Rel: August 21, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2026-0260
James David McGee
v.
Lauderdale County Board of Education
Appeal from Order of Hearing Officer
(2025-106)
MOORE, Presiding Judge.
James David McGee worked as a bus driver for the Lauderdale
County Board of Education ("the Board"). As a bus driver, McGee was a
classified employee under Ala. Code 1975, § 16-24C-3(2), a part of the
Students First Act ("the SFA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 16-24C-1 et seq.
CL-2026-0260
Because he worked full time for more than three years, McGee was
considered a nonprobationary classified employee. See Ala. Code 1975, §
16-24C-4(2).
On July 2, 2025, Jerry Hill, the superintendent of the Board,
notified McGee by letter that he was recommending to the Board that
McGee's employment be terminated. McGee timely requested an
evidentiary hearing before the Board pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 16-24C-6(b), a part of the SFA. Following a hearing on September 12, 2025,
the Board voted to adopt Hill's recommendation and to terminate
McGee's employment. McGee appealed the termination decision and
requested review by an administrative hearing officer. See § 16-24C-6(f).
The administrative hearing officer affirmed the Board's decision by an
order rendered on February 23, 2026. McGee now appeals to this court.
See id.
The record shows that, in 2024, McGee hired K.M., a female highschool student who rode on the bus that McGee operated, to assist with
housekeeping at his home. On November 14, 2024, K.M. reported to the
Lauderdale County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") that, on
one occasion when McGee was transporting K.M. in his personal vehicle
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to take her home after work, McGee had inappropriately touched her.
DHR opened a child-abuse-and-neglect investigation, and the matter was
referred to the local district attorney. The criminal investigation was
concluded in January 2025 when a grand jury, before which McGee had
testified, refused to indict McGee for any offense. However, in May
2025, DHR concluded that McGee was "indicated" for abusing K.M.1
McGee initially elected to contest the indicated finding through an
administrative hearing, see Ala. Code 1975, § 26-14-7.1, but, after
considering the costs of the process, McGee withdrew his contest.
On May 9, 2025, DHR sent a letter to the Board notifying the Board
of the final disposition of its investigation. In the letter, DHR stated that
"our findings note that abuse or neglect [of K.M.] occurred" and labeled
McGee as the person allegedly responsible for that abuse or neglect.
Whitney Coates, the director of human relations for the Board, testified
that, after receiving the letter from DHR regarding the results of its
investigation and after reviewing McGee's personnel file, which showed
that, in 2019, McGee had been reprimanded for improper comments he
1"Indicated" means "[w]hen credible evidence and professional
judgment substantiates that an alleged perpetrator is responsible for
child abuse or neglect." Ala. Code 1975, § 26-14-8(a)(1).
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had allegedly made to female students riding on his bus, she had
recommended to Hill that McGee's employment be terminated. By law,
DHR was required to file its "indicated" report in the statewide childabuse-and-neglect registry. See Ala. Code 1975, § 26-14-8. Coates
essentially testified that the Board could not employ any person who had
an indicated child-abuse finding listed on the registry.
Hill testified that, after conferring with Coates, he decided to
recommend to the Board that McGee's employment be terminated. On
July 2, 2025, Hill drafted a letter to McGee that stated, in pertinent part:
"This letter is to inform you that I am recommending your
termination as a tenured transportation driver with the
[Board] on the grounds of immorality and other good and just
cause.[2] (See attachment). The facts supporting the proposed
termination are follows:
"1. See attachment."
Hill did not testify regarding how the letter was delivered to McGee, but
Coates testified that the Board customarily used certified mail for
delivery of personnel letters. Hill testified that the notice itself did not
contain the factual bases underlying the reason for the termination of
2"[I]mmorality" and "other good and just cause" are valid reasons to
terminate a nonprobationary classified employee under the SFA. See
Ala. Code 1975, § 16-24C-6(a).
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McGee's employment but that the required information was in the
"attachment." Hill testified that the "attachment" referred to in the
notice was the May 9, 2025, "DHR report" notifying the Board that DHR
had found that McGee had perpetrated abuse or neglect against K.M.
Hill could not recall if he had attached the DHR report to the notice. Hill
said that his secretary was responsible for making sure that the intended
attachment was appended to the notice and delivered to McGee. The
Board did not call Hill's secretary as a witness.
After the Board voted to terminate his employment, McGee
appealed for review before a hearing officer, arguing, among other things,
that the Board had not complied with § 16-24C-6(b), which provides, in
pertinent part:
"The termination of a ... nonprobationary classified employee
... shall be initiated by the recommendation of the chief
executive officer in the form of a written notice of proposed
termination to the employee. ... [T]he notice shall state the
reasons for the proposed termination, shall contain a short
and plain statement of the facts showing that the termination
is taken for one or more of the reasons listed in subsection (a),
and shall be issued in conformity with subsection (k)."
McGee argued that, in its written notice of proposed termination, the
Board did not provide McGee with any statement of the factual
allegations upon which it had based its decision to terminate his
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employment for immorality and other good and just cause. McGee
pointed out that, according to Hill, the factual allegations were supposed
to be in the DHR report attached to the notice, but, he maintained, the
Board had failed to prove that the DHR report was attached and was
delivered to McGee along with the notice. The Board countered that the
DHR report contained the necessary factual basis for its termination
decision and that the evidence did not show that McGee had failed to
receive the DHR report.
