Rel: August 21, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2025-0972
James D. Terry and JoAnn N. Terry
v.
Susan L. Randolph, Terry L. Beasley, and Shawn A. Turner
Appeal from Marion Circuit Court
(CV-23-900119)
PER CURIAM.
James D. Terry ("James") and JoAnn N. Terry appeal from an order
of the Marion Circuit Court ("the trial court") purporting to enforce an
alleged settlement agreement arising from their defamation action
against Susan L. Randolph ("Susan"), Terry L. Beasley, Shawn A. Turner
CL-2025-0972
("Shawn"), and James L. Turner III ("Trey") ("the defendants"). Because
the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the alleged
settlement agreement, we dismiss the appeal with instructions to the
trial court to vacate its order.
Background
The action arose out of a dispute between the Terrys, who were the
owners of an apartment rented by James L. Turner, Jr. ("Junior"), and
Junior's family members. Susan and Shawn are Junior's sister and
brother, respectively; Beasley is Junior's cousin; Trey is Junior's son.
According to the Terrys' complaint, Junior rented an apartment
from them, including an "open garage area" shared by both the Terrys
and Junior. In July 2021, Junior was diagnosed with cancer and was
unable to continue working as a truck driver during his treatment. In
August 2021, Beasley delivered to Junior a reloading table ("the table")
that Beasley had built for Junior. The table was placed in the garage
area. According to the Terrys, Junior paid Beasley for the cost of
materials to build the table.
Beginning in September 2021, Junior began having difficulty
paying his rent. The Terrys, believing that Junior would be able to return
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CL-2025-0972
to work in February 2022, told him that he would always have a place to
live and that he could pay his rent as he was able. On one occasion,
Junior offered to give the Terrys a rifle worth $2,500, but the Terrys
declined the offer.
In January 2022, Junior owed the Terrys $1,750, which included a
balance of $250 for November 2021, $750 for December 2021, and $750
for January 2022. On January 20, 2022, the Terrys met with Junior, at
his request, and he gave them the table in lieu of $1,000 of rent due for
the months of November 2021 and December 2021. Junior also gave the
Terrys a $1,000 check for rental amounts due for the months of January
2022 and one-third of February 2022.
Junior died on January 25, 2022. Thereafter, Susan contacted the
Terrys about securing Junior's property and about the status of Junior's
unpaid rent. The Terrys informed her that Junior had paid all of his rent
on January 20, 2022. The Terrys moved the table from the garage area
and secured it in a metal building.
On January 27, 2022, Susan, Shawn, and Trey arrived at the
apartment to retrieve Junior's property. The Terrys informed Susan and
Shawn that Junior had paid all rent due through February 10, 2022, by
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giving them the table and a $1,000 check on January 20, 2022. Later
that evening, Susan and Shawn telephoned the Terrys and discussed
their desire to purchase the table back and to give it to Beasley.
According to the Terrys, they agreed to sell the table back to Susan and
Shawn.
The next day, the defendants contacted the Winfield Police
Department ("the police department") and reported that the Terrys had
taken the table. The defendants claimed that the table belonged to
Beasley because, they said, Junior had never paid Beasley for the
material used to build the table. After the police department contacted
the Terrys, the Terrys agreed to sell the table to the defendants on
January 30, 2022, for $1,000. However, when the parties met at the
appointed time, Beasley refused to buy the table. Thereafter, the
defendants returned to the police department, and Susan told a police
officer that the Terrys had refused to accept a $1,000 check that she had.
Trey then filed a criminal complaint against the Terrys, asserting that
he owned the table as the heir of Junior's estate. Beasley later filed a
criminal complaint against the Terrys, asserting that he owned the table.
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The Terrys were later arrested and charged with felony theft of property
in connection with those complaints ("the criminal cases").
On December 1, 2023, the Terrys commenced an action against the
defendants, asserting claims of conspiracy to defame, defamation of
character, libel and slander, and libel and slander per se ("the civil case").
James, who is an attorney, represented the Terrys along with cocounsel.
Susan, Beasley, and Shawn ("the represented defendants") answered the
complaint.
On April 23, 2024, the trial court entered a default judgment
against Trey, with the damages to be determined at a later hearing. On
August 9, 2024, Beasley asserted a counterclaim alleging conversion
against the Terrys.
During the course of the litigation, the parties engaged in
negotiations regarding a possible settlement. However, it does not
appear that any of the settlement offers that appear in the record were
accepted.
In April 2025, the remaining parties reached the alleged settlement
agreement. However, the record does not contain a memorial of that
agreement. The only document in the record setting forth the terms of
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CL-2025-0972
the alleged settlement agreement is the trial court's April 11, 2025,
judgment. That judgment provided:
"This matter coming to be heard on April 7, 2025, the
[Terrys] appeared by and through their counsel, [the
represented defendants] appeared by and through their
counsel, and [Trey] was not present although he had been
subpoenaed. The Court was advised that the parties present
reached an agreement to resolve all issues between those
parties, and in consideration thereof, it is HEREBY
ORDERED as follows:
"1. A consent judgment is hereby rendered against [the
represented defendants] jointly and severally in the amount
Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000). The consent judgment may be
fully satisfied with a payment of Two Thousand Two Hundred
and Fifty Dollars ($2,250) to the [Terrys] within thirty (30)
days of this Order.
