). A portion of a statute " 'is ambiguous when it
is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in
either of two or more senses.' " S&S Distrib. Co. v. Town of New Hope,
334 So. 2d 905, 907 (Ala. 1976) (quoting State ex rel. Neelen v. Lucas, 24
Wis. 2d 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1964)). However, " '[b]ecause the
meaning of statutory language depends on context, a statute is to be read
8
CR-2025-0412
as a whole … [and s]ubsections of a statute are in pari materia.' " Mitchell
v. State, 316 So. 3d 242, 247 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019) (quoting Ex parte
Jackson, 614 So. 2d 405, 406 (Ala. 1993)).
We begin, therefore, by noting that, in § 12-15-213(a), the
Legislature extended to certain juvenile proceedings some of the
procedural safeguards available in adult criminal proceedings.
Specifically, that subsection applies to cases involving a "child charged
with a delinquent act or who is alleged to be in need of supervision" and
requires that such children "shall be accorded the rights and privileges
afforded by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
Alabama of 1901." (Emphasis added.) A "delinquent act" is defined as an
"act committed by a child that is designated a violation, misdemeanor, or
felony offense pursuant to the law of the municipality, county, or state in
which the act was committed or pursuant to federal law." § 12-15-102(6),
Ala. Code 1975. A "child in need of supervision" is one who has been
adjudged to be in need of supervision for a non-criminal reason. § 12-15-102(4). "Probation" is defined as the "legal status created by order of the
juvenile court following an adjudication of delinquency or in need of
supervision whereby a child is permitted to remain in a community
9
CR-2025-0412
subject to supervision and return to the juvenile court for violation of
probation at any time during the period of probation." § 12-15-102(21)
(emphasis added).
When a juvenile violates the terms of his or her probation, as did
T.L.W., the juvenile's probation may be revoked by the filing of a petition
to revoke the probation, pursuant to § 12-15-132(a). T.L.W.'s argument
that the revocation of juvenile probation prohibits subsequent
delinquency proceedings based "upon the same conduct" hinges on
treating subsection (c) of § 12-15-213 as being wholly independent of
subsections (a) and (b). T.L.W. maintains that references to "the petition"
in subsection (c) refer to any type of juvenile petition -- including petitions
to revoke juvenile probation -- rather than being limited to petitions
initiating the two types of juvenile proceedings specifically referenced in
subsection (a): those involving delinquency and children in need of
supervision.
Yet, as stated previously, this Court must read and consider
subsections of a statutory provision in pari materia. Mitchell, 316 So. 3d
at 247 (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 614 So. 2d at 406). In other words,
subsections of a statutory provision " 'should be construed together to
10
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ascertain the meaning and intent of each.' " Ex parte Jackson, 614 So. 2d
at 406 (quoting McCausland v. Tide-Mayflower Moving & Storage, 499
So. 2d 1378, 1382 (Ala. 1986)).
" ' "The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that this
Court is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent as
expressed in the statute. … In this ascertainment, we must
look to the entire Act instead of isolated phrases or clauses …
and words are given their plain and usual meaning. …
Moreover, just as statutes dealing with the same subject are
in pari materia and should be construed together, … parts of
the same statute are in pari materia and each part is entitled
to equal weight." ' "
Craft, 312 So. 3d at 37 (quoting Cockrell, 214 So. 3d at 332, quoting in
turn First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla. v. Lee Cnty. Comm'n, 75 So. 3d 105,
111-12 (Ala. 2011)). " 'When interpreting a statute, this Court must read
the statute as a whole because statutory language depends on context.' "
Alabama Dep't of Revenue v. Greenetrack, Inc., 369 So. 3d 640, 650 (Ala.
2022) (quoting Bean Dredging, L.L.C. v. Alabama Dep't of Revenue, 855
So. 2d 513, 517 (Ala. 2003)). Indeed, "our rules of statutory construction
direct us to look at the statute as a whole to determine the meaning of
certain language that is, when viewed in isolation, susceptible to multiple
reasonable interpretations." Ex parte Alfa Fin. Corp., 762 So. 2d 850, 853
(Ala. 1999).
11
CR-2025-0412
At bottom, by latching on to the phrase "the petition" in § 12-15-213(c), T.L.W. asks this Court to find ambiguity where none exists.
