Slip Op. 26-100
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
INSPIRED VENTURES, LLC,
Plaintiff,
Before: Lisa W. Wang, Judge
v.
Court No. 24-00062
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
[Granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.]
Dated: August 20, 2026
Elon A. Pollack, Stein Shostak Shostak Pollack & O’Hara, LLP, of Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff Inspired Ventures, LLC.
Alexander J. Vanderweide, Senior Trial Counsel, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of New York, NY, for Defendant United States. With him on the brief were Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Justin R. Miller, Attorney-In-Charge, International Trade Field Office. Of counsel on the brief was Zachary S. Simmons, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Wang, Judge: This action stems from U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s
(“Customs”) actions with respect to two entries, Entry Nos. AVV-0053438-1 (“Entry 1”)
and AVV-0053445-6 (“Entry 2”), of certain rubber tires from the People’s Republic of
China (“PRC”) that Plaintiff Inspired Ventures, LLC, seeks to import into the United
States. On January 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
CIT Rule 56(a), arguing that: (1) it “has satisfied the applicable requirements to enter its Court No. 24-00062 Page 2
tires and the [g]overnment’s continued refusal to release the goods is without
justification[;]” and (2) the court should “order the tires be released immediately and all
storage and related expenses … either waived or borne by Defendant.” Pl.’s Mot. for
Summ. J. and Accompanying Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mot.”) at
3, 8, ECF No. 48.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted in
part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The court presumes familiarity with the facts of this case as set out in both its
previous opinion denying Defendant United States’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, and the court’s memorandum and order granting Plaintiff’s motion for
referral to court-annexed mediation. Inspired Ventures, LLC v. United States, 739 F.
Supp. 3d 1343 (CIT 2024); Mem. and Order Granting Pl.’s Mot. for Referral to Ct.-Annexed Mediation, ECF No. 34. The court recounts those facts relevant to its
consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff, “a Wyoming limited liability corporation[,] … is the consignee, purchaser,
and importer of the subject merchandise.” Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 5. In November 2023,
Plaintiff attempted to import certain rubber tires from the PRC, which were assigned
entry numbers AVV-0053438-1 and AVV-0053445-6. Id. ¶¶ 11–12; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s
Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Resp.”) at 1, ECF No. 50; Declaration of Gregg A. Cummings
(“Cummings Declaration”) ¶¶ 1–2, ECF No. 48-3.
Court No. 24-00062 Page 3
On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed its complaint in this action, challenging
Customs’ alleged exclusion of Entries 1 and 2. Compl. ¶¶ 18–23. Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on May 13, 2024. Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss and Accompanying Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 10. The
court denied Defendant’s motion on October 30, 2024. Inspired Ventures, 739 F. Supp.
3d at 1357–1358.
On April 17, 2025, in a joint status report, the parties informed the court that they
agreed that the tires in both entries “are properly marked in accordance with 49 C.F.R. §
574.5(g), the lack of which [initially] formed the basis for the tires being detained as
inadmissible.” Joint Status Rep. (Apr. 17, 2025) at 4–5, ECF No. 30.
On April 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the court refer this
action to court-annexed mediation. Pl.’s Mot. for Referral to Ct.-Annexed Mediation,
ECF No. 32. Defendant filed its response in opposition on May 9, 2025. Def.’s Resp. to
Pl.’s Mot. for Referral to Ct.-Annexed Mediation, ECF No. 33. The court granted
Plaintiff’s motion for referral to court-annexed mediation on May 19, 2025. Mem. and
Order Granting Pl.’s Mot. for Referral to Ct.-Annexed Mediation.
The court extended its referral to mediation four times. Orders Extending the
Referral to Mediation, ECF Nos. 35–38. On October 9, 2025, Judge Claire R. Kelly, who
served as Judge Mediator in this matter, filed a report of mediation informing the court
that “[t]he mediation did not result in a settlement[.]” Report of Mediation, ECF No. 41.
