[Cite as Gant v. Bolan, 2026-Ohio-3226.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
ARLINE BURKS GANT, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 115416
v. :
JOSEPH BOLAN, SR., ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellees. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 20, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-25-117946
Appearances:
Milton and Charlotte Kramer Law Clinic, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, Andrew S. Pollis,
Supervising Attorney, and Louden J. Keihl, Legal Intern,
for appellant.
Margaret E. Cooper, LLC, and Margaret E. Cooper, for
appellees.
LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:
Plaintiff-appellant Arline Burks Gant (“Gant”) appeals from the trial
court’s journal entry granting the defendants-appellees’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss (“Motion to Dismiss”) her amended complaint (“Amended Complaint”) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After a thorough review of
the facts alleged and the law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment granting the
motion to dismiss in part, affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
A. Amended Complaint
On May 20, 2025, Gant initiated this action, filing a 42-page
complaint against Judith Bolan, Joseph Bolan Sr., Storage Solutions Inc. of Ohio
(“Storage Solutions”), 69th Street Holding Group, and 69th Street Property
Portfolio (collectively, the “appellees”), asserting claims arising out of her storage of
property in a storage unit located at 2363 E. 69th Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44104.
On May 27, 2025, Gant filed an Amended Complaint. The Amended
Complaint is 13 pages in length. The first two pages are a description of her
grievances resulting from nonpayment of storage fees. The third page continues
with the discussion of grievances and contains references to exhibits, some of which
are attached. The remaining pages include an itemization of Gant’s property in
storage, photographs, excerpts of emails, and a document dated April 29, 2025,
titled “Notice of Lien and Intent to Sell Personal Property” (the “Second Lien
Notice”).
In her Amended Complaint, Gant alleged the following facts. Gant
placed her property in storage with Joseph Bolan Sr. and Judy Bolan (collectively, the “Bolans”). She did not specify when she placed her property in storage. Gant
acknowledged that she was “very delinquent in paying [her] storage fees,” admitting
that her last payment was in November 2023. The Bolans told her that “because
[she] had not paid [the fees] they used [her storage space] to store their cars.”
In February 2025, after 14 months of nonpayment, Gant asked the
Bolans what she owed them and “we began the process of getting out.” Gant alleged
that she and Judy Bolan arranged to meet, that she agreed to pay $10,000, and that
she would move the items out of the storage unit the “following day.” According to
Gant, this meeting did not occur.
Gant described several unsuccessful subsequent attempts to pay the
money owed. Gant “ask[ed] to pay a different way, to actually meet at the bank,”
and also “offered to meet at storage and go with them together.” However, the
Bolans refused to meet. When Gant attempted to pay by going on the storage site,
one of the Bolans’ employees was “flailing his arms and yelling” at her in a “very
threatening manner,” and “told [her] the Bolans had just called him and told him to
tell [her] to go away.” Gant next offered to put money in an escrow account until she
could confirm that her belongings were still in the storage unit. Gant claimed that
the Bolans “refus[ed] to be paid face to face on site and only excepting [sic] wire
transfers (text) sent to (?) where I wasn’t sure!”
Gant alleged she was given a new date of April 17, 2025, to pay $7,500,
“at which point [she] would be allowed to enter the room and inspect [her] things, [and] the remaining $2,500 (total $10,000) would be due in 2 weeks at which point
[she] would be able to move.”
Gant explained that her only request to the Bolans was that she
receive photos of her things prior to making payment. Gant received photos of her
items but had “issues” with the appearance of her property, including a missing
piano and property that appeared out of place. Gant informed the Bolans of her
concerns but still agreed to pay the $10,000. However, the Bolans again changed
the “payoff arrangement[,] this time moving the payment of the initial $7,500 to be
sent by wire the following Monday the 21[st of April].”
Gant stated that she contacted the police on April 18, 2025. The police
communicated with the Bolans, who informed the officer that Gant was to make
payment to their attorney, Margaret Cooper (“Cooper”), on April 21, 2025.
