FILED
Aug 20 2026, 9:12 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Alberto Garcia-Rodriguez,
Appellant-Petitioner
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Respondent
August 20, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-PC-1121
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable Michelle Waymire, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49D30-2509-PC-27108
Opinion by Judge Mathias
Judges Kenworthy and DeBoer concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 1 of 19
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Following his arrest on several felony and misdemeanor charges, Alberto
Garcia-Rodriguez moved for a trial within seventy days (commonly referred to
as a speedy-trial motion) in accordance with Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B).
Pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B), if a defendant who is in jail and held beyond
the seventy-day limit moves for dismissal, the State’s charges “must be
dismissed” absent a justifiable showing for the delay. But his trial counsel failed
to follow our Supreme Court’s guidance in Grimes v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1224,
1230-34 (Ind. 2024), in how to prosecute the motion to dismiss, which, as we
explained in his direct appeal, resulted in the motion’s failure. Garcia-Rodriguez
v. State, No. 24A-CR-2868, 2025 WL 1249708, at *3-4 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 30,
2025) (mem.) (“Garcia-Rodriguez I”).
[2] Garcia-Rodriguez filed a petition for post-conviction relief and argued that he
had received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel for her failure to
properly prosecute the Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss. The post-conviction court
found and concluded that, while Garcia-Rodriguez’s trial counsel had
committed a “critical error” that resulted in the failure of the motion,
nonetheless Garcia-Rodriguez was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure
because, even if she had properly prosecuted the motion, the trial court had the
discretion to give priority to the longer-pending, non-speedy-trial criminal case
it had prioritized over Garcia-Rodriguez’s speedy-trial case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 2 of 19 [3] The post-conviction court’s conclusion is contrary to law. In Austin v. State, 997
N.E.2d 1027, 1040-41 (Ind. 2013), our Supreme Court made clear that, “absent
extenuating circumstances, a defendant seeking a speedy trial would almost
invariably be entitled to a trial setting ahead of any criminal defendant who had
not filed a Rule 4 motion.” (Emphasis added.) The post-conviction court found
no such extenuating circumstances for prioritizing the non-speedy-trial case
over Garcia-Rodriguez’s speedy-trial case, nor does the State suggest that any
such circumstances could have been found. Thus, had Garcia-Rodriguez’s
counsel properly prosecuted the Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss, the trial court, as
a matter of law, would have been required to dismiss the State’s charges against
him.
[4] We therefore reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand with
instructions for the court to grant Garcia-Rodriguez’s petition for postconviction relief.
Facts and Procedural History
[5] We set out the relevant facts and procedural history in Garcia-Rodriguez’s
direct appeal as follows:
On March 15, 2024, the State charged Garcia-Rodriguez with
Level 5 felony domestic battery, Level 5 felony battery, Level 6
felony intimidation, Level 6 felony criminal confinement, and
Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. The State later amended
its information to add two counts of Class A misdemeanor
invasion of privacy.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 3 of 19
On July 2,[1] Garcia-Rodriguez filed his motion for an early trial
under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B), which generally required the
court to hold his trial within seventy days of the filing of that
motion. The court eventually scheduled Garcia-Rodriguez’s trial
for September 9, the day before the seventy-day deadline was set
to expire.
On September 9, the parties appeared before the court, and the
court informed them that it would have to reschedule GarciaRodriguez’s trial to a later date due to court congestion. The
court stated that Garcia-Rodriguez’s case was “our second-choice
matter, and I have confirmed our first-choice matter.” GarciaRodriguez objected to having his trial rescheduled, which the
court overruled.
That same day, the court entered its written order continuing the
trial. In the written order, the court stated:
The court on its own motion pursuant to Criminal Rule 4
takes notice of the court’s congested calendar, in that the
court will be trying:
Case Name: [J.R.M.,] Cause No: 49D30-2202-F3-004819
[(“Cause No. F3-4819”).]
The court now vacates the trial date of this cause and
orders this matter reset on the first available trial date.
