IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-KA-00579-SCT
ISAAC MERRIMON a/k/a ISAAC MERRIMAN
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/07/2025
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES T. KITCHENS, JR. TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: PAYTREEN KEYUM DAVIDSON
STEPHANIE L. MALLETTE
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
JOSEPH SCOTT HEMLEBEN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: INDIA MARIAH SPRINKLE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: SCOTT WINSTON COLOM
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/20/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
SULLIVAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. On May 5, 2025, Isaac Merrimon was found guilty of receiving stolen property in
violation of Mississippi Code Section 97-17-70 (Rev. 2020). He was sentenced to five years
in the custody of Mississippi Department of Corrections without the possibility of parole.1
He now appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred by giving a jury instruction that was
1
Merrimon was sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2020).
an incorrect statement of law, (2) the evidence was insufficient, and (3) the verdict was
contrary to the weight of the evidence.
¶2. When the jury instructions are read as a whole, they correctly state the law.
Additionally, based on this Court’s standard of review, we find that the evidence is sufficient
to uphold Merrimon’s conviction. Similarly, the verdict was not against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence. Therefore, this Court finds that no reversible error occurred and
affirms Merrimon’s conviction and sentence.
FACTS
¶3. On the night of July 14, 2023, Ricky Carter went to a restaurant in Hattiesburg,
Mississippi, with his girlfriend and some friends. Around midnight, Carter went home with
his girlfriend, leaving his car, i.e., a 2003 red Ford Mustang, in the parking lot of the
restaurant. He also left his keys inside of the car. In the early hours of July 15, 2023, Carter
returned to retrieve his car from the parking lot. Upon his arrival, he discovered that his car
was no longer at the restaurant. In response, he called the police in order to report the car as
stolen. Officer Payton Mills with the Hattiesburg Police Department was dispatched to
Carter’s location. Officer Mills obtained the vehicle’s information, which was entered into
the NCIC2 system.
¶4. Later that day, Starkville Police Officer Joinay Watts responded to a call regarding
2
NCIC stands for National Crime Information Center. See McCollum v. State, 372 So. 3d 980, 983 (Miss. 2023).
2
a “suspicious circumstance” occurring in the parking lot of a local restaurant. Officer Watts
explained that the call was “about an individual setting items of clothes and just debris on fire
inside of the parking lot.” When she arrived on the scene, she “encountered an individual that
was sitting in a car next to a fire.” She identified Isaac Merrimon as that individual.
According to Officer Watts, Merrimon informed her that the reason for the fire was because
he had “dropped a cigarette on them. And he was just taking them out of the car and putting
them on the ground to put the fire out.”
¶5. Officer Watts testified that she provided the vehicle’s information to dispatch, which
advised her that “they had a NCIC hit.” She explained that an NCIC hit meant that “the
vehicle was possibly stolen.” She explained also that the vehicle was reportedly stolen from
Hattiesburg. According to Officer Watts, after Merrimon had been informed that the car was
reportedly stolen, Merrimon became upset and claimed that he did not steal the vehicle.
¶6. Merrimon asserted that he had bought the vehicle from Carter for eight dollars. When
asked if he had any proof, Officer Watts stated that Merrimon showed her a handwritten
“piece of paper with the original owner of the vehicle’s name” and it “had the amount
that—the eight dollars written on it.” Officer Watts testified that the piece of paper did not
appear to be a bill of sale, nor was it notarized or signed.3 She stated also that Merrimon did
not provide any other information that showed a transfer in ownership. Additionally, Carter
3
While it is unclear whether this “piece of paper” was taken from Merrimon upon his arrest, it was not admitted into evidence.
3
testified that he did not sell his car to anyone or give anyone permission to use his car that
night. He stated also that he had “never seen” Merrimon.
¶7. Both Carter and Officer Watts testified about the value of the vehicle. According to
Carter, he stated that the value of his car was “[a]round $3,000.” He explained that he used
Kelley Blue Book to help determine the value of the vehicle. Officer Watts testified also that
she used Kelley Blue Book to determine the value of the vehicle. She explained that based
on the “year, make, model, and the mileage[,]” the estimated minimum value of the vehicle
was “a little over $1,600.”