In a final decision and order, the hearing officer determined that
McGee had received adequate notice on the following theory:
"McGee argues that because the DHR report was not
attached to or enclosed with Hill's letter proposing
termination, he was not given a short and plain statement of
the facts that informed him of the charge that would allow
him to prepare a defense. The Board argues that inadequate
notice is an affirmative defense and McGee failed to prove
that [the] DHR report was not included in Hill's letter.
"The hearing officer agrees that the case authorities
cited by Hill absolutely require that the termination letter
contain a short and plain statement of the facts that underpin
a proposed termination, and that a failure to do so cannot be
cured by discovery that occurs before a hearing.
"Just as there is a rebuttable presumption of service, the
hearing officer concludes there is a rebuttable presumption
that the DHR report was attached or enclosed in Hill's letter.
Based on the record, McGee did not rebut the presumption."
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In other words, the hearing officer presumed that McGee had received
the attachment along with the notice and placed the burden on McGee to
prove otherwise.
By its plain language, § 16-24C-6(b) provides that the termination
of the employment of a nonprobationary classified employee may be
initiated only by a written notice containing a short and plain statement
of the facts supporting the grounds for termination. Nothing in the law
precludes an employer from providing the necessary factual statement as
an attachment to a letter notifying the employee of a proposed
termination. However, as § 16-24C-6(b) also plainly provides, the notice
and the attachment must be delivered together because the notice must
contain both the statutory grounds for termination and the factual basis
for those grounds. Consequently, if the notice the Board provided to
McGee did not contain the DHR report setting forth the required factual
allegations supporting the termination decision, the notice was not
adequate to initiate the termination process. See generally Ex parte
Soleyn, 33 So. 3d 584 (Ala. 2009) (holding that, in the absence of a short
and plain statement of the facts supporting the grounds for termination
in notice of proposed termination, employees could not be properly
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terminated under the Fair Dismissal Act, Ala. Code 1975, former § 36-26-100 et seq.).
In this case, the hearing officer, analogizing the delivery of a
written notice of a proposed termination under the SFA to service of
process under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, applied a
presumption that the Board had delivered the DHR report along with the
notice that it provided to McGee. However, the SFA contains specific
rules governing the presumption of delivery of a written notice of a
proposed termination.
Section 16-24C-6(k) provides that, when notice of a proposed
termination is delivered by certified mail or private mail carrier, the
notice
"shall be deemed received by the employee and complete for
purposes of [the SFA] two business days after the notice is
deposited for certified delivery in the United States mail or
placed with a private mail carrier for next business day
delivery. The employer has the burden of producing evidence
that service was affected in the manner permitted by [the
SFA], but the employee has the burden of proving that such
service was not properly made."
In Taylor v. Huntsville City Board of Education, 143 So. 3d 219 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2013), this court held that § 16-24C-6(k) establishes a rebuttable
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CL-2026-0260
presumption that an employee received the notice of a proposed
termination within two business days when it was delivered by certified
mail. Once the employer proves that it deposited the notice for certified
delivery in the United States mail, properly addressed and postage
prepaid, the burden shifts to the employee to prove that the notice was
not properly delivered, and, if the employee presents evidence disputing
proper delivery, the issue becomes one of fact to be resolved by the factfinder.
In Taylor, this court explained that the rebuttable presumption
codified in § 16-24C-6(k) is like the common-law mailbox rule. Under the
common-law mailbox rule, the presumption of delivery of a letter arises
only when the evidence shows that the letter was deposited in the mail,
properly addressed and postage prepaid. See Taylor, 143 So. 3d at 229
n.3. Under the common-law mailbox rule, to create a presumption of the
delivery of a written communication through the mail, a party must, at a
minimum, show the content of the communication that was placed in the
mail. See Reserve Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 260 Iowa 740, 150 N.W.2d 632
(1967). In this case, the mailbox rule established in § 16-24C-6(k) could
not be applied. Assuming that the Board followed its policy by delivering
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the notice of proposed termination by certified mail, no witness testified
that the DHR report was attached to the written notice of the proposed
termination or enclosed in the same envelope. Hill testified that he did
not recall attaching the DHR report, and his secretary, who Hill testified
was responsible for securing the attachment, was not called to testify.
In the absence of such a presumption, the question whether the
DHR report was attached to the notice remained in dispute. Section 16-24C-6(c) provides that "the chief executive officer ... shall bear the burden
of proof with regard to disputed issues of material fact." Accordingly, the
burden rested on Hill to establish that he had delivered both the notice
and the DHR report containing the factual basis for the proposed
termination. Hill did not discharge that burden. Thus, the hearing
officer erred in determining that the Board had complied with the notice
provisions of § 16-24C-6(b).
Without the required factual statement, the Board failed to
properly initiate the termination process under the SFA. We, therefore,
reverse the order of the hearing officer, and we render a judgment for
McGee, concluding that his employment was not effectively terminated
due to a lack of proper notice of the factual underpinning for the proposed
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CL-2026-0260
termination of his employment.3 See generally Bishop State Cmty. Coll.
v. Archible, 33 So. 3d 588, 591 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (holding that hearing
officer did not err in dismissing appeal of termination decision because
the evidence showed that the employer had not provided a short and
plain statement of the facts supporting the decision, thus rendering the
termination ineffective). However, nothing in our opinion should be
construed as foreclosing the Board from properly commencing the
termination process by providing proper notice to McGee of the reasons
for the termination of his employment and the facts underlying those
reasons, as contemplated by § 16-24C-6(b).
REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.
Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
3Based on our disposition, we pretermit discussion of McGee's other
arguments on appeal.
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