Dalton D. Banks v. Darla Lashay Persall; Dean Smith; Fuller, Willingham & Carter, LLC; Melvin Hasting; and Thomas Drake II

2026-08-21

Summary · law.co

Holding. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's judgment dismissing Banks's complaint based on res judicata and dismissed the appeals to the extent they challenged pending Rule 60(b) motions for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Dalton Banks appealed the dismissal of a lawsuit he filed in Cullman Circuit Court against lawyers and others involved in his 2022 divorce proceedings. Banks had previously filed a nearly identical complaint in Cullman District Court, which was dismissed for failure to state a valid claim. Rather than appeal that dismissal, Banks filed a new action in circuit court alleging slander and other misconduct by the defendants. The circuit court dismissed this second complaint on the basis of res judicata, concluding that the district court's earlier dismissal constituted an adjudication on the merits that barred the renewed claims.

On appeal, Banks failed to meaningfully challenge the res judicata analysis that formed the basis for the dismissal. Instead, he reasserted the merits of his claims and raised collateral arguments about the defendants' motion to dismiss and alleged procedural violations. The Supreme Court of Alabama found that Banks's failure to address the dispositive res judicata issue constituted appellate waiver. The court also rejected Banks's due-process arguments, noting that he cited no applicable law in support. Additionally, Banks raised arguments concerning pending Rule 60(b) motions seeking relief from the judgments, but the court determined it lacked appellate jurisdiction over those matters because the motions remained pending in the trial court.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether res judicata barred Banks's second complaint based on the district court's prior dismissal
Whether Banks properly preserved his arguments on appeal
Appellate jurisdiction over pending Rule 60(b) motions for relief from judgment

Procedural posture

Banks appealed the Cullman Circuit Court's dismissal of his complaint on res judicata grounds, while also raising arguments concerning pending postjudgment motions for relief under Rule 60(b).

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Rel: August 21, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

SPECIAL TERM, 2026

SC-2025-0737 and SC-2025-0738

Dalton D. Banks

Darla Lashay Persall; Dean Smith; Fuller, Willingham & Carter,

LLC; Melvin Hasting; and Thomas Drake II

Appeals from Cullman Circuit Court

(CV-25-900260)

PARKER, Justice.

SC-2025-0737; SC-2025-0738

The doctrine of res judicata rests on the simple idea that litigation

must eventually end, that final judgments should truly be final. See, e.g.,

Hughes v. Martin, 533 So. 2d 188, 190 (Ala. 1988). Below, the Cullman

Circuit Court dismissed pro se litigant Dalton D. Banks's lawsuit on this

basis, reasoning that the Cullman District Court had previously

considered and rejected the very same claims. Because Banks has failed

to articulate a cogent argument in support of reversal, we affirm the

circuit court's judgment of dismissal. Banks also presents arguments

concerning his still-pending postjudgment requests for relief from that

judgment. See Ala. R. Civ. P. 60(b). So, to that extent, we dismiss his

appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

This matter is the latest in a series of legal proceedings involving

Banks following his 2022 divorce. About a year after the divorce became

final, Banks's ex-wife brought a civil lawsuit against him. A few months

after that, Banks and his ex-wife traded accusations of contempt in a

separate domestic-relations case. Eventually, law-enforcement officers

seized firearms from Banks as part of an involuntary-commitment

proceeding against him in the Cullman Probate Court.

SC-2025-0737; SC-2025-0738

Following those events, Banks brought suit in the Cullman District

Court against a long list of defendants, including his ex-wife, an

insurance agent, and various lawyers who were involved (or allegedly

involved) in the events recounted above. Banks alleged that the

defendants had made "misrepresentations" and "false statements"

against him during his 2022 divorce proceedings. The district court

dismissed Banks's complaint for failure to state a valid claim.

Rather than appeal, Banks commenced a new action below using

an entirely new complaint. The defendants were slightly different; this

time, Banks named only the lawyers as defendants. The court was also

different; this time, Banks sued in the Cullman Circuit Court rather than

the Cullman District Court. Otherwise, this new action was eerily similar

to the previously dismissed district-court case: Banks alleged that the

defendants had committed "slander" and various other forms of

misconduct during his 2022 divorce matter.