¶8. At the end of the State’s case, Merrimon moved for a directed verdict, arguing that
the State ha[d] failed to provide evidence of proof of each element in
possession of stolen property beyond a reasonable doubt. In that, they have
failed to prove [Merrimon] knew or should have known the property he was
in possession of was in fact stolen.
The trial court denied the motion.
¶9. Merrimon testified and provided a different version of events. He stated that he started
the fire in order to keep warm. He explained that while he initially denied ownership of the
car, he later told the police that he had a bill of sale because they “kept on asking” him and
that he wanted them to “leave [him] alone.” He described the bill of sale as a “piece of paper
[that] didn’t have words spelled good on it at all.” Merrimon admitted that he had previously
been in Hattiesburg but claimed to have “been in Starkville for about three or four days, two
days.” He claimed also that the police “put [him] inside of the car” and that he “did not say
one time [he] was driving that car.”
4
¶10. After considering the evidence, the jury returned a guilty verdict, and Merrimon was
sentenced to serve five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections
without the possibility of parole. At the conclusion of his trial, Merrimon filed a motion for
a new trial or, in the alternative, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied.
Merrimon timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Jury Instruction S-2
¶11. While Merrimon and the State agree that Jury Instruction S-1, the elements
instruction, properly informed the jury of the necessary elements for the charged crime,
Merrimon challenges the trial court’s decision to grant Jury Instruction S-2. Jury Instruction
S-2 explained possession:
The [c]ourt instructs the [j]ury that “possession” as that term is used in
this case may be actual or constructive.
A person has actual possession when he or she knowingly has direct,
immediate, and exclusive physical control over the thing or object.
For constructive possession, there must be sufficient facts to warrant a
finding that the [d]efendant was aware of the presence of the particular object
and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it. It need not be actual
or physical possession. Constructive possession may be shown by establishing
that the property involved was subject to his or her dominion or control.
Merrimon argues that the trial court erred by granting Jury Instruction S-2 because it
broadened the definition of possession and permitted the jury to convict without finding
guilty knowledge, which is an essential element of the charged crime. Specifically, he asserts
5
that
Although the jury received a correct elements instruction for receiving stolen
property, S-2 supplied a broader definition of “possession” that permitted
conviction for mere possession of recently stolen property without the distinct,
statutory requirement of guilty knowledge. In effect, the constructivepossession instruction lessened the State’s burden by both diluting the statute’s
intentional-possession requirement and decoupling possession from the
separate element of knowledge that the property was stolen.
¶12. “Whether to grant or deny proposed jury instructions is within the sole discretion of
the circuit court.” Brown v. State, 332 So. 3d 1287, 1289 (Miss. 2022) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Victory v. State, 83 So. 3d 370, 373 (Miss. 2012)). We have
explained that:
“This Court reviews jury instructions under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”
Roby v. State, 183 So. 3d 857, 872 (Miss. 2016) (citing Thompson v. State,
119 So. 3d 1007, 1009 (Miss. 2013)). “The jury instructions are to be read as
a whole, with no one instruction to be read alone or taken out of context.”
Watkins v. State, 101 So. 3d 628, 633 (Miss. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Bailey v. State, 78 So. 3d 308, 315 (Miss. 2012)). “If the
jury instructions, read as a whole, fairly announce the law of the case and
create no injustice, no reversible error will be found.” Windless v. State, 185
So. 3d 956, 960 (Miss. 2015) (citing Harris v. State, 861 So. 2d 1003, 1014
(Miss. 2003)).
Jenkins v. State, 371 So. 3d 593, 596 (Miss. 2023).
¶13. According to Merrimon, Jury Instruction S-2 is incorrect as it permits the jury to
“believe[] that dominion or control alone was legally sufficient, even without the conscious,
volitional possession that Section 97-17-70 requires.” Additionally, he claims that the
instruction permits “the jury to collapse possession and knowledge into a single concept.”