Construing § 12-15-213 as a whole, as we must, there is no ambiguity as
to what the Legislature intended. While it is true that there are more
than two types of "petitions" that may be brought in juvenile court,
references to "the petition" in subsections (b) and (c) of § 12-15-213 must
be informed by subsection (a)'s focus on proceedings initiated by petitions
to adjudicate children delinquent or in need of supervision. We note,
moreover, that this approach is consistent with the fact that the
Legislature has long sought to "extend[] to juveniles charged with
delinquency many of the procedural safeguards available to adult
criminal defendants." Driskill v. State, 376 So. 2d 678, 679 (Ala. 1979).
However, we see nothing in this text showing that the Legislature sought
to extend greater protection to juveniles in the probation-revocation
context than are available to adult defendants.
To be sure, "[d]elinquency, child in need of supervision, and
dependency cases and proceedings" are all "initiated by the filing of a
petition by the juvenile court intake officer." § 12-15-120(a), Ala. Code
1975. In addition, proceedings to revoke probation or aftercare are
12
CR-2025-0412
initiated "by the filing of a petition entitled 'petition to revoke probation'
or 'petition to revoke aftercare.' " § 12-15-132(b).4 But only by a strained
or tortured reading of § 12-15-213 could this Court find that the
Legislature intended to address two specific types of petitions in
subsection (a), yet -- for an unknown reason -- intended to change course
and reference all juvenile proceedings initiated by a petition simply by
using the term "the petition" in subsection (c).
We also must give effect to " ' "the words as written by the
legislature." ' " Craft, 312 So. 3d at 37 (quoting Cockrell, 214 So. 3d at 331,
quoting in turn DeKalb Cnty. LP Gas Co., 729 So. 2d at 275). Notably, in
subsection (c), the Legislature did not refer to "any" petition but used the
definite article "the" to identify which petition it was referencing. The
only sensible reading of the Legislature's reference to "the petition" in
this context is as a reference to a petition previously referenced in the
statute itself. Read in pari materia with subsection (a), this is plainly a
reference to the delinquency or child-in-need-of-supervision petition
initiating a proceeding governed by § 12-15-213(a). See Martin v. Martin,
4Other statutory provisions also reference various parties' ability to
file a "motion" seeking revocation of a probation order. See, e.g., § 12-15-221(a), Ala. Code 1975.
13
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329 So. 3d 1242, 1245 (Ala. 2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107-11
Thomson/West (2012)) ("It is a well-established principle of statutory
interpretation that '[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of
others.' "). For these reasons, we reject T.L.W.'s argument
T.L.W. cites State v. S.-Q.K., 292 Or. App. 836, 426 P.3d 659 (2018),
to support her interpretation of § 12-15-213(c), but that decision by the
Oregon Court of Appeals is unpersuasive. The statute at issue there did
not reference a particular type of juvenile proceeding but, instead, used
the term "adjudicatory hearing" to identify when jeopardy attaches and
specifically provided that
"proceedings in adult criminal court and other juvenile court
adjudicatory proceedings based on an act alleged in a petition
or citation to have been committed by a child, ward, youth or
adjudicated youth or allegations arising out of the same
conduct are barred when the juvenile court judge or referee
has begun taking evidence in an adjudicatory hearing or has
accepted a child['s] … admission … to the allegations of the
petition or citation."
Or. Rev. Stat. § 419A.190. Unlike § 12-15-213, the Oregon statute
contained no language limiting its scope to particular types of juvenile
proceedings. Compare § 12-15-213(a), Ala. Code 1975, with Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 419A.190. Additionally, the court in S.-Q.K. did not find that the
14
CR-2025-0412
meaning of the Oregon statute was clear from its text, relying instead
upon legislative history. 292 Or. App. at 840-46, 426 P.3d at 661-65.
Finally, probation-revocation proceedings in an Alabama juvenile court
occur only after "adjudicatory proceedings" have concluded, as Alabama
law defines "probation" as a "legal status created by order of the juvenile
court following an adjudication of delinquency or in need of supervision,"
§ 12-15-102(21), and it further restricts a juvenile court's authority to
enter an order of probation to two types of adjudicatory proceedings, and
only then when a child is determined to be in need of care or
rehabilitation, see § 12-15-215(c), Ala. Code 1975.
T.L.W. also urges us to read subsections (c) and (e) of § 12-15-132
in pari materia with § 12-15-213(c). According to T.L.W., doing so
demonstrates the Legislature's intent to expand double-jeopardy
protections to juvenile proceedings so as to prohibit subsequent
delinquency proceedings based on the same conduct that results in a
revocation of juvenile probation. That is, T.L.W. asks us to hold that these
statutes, acting together, treat juvenile-probation-revocation proceedings
as proceedings at which jeopardy attaches and as barring subsequent
prosecution or delinquency proceedings. We decline to do so.