Two days later, i.e., the day after the seventy-day deadline had
passed, Garcia-Rodriguez moved to dismiss the State’s charges
under Criminal Rule 4(B). In that motion, Garcia-Rodriguez
1
Our Supreme Court decided Grimes on June 26, 2024.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 4 of 19
asserted that the defendant in Cause No. F3-4819 “never asserted
his right to a fast and speedy trial, and the case was not set for a
[s]peedy [t]rial on September 9, 2024.” Thus, Garcia-Rodriguez
continued, his case “should have been prioritized over” Cause
No. F3-4819 on September 9, and the failure to hold his trial
within seventy days of his early-trial motion required the court to
dismiss the State’s charges against him. But Garcia-Rodriguez
did not attach any records from Cause No. F3-4819 to his motion
to dismiss. The trial court summarily denied Garcia-Rodriguez’s
motion the next day.
In October, the court held Garcia-Rodriguez’s jury trial. The jury
found Garcia-Rodriguez guilty of several of the charged offenses,
and the court entered judgment of conviction against GarciaRodriguez for Level 5 felony domestic battery, Level 6 felony
intimidation, and two counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion
of privacy. The court then sentenced Garcia-Rodriguez
accordingly.
Garcia-Rodriguez I, 2025 WL 1249708, at *1-2 (citations to the record and
footnote omitted; alterations original to Garcia-Rodriguez I).
[6] On direct appeal, Garcia-Rodriguez raised a single issue for our review,
namely, whether the trial court erred when it denied his Rule 4(B) motion to
dismiss. We began our review with our Supreme Court’s recognition of the
purposes of Rule 4:
Criminal Rule 4 implements a criminal defendant’s constitutional
right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ind. Const. art. 1,
§ 12; Crim. R. 4. Rule 4 places the onus on the State to bring
defendants to trial and gives them a procedure to invoke their
speedy-trial right. Austin[,] 997 N.E.2d [at] 1037[.] The rule is not
meant to give defendants a “technical means to avoid trial but
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 5 of 19
rather to assure speedy trials.” Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026,
1028 (Ind. 2012).
Under Rule 4(B), a defendant may move for a speedy trial, which
obliges the State to bring the defendant to trial within seventy
days, or else the charges must be dismissed. But this obligation
has exceptions. A court may delay the start of trial past the
seventy-day window due to congestion of the court’s calendar or
an emergency. . . .
Id. at *2 (quoting Grimes, 235 N.E.3d at 1230; brackets and footnote omitted).
[7] We then explained the procedure our Supreme Court has outlined for how
criminal defendants must prosecute Rule 4(B) motions to dismiss:
Our Supreme Court applies a “burden-shifting test” to “evaluate
a trial court’s decision to reschedule a trial past the seventy-day
deadline for calendar congestion.” [Grimes, 235 N.E.3d] at 1231.
The test “starts with the trial court’s order finding the court’s
schedule is congested and continuing the trial date.” Id. That
finding “is presumed correct” and shifts the burden to the
defendant both to object to the continuation of his trial and also
to move to dismiss the State’s charges once the seventy-day
deadline passes without a trial. Id. In his motion to dismiss, “the
defendant must show that the court’s congestion finding was
factually or legally inaccurate . . . .” Id. (quotation marks
omitted). If he does so, the burden shifts back to the trial court to
further explain itself if it denies the motion to dismiss. See id. at
1234.
Id. (emphasis added). Critically, we emphasized that, to “show” the court’s
congestion finding was inaccurate:
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 6 of 19
the defendant must include with his motion to dismiss
“evidence” that is “sufficient” to show that “the court’s
congestion finding was incorrect when the court continued the
trial.” Grimes, at 235 N.E.3d at 1233. For example, in Grimes, our
Supreme Court held that the defendant met his burden to show
prima facie error in the court’s finding of congestion when he
included with his motion to dismiss a copy of the court’s own
docket, albeit a docket dated nine days after the trial court’s
congestion finding. Id. at 1234.
Id. at *3.
[8] Applying our Supreme Court’s balancing test to how Garcia-Rodriguez’s trial
counsel prosecuted his Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss, we concluded:
Here, at the September 9 hearing, the court found that calendar
congestion required it to reschedule Garcia-Rodriguez’s trial past
the seventy-day deadline. The court specifically found that Cause
No. F3-4819 had “first-choice” priority over Garcia-Rodriguez’s
case. The court’s finding shifted the burden to Garcia-Rodriguez
to promptly object, which he did, and then to move to dismiss
the State’s charges once the seventy-day deadline had passed,
which he also did.
