IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2024-KA-01178-SCT
CARLY MADISON GREGG a/k/a CARLEY
MADISON GREGG
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/25/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEWEY KEY ARTHUR
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: BRIDGET RENEA TODD
KIMBERLY MARIE PHILLIPS
MICHAEL SHELTON SMITH, II
KATHRYN WHITE NEWMAN
KEVIN D. CAMP
STANLEY CALEB COLEMAN
JOHN MARTIN LASSITER
NATALIE McCARTY
RYAN MATTHEW BERRY
JOHN K. BRAMLETT, JR.
JOSHUA WAYNE STOVER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: KEVIN D. CAMP
JAMES HOWARD MURPHY
BRADLEY S. CLANTON
LANCE O’NEAL MIXON
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: KATHRYN WHITE NEWMAN
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALLISON KAY HARTMAN
LaDONNA C. HOLLAND
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOHN K. BRAMLETT, JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/20/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
COLEMAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Carly Madison Gregg shot and killed her mother, and she shot her stepfather, who
survived. A Rankin County jury convicted Gregg of first degree murder, attempted murder,
and tampering with evidence. The jury sentenced her to life imprisonment for the murder
and attempted murder convictions, and the trial judge sentenced her to ten years for
tampering with evidence. The sentences will run concurrently. Discerning no reversible
error, the Court affirms the verdict and sentences.
FACTS
¶2. On March 19, 2024, Ashley Smylie and her fourteen-year-old daughter, Gregg,
returned home from Northwest Rankin High School shortly before 4:00 p.m. The State’s
witness B.G., a friend of Gregg’s, testified that Ashley had learned that day that Gregg had
been using marijuana and a burner phone. The home’s Wyze kitchen camera showed Ashley
enter Gregg’s bedroom and apparently search for vape-related items. It also showed Gregg
moving in and out of the house with the dogs before reentering. The video then showed
Gregg pause, go toward her parents’ bedroom, return while concealing something behind her
back, and move toward Gregg’s bedroom. A gunshot was heard at approximately 4:14 p.m.,
Ashley screamed, and then two more shots were fired.
¶3. After the shots, the video showed that Gregg returned to the kitchen, picked up
Ashley’s phone, and while impersonating her mother, texted Heath Smylie, her stepfather,
asking whether he was almost home. Gregg then removed the kitchen security camera and
hid it in the refrigerator. She also contacted multiple friends, including B.G., T.G., S.K.R.,
and B.W., asking them to come to her house or saying that she needed help. B.G. testified
2
that, when he told Gregg not to hurt herself or anyone else, she responded that “it was too
late.” T.G. testified that Gregg told him she had “fucked up” but would not tell him what had
happened and told him not to call 911. B.W., a friend who came to the house after the
shooting, testified that Gregg told her not to “freak out,” asked whether she had ever seen a
dead body, and told her that her mother was in the bedroom if B.W. wanted to look.
According to B.W., Gregg said that she had shot her mother three times and had three more
shots for Heath when he came home.
¶4. When Heath arrived home at approximately 5:03 p.m., he entered through the garage
door into the kitchen. Heath testified that a gun fired almost immediately as the door opened
only a few inches. He struggled with Gregg over the gun, and two additional shots were
fired. One shot struck Heath in the shoulder. Heath took the revolver from Gregg, and
Gregg fled. Heath then found Ashley in Gregg’s bedroom with a towel over her face.
¶5. Deputy Hunter Lewis of the Rankin County Sheriff’s Office responded to the scene,
found Heath distraught, and observed Ashley inside the home with no detectable pulse.
Gregg was later found nearby by Deputy Tony Shack and taken into custody without
incident.
¶6. The physical evidence presented was consistent with the State’s theory. Ashley had
been shot three times in the face and head, and one shot showed stippling, indicating a
close-range shot. The Taurus .357 revolver recovered from the scene contained one live
round, meaning six rounds had been fired if the revolver had been fully loaded initially. Both
of Gregg’s hands tested positive for gunshot-residue particles. DNA from the revolver’s
3
trigger produced a partial profile consistent with Gregg’s DNA, and Ashley was excluded
as a contributor to that trigger profile.
¶7. Gregg was indicted in the Rankin County Circuit Court for first degree murder,
attempted murder, and tampering with physical evidence. The case was tried from
September 16 through September 20, 2024.
¶8. Gregg’s principal defense at trial was insanity. She did not seriously dispute that she
shot Ashley and Heath; rather, she contended that, because of serious mental illness,
dissociation, and possible medication effects, she did not know the nature and quality of her
acts nor did she know that what she was doing was wrong.
¶9. Prior to the shooting, Gregg had been treated for depression and anxiety by Olivia
Leber, a psychiatric mental-health nurse practitioner. Leber saw Gregg in January, February,
and March 2024. She diagnosed Gregg with adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and
depressed mood and major depressive disorder, single episode, moderate. She first
prescribed a 25 milligram dose of Zoloft, later increased the dose to 50 milligrams, and
finally switched Gregg to a 5 milligram dose of Lexapro shortly before the shooting after
Gregg reported feeling “like a zombie.” Leber testified that Gregg denied suicidal ideation,
homicidal ideation, auditory or visual hallucinations, and psychotic symptoms during
treatment. However, she also testified that patients do not always disclose everything, and
that if she had known Gregg was hearing voices, she would have reconsidered the diagnosis
and considered an antipsychotic.