15
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The viability of T.L.W.'s argument hangs on her contention that a
"juvenile adjudication for a violation of probation is an adjudication of
delinquency." (T.L.W.'s brief at 18.) T.L.W. offers no citation to Alabama
law defining an adjudication for a juvenile-probation violation as such,
however. Nor have we found any. Instead, T.L.W. points to the text of §
12-15-132(e), which provides that an adjudication for a juvenileprobation violation "for a child in need of supervision is not an
adjudication of delinquency." (T.L.W.'s brief at 18.) T.L.W. appears to
read this subsection as evidence that an adjudication for a juvenileprobation violation for a delinquent child is intended as an adjudication
of delinquency based on the new conduct alleged in the revocation
petition -- thus making it logical to extend double-jeopardy protections to
those juvenile proceedings. In T.L.W.'s view, because "no similar law
exists for an adjudication in a revocation of probation petition where the
underlying charge is not a [child-in-need-of-supervision] petition," then a
"juvenile adjudication for a violation of probation is an adjudication of
delinquency." (Id.)
But the revocation of probation is not an adjudication of
delinquency. As we have explained before, a "juvenile court may find a
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child delinquent 'on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon
competent, material, and relevant evidence[] that the child committed
the acts by reason of which the child is alleged to be delinquent.' " J.M.A.
v. State, 74 So. 3d 487, 492 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (citing § 12-15-212(a),
Ala. Code 1975). By contrast, as in adult-probation-revocation
proceedings, a lesser standard of proof applies in juvenile-probationrevocation proceedings. Section 12-15-132(c) provides that "[p]robation or
aftercare proceedings shall require clear and convincing evidence. In all
other respects, proceedings to revoke probation or aftercare shall be
governed by the procedures, safeguards, and rights and duties applicable
to delinquency and child in need of supervision cases contained in" Ala.
Code 1975, Title 12, Chapter 15. (Emphasis added.)
Further, § 12-15-132(a) speaks to the nature of a probationrevocation proceeding in juvenile court. First, that subsection recognizes
that any order of probation is entered "incident to an adjudication as a
delinquent child or a child in need of supervision," the same two types of
proceedings to which § 12-15-213 applies. § 12-15-132(a). Second, that
subsection clearly frames the focus of a juvenile-probation-revocation
petition on obtaining "a revocation of the order" of probation, not on
17
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whether an adjudication of delinquency, or of a child in need of
supervision, is warranted. § 12-15-132(a). At the conclusion of a juvenileprobation-revocation proceeding, if the child is found to have violated the
conditions of his or her probation, "the juvenile court may extend the
period of probation or aftercare or make any other order of disposition
specified for a child adjudicated delinquent or in need of supervision." §
12-15-132(d).
As for § 12-15-132(e), that subsection makes clear that a child in
need of supervision -- a form of juvenile adjudication that is not overtly
criminal in nature5 -- does not become a delinquent child -- a form of
adjudication for conduct that is overtly criminal in nature6 -- merely due
to violations of the terms and conditions of an order of probation entered
by a juvenile court. That is, because an order of probation may be entered
following either type of adjudication, § 12-15-132(e) clarifies that the
violation of an order of probation by a child adjudicated as being in need
of supervision does not constitute a "delinquent act," making the child a
"delinquent child" as those term are defined in § 12-15-102(6) and (7). Of
5See § 12-15-102(4), Ala. Code 1975.
6See § 12-15-102(6) and (7), Ala. Code 1975.
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course, for children placed on juvenile probation following adjudications
of delinquency, that provision is unnecessary and inapplicable. See Stiff
v. Equivest Fin., LLC, 362 So. 3d 141, 147 (Ala. 2022) (quoting League of
Women Voters v. Renfro, 290 So. 2d 167, 169 (Ala. 1974)) (" 'Where
possible, statutes should be resolved in favor of each other to form one
harmonious plan and give uniformity to the law.' ").
Accordingly, despite T.L.W.'s arguments to the contrary, we
conclude that § 12-15-213(c) does not extend double-jeopardy protections
to juvenile-delinquency proceedings involving delinquent acts that were
previously the subject of juvenile-probation-revocation proceedings.
II.