However, Garcia-Rodriguez’s . . . objection and motion alone
were not sufficient to demonstrate that the court’s congestion
finding was clearly erroneous. Rather, the burden was on him to
include evidence with his motion to dismiss to show that the
court’s congestion finding was incorrect. But Garcia-Rodriguez
included no evidence with his motion to dismiss; he simply
asserted that the court was wrong. Thus, Garcia-Rodriguez did
not meet his burden under Criminal Rule 4(B) to show, in his
motion to dismiss, that the court’s congestion finding was clearly
erroneous.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 7 of 19
Id. (citation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
[9] But Garcia-Rodriguez also asked our Court to take judicial notice of the CCS
from Cause No. F3-4819. We agreed and then explained why doing so did not
matter to the outcome of his direct appeal:
That CCS demonstrates that the defendant in Cause No. F3-4819
was charged in February 2022, arrested in September 2022, and
never requested a speedy trial. Indeed, he moved for, joined in, or
did not oppose ten continuances of his trial date following his
arrest and prior to his September 9, 2024, trial. The defendant’s
case in Cause No. F3-4819 was also consolidated with a
misdemeanor case that had been pending since 2016, but the
defendant had never been separately held in jail in that case.
Further, the charges in the misdemeanor case were dismissed in
January 2024.
Had Garcia-Rodriguez properly included that CCS with his motion to
dismiss, he would have at least cast serious doubt on the trial court’s
assertion that the defendant in Cause No. F3-4819 was entitled to
priority over Garcia-Rodriguez’s case. As our Supreme Court has
long made clear, “a defendant seeking a speedy trial would
almost invariably be entitled to a trial setting ahead of any
criminal defendant who had not filed a Rule 4 motion.” Austin[,]
997 N.E.2d [at] 1041[.]
But that does not mean that Garcia-Rodriguez would have been
entitled to have the State’s charges dismissed at that point.
Rather, had Garcia-Rodriguez included the CCS with his motion to
dismiss, the burden would have shifted back to the trial court to further
explain its congestion finding if the court were to deny the motion to
dismiss. See id. at 1042; see also Grimes, 235 N.E.3d at 1234.
Indeed, while Rule 4 cases generally receive priority over nonRule 4 cases, there is no “bright-line approach whereby all other
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 8 of 19
cases must yield to the defendant who files a speedy trial
motion,” and “a variety of things could constitute congestion” of
the court’s calendar aside from which cases are Rule 4 cases and
which are not. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1040, 1042.
And that is the critical flaw with Garcia-Rodriguez’s motion to
dismiss in the trial court. Because he did not attach the CCS from
Cause No. F3-4819 to his motion to dismiss, he did not shift the burden
back to the trial court to further explain its congestion finding.
Therefore, we can take nothing from the court’s ensuing
summary denial of his motion to dismiss other than the correct
conclusion that Garcia-Rodriguez’s motion was unsupported. . . .
Id. at *3-4 (emphases added; original emphasis removed). Accordingly, we
affirmed the trial court’s denial of Garcia-Rodriguez’s Rule 4(B) motion to
dismiss. Id. at *4.
[10] Following the conclusion of his direct appeal, Garcia-Rodriguez filed his
petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition, he alleged that his trial
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by not including the CCS from
Cause No. F3-4819 with his Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss. And he argued that,
had his trial counsel done so, the trial court would not have been able to rebut
his showing of his entitlement to dismissal of the charges.
[11] The post-conviction court granted Garcia-Rodriguez’s request to decide his
petition by affidavit and submitted exhibits only. Thereafter, the post-conviction
court agreed that Garcia-Rodriguez’s trial counsel had “committed a critical
error in failing to submit supporting documents along with [the] motion to
dismiss and therefore was arguably deficient in her performance . . . .”
