In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-26-00227-CV
SEREIVANDY KIM, Appellant
V.
CEDAR WOODS COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 457th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 26-05-07334
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this accelerated appeal, Sereivandy Kim (“Appellant” or “Kim”) challenges
the trial court’s denial of his application for a temporary injunction. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4). In his application, Kim sought a mandatory
injunction that would require Cedar Woods Community Association, Inc.
(“Appellee” or “Cedar Woods”) to restore possession of a residence to Kim while
Kim and Cedar Woods litigate Kim’s suit to quiet title over the residence.
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In five issues, Kim contends: (1) an order authorizing a foreclosure in previous
litigation between Kim and Cedar Woods is void because the trial court signed the
order on a Sunday; (2) the foreclosure order is void because the trial court dismissed
the case for want of prosecution within thirty days of the date the trial court signed
the order; (3) the homeowners’ association that obtained the foreclosure order lacks
clean hands and consequently cannot obtain relief; (4) the foreclosure order is void
because the homeowners’ association failed to serve him with citation or petition;
and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by denying injunctive relief without
conducting an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the order denying a temporary
injunction.
Background
In April 2026, Kim, a self-represented party, filed an Original Petition to Quiet
Title, which the District Clerk assigned Trial Cause Number 26-05-07334 in the
457th District Court of Montgomery County. In his Original Petition, Kim alleges
that in June 2022 Cedar Woods filed an expedited proceeding to foreclose on Kim’s
residence for nonpayment of assessments. The District Clerk assigned the case Trial
Cause Number 22-06-06993. Kim alleges the citations issued in the case were
returned unserved. Kim alleges that on Sunday, August 7, 2022, at 5:37:03 p.m., the
trial court signed “Property Owners Association Agreed Order on Application for
Expedited Foreclosure.” Kim further alleges that the order was filed four days earlier
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and any signatures purporting to represent his agreement were placed on the
document without his knowledge, participation, or consent. In his Original Petition,
Kim alleges that an entry in the Registry of Actions for Trial Cause Number 22-06-06993 for August 26, 2026 states: “CANCELED — ‘Dismiss for Want of
Prosecution’ — with the notation ‘Agreed Resolution[.]’”
Kim alleges the residence was purportedly sold at a foreclosure sale for
approximately $300,000, and the current record of title reflects 627 Oak Circle Dr E
LLC owns the property. In his Original Petition, Kim asks the trial court to render a
declaratory judgment that the Trustee’s Deed is void because Kim was never served
with citation in Cause Number 22-06-06993, the order authorizing Cedar Woods to
foreclose was signed on a Sunday, the order was electronically filed days before it
was signed, Kim never agreed to the foreclosure order, and Trial Cause Number 22-06-06993 was dismissed, thus voiding the foreclosure order. In addition to seeking
a declaratory judgment that the Trustee’s Deed is void, Kim seeks damages for
wrongful foreclosure because the foreclosure was conducted in violation of section
209.009 of the Texas Property Code, which requires a court judgment before a
property owners association may foreclose on a residence.
On May 4, 2026, Kim filed Plaintiff’s Emergency Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Mandatory Injunction. In his application Kim asked the trial
court to issue a mandatory injunction ordering Cedar Oaks to immediately restore
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possession of the property located at 627 Oak Circle Drive East to Kim. On May 4,
2026, the trial court signed an order denying a temporary restraining order.
On May 20, 2026, Kim filed Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Temporary
Injunction and Mandatory Injunction to Restore Possession. Kim asserted that Cedar
Woods was served with citation on May 18, 2026, and the citation was filed the
following day. Kim alleged immediate action was necessary because the Kim family
had been evicted on May 20, 2026.1 On May 21, 2026, the trial court signed an order
denying the Emergency Motion for Temporary Injunction and Mandatory Injunction
to Restore Possession.
On May 21, 2026, Kim filed Plaintiff’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
the Denial of Ex Parte Emergency Injunctive Relief and Request for Expedited
Evidentiary Hearing.
On June 2, 2026, Cedar Woods filed Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. In its
motion, Cedar Woods asserted that Kim brought the lawsuit in error against the
wrong defendant. Cedar Woods alleged, “While the Association did file an
Application for Expedited Foreclosure Pursuant to Rule 736 due to the Plaintiff’s
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In the brief he filed in this accelerated appeal, Kim states that his family was forcibly displaced from 627 Oak Circle Drive East in April 2023. In a Motion to Expedite filed by Kim in this appeal, Kim explains that after they lost their home to foreclosure his credit was damaged and they had to pay rent of $2,300 per month for a dwelling, and the eviction that occurred in 2026 concerned a residence at a different address.
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failure to pay [his] assessments, the Association did not foreclose on the Plaintiff’s
property.” In the motion, Cedar Woods states, “The party who foreclosed on the
Plaintiff’s property is the Plaintiff’s lender, Guild Mortgage Company.” According
to Cedar Woods and as indicated in exhibits attached to the motion, in 2018 Kim
secured a loan through Guild Mortgage that was secured by a Deed of Trust. The
mortgage company initiated a non-judicial foreclosure that occurred on December
6, 2022, and a Substitute Trustee’s Deed conveyed the property to Guild Mortgage
Company, LLC. The Substitute Trustee’s Deed recites: Kim conveyed the property
to Trustee in trust to secure payment of a note; the beneficiary, Guild Mortgage
Company, LLC, declared that Kim defaulted on the note; notices stating the time,
place, and terms of sale were mailed, posted, and filed, as required by law; and the
substitute trustee sold the property to the highest bidder on December 6, 2022.
On June 4, 2026, Cedar Woods filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss that
asked the trial court to dismiss the suit pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
91a.
On June 4, 2026, Kim perfected this accelerated appeal.