¶10. Rebecca Kirk, a licensed professional counselor, also saw Gregg weekly in the time
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leading up to March 19 for a total of nine sessions. Kirk testified that Gregg discussed
depression, anxiety, self-hatred, family stress, and difficulty opening up. Kirk also testified
that, during the session the day before the shootings, Gregg appeared emotionally stable, did
not report suicidal or homicidal thoughts, and did not report delusions, memory problems,
or dissociation. Kirk believed Gregg loved her mother and was sensitive to her mother’s
feelings.
¶11. During her testimony, Kirk was asked about a note she made in the margin of her
psychological records regarding the novel Crime and Punishment. She testified that Gregg
had mentioned wanting to read it. The prosecutor asked Kirk to explain the plot of the novel,
and the defense objected. After debate, the trial court overruled the objection, and Kirk was
allowed to testify that Crime and Punishment was a novel about a “psychopath who lives in
Russia” who murders a woman. Kirk testified that during a later session, Gregg told her that
“she finished her reading.”
¶12. The defense called Dr. Andrew Clark, a former faculty member of Harvard Medical
School who is a psychiatrist board certified in adult psychiatry, child and adolescent
psychiatry, and forensic psychiatry. Dr. Clark interviewed Gregg after she was arrested and
diagnosed her with Bipolar II disorder, depression, a mood disorder, and “other specified
schizophrenia spectrum and related psychotic disorders.” He testified that Gregg’s symptoms
escalated in the period before March 19, that antidepressants can worsen bipolar instability
and her mood disorder, and that Gregg’s later jail records documented command auditory
hallucinations. According to Dr. Clark, Gregg experienced an acute dissociative reaction on
5
March 19 triggered by psychiatric crisis and stress after her mother discovered the marijuana
use. He ultimately opined that Gregg did not understand the nature and quality of her acts
and could not appreciate right from wrong under the M’Naghten standard. See M’Naghten’s
Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 10 Clark & F. 200.
¶13. The State called to the stand two additional psychological witnesses, Dr. Amanda
Gugliano and Dr. Jason Pickett. Dr. Gugliano, a forensic psychologist at Mississippi State
Hospital, evaluated Gregg for competency. She found Gregg competent to stand trial but did
not render a sanity opinion because medication effects were raised, and she believed a
forensic psychiatrist should address that issue. Dr. Pickett, a board-certified psychiatrist and
forensic psychiatrist, evaluated Gregg and testified that, even assuming the defense
diagnoses, Gregg understood the nature, quality, and wrongfulness of her acts. Dr. Pickett
relied heavily on the contemporaneous evidence: Gregg’s retrieving and concealing the gun,
peeking around the corner, texting Heath from Ashley’s phone, hiding the camera,
summoning friends without disclosing the shooting over the phone, telling T.G. not to call
911, and telling B.W. that she had three shots for Heath.
¶14. After the presentation of the evidence, the jury ultimately rejected Gregg’s insanity
defense and found her guilty on all three counts. The case immediately proceeded to a
sentencing phase. The trial court asked whether either side wished to call witnesses. Neither
side did. Both sides moved to adopt and incorporate the guilt-phase record. The court
instructed the jury to consider the Miller factors: Gregg’s chronological age; her family and
home environment; the circumstances of the homicide offense; incompetencies associated
6
with youth; and the possibility of rehabilitation. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477
(2012).
¶15. The sentencing instructions then gave the jury choices. For Count I, first degree
murder, Instruction SS-1 allowed the jury to sentence Gregg to “life imprisonment,” to “life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole,” or to state that it was unable to fix punishment.
For Count II, attempted murder, Instruction SS-2 used a similar framework, allowing “life
imprisonment,” “life imprisonment with the possibility of parole,” or inability to fix
punishment. During deliberations, the jury asked, “What is life in prison without parole?
Years-wise.” The court responded that the jury had “received all the evidence in this case.
Please continue your deliberations.”
¶16. The jury fixed punishment at life imprisonment on Count I, first degree murder, and
life imprisonment on Count II, attempted murder. The trial court imposed a ten-year
sentence on Count III, tampering with physical evidence. The sentencing order sentenced
Gregg to “life imprisonment” for Counts I and II.
¶17. Gregg filed a motion for new trial, or in the alternative JNOV, and the trial court
denied the post-trial motions. Gregg appeals and raises nine issues.
Errors in Sentencing
ISSUE I. The trial court committed reversible error by giving sentencing
instructions as to Counts I and II that were improper under Mississippi Code
Annotated Section 97-3-21(2)(b) (Supp. 2025) (amended effective July 1,
2024).
ISSUE II. Carly’s sentence of life imprisonment without parole as to Count II
is categorically unconstitutional.
7
ISSUE III. The trial court erred by not conducting a Miller hearing to
determine eligibility vel non for life with possibility of parole as to Count I.
ISSUE IV. The prosecutor made improper and highly prejudicial comments
during closing arguments relating to parole eligibility.
ISSUE V. To the extent that Carly’s sentence(s) is to be construed as LWOP
as imposed by the jury, this sentence was against the overwhelming weight of
the evidence and should be set aside.