However, when Gant spoke with Cooper on April 18, 2025, Cooper told her that she
now had to pay $11,300. Gant contacted the police again on April 18, 2025, and this
time also filed a police report.
On April 22, 2025, Gant “received [l]ien paperwork from [Cooper]”
who was counsel for Storage Solutions (the “First Lien Notice”). Gant alleged that
the lien paperwork is not signed by a judge and “list[s] a fake phone number as the
contact . . . for payment[].” Gant contended that, as a result, she “had no way of
following the lien guidelines on how to remedy this lien.” Gant received the Second
Lien Notice dated April 29, 2025, which she attached to the Amended Complaint.
The Second Lien Notice is addressed to “Ms. Arline Gant” and “Ms. Dakota Gant[,] c/o Arline Gant,” and states, in pertinent part, that it was sent on behalf of Storage
Solutions through Cooper, its lawyer, and that
[t]his letter serves as formal notice that you are in default under the
terms of your rental agreement with Storage Solutions Inc. of Ohio for
the storage unit located at:
Unit #: IRI/ Tool Room
Facility Address: 2363 E 69th Street
The Second Lien Notice explains that Gant owes a total of $11,249.40
and that her date of last payment was November 2023, and that pursuant to
R.C. 5322.03, the property stored in the above-listed unit is now subject to a lien in
favor of Storage Solutions. The letter describes generally the items stored in the unit
as furniture, art, instruments, boxes, household goods, and tools. The letter also
states that if payment is not received within ten days, the stored property “may be
sold at public or private sale, or otherwise disposed of, to satisfy the lien.” However,
the notice provides a specific deadline for payment of May 13, 2025, which is 14 days
after the date of the letter. The Second Lien Notice further specifies that to avoid
sale or disposal, Gant must also contact the listed number to make arrangements no
later than May 13, 2025. The sentence “[p]ay the total amount due of $11,249.40”
is the only sentence that appears in larger, more conspicuous font. Further, the
letter states that
[t]his notice has been sent via verified email, as permitted under Ohio
Revised Code § 5322.03. Notice was sent previously via certified mail
to 31400 Jackson, Moreland Hills, OH 44022, but was returned as you
have not provided us with a valid forwarding address per the terms of
the signed rental agreement. This notice was originally sent 4/22/2025
and has been updated in this notice with a different phone number.
Gant alleged she is “being scammed,” adding that Cooper and the
Bolans sent her “scandalous text [sic] accusing [her] of lying, racial undertones, lie
after lie . . . .” Cooper refused to schedule an appointment in her office and told Gant
that her “only other option is to send the money to [Cooper,] and after she receives
and cashes it will [sic] she only than [sic] send [Gant] a receipt.”
Gant’s Amended Complaint concludes that she does not owe the
Bolans money, noting that she has attempted to pay on numerous occasions, adding
that she now has “attorney fees and so much more.” She stated that the Bolans owe
her “$65,000 [sic] the cost of the art, grand piano and so much more.”
B. Motion to Dismiss
Appellees’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss argued that the
Amended Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and
asked the court to dismiss all claims with prejudice.
In their Motion to Dismiss, Appellees asserted that the Amended
Complaint “stems from the enforcement of a self-storage lien arising under a
commercial lease executed on May 15, 2021.” Appellees argued that Gant admitted
to failing to pay rent beginning in November 2023, and that they “properly invoked
[their] statutory lien rights under the Ohio Self-Service Storage Facility Act,
R.C. Ch. 5322, including issuance of statutory notices, an opportunity to cure, and a
lawful public auction.”
Appellees asserted that Gant’s Amended Complaint did not set forth
cognizable legal claims and “consists of a single paragraph of disjointed grievances, lacking articulated claims, legal theories, or factual support.” Although Appellees
argue that Gant failed to set forth cognizable claims, they nevertheless “decipher
what claims might possibly be intended and [ ] respond as if those claims had been
properly pled.” Gant did not appear to disagree with the claims suggested by the
Appellees but disputed their entitlement to dismissal.