The Cullman Circuit Court dismissed Banks's new complaint just

as the Cullman District Court had done before. The circuit court's basis

for dismissal was res judicata. According to the circuit court, the districtcourt's dismissal order constituted an "adjudication on the merits," which

SC-2025-0737; SC-2025-0738

operates to "preclude[] subsequent actions involving the same claims and

parties."

Banks thereafter noticed his appeal to this Court. Soon after that,

he also filed postjudgment motions seeking a new trial (see Rule 59, Ala.

R. Civ. P.) and other relief from the circuit court's judgment dismissing

his complaint (see Rule 60, Ala. R. Civ. P.). By now, Banks's Rule 59

motion for a new trial seemingly has been denied by operation of law. See

Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. To our knowledge, however, his Rule 60 motion

for relief from the dismissal remains pending before the circuit court.

II.

On appeal, Banks makes various arguments challenging the

dismissal of his complaint. But none are persuasive. Indeed, as to the

dispositive issues, Banks scarcely makes any argument at all.

Banks primarily challenges the dismissal simply by reasserting the

merits of his claims. He also argues that the circuit court should have

considered his supplement to his complaint and that the defendants'

motion to dismiss did "not properly dispose of subpoenas or contempt of

court." Banks's brief at 18. The problem with these arguments is that

they fail to address the circuit court's basis for dismissal -- that Banks's

SC-2025-0737; SC-2025-0738

claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We have long held that

an appellant's "failure … to discuss in the opening brief an issue on which

the trial court might have relied as a basis for its judgment" constitutes

appellate waiver resulting in affirmance of the judgment under review.

Soutullo v. Mobile Cnty., 58 So. 3d 733, 739 (Ala. 2010). Banks's failure

to challenge the circuit court's res judicata analysis amounts to just such

a waiver.

Banks also contends that the circuit court violated his due-process

rights by "[sitting] on the case for months" and not holding a hearing

before entering its judgment. Banks's brief at 16. But Banks fails to cite

any applicable law in support of this argument and thus has failed to

fulfill his basic duty as an appellant to present "cases, statutes, [or] other

authorities" demonstrating error below. Ala. R. App. P. 28(a)(10). In any

event, we perceive no defect stemming from any delay or lack of hearing

and will not reverse the circuit court's judgment on this point.

Banks finally argues that the district court's order was void because

it did not address his motion for sanctions. Of course, the merits of the

district court's order are not before this Court in these appeals from the

circuit court's judgment. But, to the extent that the validity of the district

SC-2025-0737; SC-2025-0738

court's order might conceivably affect the res judicata analysis, we note

that the district court's dismissal order expressly dismissed Banks's

"claims … in their entirety" and "with prejudice." Because all of Banks's

claims were dismissed, Banks's assertion that the motion for sanctions

was not addressed is simply inaccurate.

III.

Banks separately argues that he is entitled to relief from both the

district court's order and the circuit court's judgment under Rule 60(b),

Ala. R. Civ. P., which allows a court to grant relief from a final judgment

in limited circumstances, such as when there has been a "mistake,"

"inadvertence," "newly discovered evidence," or "fraud." As noted above,

however, Banks's Rule 60(b) motion is still pending in the circuit court,

and "[a]n appeal concerning a still-pending Rule 60(b) motion must be

dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction." Womble v. Moore, 370 So. 3d

817, 819 (Ala. 2022). We accordingly dismiss Banks's appeals to the

extent that they relate to his Rule 60(b) motion.

IV.

Because Banks has failed to properly preserve his primary

arguments on appeal, we affirm the judgment dismissing his complaint.

SC-2025-0737; SC-2025-0738

To the extent that he challenges a pending request for Rule 60(b) relief,

the appeals are dismissed.

SC-2025-0737 -- APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED.

SC-2025-0738 -- APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED.

Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Cook, JJ., concur.