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 9 of 19
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 165. But, trial counsel’s “critical error”
notwithstanding, the post-conviction court found that Garcia-Rodriguez could
not show that his Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss, if properly prosecuted, “would
have been successful,” stating:
The CCS in Cause F3-4819 shows that the September 9, 2024[,]
jury trial had been labeled by the Court as “NO FURTHER
CONTINUANCES.” Although there was no speedy trial request
in that case, the defendant was in custody, the case was filed in
February 2022, and the defendant had been arrested in
September of 2022, approximately eighteen (18) months before
[Garcia-Rodriguez’s] case was filed.
Id. The post-conviction court further found that the trial court had “made a
determination that the older[,] non-speedy trial case with a defendant in
custody should be first priority on September 9[] and gave [Garcia-Rodriguez]
the next available date.” Id. at 166.
[12] Based on those findings, the court concluded that, had Garcia-Rodriguez’s trial
counsel included the CCS in Cause No. F3-4819 with the motion to dismiss,
the trial court still would have denied the motion. Thus, the post-conviction
court denied Garcia-Rodriguez’s petition on the basis that he had failed to show
that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s performance.
[13] This appeal ensued.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 10 of 19
Standard of Review
[14] Garcia-Rodriguez appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief. As our Supreme Court has explained:
Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which the
defendant must establish his claims by a preponderance of the
evidence. Post-conviction proceedings do not offer a superappeal[;] rather, subsequent collateral challenges to convictions
must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction
rules. Those grounds are limited to issues that were not known at
the time of the original trial or that were not available on direct
appeal. Issues available but not raised on direct appeal are
waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res
judicata. . . .
Because the defendant is appealing from the denial of postconviction relief, he is appealing from a negative judgment and
bears the burden of proof. Thus, the defendant must establish
that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly
points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court’s
decision. In other words, the defendant must convince this Court
that there is no way within the law that the court below could
have reached the decision it did. . . .
Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013) (citation modified).
Typically, we review the factual findings of the post-conviction court under our
clearly erroneous standard of review. Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1236-37
(Ind. 2008). However, where, as here, the court’s factual findings “are based
entirely on a paper record,” we review them “de novo.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 11 of 19 [15] Garcia-Rodriguez argues that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his
petition because the record establishes that he received ineffective assistance of
trial counsel with respect to counsel’s prosecution of the Rule 4(B) motion to
dismiss. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel:
[The post-conviction petitioner] must show (1) that his counsel’s
performance fell short of prevailing professional norms, and (2)
that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.
2d 674 (1984). A showing of deficient performance under the first
of these two prongs requires proof that legal representation
lacked an objective standard of reasonableness, effectively
depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the
proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.
When assessing the counsel’s performance, we rely on some
basic guidelines. First, we start by strongly presuming that,
throughout the proceedings, counsel exercised reasonable
professional judgment and rendered adequate legal assistance.
Second, defense counsel enjoys considerable discretion when
developing legal strategies for a client, demanding deference
during judicial review. Third, counsel’s isolated mistakes, poor
strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not
necessarily render representation ineffective.
Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1177 (Ind. 2020) (citation modified).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 12 of 19
1. The performance of Garcia-Rodriguez’s counsel was
constitutionally deficient.
[16] We first consider whether Garcia-Rodriguez established that his trial counsel’s
prosecution of the Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss was constitutionally deficient.
To show that it was, Garcia-Rodriguez was required to show that his counsel’s
failure to attach necessary documentation to support the motion was objectively
unreasonable. See id. The post-conviction court agreed that Garcia-Rodriguez’s
trial counsel had “committed a critical error in failing to submit supporting
documents along with [the] motion to dismiss” but then stated only that
counsel’s failure “was arguably deficient in . . . performance . . . .” Appellant’s
App. Vol. 2, p. 165.