The court granted Appellees’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss,
finding that “even construing the complaint and amended complaint liberally,
plaintiff’s complaint and amended complaint fail to cogently state a claim for relief
or allege facts sufficient to state any cognizable legal action upon which relief can be
granted.”
It is from this order that Gant appeals, raising one assignment of error
for our review: “The trial court erred by dismissing Gant’s amended complaint
under Civ.R. 12 (B)(6).”
II. Law and Analysis
A. Pro Se Litigants
Initially, we note that Gant acted pro se in the trial court. This court
has previously recognized
a pro se litigant may face certain difficulties when choosing to represent
oneself. Although a pro se litigant may be afforded reasonable latitude,
there are limits to a court’s leniency. Henderson v. Henderson, 11th
Dist. Geauga No. 2012-G-3118, 2013-Ohio-2820, ¶ 22. Pro se litigants
are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and
are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by
counsel. In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 138
Ohio St.3d 43, 2013-Ohio-5478, 3 N.E.3d 173, ¶ 22.
Saeed v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2017-Ohio-935, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.).
Nevertheless, “‘courts afford pro se litigants some leeway in
construing their filings . . . .’” Rasheed v. Robinson, 2025-Ohio-3284, ¶ 21 (8th
Dist.), quoting Djurin v. Ginley, 2023-Ohio-1041, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). “‘But that leeway
manifests in limited ways including attempting to address a pro se litigant’s
arguments on the merits when they are indecipherable . . . .’” Id. at ¶ 21, quoting
State ex rel. Neil v. French, 2018-Ohio-2692, ¶ 11.
B. Standard of Review — Motion to Dismiss
Civ.R. 8(A) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief . . . .” Further,
“[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” Civ.R. 8(E)(1).
Civ.R. 8(A) must be read in conjunction with the remaining sections of Civ.R. 8,
including Civ.R. 8(F) that provides “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.”
Civ.R. 8 is a liberal pleading rule. Bowers Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Chuparkoff, 2010-Ohio-419, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.). Under the rule’s liberal pleading
requirements, a plaintiff must merely set forth operative facts in her complaint
“which give fair notice of the action . . . .” Id., quoting Truax v. Arora, 1993 Ohio
App. LEXIS 2059, *5 (9th Dist. Apr. 7, 1993). “Any legal theory applicable to the
stated facts will support a recovery.” Truax at id.; Vagas v. Hudson, 2009-Ohio6794, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.) (A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss as long as it “sets
forth adequate facts demonstrating a claim for relief.”). If a complaint does not comply with Civ.R. 8(A), it may be dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). See Doe
v. Greenville City Schools, 2022-Ohio-4618, ¶ 7-8.
A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests
the sufficiency of a complaint. Assn. for Defense of Washington Local School Dist.
v. Kiger, 42 Ohio St.3d 116 (1989). The Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal of a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate if, after
presuming the truth of all factual allegations of the complaint and making all
reasonable inferences in a nonmoving party’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that
the nonmoving party could prove no set of facts entitling the moving party to the
requested relief. Rosen v. Celebrezze, 2008-Ohio-853, ¶ 13. In considering a
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, the court “‘is limited to the four corners of the
complaint along with any documents properly attached to, or incorporated within,
the complaint.’” Figgie v. Figgie, 2021-Ohio-1812, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), quoting Lakeside
Produce Distrib. v. Wirtz, 2021-Ohio-505, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.).
On appeal, our review of the trial court’s decision regarding a
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion is de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 2004-Ohio-4362,
¶ 5. “De novo review means that this court uses the same standard that the trial
court should have used, and we examine the evidence to determine if as a matter of
law no genuine issues exist for trial.” Brewer v. Cleveland City School Bd. of Edn.,
122 Ohio App.3d 378, 383 (8th Dist. 1997), citing Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co.,
64 Ohio St.2d 116, 119-120 (1980). In other words, we review the trial court’s
decision without according the trial court any deference. 6750 BMS, L.L.C. v. Drentlau, 2016-Ohio-1385, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing Brown v. Cty. Commrs., 87 Ohio
App.3d 704, 711 (4th Dist. 1993).