¶14. Merrimon’s arguments are without merit. This Court has held that “[t]he law does not
6
demand proof that the accused took the stolen property into his hands[.]” Williams v. State,
595 So. 2d 1299, 1303 (Miss. 1992). To satisfy the element of possession or receipt of stolen
property, the State must show that “the accused has performed some act with respect to the
property, that he has exercised dominion or control over it, though such need not have been
exclusive.” Id.; see Davis v. State, 586 So. 2d 817, 820 (Miss. 1991) (“Physical possession
of the property is not required nor is exclusive control or dominion. Daniel v. State, 212
Miss. 223, 228, 54 So. 2d 272, 274 (1951). It is adequate that the prosecution prove that the
property was subject to the defendant’s dominion and control.”). “However, mere possession
[or dominion and control] alone is inadequate to prove receipt or purchase of property or
knowledge that the property had been stolen.” Lewis v. State, 573 So. 2d 713, 714 (Miss.
1990) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Int. of W.B., 515 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Miss.
1987); Thompson v. State, 457 So. 2d 953, 955 (Miss. 1984)). In addition to proving
possession, “the state also must prove guilty knowledge, which is the ‘gist of the offense of
receiving stolen property.’” Id. at 715 (quoting Whatley v. State, 490 So. 2d 1220, 1222
(Miss. 1986); Van v. State, 477 So. 2d 1350, 1351 (Miss. 1985); Thompson, 457 So. 2d at
954).
¶15. Jury Instruction S-2 permitted the jury to find possession by either actual, physical
possession or by having dominion or control over the vehicle. When Jury Instructions S-1,
the elements instruction, and S-2 are read as a whole, it is clear that the State had to prove
both possession and guilty knowledge. Thus, this Court finds that the trial court did not err
7
by granting Jury Instruction S-2 because it is a correct statement of law.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶16. “When testing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court uses a de novo standard of
review.” Sanford v. State, 247 So. 3d 1242, 1244 (Miss. 2018) (citing Brooks v. State, 203
So. 3d 1134, 1137 (Miss. 2016)). “In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the
evidence in a criminal trial, this Court considers whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Quinn v. State, 408
So. 3d 637, 640 (Miss. 2025) (quoting Body v. State, 318 So. 3d 1104, 1108 (Miss. 2021)).
In doing so, this Court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State, giving
the State the benefit of all favorable inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence.” Henley
v. State, 136 So. 3d 413, 415 (Miss. 2014) (citing Graham v. State, 120 So. 3d 382, 386-87
(Miss. 2013)).
¶17. Merrimon asserts that the evidence is insufficient for two reasons: (1) the State failed
to prove he knew or should have known that the vehicle was stolen, and (2) the State failed
to prove that the value of the vehicle satisfied the statutory scheme.
a) Guilty Knowledge
¶18. Merrimon argues that “the State offered no evidence establishing that Merrimon knew
the vehicle was stolen[.]” Instead, he asserts that the evidence proved only that Merrimon had
possessed the vehicle.
¶19. The State argues that the evidence was sufficient to show guilty knowledge. The State
8
asserts that the following facts and circumstances surrounding his possession of the vehicle
“point[s] to Merrimon’s guilt[:]”
(1) The owner of the vehicle testified that he left the keys inside of the car
overnight in a Hattiesburg restaurant’s parking lot;
(2) The owner of the vehicle testified that he did not sell his vehicle to
Merrimon or to anyone;
(3) Only hours after being reported stolen from Hattiesburg, the vehicle
was discovered “in Merrimon’s possession several counties away in
Starkville[;]”
(4) “Merrimon told police he bought the car for eight dollars from Carter
and drove it from Hattiesburg to Starkville[;]”
(5) “The only ‘evidence’ Merrimon offered police to prove a sale was a
piece of unsigned, unnotarized notebook paper showing the ‘original
owner’s name’ with the words ‘eight dollars’ scribbled on it.”
¶20. While Merrimon is correct that “unexplained possession of recently stolen property,
standing alone, is insufficient to satisfy the guilty knowledge [requirement,]” McClain v.