In its brief, the State argues that this Court's precedents regarding
double jeopardy and adult-probation-revocation proceedings apply to
juvenile-probation-revocation proceedings. (State's brief at 25-29.) This
Court has not previously addressed whether our precedents concerning
adult-probation-revocation proceedings and double jeopardy apply in the
juvenile context.
The question whether jeopardy attaches in a juvenile-delinquency
proceeding is well settled. In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 521-27 (1975),
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the United States Supreme Court considered whether a juvenile's doublejeopardy rights were violated when he was tried as an adult for a crime
for which a juvenile court had already found him delinquent. Holding
that the juvenile had been subjected to double jeopardy, the Court
explained that it could not "conclude … that a juvenile is not put in
jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has
committed acts that violate a criminal law." Id. at 528-29. It further
clarified that "the risk to which the term jeopardy refers is that
traditionally associated with 'actions intended to authorize criminal
punishment to vindicate public justice.' " Id. at 529 (quoting United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943)).
In Smith v. State, 368 So. 2d 298, 301 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978), this
Court synthesized the operative rule set out in the Breed decision: "Any
adjudicatory finding of delinquency in the juvenile court that the juvenile
had violated a criminal statute would cause jeopardy to attach." Since
then, we have reaffirmed this rule on multiple occasions. See, e.g.,
M.L.W. v. State, 372 So. 3d 241, 244 (Ala. Crim. App. 2022); Cruse v.
State, 489 So. 2d 694, 696 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Driver v. State, 456 So.
2d 1140, 1141-42 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
20
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This Court has also established, at least in the adult context, that
jeopardy does not attach in noncriminal actions. Namely, "Alabama has
consistently held that the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause is not applicable to administrative proceedings." Ex parte K.H.,
700 So. 2d 1201, 1205 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). That is, " ' "[t]he Double
Jeopardy Clause does not apply to actions that are not essentially
criminal. … Nor does it apply to disciplinary, parole, probation, or bond
revocation hearings, because they are administrative proceedings." ' " Id.
(quoting Coleman v. State, 642 So. 2d 532, 533-34 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994)).
We have not addressed, however, whether a juvenile court's
determination that a juvenile has violated a condition of probation by
committing a new delinquent act is the type of adjudicatory proceeding
to which jeopardy attaches. In other words, we have not decided whether
a juvenile-probation-revocation proceeding should be treated the same as
an adult-probation-revocation proceeding for precedential purposes in
determining whether jeopardy attaches at such a proceeding.
Other jurisdictions, however, have held that jeopardy does not
attach during juvenile-probation-revocation proceedings. For example, in
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In re O'neal, 160 N.C. App. 409, 585 S.E.2d 478 (2003), the North
Carolina Court of Appeals considered whether double-jeopardy
protections applied to juvenile-probation-revocation proceedings. There,
the juvenile was placed on probation for one year after being adjudicated
delinquent for committing a misdemeanor assault. 160 N.C. App. at 410,
595 S.E.2d at 479. A juvenile-court counselor filed the equivalent of a
revocation petition alleging that the juvenile had committed several
probation violations, including becoming "physically aggressive" with
another child. 160 N.C. App. at 410-11, 585 S.E.2d at 479-80. The juvenile
admitted to the allegations contained in the revocation petition, and the
juvenile court concluded that he had willfully violated his probation
conditions and placed him on probation for another year. 160 N.C. App.
at 411, 585 S.E.2d at 480.
Thereafter, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that the
juvenile had committed misdemeanor assault based the same incident.
Id. The juvenile moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the
prosecution violated his double-jeopardy rights. Id. The juvenile court
denied his motion and ultimately entered an adjudication finding the
juvenile delinquent of simple assault. Id.
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The juvenile's sole contention on appeal was that the juvenile court
had erred in denying his motion to dismiss because he had admitted to
the same underlying conduct at his revocation hearing. 160 N.C. App. at
411-12, 585 S.E.2d at 480. The appellate court noted that the United
States Supreme Court, in Breed, "only extended double jeopardy
protection to adjudicatory or delinquency hearings," explained that a
" 'probation violation hearing is not a criminal prosecution,' " and
recognized that "[i]t is well established that double jeopardy protections
do not apply to probation revocation hearings." 160 N.C. App. at 412-13,
585 S.E.2d at 480-81 (quoting State v. Monk, 132 N.C. App. 248, 252, 511
S.E.2d 332, 334 (1999)). The court held that jeopardy did not attach when
the juvenile admitted to the underlying conduct during his probationrevocation hearing. 160 N.C. App. at 413, 585 S.E.2d at 481. It reasoned
that, in the juvenile's case, the juvenile court had found by a
preponderance of the evidence only that the juvenile had violated his
probation conditions, not that the juvenile was in fact delinquent. 160
N.C. App. at 413-14, 585 S.E.2d at 481.