We note that documents properly incorporated into the complaint
may be considered in conducting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) analysis. Reynolds v. Kamm,
2023-Ohio-3797, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). “Any written instrument attached to a pleading
pursuant to Civ.R. 10(C) & (D) is part thereof for pleading purposes.” Keenan v.
Adecco Emp. Servs., 2006-Ohio-3633, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.). However, “‘not every
document attached to a pleading constitutes a . . . written instrument’” for purposes
of considering whether the document is deemed to be incorporated into the
complaint. Reynolds at ¶ 15, quoting State ex rel. Leneghan v. Husted, 2018-Ohio3361, ¶ 17. “A written instrument ‘has primarily been interpreted to include
documents that evidence the parties’ rights and obligations, such as negotiable
instruments, “insurance policies, leases, deeds, promissory notes, and contracts.”’”
Id., quoting id., quoting Inskeep v. Burton, 2008-Ohio-1982, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.).
In assessing whether the Amended Complaint states a claim upon
which relief may be granted, we limit our analysis to the description of events and
allegations on pages 1-3 and the Lien Notice on pages 11-12. While the Lien Notice
addresses the parties’ rights and obligations pursuant to R.C. 5322.03, the
remaining pages, which include numerous emails and photographs, do not
constitute written instruments. See Berick v. Engwiller Props., Inc., 2025-Ohio1989, ¶ 14, 15 (5th Dist.) (Civ.R. 10(D) “does not provide for the attachment and
incorporation of unauthenticated photographs to the pleadings.”); see also State ex rel. Maynard v. Medina Courthouse Steering Commt., 2020-Ohio-5562, ¶ 15 (9th
Dist.) (Email was not a “written instrument” under Civ.R. 10(C).); Davis v. Widman,
2009-Ohio-5430, ¶ 18 (3d Dist.) (holding that photographs are neither accounts nor
written instruments under Civ.R. 10(C)-(D)).
C. Gant’s Claims
On appeal, Gant argues that although she did not name specific
causes of action in her Amended Complaint, she “detailed facts and attached several
documents to support her claims” for breach of contract, conversion, and statutory
violations of R.C. Ch. 5322.
1. Conversion and R.C. 5322.03
Gant argues on appeal that the Amended Complaint has sufficiently
pled facts to support a claim for conversion, as well as a claim under R.C. 5322.03.
We review these arguments together because they are interrelated.
“Conversion is the ‘“wrongful control or exercise of dominion over the
property belonging to another inconsistent with or in denial of the rights of the
owner.”’” Figgie, 2021-Ohio-1812, at ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), quoting Poston ex rel. Poston
v. Shelby-Love, 2017-Ohio-6980, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), quoting Beavers v. PNC Bank,
N.A., 2013-Ohio-5318, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.). The elements of a conversion are “(1)
plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of conversion;
(2) defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff’s property
rights; and (3) damages.” Haul Transport of Va., Inc. v. Morgan, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2240, *9 (June 2, 1995), quoting 18 Am.Jur.2d, Conversion, § 2, at 146-147
(1985).
R.C. 5322.02(A) states that
[t]he owner of a self-service storage facility has a lien against the
occupant on the personal property stored pursuant to a rental
agreement in any storage space at the self-service storage facility, or on
the proceeds of the personal property subject to the defaulting
occupant’s rental agreement in the owner’s possession, for rent labor,
late fees, or other charges in relation to the personal property that are
specified in the rental agreement . . . .
R.C. 5322.02(A).