Errors at Trial
ISSUE VI. The trial court committed reversible error by prospectively denying
any requests for continuance without evaluating the circumstances that might
arise during the proceedings.
ISSUE VII. The trial court erred by compelling psychiatric evaluations absent
the findings required by MRCrP 12.2 and 17.4, thereby abusing its discretion
and depriving her of a fair trial.
ISSUE VIII. The trial court erred when it allowed Rebecca Kirk to summarize
the book Crime and Punishment over objection of Defendant.
ISSUE IX. Cumulative error requires reversal.
(Citation modified.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶18. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Altman v. State, 340 So.
3d 293, 294 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2022) (quoting Tipton v. State, 150 So. 3d 82, 84 (Miss. 2014)).
Likewise, the legality of a sentence also is a question of law and, therefore, is reviewed de
novo. Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613, 614 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2023) (quoting Moore v. State, 986
So. 2d 928, 932 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2008)). A sentence not authorized by statute is illegal as “no
court may adjudge and sentence a defendant beyond its statutory authority to do so.” Ward
v. State, 708 So. 2d 11, 14 (¶ 12) (Miss. 1998) (citing Luckett v. State, 582 So. 2d 428 (Miss.
8
1991), overruled on other grounds by Bester v. State, 188 So. 3d 526, 529 (Miss. 2016)).
¶19. Jury instructions are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Stanfield v. State,
269 So. 3d 1188, 1190 (¶ 15) (Miss. 2019) (quoting Thomas v. State, 249 So. 3d 331, 346
(¶ 49) (Miss. 2018)). “[T]he instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so
read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no
reversible error will be found.” Id. at 1190 (¶ 15) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73-74 (¶ 20) (Miss. 2010)).
Additionally, the Court will “review the trial judge’s additional written instructions in
response to a question from the jury for an abuse of discretion.” Willie v. State, 204 So. 3d
1268, 1276 (¶ 23) (Miss. 2016) (citing Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 634 (¶ 36) (Miss.
2013)).
¶20. A trial court’s rulings on continuances, evidentiary matters, and mental examinations
are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Payton v. State, 897 So. 2d 921, 931 (¶ 11) (Miss.
2003) (“The standard of review to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be grounds for reversal unless shown to have resulted
in manifest injustice.” (citing Coleman v. State, 697 So. 2d 777, 780 (Miss. 1997), disagreed
with by Dilworth v. State, 909 So. 2d 731, 735 n.4 (Miss. 2005))); Anderson v. State, 62 So.
3d 927, 933 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2011) (“The standard of review for admission of evidence is abuse
of discretion.” (citing Hobgood v. State, 926 So. 2d 847, 852 (Miss. 2006)); Harden v. State,
59 So. 3d 594, 603 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2011).
9
DISCUSSION
I. Guilt-Phase Errors
A. The trial court’s statements regarding continuances do not warrant reversal.
¶21. Gregg argues that the trial court committed reversible error by prospectively denying
any continuance when it stated at an early hearing that “[t]his Court does not continue cases.”
In support of her argument, she relies on Leonard v. Leonard, 486 So. 2d 1240 (Miss. 1986),
which cautioned that a court with an automatic policy that continuances “are not granted by
this court under any circumstances” is not exercising discretion but “acting arbitrarily and
capriciously[.]” Id. at 1241.
¶22. In Leonard, the Hinds County Chancery Court had a policy that “continuances from
contempt matters are not granted by this court under any circumstances.” Id. The attorney
for Celeste Leonard had a prior obligation to appear in Warren County County Court. Id.
He filed a motion for continuance based on his conflict, and the court denied it based on its
automatic policy. Id. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
contempt and remanded. Id. at 1242.
¶23. The Rankin County Circuit Court’s language is in friction with the Court’s holding
in Leonard. As the Court stated, a trial court may control its docket, and it may insist that
parties act diligently, but a court should not announce a categorical rule that continuances
will not be granted regardless of future circumstances because a court cannot know what the
circumstances may be. Continuance rulings require case-specific discretion. A court should
avoid language suggesting that calendar concerns will prevail over later-arising constitutional
10
or preparation concerns.
¶24. However, the record does not support reversal of the convictions. In Leonard,
counsel filed and the trial court denied a motion for continuance. Id. at 1241. Here, Gregg
never filed a motion for continuance. Because no continuance motion was presented and
denied, there is no actual continuance ruling for the Court to review for abuse of discretion.
See Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216, 232 (¶ 57) (Miss. 2010) (“The trial court cannot be
held to err on an issue not presented to it for decision.” (citing McCurdy v. State, 511 So. 2d
148, 150 (Miss. 1987))).
¶25. Gregg responds that asking for a continuance would have been futile after the trial
judge’s categorical statement. The argument has some equitable force, and it explains why
the judge’s language should not be endorsed, but futility does not by itself establish
reversible error. The problem is prejudice. When the Court reviews an unobjected-to error,
we apply the plain error standard, which requires a determination that “the trial court has
deviated from a legal rule, whether that error is plain, clear, or obvious, and whether that
error has prejudiced the outcome of the trial.” Swinney v. State, 241 So. 3d 599, 606 (¶ 15)
(Miss. 2018) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Conner v. State, 138 So. 3d 143, 151
(¶ 19) (Miss. 2014)).
