Rel: August 21, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
SC-2026-0249
I. Ripon Britton, Jr., and Gregory H. Hawley
v.
Yashiba Glenn Blanchard, in her official capacity as Jefferson
County Judge of Probate
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-26-900698)
SELLERS, Justice.
SC-2026-0249
I. Ripon Britton, Jr., and Gregory H. Hawley appeal from a
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing their petition for the
writ of mandamus directed to the Jefferson Probate Court. We reverse.
I. Facts
On January 29, 2026, Jefferson County Probate Judge Yashiba
Glenn Blanchard entered an administrative order ("the order"), which
was recorded in the land records of the probate court. In that order,
Judge Blanchard directed that a "forensic accounting" be performed
"immediately" on all wards' estates that had been previously
administered by attorneys Britton and Hawley and transferred to
Edmond Earle, the newly appointed guardian and conservator for
Jefferson County. The order also provided that all fees for the forensic
accountings were approved for payment from each ward's estate. Britton
and Hawley petitioned the circuit court, pursuant to § 6-6-640, Ala. Code
1975, for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Blanchard to vacate the
order. According to Britton and Hawley, the order encompassed
approximately 146 cases, in which they had previously served as
conservator and/or guardian. Of those cases, some concerned only
guardian-related matters, thus involving no conservatorship estate from
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which accounting fees could be paid; some of the conservatorship
proceedings had already been discharged by final order of the probate
court; and some of the conservatorship proceedings had already resulted
in final-settlement hearings and were awaiting action by the probate
court. Britton and Hawley also alleged that the order did not stem from
any petition or motion, was not entered on the docket of any guardianship
or conservatorship proceeding, did not identify any protected person or
estate, was entered without notice and a hearing, and was entered
without any findings of fact or conclusions of law. Britton and Hawley
also filed an emergency motion requesting that the circuit court stay
enforcement of the order pending the resolution of their mandamus
petition. The circuit court entered an order granting that motion,
specifically directing Judge Blanchard to take no further action to enforce
or to implement the order pending the resolution of the mandamus
petition. Judge Blanchard filed a response, arguing that the mandamus
petition was due to be denied because she had entered the order pursuant
to her administrative powers.
Despite initially staying the order, the circuit court ultimately
dismissed the petition for the writ of mandamus filed by Britton and
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Hawley. In its dismissal judgment, the circuit court expressed its belief
that the concurrent equitable jurisdiction conferred upon the probate
court by Act No. 1144, Ala. Acts 1971 ("the local act"), deprived the circuit
court of its supervisory jurisdiction over the probate court. This appeal
followed.
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo whether the circuit court had subject-matter
jurisdiction over the petition for the writ of mandamus filed by Britton
and Hawley. Ex parte Culbreth, 966 So. 2d 910 (Ala. 2006).
III. Discussion
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the local act divests
the circuit court of its supervisory jurisdiction over the probate court,
thus depriving it of its power to issue a writ of mandamus directed to the
probate court, if necessary. The local act applies to cases originating in
the Jefferson Probate Court. Section 1 of the local act provides, in
pertinent part, that the probate court "shall have general jurisdiction
concurrent with that of the Circuit Courts of this State, in equity, in the
administration of the estates of … minors and insane or non compos
mentis persons," which would include guardianship and conservatorship
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proceedings. See, e.g., Ala. Code 1975, § 12-13-1 and § 26-2A-1 et seq.
Section 4 of the local act provides that appeals "may be taken from the
orders, judgments and decrees" of the probate court to the Supreme
Court. Finally, section 6 of the local act provides:
"The jurisdiction conferred by this act … is intended to be
cumulative only, and it is not intended hereby to in any
manner limit or restrict the present jurisdiction of the Circuit
Courts or the Probate Courts of such counties, including,
without limitation, the right to appeal from orders, judgments
and decrees of the Probate Judges of such counties in the
manner as now provided by law. Nothing in this act shall be
construed as prohibiting or as creating any conditions to the
removal of any estates, or the administration of any estates,
from the Probate Court to the Circuit Court, in equity, as is
now provided by law. It is the primary intention of this act to
expedite and facilitate the administration of estates and such
other matters as are mentioned herein .…"
Thus, the local act expressly grants the probate court in this case
general, concurrent equity jurisdiction with the circuit courts in this
State over estate-administration matters, which would include
guardianship and conservatorship proceedings. Notably absent from the
local act is any reference to review by a petition for the writ of mandamus
or other supervisory, remedial writs; rather, the local act speaks only to
where appeals lie. The local act also provides that it does not "limit or
restrict the present jurisdiction" of the circuit courts. Id. For these
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reasons, we conclude that the general superintendence of the circuit court
was not altered in any way by the fact that the probate court shared
concurrent equitable jurisdiction with the circuit court under the local
act.1 Rather, the circuit court retains its general superintendence and
control over the probate court pursuant to § 12-11-30(4), Ala. Code 1975.
That Code section provides that "[t]he circuit court shall exercise a
general superintendence over all district courts, municipal courts, and
probate courts." (Emphasis added.) "Encompassed in this
superintendence is the power to review certain judgments and orders of
1Britton and Hawley assert that Jett v. Carter, 758 So. 2d 526 (Ala.
1999), is "binding" precedent in this case. Jett, however, addressed the
local act in the context of an appeal from the probate court to the circuit court. In doing so, the Jett Court overruled Schroeder v. McWhite, 569
So. 2d 316 (Ala. 1990), specifically rejecting the rule in Schroeder that,
when the probate court exercises concurrent equitable jurisdiction with
the circuit court, the proper court in which to appeal is this Court. See
Jett, 758 So. 2d at 530 ("We have found no authority other than Schroeder
for disallowing an appeal from one court to another on the basis that the
first was 'acting in its exercise of jurisdiction concurrent with that of the' other court. Schroeder, 569 So. 2d at 318-19. Most important is the fact
that we find no authority for that proposition in [the local act], which
explicitly states that 'it is not intended hereby to in any manner limit or restrict ... the right to appeal from orders, judgments and decrees of the
Probate Judges of such counties in the manner as now provided by law.'
Act No. 1144, § 6." (footnote omitted)). Although the holding in Jett is
persuasive, Jett is not binding authority here insofar as it addresses the
local act in the context of appeals, not petitions for supervisory, remedial writs.
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the probate court, either through direct appeal or by petition for an
extraordinary writ." Franks v. Norfolk S. Ry., 679 So. 2d 214, 216 (Ala.
1996). See also Ala. Const. 2022, Art. VI, § 142(b) (providing, in pertinent
part, that the circuit court "may be authorized by law to review decisions
of … inferior courts" and that it "shall have authority to issue such writs
as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate its powers, and shall
have such other powers as may be provided by law"), and Reagan v.
Rhodes, 264 Ala. 39, 45, 84 So. 2d 647, 653 (1956) (noting that a probate
court is an "inferior jurisdiction subject to the circuit court's general
superintendence"). Thus, the fact that the probate court in this case
shares equity jurisdiction with the circuit court in connection with
certain matters does not elevate the probate court to an equivalent
position. Rather, the probate court retains its identity as an inferior
court subject to the general superintendence of the circuit court.
Accordingly, the circuit court had jurisdiction pursuant to § 12-11-30(4)
to exercise its general supervision and control over the probate court,
which includes the authority to issue any writ "as may be necessary or
appropriate to effectuate its powers." Ala. Const. 2022, Art. VI, § 142(b).
IV. Conclusion
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Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court
and remand this cause with instructions to the circuit court to vacate its
judgment dismissing the petition for the writ of mandamus and to take
such further action on the petition as is consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Cook, and Parker, JJ., concur.
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