“R.C. 5322.03 provides that the owner’s lien created by
R.C. 5322.02(A) for a claim that has become due may be enforced pursuant to the
terms stated in R.C. 5322.03 regarding notification, advertisement, and sale
procedures.” Cirotto v. Am. Self Storage of Pickerington, 2025-Ohio-1670, ¶ 46
(10th Dist.). In other words, if the owner of a self-storage facility does not follow the
procedures set forth in R.C. 5322.03, it cannot enforce its owner’s lien against the
occupant of the unit. See Drentlau, 2016-Ohio-1385, at ¶ 37 (8th Dist.).
The lien enforcement procedures under R.C. 5322.03 require that
notice is given to all persons who claim an interest in the property. Relevant for our
purposes, the notice must include:
(1) The name and last known address of the occupant who rented the
storage space in which the personal property was stored;
(2) An itemized statement of the owner’s claim showing the sum due at
the time of the notice and the date when the sum became due;
(3) A brief and general description of the personal property subject to
the lien . . .
(4) A notice of denial of access to the personal property, if denial of
access is permitted under the terms of the rental agreement, which
notice provides the name, street address, and telephone number of the
person whom the person notified may contact to pay the claim and to
either obtain the personal property or enter into a rental agreement for
the storage of the personal property;
(5) A demand for payment within a specified time not less than ten days
after delivery of the notice;
(6) A conspicuous statement that unless the claim is paid within that
time the personal property will be advertised for sale and will be sold
by auction and that, if no person purchases the personal property at the
auction, the personal property may be sold at a private sale or
destroyed; [and]
(7) The street or internet address of the place at which the sale will be
held, if the sale will be held at a place other than the self-service storage
facility in which the personal property was stored.
R.C. 5322.03(C).
On appeal, Gant correctly asserts that R.C. 5322.03 delineates a
process whereby an owner of a storage facility may enforce a lien on the property
stored therein pursuant to a rental agreement and that R.C. 5322.03(O)(2)
establishes that “an owner who fails to comply with the R.C. 5322.03 sale process
requirements is liable for damages and, when the violation is willful, [is] liable for
conversion.”
Gant admitted, in her Amended Complaint, that after she became
delinquent in her rent for the storage unit in November 2023, the Bolans “agreed to
give me a chance each time I could not follow through. They also said because I had
not paid they used it to store their cars.” Beginning in February 2025, when Gant
attempted to satisfy her debt to the Bolans, the Bolans refused to accept her payment and precluded access to her property. On appeal, Gant argues that she “relied on a
renegotiation of the lease terms, but the Bolans repeatedly dishonored that
renegotiation, preventing her from making rental payment.”
Moreover, Gant argues on appeal that in late April 2025 the Bolans’
attorney sent Gant the Second Lien Notice, which “invoked R.C. 5322.03 to support
the initiation of a lien on Ms. Gant’s property in favor of the Defendants.” However,
she argues that the Appellees did not follow the procedure under R.C. 5322.03 to
properly enforce a lien on her property, identifying the following defects in the
Second Lien Notice: (1) lack of itemized statement showing the sum due, (2) lack of
conspicuous auction warning, and (3) failure to include a denial of access
advisement.
Appellees respond that the claim for conversion fails as a matter of
law because “[c]onversion requires wrongful dominion,” which did not occur here
because both the lease and Ohio law authorize denial of access and disposition of
stored property upon default of payment. Appellees also argue that Gant never
contended in her Amended Complaint that R.C. 5322.03 was violated, but that she
merely “labels the lien “fraudulent” and seeks damages, but . . . does not identify a
specific contractual provision that . . . [was] breached,” and does not “articulate
statutory damages elements.”