¶26. Gregg identifies the accelerated schedule, the mental-evaluation orders, and the
complexity of the case, but she does not show how the outcome would have been different
at trial had a continuance been granted. The defense presented an insanity defense through
a highly qualified child-and-adolescent psychiatrist; the State presented rebuttal experts; and
11
the jury had before it extensive mental-health evidence.
¶27. Thus, on the record before us today, we hold that the trial court committed no
reversible error on the issue. Trial courts should not employ blanket no-continuance policies,
but the absence of a continuance motion, adverse ruling, and specific prejudice prevents
reversal here.
B. The mental-evaluation order does not warrant reversal of the
convictions.
¶28. On July 3, 2024, in response to the State’s motion, the trial court ordered Gregg to
submit to a mental evaluation and M’Naghten analysis. The mental evaluation for
competency to stand trial was ordered pursuant to Rule 12.2(a) of the Mississippi Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the M’Naghten analysis for sanity at the time of the crime was
ordered pursuant to Rule 12.2(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure.
¶29. Gregg argues that the trial court erred by ordering the evaluations before the defense
had filed a formal Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.4(b) notice of intent to rely on
insanity and without the Rule 12.2 findings required for a competency evaluation. She
frames the error as both procedural and constitutional, arguing that the orders compelled
premature disclosure of defense strategy, gave the State an unfair expert advantage, and
violated Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment protections.
¶30. The State responds that the claim is waived and meritless. The State avers that Gregg
raised mental health early, retained experts, stated through counsel that she intended to raise
M’Naghten, did not object to the State’s motion for evaluation, and later filed a notice of
intent to rely on insanity. Specifically, Gregg filed a motion for assessment and evaluation
12
asking for a mental health evaluation on March 20, 2024 (the day after the murder), noted
at the preliminary hearing on April 16, 2024 that “[b]ased on [her] fragile mental state . . .
[her] fitness to stand trial will be at risk by the time we get to trial,” and disclosed at the bond
hearing on June 4, 2024 that she was “undergoing psychiatric treatment.” The State further
argues that the court had authority under Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure 12.2, 12.3,
16.1, and 17.4 to manage mental health issues and set deadlines and that any premature
sequencing was mooted when Gregg ultimately relied on insanity at trial.
¶31. The trial court’s order cites “reasonable grounds to order . . . a mental evaluation and
[M’Naghten] Analysis” pursuant to Rule 12.2(a). Rule 12.2(a) reads:
(a) Competency to Stand Trial or Be Sentenced. If at any time before or
after indictment, the court, on its own motion or the motion of any party, has
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is mentally incompetent, the
court shall order the defendant to submit to a mental examination.
MRCrP 12.2(a). Rule 12.2(a) provides the trial court authority to order a competency
evaluation based on its own judgment that there are reasonable grounds for one. Here, the
defense gave the court multiple indications that Gregg’s mental health was a consideration.
Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion by ordering an evaluation for competency.
¶32. A mental examination for a defendant’s sanity at the time of the crime is different.
Rule 12.2(b) contemplates a mental examination after the defendant has raised an insanity
defense under Rule 17.4(b). It reads:
(b) Insanity Defense. If the defendant has timely raised a defense of insanity
pursuant to Rule 17.4(b), the court, on its own motion or the motion of any
party, may order the defendant to submit to a mental examination to investigate
the defendant’s mental condition at the time of the offense.
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MRCrP 12.2(b).
¶33. The State’s June 17, 2024, motion requesting mental evaluation acknowledged that
Gregg had not yet satisfied the formal requirements for an insanity defense. The circuit
court’s order on July 3, 2024, also stated that Gregg “may” raise an insanity defense,
language that suggests the court was acting in anticipation of a defense rather than in
response to formal notice. Rule 12.2(b) authorizes a trial court to order an evaluation of a
defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense “[i]f the defendant has timely has timely
raised a defense of insanity[;]” therefore, the language of the rule makes clear that a
defendant’s Rule 17.4(b) notice of insanity defense is a condition precedent to a judge’s
ordering a sanity evaluation under Rule 12.2(b).
¶34. The error, however, does not warrant reversal of the convictions for multiple reasons.
First, the record contains substantial waiver and acquiescence problems. Gregg did not lodge
a categorical objection to evaluation. At the hearing, when the trial court asked whether
Gregg objected to the State’s motion, defense counsel asked only that the State’s evaluation
occur after the defense expert’s evaluation. Defense counsel also had stated earlier that
Gregg intended to raise a M’Naghten issue, which could be construed as notice of intent to
use insanity defense. The defense later filed a formal notice of insanity on August 28, 2024,
and presented an insanity defense at trial. The above-described facts make difficult
characterizing the evaluation orders as a forced disclosure of a defense that Gregg never
intended to use.
¶35. Second, the trial court’s error of ordering the sanity evaluation is mitigated by the fact
14
that none was performed. The court’s order instructed Dr. Gugliano to evaluate Gregg for
competency and sanity. However, Dr. Gugliano ultimately declined to evaluate for sanity
and only rendered her opinion on competency.
