In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-24-00431-CR
NO. 09-24-00432-CR
RAMON FIGUEROA JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 9th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause Nos. 22-07-08859-CR & 22-12-17309-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Montgomery County grand jury indicted Ramon Figueroa Jr. for the
second-degree felony offense of online solicitation of a minor and the first-degree
felony offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child. See Tex. Penal Code
Ann. §§ 21.02(b) (continuous sexual abuse of a child), 33.021(b), (f) (online
solicitation of a minor). Figueroa pleaded guilty to the offense of online solicitation
of a minor as charged. The State filed a Motion to Proceed on a Lesser Included
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Offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child, and Figueroa pleaded guilty to that
lesser-included offense. See id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B), (e) (aggravated sexual assault of
a child); see also Price v. State, 413 S.W.3d 158, 163 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013)
(explaining aggravated sexual assault of a child is a lesser-included offense of
continuous sexual abuse of a child), aff’d, 434 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
The offenses involved two victims, “Erin” and “Ashley.” After a punishment hearing,
the trial court sentenced him to twenty years for online solicitation and life for
aggravated assault and ordered that the sentences run concurrently. In a single issue,
Figueroa complains the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set a hearing
on his Motion for New Trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgments as discussed
below.
Background
Guilty Plea
Figueroa signed written plea admonishments indicating he elected to have the
court decide punishment. The trial court admonished him on the record of the
offenses and punishment ranges. After indicating he understood the ranges, that his
right to appeal would be limited, and that he wanted to waive his right to a jury trial,
Figueroa pleaded guilty to the second-degree felony offense of online solicitation of
a minor and aggravated sexual assault of a child. Although the trial court said that
the aggravated assault of a child offense was “a reduction” from the continuous
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sexual abuse of a child offense, the State represented that it was an open plea without
a cap. The trial court admonished Figueroa that “[a]s long as I stay within that
punishment range that we talked about in each of these cases, really, your appellate
rights are pretty limited[,]” and Figueroa indicated he understood. The trial court
accepted Figueroa’s guilty plea, requested a pre-sentencing investigation report
(PSI), and set the sentencing hearing for a later date. The trial court’s certification
indicated that this was not a plea bargain case, and Figueroa could appeal his
sentences only.
Sentencing Hearing
The sentencing hearing occurred on November 15, 2024. The State called two
witnesses, and three witnesses testified for the defense. The State’s witnesses
included a detective and Ashley’s father, while the defense witnesses included an
expert and Figueroa’s parents. The State focused on the fact that Figueroa used
Snapchat to contact multiple individuals between twelve and fifteen years old and
lied about his age. The State asked that the trial court sentence Figueroa to life plus
twenty years and that the sentences be served consecutively.
The State’s first witness was Caitlin Adams with the Conroe Police
Department, who investigated this case involving Figueroa. She explained that she
became involved when her supervisor called her on July 5, 2022, regarding a
potential runaway. The runaway was Erin. Adams learned from Erin’s mother and
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sister that Erin had been talking to Figueroa, whom Erin referred to as her
“boyfriend.” They also told Adams that Erin had run away with him.
Adams testified that through her investigation, she located Figueroa’s
mother’s address the same day. Adams contacted a Houston Police Department
(HPD) officer to assist with reaching out to Figueroa’s mother, Sonia. She said the
HPD officer contacted Sonia at her residence and told Sonia that they were looking
for Erin. Adams testified that Sonia told them that she knew where Erin was and
would return Erin to Adams or to her mother, but Sonia refused to provide the
address where Erin was. Adams insisted that Sonia meet her, so she “could receive
the 13-year-old from her.” Adams explained that Erin was uncooperative with the
investigation and ran away because she wanted to be with Figueroa.