We disagree with the Appellees’ argument that Gant did not allege
facts which, if proven true, would establish claims for conversion or violation of
R.C. 5322.03. While R.C. 5322.03 does provide a mechanism whereby an owner of a self-storage facility may enforce a lien on stored property, ultimately resulting in
the auctioning or destruction of property, the statute provides specific requirements
that must be met to legally effectuate the disposition of property. This includes
certain notices that Gant alleges were not provided to her. For example, Gant
asserted in the Amended Complaint that the First Lien Notice did not include a
working telephone number of the person who may be contacted to pay the claim,
and as a result she “had no way of following the lien guidelines on how to remedy
this lien.” Additionally, a review of the Second Lien Notice sent by counsel for
Storage Solutions confirms that it did not include the statutorily required (1)
itemized statement showing the sum due, (2) conspicuous auction warning, and (3)
denial of access advisement.1
Moreover, not only did Gant allege she was improperly denied access
to her property after the issuance of the lien notices beginning in April 2025, Gant’s
Amended Complaint asserted that she was denied access to her property beginning
in February 2025, when a storage facility employee yelled at her told her to “go
away.” Gant’s Amended Complaint alleged that a denial of access was ongoing while
she made numerous unsuccessful attempts to pay her debt.
1 Regarding denial of access, we simply note that the Second Lien Notice does not
include such an advisement. We express no opinion as to whether denial of access is permitted under the terms of the rental agreement so as to require such an advisement. See R.C. 5322.03(C)(4). Moreover, we disagree with Appellees’ assertion that R.C. Ch. 5322 authorizes denial of access and disposition of stored property upon default of payment. As discussed, R.C. 5322.03 imposes specific requirements on the party seeking to deny access and dispose of stored property.
Therefore, presuming the truth of all factual allegations in the
Amended Complaint and making all reasonable inferences in Gant’s favor, we find
that the trial court erred in dismissing Gant’s claims for conversion and violations
of R.C. 5322.03 under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
2. Breach of Contract
Gant also argues that her Amended Complaint has sufficiently pled a
breach-of-contact claim. We agree.
“A contract is generally defined as a promise, or a set of promises,
actionable upon breach. Essential elements of a contract include an offer,
acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained for legal benefit
and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual assent and legality of object and of
consideration.’” Kostelnik v. Helper, 2002-Ohio-2985, ¶ 16, quoting Perlmuter
Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc., 436 F.Supp. 409, 414 (N.D.Ohio 1976). “A meeting of
the minds as to the essential terms of the contract is a requirement to enforcing the
contract.” Id. at ¶ 16, citing Episcopal Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of
Indus. Relations, 61 Ohio St. 3d 366, 369 (1991).
An oral agreement may be enforceable “if there is sufficient
particularity to form a binding contract.” Kostelnik at ¶ 15, citing Spercel v. Sterling
Indus., Inc., 31 Ohio St.2d 36, 39 (1972). The terms of an oral contract can be
determined from the “‘words, deeds, acts, and silence of the parties.’” Kostelnik at
¶ 15, quoting Rutledge v. Hoffman, 81 Ohio App. 85, 86-87 (12th Dist. 1947).
“A contract may be altered . . . by a subsequent modification to its
terms.” Trader v. People Working Cooperatively, 104 Ohio App.3d 690,694 (1st
Dist. 1994). For a contract modification to be binding, “it must be supported by
consideration.” Id. at 694-695.
Finally, “[t]o prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff
must prove: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3)
breach by the defendant and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff.” Gurary v. John
Carroll Univ., 2024-Ohio-3114, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.). However, “if a contract is
comprised of mutual dependent promises . . . then a party is not in default until the
other party tenders performance.” 2 Carter v. New Buckeye Redevelopment Corp.,
1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1414, *9 (8th Dist. Apr. 2, 1998), citing Young v. Brookshire,
101 Ohio App.3d 458, 461 (12th Dist. 1995).
As a threshold matter, we note that Appellees repeatedly reference a
storage lease agreement in their appellee brief. However, the lease was neither
described, nor attached to the Amended Complaint, and is thus not contained within
the “four corners of the complaint.”3 We, therefore, cannot consider it for purposes
of our review of the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.
2 The word “tender” means a “readiness and willingness to perform in the case of
the concurrent performance by the other party, with present ability to do so, and notice to the other party of such readiness.” Raudabaugh v. Hart, 61 Ohio St. 73, 88 (1899), syllabus.