[17] Garcia-Rodriguez’s counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. Prior
to Garcia-Rodriguez having filed his speedy-trial motion, our Supreme Court
had established the burden-shifting framework in which motions to dismiss
under Rule 4(B) are to be prosecuted by defense counsel. Grimes, 235 N.E.3d at
1230-34. That framework made clear that, where, as here, the burden is on the
defendant to show that the trial court’s finding of congestion was clearly
erroneous, the defendant can meet that burden only by submitting “evidence”
to the court that is “sufficient” to show that “the court’s congestion finding was
incorrect when the court continued the trial.” Id. at 1233. Thus, the law on how
Garcia-Rodriguez’s counsel ought to have prosecuted the motion to dismiss
was established at the time she attempted to argue that her client was entitled to
dismissal under Rule 4(B).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 13 of 19 [18] Yet, Garcia-Rodriguez’s trial counsel failed to follow our Supreme Court’s
instructions. Instead, she merely asserted to the trial court that its assessment of
which case had priority was erroneous. Counsel’s mere assertion to the trial
court, without including the CCS from Cause No. F3-4819 or asking the trial
court to take judicial notice of that CCS, was objectively unreasonable.
[19] Still, the State asserts that Garcia-Rodriguez received constitutionally sufficient
performance from his trial counsel because she took all the right steps in
prosecuting the speedy-trial motion save for “the single legal error at issue . . . .”
Appellee’s Br. at 14-15. We reject the State’s argument. While not all mistakes
rise to the level of constitutionally deficient performance, this mistake was the
entire and exclusive reason Garcia-Rodriguez’s Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss
failed, which denied him his Rule 4(B) speedy-trial right. And the stakes were
high—simply follow our Supreme Court’s instructions in Grimes, and counsel
could have obtained “dismissal” of the State’s charges against her client
altogether. Crim. R. 4(B). Her failure to do so was unreasonable and denied
Garcia-Rodriguez his constitutional guarantee to effective counsel.
2. The deficient performance of Garcia-Rodriguez’s counsel
denied him dismissal of the State’s charges that he otherwise
would have been entitled to as a matter of law.
[20] We thus turn to whether trial counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance
resulted in prejudice against Garcia-Rodriguez. Prejudice here means a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceedings below
would have resulted in a different outcome. Wilson, 157 N.E.3d at 1177. A
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 14 of 19
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. Id.
[21] Had Garcia-Rodriguez’s trial counsel included the CCS from Cause No. F3-4819 in her response to the trial court’s finding of congestion, that CCS would
have demonstrated that Cause No. F3-4819 was a non-speedy-trial criminal
case, albeit a longer pending one. The burden thus would have shifted to the
trial court to further justify its congestion finding. Here, the post-conviction
court stated that, had Garcia-Rodriguez’s trial counsel properly shifted the
burden back to the trial court, the court would have exercised its discretion to
prioritize F3-4819 over Garcia-Rodriguez’s speedy-trial case because F3-4819
was the longer pending case. The post-conviction court made no other findings
in support of prioritizing F3-4819, nor does the State suggest on appeal that any
other such findings could have been found from the record. See Appellee’s Br. at
18-19.
[22] Thus, whether counsel’s deficient performance resulted in prejudice against
Garcia-Rodriguez turns on whether the trial court had discretion to give priority
to Cause No. F3-4819. Regarding prioritization of cases involving Criminal
Rule 4, our Supreme Court has made clear:
The constitutional protections embodied by Criminal Rule 4 necessitate a
prioritized treatment when a defendant files a motion pursuant to Rule
4(B)—a treatment beyond simply assigning that defendant’s case
to the next presently vacant trial setting on the calendar.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 15 of 19
Rather, it must be assigned a meaningful trial date within
the time prescribed by the rule, if necessary superseding
trial dates previously designated for civil cases and even
criminal cases in which Criminal Rule 4 deadlines are not
imminent. We recognize, however, that emergencies in
either criminal or civil matters may occasionally interfere
with this scheme. Similarly, there may be major, complex
trials that have long been scheduled or that pose significant
extenuating circumstances to litigants and witnesses,
which will, on rare occasions, justify application of the
court congestion or exigent circumstances exceptions.