The North Dakota Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
In re O.F., 773 N.W.2d 206 (N.D. 2009). There, the juvenile was initially
23
CR-2025-0412
adjudicated delinquent and placed under the supervision of the juvenile
drug court. Id. at 207. Later, law-enforcement officers cited the juvenile
for violating his curfew, and, upon returning home, he killed his family's
pet kitten. Id. The drug court then recommended that the juvenile be
sanctioned; a juvenile referee followed that recommendation and
required the juvenile to complete six additional hours of community
service. Id.
The State then filed a delinquency petition alleging that the
juvenile had mistreated animals, in violation of N.D. Cent. Code § 36-21.1-02(1), and that he was an unruly child for violating his curfew. Id.
The juvenile moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the prosecution
for mistreating an animal and for violating curfew -- the same conduct
for which the juvenile drug court had sanctioned him -- violated his
double-jeopardy rights. Id. The juvenile court denied the motion to
dismiss, and the juvenile pleaded guilty to the charges while reserving
his right to appeal the juvenile court's denial of his motion to dismiss. Id.
On appeal, he raised the same argument asserted in his motion to
dismiss. Id.
24
CR-2025-0412
The North Dakota Supreme Court initially observed that there "is
no substantive difference between a sanction imposed on a participant by
a juvenile drug court for violation of the program's rules and revocation
of probation by a district court for a defendant's violation of a condition
of probation." Id. at 208. It then noted that " ' "probation revocation … is
not a stage of a criminal prosecution" ' " and that "courts have long held
'the fact that one act formed the basis for both [a] criminal conviction and
[a] probation revocation does not violate double jeopardy.' " Id. (quoting
State v. Olson, 656 N.W.2d 650, 654 (N.D. 2003), and Merry v. State, 752
P.2d 472, 475 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988)). The court further explained that
a probation-revocation hearing " 'is considered a continuation of the
original prosecution for which probation was imposed[,] … [and] the sole
purpose is to determine whether a criminal defendant has breached a
condition of his existing probation, not to convict that individual of a new
criminal offense.' " Id. at 209 (quoting State v. Gautier, 871 A.2d 347, 361
(R.I. 2005)). " 'Consequently,' " it continued, " ' jeopardy does not attach to
probation-revocation proceedings, because "these proceedings are not
designed to punish [criminal defendants] for violation of a criminal
law." ' " Id. (citations omitted).
25
CR-2025-0412
The court held that the juvenile's double-jeopardy rights were not
violated by the juvenile court's delinquency adjudication, even though it
was premised on the same conduct that had previously formed the basis
of the drug court's sanction. Id. It reasoned that, rather than adjudicating
the juvenile delinquent, the drug court and the juvenile referee had only
sanctioned the juvenile for violating program rules. Id. Accordingly,
jeopardy had not attached at the sanction proceedings. Id.
We find such reasoning persuasive and conclude that juvenileprobation-revocation proceedings are not the type of adjudicatory
proceedings at which jeopardy attaches. In T.L.W.'s case, the probationrevocation proceedings concerned T.L.W.'s punishment for her previous
delinquency adjudication for third-degree domestic violence -- i.e., the
juvenile court's purpose was to determine whether T.L.W. had violated a
condition of her probation, not to adjudicate the alleged delinquent act of
third-degree escape. In fact, the juvenile court did not adjudicate T.L.W.
delinquent of third-degree escape at the April 8, 2025, hearing; instead,
it found by clear and convincing evidence, based on her admission, that
T.L.W. was "in violation of [her] probation" when she escaped from
custody. (Supp. R. 6.) Because the probation-revocation proceedings were
26
CR-2025-0412
noncriminal in nature, relating to T.L.W.'s legal status as being "subject
to supervision and return to the juvenile court for violation of probation
at any time during the period of probation," § 12-15-102(21), jeopardy did
not attach when T.L.W. admitted to violating the conditions of her
probation by escaping from custody.