¶36. Third, Gregg does not identify a concrete piece of compelled evidence that improperly
reached the jury and changed the verdict. Again, Dr. Gugliano did not render a sanity
opinion. Instead, she testified that she stopped short of that opinion and recommended a
forensic psychiatrist because medication issues were outside her specialty. Dr. Pickett did
testify for the State, but Gregg’s challenge is primarily to the timing and compelled nature
of the process, not to a particular inadmissible statement that should have been suppressed.
The State’s rebuttal to insanity would have been available once Gregg filed her notice and
presented Dr. Clark.
¶37. Fourth, any error in ordering the evaluations before formal Rule 17.4 notice was
harmless in light of the ultimate process and evidence of the trial. Gregg placed her sanity
squarely at issue. The jury heard the defense expert’s explanation for why Gregg was legally
insane and the State’s expert’s explanation for why she was not. The evidence from the
video, text messages, post-shooting statements, concealment of the camera, and attempt to
shoot her stepfather gave the jury a strong basis to reject insanity independent of any arguable
procedural irregularity in the evaluation order.
¶38. Given defense counsel’s lack of objection, Gregg’s later insanity notice, the use of
insanity at trial, and the absence of a specific showing of prejudice affecting the verdict, the
improper ordering of a sanity mental evaluation does not merit reversal of the convictions.
15
C. The admission of the Crime and Punishment testimony does not require
reversal.
¶39. Gregg argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing counselor Rebecca
Kirk to summarize the novel Crime and Punishment for the jury. In her treatment notes, Kirk
had written that Gregg “will read Crime and Punishment.” The prosecutor asked, “Can you
tell us, what is Crime and Punishment—kind of what’s that story about?” Over a defense
objection, Kirk summarized the novel as involving a “psychopath” student who plans and
commits murder, writes about why people kill, is declared insane, and serves time in a labor
camp. Kirk then acknowledged that she had underlined the title for grammatical reasons, not
clinical emphasis. Later in her testimony, she said that Gregg had finished reading the book.
¶40. The State argues that Gregg invited any error by introducing Kirk’s records, that the
testimony gave context to treatment notes used by the defense, and that Kirk testified as a lay
witness rather than an expert. The State also argues that any error was harmless.
¶41. Kirk’s summary of Crime and Punishment was as follows:
Crime and Punishment is about a protagonist, which is the main character. It
was written by a Russian author back in maybe 1866, I believe. And it is, the
entire book -- very difficult book -- about a psychopath who lives in Russia.
And he is poor. He is a student who is very intelligent. And he comes on hard
times, impoverished and he has this obsession with -this obsessive thinking of
basically planning to murder a woman with a hatchet. And the novel kind of
really -- that murderous act happens pretty early on in the novel, and then the
remaining novel continues to kind of be about his processing of it. And he
even published something in the paper about why people kill, like -- and things
like that. Anyway. And then he eventually is sentenced because of his
admittance of his crime, that kind of also was found out as well. But he was
declared insane. And he served eight years in a Russian labor camp. And
when he was in the Russian labor camp, he was unrepentant and he did not
think that what he had done was wrong and that the woman deserved it. He
did actually kill her sister, too, with a hatchet to her skull, but that was kind of
16
an accident because she came home too early.
¶42. The State was entitled to examine Kirk about her treatment notes and about what
Gregg said during counseling, and it was also entitled to rebut the defense expert’s reliance
on the notes. However, the plot of a nineteenth century novel had little probative value
unless the State could connect the substance of the book to Gregg’s own statements,
thoughts, or conduct, which it did not do. A bare treatment note reference to the title did not
necessarily open the door to a plot summary emphasizing murder, psychopathy, insanity, and
punishment. The implied danger was that the jury would reason by association: Gregg read
or wanted to read a novel about a murderer, therefore, Gregg’s own mental state resembled
the fictional murderer’s. That could be considered the type of unfair-prejudice concern
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 is designed to address.
¶43. Absent a stronger connection between the book’s themes and Gregg’s own statements
or conduct, a detailed plot summary was only marginally relevant and carried a risk of unfair
prejudice. The trial court should have limited the testimony. However, the error was not so
“arbitrary and clearly erroneous, amounting to an abuse of discretion” as to require reversal.
Clark v. State, 315 So. 3d 987, 994 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31, 34 (Miss. 2003)).
¶44. Furthermore, the error did not affect the verdict. The evidence that Gregg committed
the acts was overwhelming, and the evidence that she understood the nature and
wrongfulness of her acts was substantial. The jury saw or heard evidence that Gregg
retrieved the gun, concealed it from the kitchen camera, shot Ashley three times, used
17
Ashley’s phone to text Heath, hid the camera in the refrigerator, asked friends to come over
without disclosing the shooting by phone, told T.G. not to call 911, told B.W. she had shot
her mother and had three shots for Heath, waited for Heath, shot him when he entered, and
fled. Dr. Pickett tied her contemporaneous actions directly to M’Naghten and testified that
they showed intact purpose, concealment, and appreciation of wrongfulness. Leber and Kirk
both testified that Gregg had not reported hallucinations, delusions, dissociation, or
homicidal ideation during treatment shortly before the crimes.
¶45. Given that record, it is “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Moffett v. State, 49 So. 3d 1073, 1099 (¶ 85) (Miss.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. State, 995 So. 2d 698, 704
(Miss. 2008)). The Crime and Punishment summary did not affect the verdict.