Clark [v. State], 659 N.E.2d [548,] 551-52 [(Ind. 1995)]. Thus,
courts recognize that Rule 4(B) does not necessarily present a
bright-line approach whereby all other cases must yield to the
defendant who files a speedy trial motion. McKay v. State, 714
N.E.2d 1182, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
For example, in the criminal arena speedy trial motions are
subject to their own internal prioritization. Where a longerincarcerated defendant moves for a speedy trial, his or her
request should generally take priority over a more recently
charged movant. But this would not necessarily be the case if,
say, the more recently charged defendant’s Criminal Rule 4
deadline was significantly more imminent and there remained
time after that deadline to hold the trial of the longer-incarcerated
defendant before his or her deadline. See James v. State, 716
N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ind. 1999). Where the trial court’s calendar can
satisfy both Rule 4 deadlines, the longer-incarcerated defendant
need not necessarily go first. After all, Rule 4 effectuates a
“speedy” trial—not necessarily the “next” trial. But at the same
time, and absent extenuating circumstances, a defendant seeking a speedy
trial would almost invariably be entitled to a trial setting ahead of any
criminal defendant who had not filed a Rule 4 motion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 16 of 19
Similarly, “[a]lthough the right of the accused to a speedy trial
stands higher than similar rights of civil litigants, civil settings
need not always give way to criminal settings required by the
time limitations in Crim. R. 4.” Baker v. State, 590 N.E.2d 1126,
1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Gill v. State, 267 Ind. 160, 165,
368 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (1977)). In addition to prioritizing the
long-scheduled, complex civil matters or those with extenuating
circumstances we referenced in Clark, civil settings must give way
to speedy trial motions only “where the continuance of the civil
trial will result in sufficient time to fully prepare for and
accommodate the criminal trial.” Gill, 267 Ind. at 165, 368
N.E.2d at 1162.
Nevertheless, “in order for the meaning of the rule not to be
eviscerated, it is essential that courts honor requests made for
speedy trials by scheduling trial dates within the time prescribed
by the rule.” McKay, 714 N.E.2d at 1188. And we therefore have
referred to this as a requirement that speedy trial motions receive
“particularized priority treatment.” Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 551. But
we do not intend to suggest that a trial judge must necessarily
wipe his or her calendar clean, or jam a trial into an opening in a
schedule or courtroom that lacks the space, time, and resources
to accommodate it. They must, however, be mindful of their
calendar and the seventy-day window and exercise all reasonable
diligence to preserve the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.
But at the same time, the aim of providing a speedy trial should
never risk an unfair or incomplete trial. Rather, the trial judge
should set the defendant’s trial for the first setting not already occupied by
a superseding speedy trial request or exceptional civil matter, or, if need
be, create a new trial setting if time allows for the availability of a
courtroom, witnesses, jury pool, and other necessary resources.
Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1040-41 (emphases added; alteration to Baker quote
original to Austin).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 17 of 19 [23] Our Supreme Court’s explanation in Austin for how to prioritize cases when at
least one Criminal Rule 4 case is involved is a mandate on this record: the trial
court had no discretion to prioritize Cause No. F3-4819, a non-speedy-trial
criminal case, over Garcia-Rodriguez’s speedy-trial case simply because Cause
No. F3-4819 was the longer pending case. Indeed, Cause No. F3-4819 was the
longer-pending case because the defendant filed or joined ten motions to
continue the jury trial, which accounted for nearly twenty-two months of delay.
Without a showing of an emergency or other extenuating circumstance, GarciaRodriguez’s Rule 4(B) request required the trial court to give his case
particularized priority treatment over Cause No. F3-4819.
[24] Thus, had Garcia-Rodriguez’s trial counsel followed our Supreme Court’s
instructions in Grimes and effectively put the burden back on the trial court to
support its finding of congestion, the trial court, as a matter of law, would not
have been able to do so. In other words, the trial counsel’s failure to properly
prosecute the Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss resulted in Garcia-Rodriguez not
receiving a dismissal of the State’s charges to which he otherwise would have
been entitled. But for his counsel’s failure, then, the result of the proceeding
would have been different: rather than standing convicted following a trial, the
trial court would have been required to dismiss the State’s charges against him.
Accordingly, the post-conviction court’s denial of Garcia-Rodriguez’s petition
is contrary to law.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 18 of 19
Conclusion
[25] For all of these reasons, we reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of GarciaRodriguez’s petition and remand with instructions for the court to grant his
petition.
[26] Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Amy E. Karozos
Public Defender of Indiana
Steven L. Nisi
Deputy Public Defender
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Andrew M. Sweet
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PC-1121 August 20, 2026 Page 19 of 19