On December 18, 2025, the parties filed a joint status report and proposed
scheduling order. Joint Status Rep. (Dec. 18, 2025), ECF No. 46. In the joint status Court No. 24-00062 Page 4
report, Defendant asserted that the tires in Entry 1 and Entry 2 were undervalued. Id. at
2–3.
On January 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting
that the court “order the tires be released immediately and all storage and related
expenses … waived or borne by Defendant.” Pl.’s Mot. at 8. In its motion, Plaintiff noted
that Customs had liquidated the entries at the value “as entered.” Id. at 7.
Defendant filed its response to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on March
2, 2026. Def.’s Resp. In its response, Defendant noted that:
In preparing the [g]overnment’s anticipated cross-motion to dismiss and
response to Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, [Customs] learned for the
first time that the aforementioned entries were inadvertently liquidated in
June 2025. Consequently the issue of the declared valuation is now final
and conclusive … and the question of whether the declared values of the
subject tires are consistent with applicable law is now moot. For this reason,
the [g]overnment no longer contests Plaintiff’s declared values.
Id. at 1 (internal citations omitted).
Having agreed that the issue of valuation was no longer in dispute, Defendant
proposed that the court order: (1) “Plaintiff remit[] to [Customs] … the antidumping and
countervailing duty [“AD/CVD”] amounts owed, and to date, not paid on [Entry 2]”;
(2) that “[w]ithin 10 days of [Customs’] receipt of [that amount], [Customs] … issue a
disposition order to release the subject tires in [Entry 1] and [Entry 2]” and “waive all
storage fees accrued with respect to the subject entries”; and (3) that “[w]ithin 10 days
of issuance of the disposition order to release the subject tires, Plaintiff … remit
payment to CBP in the amount of $11,095.76[,]” which “represents the regular duties,
taxes, fees, and interest owed, and to date, not paid on Entry [2].” Id. at 2. Court No. 24-00062 Page 5
Plaintiff filed its reply on March 20, 2026. Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Mot.
for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 52. Defendant filed a reply on May 1, 2026. Def.’s
Reply, ECF No. 54.
JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court has jurisdiction over this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) provides that
“[t]he Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action
commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section 515 of
the Tariff Act of 1930.” Plaintiff brings this action under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). Compl.
¶ 10; see Inspired Ventures, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 1349–1358.
The court will grant a motion for summary judgment when “the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” CIT R. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247–250 (1986). In considering whether material facts are in dispute, “all evidence
must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment[,]” with the court drawing all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s
favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 261, n.2. Per CIT Rule 56(c)(1), “[a] party asserting that a
fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to
particular parts of materials in the record …; or (B) showing that the materials cited do
not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party
cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”
Court No. 24-00062 Page 6
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the court should grant its motion for summary judgment and
order Customs to release both entries, contending that: (1) Customs has already
released both entries; (2) the legal basis for Entry 1 to be released has been met; and
(3) “payment is not a prerequisite to secure the release” of Entry 2. Pl.’s Reply at 1–3;
Pl.’s Mot. at 3. Defendant responds that: (1) it disputes that the subject merchandise
has been released; (2) the court should not order Entry 1 released until required duties
have been paid on Entry 2; and (3) payment is a prerequisite for the release of Entry 2.
Def.’s Reply at 2–3; Def.’s Resp. at 2.
The court addresses each issue in turn.
I. Customs Has Not Released Entries 1 and 2
A threshold issue before the court is whether the subject merchandise has been
“released” by Customs.
Plaintiff contends that “[Customs] released the tires imported on [Entry 1] on
February 22, 2024” and “the tires on [Entry 2] on August 8, 2024.” Pl.’s Reply at 1.
Plaintiff argues that “[i]t is fiction that [Customs] can demand payment as a prerequisite
for goods it has already released.” Id. at 2.1
Defendant argues that Customs never released either entry. Def.’s Reply at 2–3.