D. Cumulative error does not require reversal of the convictions.
¶46. Gregg argues that even if no single guilt-phase error requires reversal, the cumulative
effect of the trial court’s rulings deprived her of a fair trial. The cumulative error doctrine
“holds that individual errors, which are not reversible in themselves, may combine with other
errors to make up reversible error, where the cumulative effect of all errors deprives the
defendant of a fundamentally fair trial.” Ross v. State, 954 So. 2d 968, 1018 (¶ 138) (Miss.
2007) (citing Byrom v. State, 863 So. 2d 836, 847 (Miss. 2003)).
¶47. The doctrine does not require reversal here. The continuance issue lacks a denied
continuance motion and a specific showing of prejudice. The mental-evaluation issue is
affected by waiver, later reliance on insanity, and lack of a concrete showing that the
18
evaluation orders changed the verdict. The Crime and Punishment issue may be the most
substantial evidentiary complaint, but any error was harmless in light of the record as a
whole. The issues do not combine to undermine confidence in the convictions.
¶48. The Court holds that the record does not support a reversal for cumulative error.
II. Sentencing Errors
A. Gregg was sentenced to life imprisonment, which is a legal sentence
under Section 97-3-21(2)(b).
¶49. Gregg argues that, as amended effective July 1, 2024, Section 97-3-21(2)(b) does not
authorize life without parole for a juvenile convicted of first degree murder after July 1,
2024. The State argues that “life imprisonment” in Section 97-3-21(2)(b), combined with
Mississippi’s parole statute, Mississippi Code Section 47-7-3 (Rev. 2023), means life without
parole after Miller consideration. The State relies principally on Johnson v. State, 396 So.
3d 1073 (Miss. 2024), in which the Court affirmed a life-without-parole sentence imposed
after Miller review.
¶50. At the time of Gregg’s sentencing, Section 97-3-21(2) provided:
(2)(a) For the purposes of this section, “juvenile offender” means a person who
had not reached the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission
of the offense.
(b) A juvenile offender who is convicted of first-degree murder after July 1,
2024, may be sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Department
of Corrections if the punishment is so fixed by the jury. If the jury fails to fix
the penalty at life imprisonment, the court shall fix the penalty at not less than
twenty (20) nor more than forty (40) years in the custody of the Department of
Corrections.
(c) A juvenile offender who is convicted of capital murder after July 1, 2024,
may be sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Department of
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Corrections or life imprisonment without eligibility for parole in the custody
of the Department of Corrections if the punishment is so fixed by the jury. If
the jury fails to fix the penalty at life imprisonment or life imprisonment
without parole, the court shall fix the penalty at not less than twenty-five (25)
nor more than fifty (50) years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21(2)(a)-(c) (Supp. 2025).
¶51. The contrast between subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c) is clear. In subsection (2)(c), the
legislature expressly authorized life without parole for juvenile capital murder. In subsection
(2)(b), the legislature did not. Both provisions were enacted as part of the same amendment,
address juvenile homicide sentencing, and both provisions appear in consecutive subsections.
The legislature therefore clearly knew how to authorize “life imprisonment without eligibility
for parole” when it intended that punishment, so its omission of that phrase from subsection
(2)(b) is understood to be intentional.
¶52. The State’s interpretation relies on importing parole consequences from Section
47-7-3 into Section 97-3-21(2)(b). The Court declines to combine the two. The parole
statute is the parole statute, and the sentencing statute is the sentencing statute.
¶53. In the juvenile-specific framework enacted in 2024, “life imprisonment” and “life
imprisonment without eligibility for parole” must be given different meanings. For juvenile
capital murder, the jury may choose either life imprisonment or life without parole. For
juvenile first degree murder, the jury may choose life imprisonment, but the sentencing
statute does not authorize life without parole. If the jury does not fix life imprisonment, the
trial court must impose a term of twenty to forty years.
¶54. Johnson v. State, 396 So. 3d 1073 (Miss. 2024), does not compel a different result.
20
Johnson involved a defendant who had been convicted long before July 1, 2024. Id. at 1075
(¶ 1). The Court noted that the 2024 amendment did not entitle Johnson to jury sentencing
because his conviction preceded the amendment’s effective date. Id. at 1078 (¶ 13).
Johnson thus did not decide whether Section 97-3-21(2)(b), as applied to a juvenile
convicted after July 1, 2024, authorizes life without parole for first degree murder. Johnson
remains applicable for the general proposition that Miller permits juvenile life without parole
in some circumstances and does not require a jury to fix the sentence, but it does not answer
the statutory question presented here: whether the legislature authorized that punishment in
subsection (2)(b) for juvenile first degree murder convictions after July 1, 2024.
¶55. The sentencing instructions given here did not clearly reflect the statutory difference.
Instruction SS-1 allowed the jury to choose “life imprisonment,” “life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole,” or inability to fix punishment. That framework told the jury that “life
imprisonment” and “life imprisonment with the possibility of parole” were different options.
Defense counsel did not object to Instruction SS-1 and affirmatively stated that the defense
had no objection to the sentencing scheme. The State’s current position is that the jury’s
selection of “life imprisonment” means life without parole because first degree murder is not
parole eligible under Section 47-7-3. If that is so, then the jury was effectively given a
life-without-parole option not listed in Section 97-3-21(2)(b). The jury’s question to the
court, “What is life in prison without parole? Years-wise[,]” confirms that parole eligibility
was central to its deliberations and that the instructions did not produce a clear understanding
of the sentencing consequences.