3 Pursuant to Civ.R. 10(D), to the extent Gant alleged a breach of the original
storage agreement, the agreement should have been attached to the Amended Complaint. It was not. However, the remedy for such a failure is not a dismissal under
Gant argues on appeal that she delayed payment on the storage lease
in reliance on a renegotiation of the original agreement. When she attempted to
satisfy her debt to the Bolans, the Bolans prevented her from making payment and
precluded access to her property.
Gant contends on appeal that, as set forth in the Amended Complaint,
the “Bolans had an agreement with her to pay the back rent she accrued.” Although
she “attempted to honor the agreement by paying multiple times . . . the Bolans
continued to alter the amount, timing, and method of payment.” Thus, the Bolans
breached their contract with Gant by failing to “perform their side of the agreement.”
In response, Appellees argue that Gant admitted to being “very
delinquent” in paying storage fees and “allow[ing] an extended period of
nonpayment to accrue,” and that the Amended Complaint merely describes a “series
of ongoing payment negotiations that never ripened into a binding obligation.”
Therefore, according to the Appellees, Gant neither pleads an enforceable
modification nor a wholly new agreement. We disagree.
Gant admitted in the Amended Complaint that she was delinquent in
paying storage fees for the property that she was storing with the Bolans. This
implies that an agreement existed between Gant and the Bolans for storage of her
property. Gant also asserted, in the Amended Complaint, that the Bolans modified
that original agreement when they “agreed to give [Gant] a chance each time [she]
Civ.R. 12(B)(6), but a motion to a more definite statement under Civ.R. 12(E). See Spit Shine A Detailer, L.L.C. v. Rick Case Hyundai, 2017-Ohio-888, ¶ 11-12 (8th Dist.). could not follow through” on payment, further claiming that because “[she] had not
paid [the Bolans they] used it to store their cars.” The Amended Complaint further
alleged that after more than a year of nonpayment, the Bolans agreed to allow Gant
to “pay $10,000 and move out the following day,” but later repeatedly changed the
method of payment and amount due, eventually demanding payment of $11,249.40.
The Amended Complaint described a series of unsuccessful attempts by Gant to pay
and a continued denial of access to her property. Gant claimed a $65,000 loss for
the items in the storage unit.
Additionally, we note that Gant’s failure to perform her end of the
modified agreement (i.e., to pay the amount owed) is not fatal to her breach-ofcontract claim. Gant set forth allegations in her Amended Complaint that, if true,
establish that Gant was ready and willing to perform, had the “present ability” to
perform, and notified the Bolans of “such readiness.” See Raudabaugh, 61 Ohio St.
at 88. The Amended Complaint lays out several attempts by Gant, beginning in
February 2025, to pay the money owed on the storage unit in accord with the
instructions provided by defendants. Despite Gant’s attempts to perform on the
modified agreement, she alleged she was prevented from doing so by the Bolans.
Taking all of Gant’s factual assertions as true, she has sufficiently pled
a breach of contract. We, therefore, find that the court erred in granting the motion
to dismiss Gant’s breach-of-contract claim.
D. The Defendants
Finally, we address defendants the 69th Street Holding Group and the
69th Street Property Portfolio. Gant has alleged no facts whatsoever against either
of these entities. Because the Amended Complaint does not identify any conduct on
the part of the 69th Street Holding Group or the 69th Street Property Portfolio, we
affirm the trial court’s decision finding Gant failed to state a claim against either
entity. The assignment of error challenging the trial court’s dismissal of the case, as
against appellants 69th Street Holding Group and 69th Street Property Portfolio, is
overruled.
For the reasons set forth above, Gant’s assignment of error
challenging the trial court’s dismissal of the Amended Complaint with respect to the
claims of conversion, violation of R.C. Ch. 5322 and breach of contract as against
appellants Judith Bolan, Joseph Bolan Sr., and Storage Solutions Inc. of Ohio is
sustained.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellees and appellant share costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR