In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-25-00229-CR
JAMES DYLIN WEST, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 1A District Court
Newton County, Texas
Trial Cause No. ND23-07849
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2023, a grand jury indicted Appellant, James Dylin West (“Appellant,”
“Defendant,” or “West”), for aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than
fourteen, a first-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(2)(B). West
pleaded “guilty” pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, and the trial court found
sufficient evidence to find West guilty, but deferred adjudication of guilt, placed
West on community supervision for ten years, ordered 240 hours of community
service, and assessed a $10,000 fine.
1
In 2025, the State filed a Motion for Adjudication of Guilt alleging that West
had failed to comply with the rules of the Supplement for Sex Offenders to
Conditions of Community Supervision. West and his attorney signed a Stipulation
of Evidence and Judicial Confession (the Stipulation) on June 5, 2025, and West
agreed that he had violated several conditions of his deferred adjudication. In the
Stipulation, West pleaded true to the State’s allegations in the Motion for
Adjudication of Guilt, and stated
I, James Dylin West, violated condition (r)(2) in that I did not
regularly attend meetings for Sexual Offender Group Therapy as
directed by the Court;
I, James Dylin West, violated condition (r)(3) in that I did not
comply with Child Safety Zones Supplement as directed by the
Court. I visited and ha[ve] stayed overnight on W. Lavielle [S]treet
in Kirbyville, Texas at an address that is 580 feet from a soccer field
and a daycare.
I, James Dylin West, violated condition (r)(9) in that I have spent the
night and visited at Matthew Roy’s house on W. Lavielle St[.],
Kirbyville, Texas, when Mr. Roy’s 10-year-old son was present in
the home.
I, James Dylin West, am the same James Dylin West, who was placed
on community supervision by the Court in Cause No. ND23[-]07849
on July 20, 2023.
It is further stipulated that the above listed violations occurred after
July 20, 2023, and during my period of community supervision;
against the peace and dignity of the State of Texas. It is further
stipulated that the Defendant hereby waived the making of a record
in this case.
2
The trial court found West had violated the terms and conditions of his probation
and adjudicated West guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a 12-year-old and
sentenced him to fifty years of confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. West timely appealed. For the reasons outlined
below, we affirm.
Issues on Appeal
West raises two issues on appeal. In his first issue, West complains that the
trial court violated his due process rights when it imposed a fifty-year sentence when
he had “a binding plea agreement for a maximum [sentence] of thirty years[.]”
In his second issue, West contends that his plea of guilty was involuntary when
he was placed on deferred adjudication because it was based on a misunderstanding
of the plea agreement and entered despite West’s documented cognitive and
comprehension limitations under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
Competency Evaluation
In May of 2023, before she accepted the guilty plea of West and placed him
on deferred adjudication, the trial court judge signed an “Order Appointing
Competency Evaluation[.]” A Competency Evaluation was conducted by Dr. Ray
Coxe, Ph.D., a psychologist. The report from Coxe provides certain background
information and states that West graduated from high school in 2012, but in
elementary school he repeated kindergarten and second grade. Further, West worked
3
doing concrete finishing for five years. According to Dr. Coxe, West appeared
healthy and “[h]e cooperated and responded coherently to all of” Coxe’s questions
and directions. West denied he had ever received mental health treatment, taken any
medication to manage his moods or behavior, or been hospitalized for mental health
reasons. Coxe concluded that West “was in contact with reality and able to
concentrate.” West knew who and where he was and could correctly identify the
year but not the month. West knew he had been charged with a “sexual offense[,]”
he stated that “if he were found guilty, his options were to go to prison, jail, or
probation[,]” he understood that “being truthful with his attorney was to his
benefit[,]” that the charge is “serious,” that he has an attorney representing him, and
that assisting counsel is in his best interest. West also stated his attorney entered a
plea for him during his recent court appearance, and he believes there is currently a
“deal on the table[.]” West also said he has had prior experiences in court, and he
has a “general understanding of probation,” and given the alternative of either prison
or probation, he said he knows probation is preferable. He understood that a
defendant might plead to resolve his case.
West’s mother informed Coxe that in his early years, West had difficulty
learning and comprehending, received speech therapy, and was diagnosed dyslexic.
According to West’s mother, West was in a car accident in 2020 and suffered a brain
injury, and since then West sometimes will “zone[] out and is off in another world.”
4
Coxe concluded that West was competent to proceed to participate in “a simple,
straightforward plea bargain.”
Evidence at the Revocation Hearing
Testimony of Dawn Kiser
Dawn Kiser testified that she is a manager and high-risk probation officer for
the East Texas CSDC, Adult Probation, and she oversees individuals who have
committed sex offenses. She has served in this position for almost thirteen years.
West was referred to sex offender counseling, but he had missed twenty-one of
seventy-five required counseling sessions. Kiser stated that West was “doing what
he want[ed] to and putting society at risk.” She considered West’s being in a home
with children, sleeping in a home with a child, and residing close to a daycare and a
soccer field, as “very concerning.” Kiser noted that West appears to struggle with
reading and comprehension, but she testified that a counselor would help West when
he did not understand something.
Kiser testified that she had been informed that West was visiting a home when
a child was present. A field visit was conducted by her department, and the occupants
of the home were interviewed. Kiser was called when it was reported that West was
across the street from the home at a gas station. Kiser spoke to West via speaker
phone. At first, West denied that a child was ever present when he visited the home.
Kiser reminded West that the Department would be giving him a polygraph test in
5
the future, and West then admitted that the child had been in the home previously
when he was there. Kiser also testified that the home was within 580 feet of a daycare
and a soccer field and that West’s “child safety zone condition” of probation
prohibited him from being within 1,000 feet of areas where children are present.
Kiser stated that West was asked at every office visit whether he had been around
any children and if he had violated any conditions of his probation.
Testimony of Kimberly Sjaastad
Kimberly Sjaastad testified that she is West’s mother, that “[e]verything” with
West is difficult, that he has the “brain of a 10 year old[,]” and that he “cannot read
at all.” Sjaastad confirmed that West understands the English language and can sign
his name. Initially, Sjaastad testified that West had lived with her his whole life, but
then she stated he has been out of her home since he graduated from school and that
he was currently thirty-one years old and staying in a tent in her front yard.
Analysis
In his first issue, West argues that he had a binding plea agreement with the
State that set punishment to thirty years if he violated the terms of his deferred
adjudication and was adjudicated guilty in the future. However, West fails to provide
the court with any reference in the record where it demonstrates the parties agreed
there would be a cap of thirty years in the event he violated the terms of his deferred
6
adjudication. And we find nothing in the record before us to support this claim. So,
there is no support in the record for his complaint as outlined in his first issue.
West cites to Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), and argues his due
process rights were violated because the State promised a cap of thirty years if he
violated the terms of his deferred supervision. In Santobello, the Supreme Court
stated, “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such
promise must be fulfilled.” 404 U.S. at 262. There is nothing in the record before us
to support the argument that the parties had an agreement to a thirty-year cap, so we
find Santobello is not applicable.
Additionally, we note that this is an appeal from a revocation and adjudication
proceeding, not a direct appeal from West’s original plea proceeding. Generally, a
defendant who is placed on deferred adjudication community supervision may raise
issues relating to the original plea proceeding only in appeals taken when the
deferred adjudication is first imposed. Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661-62
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Accordingly, in an appeal from a revocation proceeding,
the defendant is generally limited to challenging only the grounds for revocation.
See Wright v. State, 506 S.W.3d 478, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“The general rule
is that an attack on the original conviction in an appeal from revocation proceedings
is a collateral attack and is not allowed.”). As this Court stated in Stewart v. State,
7
No. 09-20-00025-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 9724, at **3-4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
Dec. 8, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication),
[t]ypically, “a defendant placed on deferred adjudication community
supervision may raise issues relating to the original plea proceeding
. . . only in appeals taken when deferred adjudication community
supervision is first imposed.” Manuel [], 994 S.W.2d [at] 661-62 []; see
also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.755(e) (defendant’s right to
appeal “shall be accorded the defendant at the time the defendant is
placed on community supervision[]”); Perez v. State, 424 S.W.3d 81,
86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Arreola v. State, 207 S.W.3d 387, 390 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). “[A]n appellant will not be
permitted to raise on appeal from the revocation of his community
supervision any claim that he could have brought on an appeal from the
original imposition of that community supervision.” Wiley v. State, 410
S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citation omitted).
While there may be recognized exceptions to this general rule allowing a challenge
for void judgments, an involuntary guilty plea does not cause the resulting judgment
to become void. See Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
(“a judgment is void only in very rare situations[,]” and “‘[a]n ‘involuntary plea does
not constitute one of those rare situations[]”) (citing Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001) and Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496-97 (1994)
(stating that claims concerning ineffective assistance of counsel and the
voluntariness of guilty pleas do not rise to the level of a jurisdictional defect resulting
from the failure to appoint counsel at all)). West does not contend the original order
placing him on community supervision was void. In an appeal from a revocation
8
proceeding, a defendant is generally limited to challenging the grounds for
revocation. Wright, 506 S.W.3d at 481.
The trial court admonished West prior to accepting his plea of guilty of:
(1) the range of the punishment attached to the offense;
(2) the fact that the recommendation of the prosecuting attorney as to
punishment is not binding on the court. Provided that the court shall
inquire as to the existence of a plea bargain agreement between the state
and the defendant and, if an agreement exists, the court shall inform the
defendant whether it will follow or reject the agreement in open court
and before any finding on the plea. Should the court reject the
agreement, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw the
defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere;
(3) the fact that if the punishment assessed does not exceed the
punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the
defendant and the defendant’s attorney, the trial court must give its
permission to the defendant before the defendant may prosecute an
appeal on any matter in the case except for those matters raised by
written motions filed prior to trial;
(4) the fact that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States of
America, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for the offense charged
may result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country,
or the denial of naturalization under federal law;
(5) the fact that the defendant will be required to meet the registration
requirements of Chapter 62, if the defendant is convicted of or placed
on deferred adjudication for an offense for which a person is subject to
registration under that chapter; and
(6) the fact that if the defendant is placed on community supervision,
after satisfactorily fulfilling the conditions of community supervision
and on expiration of the period of community supervision, the court is
authorized to release the defendant from the penalties and disabilities
resulting from the offense as provided by Article 42A.701(f).
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(1)-(6).
The Written Plea Admonishments are in the clerk’s record and the
admonishments informed West when he entered his guilty plea and accepted
9
deferred adjudication that if he violated the terms of his deferred adjudication he
would face the following range of punishment:
[] First-Degree Felony: Life or any term of not more than 99 years
nor less than 5 years in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice; in addition, a fine not to exceed
$10,000 may also be assessed.
The Written Plea Admonishments also informed West about the other
provisions in article 26.13(a)(2)-(6) as follows:
[] Plea Bargaining: A plea bargain or recommendation of
punishment is not binding on the Court. The Court may set punishment
anywhere within the range provided by law for this offense. If there is
a plea bargain agreement, the Court will inform you in open Court
whether the agreement will be followed before making any finding on
your plea. Should the Court reject the agreement, you will be permitted
to withdraw your plea should you desire.
[] Permission to Appeal: When the Court follows a plea bargain
agreement, permission of the Court must be given before you can
prosecute an appeal on any matter in the case, except for matters raised
by written motion filed prior to trial. This Court seldom consents to an
appeal where conviction is based upon a guilty plea.
[] Citizenship: If you are not a citizen of the United States of
America, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for this offense may result
in deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country, or the
denial of naturalization under federal law.
[] Sex Offender Registration Program: You will be required to
meet the registration requirements of Chapter 62, Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure (Sex Offender Registration Program) if you are
convicted of or placed on deferred adjudication for an offense for which
a person is subject to registration under that chapter.
[] Deferred Adjudication: Should the Court defer adjudicating your
guilt and place you on probation, upon violation of any imposed
condition, you may be arrested and detained as provided by law. You
will then be entitled to a hearing limited to the determination by the
Court, without a jury, whether to proceed with an adjudication of your
guilt upon the original charge. No appeal may be taken from this
10
determination. Upon adjudication of your guilt, the Court may assess
your punishment anywhere within the range provided by law for this
offense.
After adjudication of guilt, all proceedings, including assessment of
punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of probation, and
your right to appeal, continue as if adjudication of guilt had not been
deferred.
[] Probation: If the Court grants you straight probation as opposed
to deferred adjudication. Upon violation of any imposed condition, you
may be arrested and detained as provided by law. You will then be
entitled to a hearing limited to the determination by the court, without
a jury, whether to revoke your probation and sentence you to
imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice for a period of time not to exceed that originally
assessed by the Court at the time you were found guilty.
The record contains a written plea bargain recommendation, which states as follows:
THE DEFENDANT IS TO BE PLACED ON COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION, WITH TEN (10) YEARS DEFERRED
ADJUDICATION; TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) HOURS
COMMUNITY SERVICE; FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF $10,000.00;
COURT COST TO BE ASSESSED AT $400.00; ATTORNEY FEES
IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,100.00. STATE AGREES TO DISMISS
ND23-07850 & ND23-07851.
The record shows West was properly admonished before he entered his guilty plea
and before he was placed on deferred adjudication, he was represented by an
attorney, and the trial court gave him oral and written admonishments. Nothing in
the record supports West’s contention that he had an agreement with the State for a
thirty-year cap if he was adjudicated upon violation of his community supervision.
That said, even if West made his plea of “guilty” under the belief that he had
an agreement with the State for a cap of thirty years if he violated the terms of his
11
deferred adjudication, the trial court would not have been required to follow that
recommendation or agreement. See Ex Parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d 818, 819 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005) (stating that “[e]ven if the parties purport to have a plea bargain
as to the sentence to be assessed after adjudication, the trial court is not bound by
the rules that apply to plea bargains at an original sentencing [because] ‘once the
trial court proceeds to adjudication, it is restricted in the sentence it imposes only by
the relevant statutory limits.’”) (quoting Von Schounmacher v. State, 5 S.W.3d 221,
223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam)). Accordingly, we overrule
West’s first issue.
In his second issue, West argues that his plea of guilty was involuntary when
he agreed to the deferred adjudication because it was based on a misunderstanding
of the plea agreement and entered despite West’s “documented cognitive and
comprehension limitations,” which he contends render his plea unknowing and
unintelligent under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 1 West’s complaint in
1
Boykin v. Alabama requires that the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty did so knowingly and voluntarily. 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). After admonishing a defendant of the applicable range of punishment of a crime, the trial court may accept a plea of guilty only if it appears that the “defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary.” See Broussard v. State, No. 09-20-00259-CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 3819, at *14 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b)). There is a prima facie showing of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, when the record shows that the trial court gave a proper admonishment. Bowman v. State, No. 09-24-00322-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 8135, at *37 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 22, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not
12
his second issue regarding the voluntariness of his plea should have been raised
when the deferred adjudication community supervision was imposed. See Manuel,
994 S.W.2d at 661-62; Arreola, 207 S.W.3d at 390; Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 319. “A
timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke a court of appeals’ jurisdiction.” Perez,
424 S.W.3d at 85 (quoting Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996)). However, West did not file a notice of appeal until after the trial court’s
revocation of his community supervision in 2025. Because West failed to file a
notice of appeal within thirty days of being placed on deferred adjudication
community supervision, this appeal challenging the voluntary nature of his plea is
untimely. See id.; see also Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a) (setting forth deadline to file a
notice of appeal in criminal cases); Crume v. State, 342 S.W.3d 241, 243 (Tex.
designated for publication) (citing Ex parte Gibauitch, 688 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Ex parte Arjona, 402 S.W.3d 312, 318 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, pet. ref’d) (“The admonishment is a prima facie showing that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.”)). The trial court may make the admonishments orally or in writing. Broussard, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 3819, at *14 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(d)). Substantial compliance by the court is sufficient when the court is admonishing the defendant, “unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court.” Id. (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann art. 26.13(c)). As such, a defendant has the burden on appeal to show that his plea was involuntary when he has entered into a plea attesting that he understands the nature of his plea and that the plea is being made knowingly and voluntarily. Bowman, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 8135, at **37-38 (citing Briggs v. State, 560 S.W.3d 176, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).
13
App.—Beaumont 2011, no pet.). So, we reject his argument that his original plea of
“guilty” was not voluntarily made. 2
2
In this case, the record demonstrates that the trial court made the required admonishments orally and in writing. In the Guilty Plea Memorandum signed by West, his trial attorney, and the trial court judge on July 20, 2023, before West was placed on deferred adjudication, West stated he was entering his plea of guilty freely and voluntarily, that the trial court had inquired into West’s competency to stand trial and based on all evidence presented, including the competency evaluation conducted by Ray Coxe, Ph.D., that West was competent, that West completely understood all written waivers, stipulations and motions and that the execution of each was done freely and voluntarily, and that he was guilty as charged. The Written Plea Admonishments signed by West on July 20, 2023, stated: that he was charged with the first-degree felony offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child and faced a term of life or any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a fine not to exceed $10,000 if convicted; that the plea bargain recommendation was for West to be placed on community supervision, with ten years of deferred adjudication, 240 hours of community service, and a fine of $10,000; that if the trial court deferred adjudicating West’s guilt and placed him on probation, any violation could result in arrest, and the trial court in adjudicating his guilt may assess punishment anywhere in the range provided by law for the offense; and, that after adjudication of guilt, all proceedings, including assessment of punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of probation, and West’s right to appeal would continue as if adjudication of guilt had not been deferred. In the Written Waiver of Defendant – Joined by Attorney and Judicial Confession signed by West, on July 20, 2023, he stated that he was able to read the English language and fully understood the court’s plea admonishments, he was aware of the consequences of his plea, he is mentally competent and that his plea was knowingly, freely and voluntarily entered, he judicially confessed to committing aggravated sexual assault as charged in the indictment or information, and he admitted he was guilty as charged. The Agreed Punishment Recommendation in the record was signed by West on July 20, 2023, in which he agreed that he would be placed on community supervision with ten years deferred adjudication, 240 hours of community service and a fine of $10,000.
14
As to the Stipulation of Evidence and Judicial Confession that West signed on
June 5, 2025, the day of the revocation hearing, West pleaded “true” to the
allegations in the State’s Motion to Adjudicate Community Supervision and stated
that he violated condition (r)(2) by not attending meetings for Sexual Offender
Group Therapy as directed by the Court, he violated condition (r)(3) by not
complying with Child Safety Zones Supplement as directed by the Court when he
stayed overnight at a residence that was 580 feet from a soccer field and a daycare,
and he violated condition (r)(9) by spending the night at a residence when a ten-yearold boy was present. Also on June 5, 2025, West and his trial attorney signed a
Waiver of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 39.14 Disclosures, in which
West stated that he was “freely, knowingly, and voluntarily waiving” his right under
article 39.14, that his attorney believes West understood the consequences of the
waiver and that he was competent to knowingly make the waiver. The trial court on
the same date also signed the waiver affirming that the trial judge had admonished
West of the consequences of signing the waiver and had ascertained that West
entered into the waiver knowingly and voluntarily, that West appeared mentally
competent, and that West’s attorney had adequately informed him of his Article
39.14 rights and the effects of the waiver.
At the Hearing on Motion for Adjudication of Guilt, after the trial court read
aloud the provisions of the community supervision that West was alleged to have
15
violated, West was given the opportunity to “rise and plead true or not true” to the
violations, and West entered a plea of “true.” The court also asked West if he was
stating that the violations were true and West answered, “[y]eah.” The trial court then
found:
Mr. James Dyl[i]n West violated the terms and conditions of his
probation, therefore [the court is] going to adjudicate him guilty today
of the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child.
The State, in seeking an adjudication of guilt, must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that a defendant violated at least one of the terms and conditions of
his community supervision. See Barefield v. State, No. 09-23-00226-CR, 2024 Tex.
App. LEXIS 474, at **3-4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 24, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). The trial court’s finding of a single violation of
a community supervision condition is sufficient to support adjudication, if the State
meets its burden of proof. See id. at *4. When a defendant voluntarily confesses or
stipulates that he has violated the terms of his deferred adjudication, that alone is
sufficient evidence to support a trial court’s decision to revoke community
supervision. Id. at *7 (citing Briggle v. State, No. 06-15-00041-CR, 2015 Tex. App.
LEXIS 10045, at **13-14, 20-21 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 25, 2015, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication)).
The record shows that the trial court also received evidence and testimony
from witnesses who confirmed that West had violated the terms of his deferred
16
adjudication. Further, the record shows West’s attorney made no argument to the
trial court that West did not understand what he signed. West does not challenge the
truth of his Stipulation of facts, nor does he contend he did not violate the terms of
his deferred adjudication. See id. at **5-7. We overrule West’s second issue.
Having overruled Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on March 5, 2026
Opinion Delivered August 19, 2026
Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.
17