21
¶56. However, despite the erroneous implication of the instructions, the error did not result
in an illegal sentence. The trial court’s sentencing order sentenced Gregg to “life
imprisonment,” not life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The jury sentencing
verdict read “[a]s to Count I, we, the jury, sentence the Defendant, Carly Madison Gregg, to
life imprisonment.” The jury sentenced Gregg to the legal sentence under the statute, life
imprisonment, and the judge entered the legal sentence, life imprisonment, on the court order.
“We have explained that an illegal sentence is one that does not conform to the applicable
penalty statute.” Grayer v. State, 120 So. 3d 964, 969 (Miss. 2013) (citation modified)
(quoting Foreman v. State, 51 So. 3d 957, 962 n.22 (Miss. 2011)). Here, the sentence
conformed to the sentencing statute and thus is not illegal.
B. Gregg was sentenced to life imprisonment for attempted murder, which
does not conflict with United States Supreme Court precedent.
¶57. Gregg also challenges her sentence for attempted murder. She argues that, if the
jury’s selection of “life imprisonment” means life without parole, the sentence is
categorically unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), because
attempted murder is a nonhomicide offense.
¶58. The State responds that Gregg’s attempted murder sentence is not actually life without
parole. Mississippi Code Section 97-1-7(2) (Rev. 2020) provides that a person convicted of
attempted murder “shall be imprisoned for life” if the punishment is fixed by the jury; if the
jury does not fix life, the court must impose not less than twenty years. The State argues that
attempted murder is a parole-eligible violent offense under Mississippi Code Section
47-7-3(1)(h)(i)(2) (Rev. 2023), making Gregg eligible for parole after serving 50 percent or
22
twenty years, whichever is less. If the State is correct, Graham does not invalidate the
attempted murder sentence because the sentence is not life without parole.
¶59. The jury received the same sentencing framework in Instruction SS-2 for attempted
murder that it received in Instruction SS-1 for first degree murder. Gregg is correct that if
“life imprisonment” was intended to mean without parole, then Graham would render it
unconstitutional. Graham clearly holds that the Eighth Amendment prohibits juveniles from
being sentenced to life without parole for nonhomicide offenses. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82.
¶60. Yet, as with Count I, the jury and the trial court did not sentence Gregg to life without
parole. The sentencing verdict returned by the jury as to Count II read, “[a]s to Count II, we,
the jury, sentence the Defendant, Carly Madison Gregg, to life imprisonment.” The court’s
sentencing order sentenced her to “life imprisonment.” Gregg’s sentence for Count II was
not illegal under the statute and complied with Graham’s stricture against juvenile lifewithout-parole sentences for nonhomicide offenses.
C. The trial court complied with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
¶61. Gregg argues that the court failed to “provide and apply a constitutionally adequate,
individualized Miller analysis under Miller v. Alabama, Montgomery v. Louisiana[, 577
U.S. 190 (2016)], and their Mississippi progeny.” She acknowledges that her counsel failed
to object contemporaneously but argues that plain error applies. The State argues that the
court conducted a proper hearing and that the issue is waived because defense counsel failed
to object.
¶62. The trial court moved to the sentencing phase after the jury delivered its verdict. The
23
court offered both sides the opportunity to call witnesses, but both declined and agreed to
incorporate the guilt-phase record for the sentencing. The State and defense counsel
provided closing arguments. Then the judge read the following instruction twice to the jury:
The Court instructs the jury that you should consider the following factors in
making your decision: One, the Defendant’s chronological age; two, the
Defendant’s family home and environment; three, the circumstances of the
homicide offense; four, the Defendant’s incompetencies associated with youth;
and five, the Defendant’s possibility of rehabilitation.
Additionally, the Miller considerations were sent with the jury on Instruction SS-1 and
Instruction SS-2.
¶63. Miller requires that juries “have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances
before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. As
the Court noted in Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65 (Miss. 2018), “[t]he Miller Court
stopped short of establishing a specific procedure for lower courts to follow when sentencing
juvenile homicide offenders; rather, the Miller Court observed several important features of
youth that would be relevant to the sentencing decision.” Id. at 68 (¶ 11). The Mississippi
Supreme Court has likewise not established a specific procedure required to satisfy Miller.
In Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d 987 (Miss. 2013), the Court formally adopted Miller and
required our courts to consider the applicable factors:
Miller does not prohibit sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders.
Rather, it “require[s] [the sentencing authority] to take into account how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The Miller
Court identified several factors that must be considered by the sentencing
authority:
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes
24
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into
account the family and home environment that surrounds
him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no
matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances
of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation
in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have
affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged
and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with
police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or
his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. See, e.g., Graham,
560 U.S. [48], 130 S. Ct. at 2032 (“[T]he features that
distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a significant
disadvantage in criminal proceedings”); J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 564 U.S. ––––, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2400–01, 180 L. Ed.
2d 310 (2011) (discussing children’s responses to interrogation).
And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the
possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most
suggest it.
Parker, 119 So. 3d at 995-96 (¶ 19) (alterations in original). The Court has further held that
“the burden rests with the juvenile offender ‘to convince the sentencing authority that Miller
considerations are sufficient to prohibit’ a sentence of life without parole.” Wharton v.