Standard of Review
“A temporary injunction’s purpose is to preserve the status quo of the
litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co.,
84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). A trial court will only issue a temporary injunction
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if the applicant establishes: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable
right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the
interim if the injunction is not granted. Id.
We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a temporary injunction for abuse
of discretion. Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Tex. 2017). Under an abuse of
discretion standard, we cannot overrule the trial court’s decision unless the trial court
acted unreasonably or in an arbitrary manner, without reference to guiding rules or
principles. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211. We cannot substitute our judgment for the
trial court’s reasonable judgment even if we would have reached a contrary
conclusion. Id. “The trial court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence
reasonably supports the trial court’s decision.” Id. (citation omitted). We limit the
scope of our review to the validity of the order, without reviewing or deciding the
merits of the underlying case. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Tex. 1978).
Discussion
We address Kim’s issues out of order. In issue five, Kim contends that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying Kim’s application for a temporary
injunction without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. He argues Rule 680
makes an evidentiary hearing mandatory. Rule 680 states:
In case a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, the
application for a temporary injunction shall be set down for hearing at
the earliest possible date and takes precedence of all matters except
older matters of the same character; and when the application comes on
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for hearing the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall
proceed with the application for a temporary injunction and, if he does
not do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 680 (emphasis added). Rule 680 requires the trial court to set a
hearing if it grants a temporary restraining order ex parte, not if it denies a temporary
restraining order. Here, the trial court denied Kim’s application for a temporary
restraining order. Consequently, Kim has not shown that the trial court violated Rule
680. See id.
Kim applied for a mandatory injunction that would require Cedar Woods to
immediately return possession of the residence to Kim, but Kim alleged that the title
to the property is currently in 627 Oak Circle Dr E LLC, not in Cedar Woods. Under
the circumstances, the trial court could deny the application for a temporary
injunction on its face because Kim judicially admitted that Cedar Woods is not in
possession of and thus, has no control over the property Kim wanted restored to him
immediately. We overrule issue five.
In issue three, Kim contends every argument in Cedar Woods’s Motion to
Dismiss depends upon the validity of the foreclosure order. He argues Cedar Woods
does not have clean hands—he does not explain why—and he contends Cedar
Woods cannot receive relief on that ground alone. Kim misunderstands Cedar
Woods’s argument in the trial court. Cedar Woods argues it was the incorrect party
to the suit to quiet title because the entity that foreclosed on the property was Guild
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Mortgage, acting under the power granted to the Trustee under the Deed of Trust,
not Cedar Woods acting under the power granted by the foreclosure order in Trial
Cause Number 22-06-06993. Cedar Woods presented the issue as one of Kim’s
standing, but regardless of the way in which it framed the issue, the validity of the
foreclosure order in Trial Cause Number 22-06-06993 is irrelevant to the grounds
stated in Cedar Woods’s motion to dismiss. Instead, Cedar Woods argues there was
no nexus between the foreclosure order and the Substitute Trustee’s Deed that
conveyed the property to Kim’s mortgage lender under a power of sale granted in a
Deed of Trust. We overrule issue three.
Kim’s remaining issues concern the proceedings that occurred in Trial Cause
Number 22-06-06993, which is not on appeal before us, nor does it appear to be part
of the underlying case in this matter. That said, we cannot resolve the merits of the
underlying case in this accelerated appeal from the denial of an application for a
temporary injunction. See Davis, 571 S.W.2d at 861-62. We may review issues,
however, to determine whether the trial court erred by impliedly finding that Kim
failed to establish a probable right to the relief sought in the lawsuit. See Butnaru,
84 S.W.3d at 204.
In issue two, Kim contends the underlying foreclosure order from 2022 which
he now complains about is void because the trial court dismissed the case for want
of prosecution on August 26, 2022. The factual assertion in the brief is not borne out
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by Kim’s Original Petition and the exhibits attached to the pleading, which indicate
the trial court cancelled a previous setting for an August 26, 2022 hearing on
dismissal for want of prosecution because the parties reached an agreed settlement
on the Rule 736 application for expedited foreclosure on August 7, 2022.
In issue four, Kim argues that the foreclosure order is void because the
Register of Actions for Trial Cause Number 22-06-06993 shows the citations that
issued in the case were returned unserved. Assuming Kim did not receive service of
process in the case, the foreclosure order would not be void if Kim entered an
appearance in the case. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 120.
In issue one, Kim contends the foreclosure order is void because the trial court
signed the order on a Sunday. Kim contends, “Texas district courts do not hold court
on Sundays in routine civil proceedings[,]” citing as authority section 22.004 of the
Government Code. That section of the Government Code grants the Supreme Court
full rulemaking power on the practice and procedure in civil actions, allows the
Supreme Court to amend rules and provides that its rules and amendments shall
remain in effect unless and until disapproved by the Legislature, repeals prior laws
governing practice and procedure, and provides for the Supreme Court to adopt rules
of procedure for particular situations. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.004. It does
not prohibit courts from signing orders on Sundays. Kim does not distinguish Rule
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4 or explain why an order signed on a Sunday would not become effective the
following day. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 4 (regarding computation of time).
Even if we assume without deciding that the factual assertions Kim makes in
his application for a temporary injunction are true, the trial court could still within
its discretion decide Kim is not entitled to a temporary mandatory injunction against
Cedar Woods. Kim has not shown that he conclusively established that he has a
probable right to the relief sought in the application for a temporary injunction such
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the application. See Butnaru, 84
S.W.3d at 204. We overrule issues one, two, three, four, and five.
Conclusion
Having overruled the issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s Order
Denying Emergency Temporary Injunction and Mandatory Injunction to Restore
Possession.
AFFIRMED.
W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice
Submitted on August 17, 2026
Opinion Delivered August 20, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
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