State, 625 So. 2d 774, 779 (Miss. 1993) (citing Tubwell v. State, 580 So. 2d 1264, 1266
(Miss. 1991); Johnson v. State, 247 So. 2d 697, 698 (Miss. 1971)), this Court has explained
that
Guilty knowledge may be shown by evidence that the defendant “received the
property under circumstances that would lead a reasonable man to believe it
to be stolen.” Ellett [v. State,] 364 So. 2d [669,] 670 [(Miss. 1978)]. It may
also be shown by the defendant’s possession of stolen property “coupled with
the further circumstances that he is said to have made misrepresentations to the
officer as to where he purchased the tire and as to whether he knew the person
from whom he received it.” Crowell v. State, 195 Miss. 427, 432, 15 So. 2d
508 (1943). A disparity between the value of the property in question and the
price at which the defendant subsequently sells it may be evidence of guilty
9
knowledge “when coupled with the possession of the burglary tools adapted
for breaking and entering and burglarizing . . . .” Corn v. State, 250 Miss. 157,
161, 164 So. 2d 777 (1964). Finally, the defendant’s “Own actions subsequent
to receipt may have a bearing on whether he knew or should have known the
property to be stolen.” Van v. State, 477 So. 2d 1350 (Miss. 1985).
Whatley, 490 So. 2d at 1222 (fourth alteration in original) (emphasis added). We have said
also that “[t]he State may prove the defendant’s guilty knowledge by adducing proof that the
defendant stole the property that is the subject of the receiving stolen property charge.”
Wilson v. State, 194 So. 3d 855, 861-62 (Miss. 2016) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-70(3)(b) (Rev. 2014)).
¶21. The State did not solely rely on Merrimon’s possession of the recently stolen vehicle
to prove guilty knowledge. Rather the jury heard testimony regarding Merrimon’s
interactions with Officer Watts and regarding the lack of evidence that showed a valid, legal
transfer in the vehicle’s ownership. Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, this Court holds that any rational juror could have found that Merrimon knew
or should have known that the vehicle was stolen.
b) Value of the Stolen Vehicle
¶22. Merrimon argues that “the State failed to prove the statutory value of the vehicle,
beyond a reasonable doubt because the only valuation evidence was speculative, hearsaybased estimate from Kelley Blue Book, unsupported by any documentation or personal
knowledge of purchase price or market value.” Simply, he asserts that the testimony
regarding the value of the vehicle is not sufficient because it was based on a Kelley Blue
10
Book estimate.
¶23. As the State points out, Merrimon did not object to either witnesses’ valuation
testimony. “In order to preserve an issue for appeal, counsel must object. The failure to
object acts as a waiver.” Jackson v. State, 174 So. 3d 232, 236 (Miss. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771, 791 (Miss. 2006)); see
also Harris v. State, 311 So. 3d 638, 658 (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (“Because the defense made
no objection at trial to Lieutenant Edgington’s lay testimony regarding the truck’s valuation
or his utilization of the Kelley Bluebook, we find that Harris has waived any argument on
appeal as to the admissibility of this evidence.”). Thus, this issue is waived.
III. Overwhelming Weight of the Evidence
¶24. Merrimon makes a brief, one-paragraph alternative argument in which he “submits
that the verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Before the trial
court, Merrimon made a general argument that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. But before this Court, Merrimon’s argument is focused on the valuation of the
vehicle. Specifically, he states, “[a]s outlined above, the testimony presented as to value was
speculative and was not based on either expert testimony or Carter’s personal knowledge.”
¶25. This Court has explained that
For a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury’s verdict. Little [v. State,] 233 So. 3d [288,] 292
[(Miss. 2017)]. This Court will not disturb that verdict, unless we conclude
that “it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow
it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Id. (internal quotation
mark omitted) (quoting Lindsey v. State, 212 So. 3d 44, 45 (Miss. 2017)).
11
Abram v. State, 420 So. 3d 881, 890 (Miss. 2025).
¶26. Merrimon is merely reasserting his sufficiency argument. Regardless, any weight-ofthe-evidence argument fails here. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, it is clear that the State presented ample evidence that: (1) the vehicle was stolen,
(2) the value of the vehicle was between $1,600 and $3,000, and (3) a reasonable person
would find that Merrimon knew or should have known that the vehicle was stolen based on
the circumstances surrounding his possession of the vehicle. Therefore, we find that the
verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
¶27. This Court finds that the trial court did not err by granting Jury Instruction S-2.
Additionally, based on our standards of review, the State presented sufficient evidence to
sustain the conviction, and the weight of the evidence supported the verdict.
¶28. AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., ISHEE, GRIFFIS,
BRANNING AND WILSON, JJ. CONCUR.
12