State, 298 So. 3d 921, 927 (¶ 25) (Miss. 2019) (quoting Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702
(Miss. 2013)).
¶64. Here, the trial court followed the guidelines set out in Miller and adopted by the Court
in Parker. Evidence was presented during the trial that addressed each of the required
considerations, and that evidence was incorporated into the jury’s deliberations. The trial
court stressed the importance of the jury considering each factor repeatedly, and Gregg was
afforded an opportunity to convince the sentencing authority that Miller would prohibit life
25
without parole. Therefore, the trial court properly conducted a Miller-compliant hearing
before the jury returned its verdict.
D. The prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments do not mandate
reversal.
¶65. Gregg also argues that several of the prosecutor’s remarks during the sentencing phase
closing argument were so inflammatory and prejudicial as to require reversal. The Court
disagrees.
¶66. The first statement that Gregg challenges is “[i]f she is given the possibility of parole,
no one in this room knows how long she will stay there. We cannot guarantee she will stay
there one year or ten years. We have no control over that.” Obviously, Gregg would not have
been parole eligible in one year. Even if she had been sentenced to the minimum of twenty
years, the parole statute, Section 47-7-3, would require that she serve the full term. Gregg
cites a string of our cases disapproving “of arguments which refer to the potential sentence
in a given case” as the basis for her claim of error. Marks v. State, 532 So. 2d 976, 983
(Miss. 1988). However, all of the cases cited were in the guilt phase, not the sentencing
phase as was the posture here. Of course counsel are allowed to refer to the potential
sentence in a closing argument occurring only in the sentencing phase. The jury had already
returned its guilty verdict when the prosecutor made the statement. Counsel should not
misstate the law during their closing arguments, but the unobjected-to misstatement of
potential parole eligibility here does not amount to reversible error by the prosecution.
Additionally, because the sentence was life imprisonment and Gregg is potentially eligible
for parole, there could be no harm from the misstatement regarding parole eligibility.
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¶67. The second challenged statement is “[i]f she were paroled, nothing would stop her
from walking into a school, nothing would stop her from walking into a shopping mall,
nothing would stop her from walking into the grocery stores, nothing would stop her from
being in the movie theaters.” Gregg argues the statement is “inflammatory, highly prejudicial
and reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury” and thus impermissible under the
Court’s holding in Hiter v. State, 660 So. 2d 961, 966 (Miss. 1995). In Hiter, the Court held
that the statements in question were “not overly prejudicial or inflammatory” and that the
“remarks made by the prosecution clearly fell within the allowable scope of closing
argument.” Id.
¶68. Gregg also argues that the second statement “veers toward an improper golden-rule
style plea” and is also equivalent to a “send-a-message appeal to community alarm.” For
either type of error, the argument is waived on appeal unless “the argument is so
‘inflammatory’ that the trial judge should have objected on his own motion[.]” Payton v.
State, 785 So. 2d 267, 270 (¶ 10) (Miss. 1999) (quoting Gray v. State, 487 So. 2d 1304, 1311
(Miss. 1986)). While the statement does imply to the jury that they should consider the safety
of the community, it is not so egregious as to mandate the trial court’s sua sponte objection.
Therefore, the argument is waived.
¶69. Finally, the third statement Gregg claims was error is “[i]n the eyes of the law—we
talked about this on Monday—Carly Gregg is an adult.” Gregg argues the statement is a
misstatement of the law and “risks misleading [the jury] about the Miller framework[.]” The
full relevant quote reads:
27
You have to consider her chronological age. We can’t change that. She’s 15
years old. In the eyes of the law -- we talked about this on Monday -- Carly
Gregg is an adult. You do get to consider her age, but that’s not the only factor
you consider when determining whether or not to send her to prison for life.
The prosecutor correctly told the jury to consider Gregg’s age under Miller. No error was
committed in allowing the third statement that Gregg challenges.
¶70. Alternatively, Gregg asks the Court to review the errors for ineffective assistance of
counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). While the Court has the
authority to review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, some claims
are better “reserved for petitions for post-conviction relief because they often rely on
materials outside the appellate record.” Williams v. State, 73 So. 3d 1125, 1129 (¶ 13) (Miss.
2011) (citing Parker v. State, 30 So. 3d 1222, 1232 (Miss. 2010)). Today’s case is one such
case.
E. The sentence was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
¶71. Gregg argues that a life without parole sentence would be against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence for the purposes of Miller. She writes, “[t]he overwhelming weight
of evidence in this case demonstrates not irreparable corruption, but mental illness, transient
crisis, and treatability, none of which were adequately considered.” Evidence was presented
such that a juror could find each factor weighed in favor of a harsher sentence, and Gregg
fails to show that the sentence “is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence
that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Jones v. State,
390 So. 3d 498, 503 (¶ 20) (Miss. 2024) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Collier
v. State, 183 So. 3d 885, 893 (¶ 34) (Miss. 2016)).
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¶72. In any event, Gregg was sentenced to life imprisonment, not life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.
CONCLUSION
¶73. The Court affirms Gregg’s convictions and sentences.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KING, P.J., ISHEE, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN AND
BRANNING, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
29