"2. That on April 23, 2024, the court entered a default
judgment against [Trey] and reserved a ruling on damages.
The [Terrys] have subsequently summitted on Affidavit for
their itemized damages. Therefore, it is HEREBY ORDERED
as follows:
"3. [The Terrys] are hereby awarded a judgment against
[Trey] in the amount of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00)
plus court cost[s]. The Circuit Clerk is hereby directed to issue
a Certificate of Judgment in said amount."
(Capitalization in original.) The April 11, 2025, judgment made no
mention of the table or the criminal cases. None of the parties filed a
postjudgment motion or appealed from the April 11, 2025, judgment. It
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CL-2025-0972
appears that the represented defendants satisfied the judgment against
them by paying the Terrys $2,250.
On June 13, 2025, the represented defendants filed a "motion to
enforce settlement." That motion recited the fact that the represented
defendants had reached a settlement agreement with the Terrys and that
the trial court had entered a final judgment. It then asserted:
"2. [The represented d]efendants have complied with
their obligations of the agreement by paying settlement funds
and drafting and providing to counsel for the [Terrys] the
requisite statements from the [represented d]efendants
regarding [the Terrys'] outstanding criminal matters for
review within the time prescribed.
"3. The settlement of this case also included the
agreement of the [Terrys] to sell a certain table to [Beasley].
Pursuant to the terms developed during extensive
negotiations with the [Terrys] and their counsel, the [Terrys]
were to deliver the said table to the office of their counsel
Jeremy Streetman to be held in trust. Upon the resolution of
all pending matters the table would be sold to Defendant
Terry Beasley. As of this filing, the said table has not been
delivered, and Defendant James Terry now maintains it will
not be delivered."
The Terrys responded to the motion to enforce the alleged
settlement agreement by arguing that the represented defendants were
still withholding their statements declining to prosecute the criminal
cases and that the criminal cases had not been dismissed. The Terrys
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CL-2025-0972
also argued that the settlement agreement did not include an enforceable
agreement regarding dismissal of the criminal cases or the sale of the
table. They asserted that any conditional offer to sell the table was not
part of the settlement of the civil case.
On August 8, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the represented
defendants' motion to enforce the alleged settlement agreement. On
August 26, 2025, the trial court entered the following order:
"On or before April 7, 2025 the Court was advised in
open court that the parties in this matter had reached an
agreement that would resolve all matters in this civil dispute,
which would also resolve [the criminal cases]. The attorneys
all acknowledged that the matters were resolve[d] and this
was further confirmed by [the assistant district attorney].
"[The represented defendants] agreed to a consent
judgment for $6,000 that could be satisfied for $2,250 if paid
within 30 days. Said amount has been paid and satisfied.
"[The represented defendants] agreed to file affidavits
with the District Attorney's office. The criminal cases are still
pending.
"….
"[James] agreed to execute a Bill of Sale and deliver
the... table to [the represented defendants' counsel's] office in
exchange for $1,000.00 after the other cases were complete.
"It is therefore ORDERED that:
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CL-2025-0972
"1. The Motion to Enforce Settlement filed by [the
represented defendants] is hereby GRANTED.
"….
"3. [The represented d]efendants shall immediately
turn over their affidavits to the [assistant district attorney].
"4. Within 72 hours of the dismissal of [the criminal
cases], [the Terrys] shall deliver the table to [the represented
defendants' counsel's] office with a signed bill of sale in
exchange for $1,000."
(Capitalization in original.)
On September 9, 2025, the Terrys filed a motion to amend the trial
court's August 26, 2025, order. In that motion, the Terrys argued that
the alleged settlement agreement between the parties did not include an
agreement that the Terrys would sell the table. They argued that their
communication dated April 4, 2025, specified that any agreement to sell
the table would be separate from the settlement agreement. Accordingly,
the Terrys moved the trial court to amend the August 26, 2025, order by
deleting its finding that James had agreed to sell the table and its
requirement that James sell the table within 72 hours of the dismissal of
the criminal cases. The trial court denied the Terrys' motion to amend
the order on October 1, 2025. The Terrys appealed.
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CL-2025-0972
Standard of Review
In their brief, the Terrys raise only two arguments, both of which
challenge the trial court's jurisdiction to order them to sell the table.
Because a claim that a trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
presents a question of law, we review such a claim de novo. Ex parte
Terry, 957 So. 2d 455 (Ala. 2006).