1 Elsewhere in its submissions to the court, Plaintiff, and sources relied upon by Plaintiff,
state that the merchandise has not been released and maintain that Customs continues to retain custody over the merchandise. See e.g., Pl.’s Mot. at 3 (“the Government’s continued refusal to release the goods is without justification.”); Cummings Declaration ¶¶ 5–6.
Court No. 24-00062 Page 7
Disposition of this issue hinges on the legal meaning of the term “released” in the
context of relevant statutes governing the entry of merchandise into the United States.
In the absence of a statutory definition of a term, as found here, the court must use the
“relevant interpretive tools” to reach “the best reading of the statute and resolve …
ambiguity.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 373 (2024). Those
interpretive tools include “the statute’s text, … statute’s structure, canons of statutory
construction, and legislative history.” Timex V.I. v. United States, 157 F.3d 879, 882
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
The relevant statutes are clear that merchandise is “released” only if certain legal
requirements related to the merchandise have been met. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1499(a)(1)
(“Imported merchandise that is required by law or regulation to be inspected, examined,
or appraised shall not be delivered from customs custody … until the merchandise has
been inspected, appraised, or examined and is reported by the Customs Service to
have been truly and correctly invoiced and found to comply with the requirements of the
laws of the United States.”),1671h(a), 1673g(a).2 Further, merchandise is not released if
Customs retains custody over it. See 19 U.S.C. § 1499.
2 Pursuant to the statute, Customs has set forth regulations governing the legal
requirements necessary for release of merchandise into the U.S. market. Specifically, 19 C.F.R. § 142 lays out the specific entry requirements that those seeking to enter merchandise into the United States must meet, including, but not limited to: (1) the necessary documentation required to enter merchandise; (2) “[b]ond requirements”; and (3) “[i]nvoice requirements.”
Further, 19 C.F.R. § 142.7 provides that “[n]o merchandise for which the entry documentation required by § 142.3 has been filed shall be released until it has been examined, or until adequate samples have been taken in the case of merchandise Court No. 24-00062 Page 8
Here, Plaintiff fails to support its claims that the entries were “released” as a
matter of law. For Entry 1, Plaintiff relies on statements from a customs broker familiar
with the entries, Mr. Gregg A. Cummings, to support its claim that “[Customs] released
the tires imported on [Entry 1] on February 22, 2024.” Pl.’s Reply at 1. Despite relying
on Mr. Cumming’s statement that Customs’ hold on Entry 1 “was removed and the tires
were released[,]” Plaintiff fails to acknowledge the next sentence, which states,
“[h]owever, [Customs] did not release these tires.” Cummings Declaration ¶ 5 (emphasis
added). Plaintiff’s reliance on the former statement is insufficient to establish that Entry
1 was released from Customs’ custody as defined by the relevant statutes.
Similarly, for Entry 2, Plaintiff relies on statements from Mr. Cummings and his
emails to support its claim that “[t]he ACE [Automated Commercial Environment] report
attached as Exhibit 4 to [the Cummings Declaration] states that the tires in [Entry 2]
were released[.]” Pl.’s Reply at 2; Cummings Declaration, Exhibit 4. Here, again, Plaintiff
fails to acknowledge the statement of Mr. Cummings that “[i]n connection with [Entry 2],
we received an ACE transmission that on August 2, 2024, … Customs removed the
hold on the shipment. However, again Customs did not release these tires.” Cummings
Declaration ¶ 5 (citing Cummings Declaration, Exhibit 3) (emphasis added). Mr.
which is to be classified and appraised by means of samples, unless this requirement is waived by the port director ….”
19 U.S.C. § 1499, in relevant part, governs such examinations, including (1) how Customs shall conduct examinations and treat unspecified articles and deficiencies; (2) how importers can provide necessary information to ensure release of merchandise in accordance with the statute; and (3) procedures governing Customs detention of merchandise after examination. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1499(a), 1499(c).