Adams relayed that she recovered the child in Humble and took her
immediately to the hospital to meet her mother and undergo a SANE exam. Although
Erin did not disclose any sexual abuse during the SANE exam, DNA evidence and
sperm collected from multiple places, including inside Erin’s vagina, matched
Figueroa. With the permission of Erin’s mother, Adams also performed an extraction
on Erin’s phone, which contained evidence of a sexual relationship between Erin
and Figueroa. Adams confirmed that she detailed this evidence in her report. After
Figueroa was charged with online solicitation of a minor in relation to Erin’s case,
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Adams learned that Figueroa continued communicating with Erin, which violated
his bond conditions.
During her investigation, Adams obtained Snapchat records through a search
warrant. The sealed Snapchat records containing child sexual abuse material were
admitted into evidence without objection. Adams testified that these Snapchat
records were voluminous and contained over 100,000 lines of communication. The
State offered a summary of the Snapchat records, which the trial court admitted over
Figueroa’s objection.
Adams testified that information contained in the records and reflected in the
summary led her to other potential victims, including Ashley. Adams described how
she identified Ashley through the Snapchat records and learned that Ashley was
twelve years old. A photograph of Figueroa with Ashley was also admitted into
evidence. Adams explained that in November 2022, she contacted Ashley’s family,
and specifically, Ashley’s sisters were helpful, as Ashley does not communicate
verbally much. Adams said that Ashley’s father relayed that Ashley is autistic with
difficulty communicating verbally, which became severe in February 2022, when
Ashley refused to communicate with anyone but her sister, “Mae.” Adams testified
that she learned that was the same month Figueroa sexually assaulted Ashley.
According to Adams, during the investigation, Mae provided some information, but
at the forensic interview, Ashley wrote out her answers to the interview questions
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and disclosed sexual abuse. Ashley underwent a SANE exam where she reported
that Figueroa penetrated her vaginally and anally, as well as strangled her with a sex
toy.
Adams discussed the summary of the Snapchat records, which sorted the
information by: the age of the victims; which ones Figueroa requested child sexual
abuse material from; the ones where he admitted knowing the contact was illegal;
those with whom he had sexually explicit conversations; and those whom he
solicited meetings with. Adams testified that she identified eight other victims with
whom Figueroa had communications that constituted online solicitation of a minor,
but she could not identify those victims. Adams testified that Figueroa consistently
lied about his age and claimed he was eighteen or nineteen, although he was twentyone; he also asked for the victims’ ages. Adams explained that the Snapchat
summary included only individuals under the age of seventeen, and the youngest
was twelve that he communicated with. According to Adams, Figueroa also bragged
to the minors that he could provide marijuana or alcohol, which meant he lied in the
PSI if he denied marijuana use.
Father testified that Mae and Ashley are his daughters. Father testified that
Ashley has “selective mutism” and autism. Although she had accidents in the past,
Father noted that it became worse in February 2022, Ashley began having frequent
accidents where she soiled herself. He also described other problems Ashley had
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after the sexual assault, which resulted in their withdrawing her from school. Father
described how the assault impacted their family, including Ashley’s having to wear
diapers now. Although Ashley had challenges before this happened, they became
worse after the assault. Father outlined the problems that Ashley still has, including
a tear in her anus from the assault, shaking in front of people, not wanting to go into
stores, not speaking to people, and not wanting to eat in front of people.
Joseph Brown, a licensed clinical social worker and licensed sex offender
treatment provider testified for the defense. Brown testified that Figueroa contacted
him seeking sex offender treatment, and Brown performed an assessment on him
then enrolled him in a treatment program. Brown described the screenings he
performed on Figueroa, which included a Static-99. He testified that Figueroa was a
low to moderate risk level. Brown noted that Figueroa had completed thirty hours of
treatment, but he recommended 250 to 300 hours. Brown said that he made sure
Figueroa “was admitting” the offense. He also explained that although Figueroa has
shown remorse, it is more about what has happened to him, and “he should have
developed a lot more empathy than he has[.]”
Brown described the differences between the treatment received in prison
versus being on probation. He testified that if treatment was a good fit, it was the
best environment to treat them while they are on probation. Brown said that the first
200 hours of Figueroa’s treatment needed to be “intense weekly” sessions. He also
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felt that Figueroa would be a “very good candidate” for probation. That said, on
cross-examination Brown testified that Figueroa has “many of the diagnostic criteria”
for pedophilia. On redirect, he clarified that he did not believe Figueroa had
pedophilia but had impulsive behavior and a past “predatory behavior” that he
developed. Brown testified that with treatment, the re-offense rate “goes way down.”
Appellant’s uncle, Manuel, testified that Figueroa works for him. Manuel
owns a transportation company and said that Figueroa has worked for him for at
least two or three years and described his job duties. Manuel described Figueroa as
a reliable and enthusiastic employee. He added that Figueroa knows what he did was
serious, and he regrets it. Manuel relayed that Figueroa has close family connections
and is accepting responsibility for what happened. He explained that he would
continue to employ Figueroa if he were given probation.
Figueroa’s mother, Sonia, also testified. Sonia testified that Figueroa lives
with them, and she helps him with his bond conditions. Sonia said that Figueroa has
become a better person and described how he helped around the home. She also
provided examples of how he helped in the community. Sonia denied that Figueroa
was a danger to the community and said that “he has learned.” She testified that
Figueroa has shown remorse and regrets everything that happened. She also claimed
that she told HPD where Erin was. Sonia testified that Figueroa should get probation,
because he was never in trouble before, he is her only son, and “he has dreams.”
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The trial court took judicial notice of the PSI and all the attachments, including
Adams’s report, which the defense did not object to. At the outset of the sentencing
hearing, the State initially asked that the trial court sentence Figueroa to life plus
twenty years and that the sentences be served consecutively. Later, following a
recess, the State revised that request after being reminded that the parties agreed the
sentences would run concurrently. The prosecutor said that “based on the
information I have before me, I believe that was our agreement, and that the State
would only seek concurrent time and not consecutive time.” The trial court then
noted, “I think I have to treat that [] as a cap kind of agreement, so that’s how I’m
going to handle it.”
The trial court found Figueroa guilty of both offenses and sentenced him to
life in cause number 22-12-17309-CR and to twenty years in cause number 22-07-08859-CR to run concurrently. At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated, “Mr.
Figueroa, this is not a plea bargain case which means you do have the right to appeal.
I’ve already instructed my coordinator to evaluate you for a court appointed attorney
for your appeal, which they will do at the jail over the next couple of days.”
Motion for New Trial
Figueroa timely filed an identical Motion for New Trial in each cause number
and provided a declaration in support of the Motion. The Motion for New Trial
complained of ineffective assistance of counsel, which fell into two categories.
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First, the Motion alleged that Figueroa received incorrect advice with respect
to his decision to plead guilty without an agreed recommendation. The Motion
asserted that the State offered thirty or thirty-five years, but trial counsel told
Figueroa that if he pleaded guilty “the judge would be lenient.” He complained that
despite being informed of the punishment, he “was never told the likelihood of a life
sentence with the possibility of parole.” Figueroa contended that “[t]he promise of
leniency by the judge provided the basis for his decision to enter a plea.” The Motion
for New Trial cited cases about the requisites of an involuntary-guilty-plea claim,
but Figueroa did not directly assert that his guilty pleas were involuntary or request
that he be allowed to withdraw them.
Second, the Motion alleged that trial counsel failed to investigate and present
additional mitigating evidence at the punishment hearing. The Motion attached
affidavits and letters from various family members and friends about his character,
work ethic, temperament, and willingness to help others, among other things.
The trial court signed acknowledgments in each cause that the Motion for New
Trial was presented timely, and the trial court denied the Motion in each cause
without a hearing.
Initial Matter: Jurisdiction
The State argues that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal, because it
is a plea bargain case, in that the reduced charge for aggravated sexual assault instead
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of continuous sexual abuse of a child effectively capped punishment. It also contends
the record does not show that Figueroa obtained the trial court’s permission to appeal.
There are two basic kinds of plea-bargaining: charge-bargaining and
sentencing-bargaining. See Shankle v. State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003) (en banc).
Charge-bargaining involves questions of whether a defendant will
plead guilty to the offense that has been alleged or to a lesser or related
offense, and of whether the prosecutor will dismiss, or refrain from
bringing, other charges. Sentence-bargaining may be for binding or
non-binding recommendations to the court on sentences, including a
recommended “cap” on sentencing and a recommendation for deferredadjudication probation.
Id. (citations omitted); Alvarado v. State, No. 09-17-00093-CR, 2019 WL 138380,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). “[T]he State’s agreement to forgo prosecution for a pending charge in
exchange for a defendant’s plea to a lesser offense effectively places a cap on the
possible punishment.” See Thomas v. State, 516 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017) (citing Kennedy v. State, 297 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009); Shankle, 119 S.W.3d at 813–14). “The law concerning the effect of a plea
bargain based on sentence bargaining also applies to plea bargains based on chargebargaining.” Alvarado, 2019 WL 138380, at *1 (citing Thomas, 516 S.W.3d at 502).
Even though sentences may be “identical on their faces[,]” charge bargains can also
impact punishment in other ways, like earlier parole eligibility or the minimum
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required sentence. See Shankle, 119 S.W.3d at 813–14. When a defendant pleads
guilty and elects to have the court assess punishment and the punishment does not
exceed the prosecutor’s recommended punishment that the defendant agreed to, he
must have the trial court’s permission to appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
44.02; see also Tex. R. App. P. 25.2.
This case involved a charge bargain where the parties agreed that Figueroa
would plead guilty to the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual assault of a
child instead of the State’s proceeding with the continuous sexual abuse of a child
charge, and both offenses were first-degree felonies with a maximum punishment of
life. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32; 21.02(b)(1)(2)(A), (h); 22.021(a)(1)(B),
(a)(2)(B). That said, continuous sexual abuse of a child requires imprisonment for a
minimum term of twenty-five years. See id. § 21.02(h). In contrast, aggravated
sexual assault of a child only requires a minimum sentence of twenty-five years in
certain circumstances not applicable here. See id. § 22.021(f). Despite
acknowledging the “reduction” in the charge at the initial plea hearing and noting
that the agreement not to request consecutive sentences acted as a “cap,” the trial
court thereafter told Figueroa he would have the right to appeal and arranged for
appointment of appellate counsel. From this, we conclude the trial court recognized
the charge bargain but granted Figueroa permission to appeal. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 44.02; Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The trial court’s unconventional
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certification of the right to appeal also supports this, as it allowed Figueroa to appeal
“punishment only.”
We reject the State’s argument and determine this Court has jurisdiction over
the appeal based on the trial court’s giving Figueroa permission to appeal. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02; Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We now turn to the merits of Figueroa’s complaint. We review a trial court’s
denial of a hearing on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. See Smith v.
State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We will reverse only if the trial
court’s decision lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See id. (citation
omitted). “The purposes of a new trial hearing are (1) to determine whether the case
should be retried or (2) to complete the record for presenting issues on appeal.”
Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Smith, 286
S.W.3d at 338). A hearing on a motion for new trial “is not an absolute right.” Id.;
Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 338. A trial judge abuses his discretion in not holding a hearing
if the motion and supporting affidavits “(1) raise matters which are not determinable
from the record and (2) establish reasonable grounds showing that the defendant
could potentially be entitled to relief.” Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 199 (citation omitted).
A motion for new trial must be supported by an affidavit setting out the factual basis
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for the claim. Id. If the affidavit is conclusory, unsupported by facts, or fails to
provide requisite notice of the basis for the relief claimed, no hearing is required. Id.
Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant complaining that counsel was
ineffective must establish counsel’s performance was (1) deficient, and (2)
prejudiced his defense. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 340. “To
show deficiency ‘the appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
his counsel’s representation objectively fell below the standard of professional
norms.’” Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 340 (quoting Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). To establish prejudice, “the appellant ‘must show there is
a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694). Thus, to be entitled to a hearing on a motion for new trial alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must allege sufficient facts from which a trial
court could reasonably conclude both that: (1) counsel failed to act as a reasonably
competent attorney; and (2) but for counsel’s failure, there is a reasonable likelihood
the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. at 340–41.
Analysis
In his sole issue, Figueroa complains the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to hold a hearing on his Motion for New Trial based on ineffective assistance
of counsel. In connection with this issue, he focuses only on the allegations that
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counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and provide additional mitigating
evidence.1 In sum, we examine whether the trial court erred by failing to hold a
hearing on his ineffective assistance claim based on the failure to investigate.
In this case, the trial court decided punishment as part of a normative process
and had the unfettered discretion to assess punishment within the applicable range.
See id. at 344 (explaining setting confinement within a prescribed range is a
“normative judgment” and the sentencer’s discretion to impose punishment within
the range is “essentially unfettered”). Figueroa cannot show deficient performance
or prejudice in this case, as he cannot show that but for counsel’s conduct, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. See id. at 341.
Here, the record does not show that counsel’s conduct was deficient by falling
below an objectively reasonable standard of professional norms. See id. at 340;
Mitchell, 68 S.W.3d at 642. The defense offered testimony from two family
members and an expert specializing in sex offender treatment in this case as
mitigation evidence. Figueroa’s mother and uncle discussed Figueroa’s character,
testified that he worked hard, helped others, was remorseful, and that he deserved
probation. The letters and affidavits from other character witnesses provided much
1
Since he does not argue the ineffectiveness claims based on an involuntary plea that were also raised in his Motion for New Trial, we do not address them in this opinion. We likewise do not address any arguments in support of this issue that were not raised in his Motion for New Trial, since they were not preserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
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of the same, and counsel could have reasonably believed that putting them on would
be cumulative. The expert opined that Figueroa was a good candidate for probation,
treatment would be better if he was on probation, and he admitted the offense. The
defense had a cogent strategy that included expert testimony and character witnesses
testifying that Figueroa deserved probation, was remorseful, and had positive
character attributes. We cannot say that this performance was deficient nor do the
affidavits in support of the Motion for New Trial establish deficiency or offer any
indication that live testimony at a hearing would be beneficial for that purpose.
Nor did Figueroa meet the prejudice prong that but for counsel’s acts the
outcome would have been different. See Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 340. The trial court
could have reasonably determined that the witnesses’ testimony referenced in the
affidavits and letters would have been cumulative and not supported a lesser
punishment, given the egregious facts of this case and that such testimony “would
not have influenced his normative judgment.” See id. at 345. Although Figueroa’s
affidavit mentions he “never knew anything about the possibility of hiring an expert
for trial[,]” the record shows that in fact, his attorney called Brown as an expert on
his behalf. Although Brown offered testimony that Figueroa was a good candidate
for supervision, he also testified that Figueroa demonstrated character traits of
pedophilia and should have more empathy for others. Testimony at trial established
that Figueroa (1) contacted many children between the ages of twelve and seventeen,
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(2) admitted he knew in some instances that the conduct was illegal, (3) lied about
his age, and (4) he continued to contact Erin in violation of his bond conditions.
Ashley’s father offered testimony about the serious negative impacts the assault had
on his daughter and the rest of their family.
Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a hearing on a Motion for New Trial based on ineffective
assistance of counsel where the Motion did not establish both Strickland prongs of
counsel’s deficient performance and prejudice. See Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 200; Smith,
286 S.W.3d at 345. The Motion for New Trial and accompanying affidavits did not
establish reasonable grounds showing that Figueroa could potentially be entitled to
relief. See Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 199. We overrule Figueroa’s sole issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Figueroa’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
AFFIRMED.
W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice
Submitted on January 2, 2026
Opinion Delivered August 19, 2026
Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
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