T.L.W. argues that, "[i]n contrast to a criminal case, where a
revocation of probation implements an existing but suspended sentence,
a juvenile probation adjudication can result in an extended period of
probation, or 'any other disposition specified for a child adjudicated
delinquent or in need of supervision.' " (T.L.W.'s brief at 19 (quoting § 12-15-132(d).) According to her, this "undetermined potential deprivation of
liberty" "demonstrates being twice put in jeopardy when both petitions
contain the same allegation, and supports the added protections the law
grants juvenile revocation of probation proceedings that are not available
in adult probation proceedings." (T.L.W.'s brief at 19.) This is not so.
Section 12-15-132(d) states that if "a child is found to have violated
the terms of his or her probation … pursuant to a revocation hearing, the
juvenile court may extend the period of probation … or make any other
order of disposition specified for a child adjudicated delinquent or in need
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CR-2025-0412
of supervision." While that statute does grant juvenile courts broad
discretion to determine the ramifications of a juvenile's probation
violation, a juvenile court's exercising that discretion does not transform
a juvenile-probation-revocation proceeding into the type of adjudicatory
hearing for which Breed mandates double-jeopardy protections.
In In re O'Neal, the court addressed this very issue. There, the court
acknowledged that, "in adult criminal cases[,] a violation of probation
usually results in the activation of a previously imposed sentence,"
whereas "in juvenile cases a probation violation usually results in a new
imposition of probation or even confinement, since there is generally no
suspended term of confinement in juvenile cases imposing probation."
160 N.C. App. at 413, 585 S.E.2d at 481. Despite this difference, the court
explained, "the better view is to treat a juvenile probation violation as
analogous to the revocation of probation in the criminal justice system."
Id. This is because the "imposition of a new term of probation, or possibly
confinement, in juvenile cases is punishment for the original offense for
which the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent" and does not punish "any
of the offenses that form the basis of the trial court's determination that
28
CR-2025-0412
a probation violation has occurred." Id. We agree with this reasoning and
apply it here.
In sum, we conclude that there is no legitimate reason to view
adult-probation-revocation proceedings differently than juvenileprobation-revocation proceedings for purposes of our prior decisions
discussing whether the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to such
proceedings. To that end, we conclude that a juvenile-probationrevocation proceeding should be treated the same as an adultprobation-revocation proceeding for precedential purposes when
analyzing whether jeopardy attaches at such a proceeding.
In this case, the record on appeal reflects that the juvenile court
adjudicated T.L.W. delinquent of third-degree domestic violence in
October 2023 and placed her on juvenile probation. (C. 14-15.) Afterward,
in March 2025, T.L.W. escaped from custody while she was still serving
that probationary term for domestic violence. (R. 5-6; Supp. R. 4.) After
admitting to the probation violation resulting from that escape, but
before the juvenile court adjudicated her delinquent of third-degree
escape, the juvenile court ordered that T.L.W. be confined to the custody
of DYS for mental-health treatment. (C. 41; Supp. R. 4-6.) Only after the
29
CR-2025-0412
probation-revocation hearing and initial commitment did the juvenile
court adjudicate her delinquent of third-degree escape. (C. 48; R. 5.) In
other words, the juvenile court's initial placement of T.L.W. into DYS
custody was pursuant to her original domestic-violence adjudication, not
as punishment for third-degree escape. Under those circumstances, the
Double Jeopardy Clause was not implicated when T.L.W. admitted to the
violation of her juvenile probation flowing from her actions constituting
third-degree escape. See Ex parte K.H., 700 So. 2d at 1205 (quoting
Coleman, 642 So. 2d at 533-34); Woodberry v. State, 625 So. 2d 1159 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1993).
Conclusion
We conclude that the Legislature's enactment of § 12-15-213(c), as
well as § 12-15-132(c) and (e), did not expand double-jeopardy protections
to include juvenile-probation-revocation proceedings. Instead, we hold
that such proceedings serve the same purposes as adultprobation-revocation proceedings, meaning the same double-jeopardy
principles that apply to adult-probation-revocation proceedings apply in
juvenile-probation-revocation proceedings. Accordingly, the judgment of
the juvenile court is affirmed.
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CR-2025-0412
APPLICATION OVERRULED; OPINION OF MAY 1, 2026,
WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED.
Windom, P.J., and Cole, J., concur. Minor, J., concurs in part and
concurs in the result, with opinion. Kellum, J., concurs in the result.
31
CR-2025-0412
MINOR, Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the result.
For the reasons stated in Part I of the main opinion, I concur in the
Court's judgment. I believe that, in light of this Court's holding in Part I
of its opinion, this Court need not address the issue in Part II.
32