Analysis
The Terrys first contend that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the represented defendants' June 13, 2025, motion to enforce the
alleged settlement agreement because, they say, that motion was
untimely. They contend that, because none of the parties moved to
amend the April 11, 2025, judgment within 30 days or appealed that
judgment within 42 days, the trial court lost jurisdiction to consider the
represented defendants' motion to enforce the alleged settlement
agreement. Second, the Terrys argue that, if the trial court did have
jurisdiction to consider the motion to enforce the alleged settlement
agreement, it lacked jurisdiction to order them to sell the table because
the trial court's April 11, 2025, judgment made no mention of the table.
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CL-2025-0972
Our supreme court has held that, "[i]f no Rule 59[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,]
motion is filed after a judgment is entered, the trial court that entered
the judgment generally loses jurisdiction to amend the judgment 30 days
after the judgment is entered." Ex parte Caremark Rx, LLC, 229 So. 3d
751, 757 (Ala. 2017) (footnote omitted). "However, a trial court
nevertheless continues to hold 'residual jurisdiction' even after that 30-day period expires such that it can still take any steps that are necessary
to enforce its judgment." Id. "The jurisdiction retained by [a] trial court
after it enter[s] its final judgment … is limited to interpreting or
enforcing that final judgment; the trial court [cannot] extend its
jurisdiction over any matter somehow related to the … final judgment in
perpetuity by simply declaring it so." Id. at 760. Here, none of the parties
filed a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate the April 11, 2025,
judgment within 30 days after that date. Accordingly, after May 11,
2025, the trial court retained only residual jurisdiction to interpret and
enforce that judgment; it had no jurisdiction over related matters.
Thus, the dispositive question is whether the represented
defendants' June 13, 2025, motion to enforce the alleged settlement
agreement fell within the trial court's residual jurisdiction to enforce the
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CL-2025-0972
April 11, 2025, judgment. For the following reasons, we hold that it did
not.
We determine the character of a motion " ' "from its essential
substance, and not from its descriptive name or title." ' " Slocumb Law
Firm, LLC v. Greenberger, 332 So. 3d 903, 906 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020)
(quoting Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 684 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Ala.
1996), quoting in turn Union Springs Tel. Co. v. Green, 285 Ala. 114, 117,
229 So. 2d 503, 505 (1969)). Here, the represented defendants' motion to
enforce the alleged settlement agreement did not seek enforcement of the
April 11, 2025, judgment because that judgment made no mention of the
table. Rather, the April 11, 2025, judgment required only that the
represented defendants satisfy the judgment by paying $6,000 to the
Terrys, or $2,250 within 30 days of the date of the judgment, and it
implicitly required the Terrys to accept payment as provided in the
judgment as satisfaction of the judgment. It is undisputed that the
represented defendants fulfilled that requirement by paying the Terrys
$2,250 within the time allowed. Thus, there was nothing left from the
April 11, 2025, judgment for the trial court to enforce. Accordingly,
because the represented defendants requested that the trial court enforce
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CL-2025-0972
the purported terms of the alleged settlement agreement that were not
incorporated into the judgment, the motion was not one to enforce the
judgment but, rather, was a motion to enforce the alleged settlement
agreement. Indeed, the title of the motion, "motion to enforce
settlement," described accurately the relief it sought.
Generally, "a proceeding to enforce a settlement is in the nature of
an action on a contract." Kappa Sigma Fraternity v. Price-Williams, 40
So. 3d 683, 690 n.3 (Ala. 2009). When a party seeks to enforce a
settlement agreement while the underlying action is still pending, the
party may move to enforce the settlement agreement in the underlying
action rather than institute a new action for breach of the settlement
agreement. Lem Harris Rainwater Fam. Tr. v. Rainwater, 373 So. 3d
1089, 1093-94 (Ala. 2022). Conversely, if the underlying action is no
longer pending when a party seeks to enforce the settlement agreement,
the party must institute a new action for breach of the settlement
agreement. Id. Only if the judgment in the underlying action
incorporates the terms of the settlement agreement does the trial court
retain residual jurisdiction to enforce the judgment through an
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injunction without the need for a party to initiate a new action. City of
Orange Beach v. Lamar Cos., 403 So. 3d 832 (Ala. 2024).
Here, because the April 11, 2025, judgment did not incorporate the
term of the alleged settlement agreement requiring the Terrys to sell the
table to Beasley, the trial court lacked residual jurisdiction to enforce
that term. Ex parte Caremark, 229 So. 3d at 760. Accordingly, the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to enter the August 26, 2025, order requiring the
Terrys to sell the table to Beasley without a new breach-of-contract action
having been commenced, Rainwater, supra, and its order is therefore
void, Green Tree-AL, LLC v. Brown, 54 So. 3d 404 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).
Because a void order will not support an appeal, we dismiss the Terrys'
appeal, but we do so with instructions to the trial court to vacate its order
enforcing the parties' alleged settlement agreement.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the appeal with instructions for
the trial court to vacate its August 26, 2025, order.
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
All the judges concur.
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