Court No. 24-00062 Page 9
Cummings expressly summarized his experience with the subject merchandise as “[t]o
date, Customs has not released those tires to Inspired.” Id. ¶ 6.
Plaintiff’s reliance on the term “release” in colloquial communications is not
sufficient to show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with regard to whether
Entries 1 and 2 have been released by Customs under the relevant statutes.
II. Entry 1 Has Met the Requirements to be Released from Customs
The next issue before the court is whether Entry 1 should be released from
Customs’ custody.
Plaintiff argues that because Entry 1 has liquidated and Plaintiff has paid all
required duties on the entry, Defendant “has no legal basis to continue to withhold
delivery of the tires [in Entry 1] to [Plaintiff].” Pl.’s Reply at 3.
Defendant asserts no legal basis for Customs’ refusal to release Entry 1. See
generally Def.’s Resp., Def’s Reply. However, for policy reasons, Defendant requests
that the court not order Entry 1 released until Plaintiff has paid duties on Entry 2. Def.’s
Resp. at 2.
By law, Customs cannot refuse to release merchandise without asserting a basis
for doing so. 19 U.S.C. § 1499(a)(1) provides that:
Imported merchandise that is required by law or regulation to be inspected,
examined, or appraised shall not be delivered from customs custody … until
the merchandise has been inspected, appraised, or examined and is
reported by the Customs Service to have been truly and correctly invoiced
and found to comply with the requirements of the laws of the United States.
This provision establishes the basis for Customs to refuse the delivery of merchandise.
It follows that once Customs has determined that goods “have been truly and correctly Court No. 24-00062 Page 10
invoiced and found to comply with the requirements of the laws of the United States,”
Customs can no longer refuse to deliver the merchandise. 19 U.S.C. § 1499(a)(1).
There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the detention of Entry 1.
Both parties agree that Entry 1 is legally marked. Pl.’s Reply at 1; Def.’s Reply at 1.
They also agree that Entry 1 has liquidated and the valuation of the entry is final. Pl.’s
Reply at 1–3; Def.’s Resp. at 1. Finally, both parties agree that all required duties have
been deposited on Entry 1. Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 3, ECF No.
48-2. Defendant has not asserted that any other material facts are in dispute. See Def.’s
Resp., Def’s Reply.
Based on the undisputed facts, the legal basis for the release of Entry 1 has
been met. See 19 U.S.C. § 1499(a)(1). Entry 1 is therefore ordered released.
Plaintiff also requests that the court order “all storage [fees] and related
expenses … waived or borne by Defendant” in relation to Entry 1. Pl.’s Mot. at 8. Given
that: (1) Defendant has no legal basis for the continued detention of Entry 1; and (2)
Defendant has agreed that it is “amenable to expeditiously resolving this case in a
manner consistent with the relief that Plaintiff seeks in its motion for summary judgment,
to wit, release of the subject tires and a waiver of all storage fees for the entries at
issue[,]” the court orders all storage fees and other expenses related to Entry 1 waived
consistent with Defendant’s statement. Def.’s Resp. at 2.
Court No. 24-00062 Page 11
III. Entry 2 Has Not Met the Requirements to be Released from Customs
The final issue before the court is whether Entry 2 should be released from
Customs’ custody.
Plaintiff argues that “payment is not a prerequisite to secure release of the tires.”
Pl.’s Reply at 2. Plaintiff has previously asserted that while “[d]uties are not deposited
for [Entry 2]; payment of duty is not due until 10 days following release of freight.” Joint
Status Rep. (Dec. 18, 2025) at 5.
Defendant argues that “[Customs] cannot release the tires in [Entry 2] because
[Plaintiff] has not paid the outstanding duties owed for this entry, including AD/CVD,
which prevents the release of the tires until such payment is received.” Def.’s Reply at
3.
19 U.S.C. § 1673g(a) provides that “[f]or all entries, or withdrawals from
warehouse, for consumption of merchandise subject to an antidumping order on or after
the date of publication of such order, no customs officer may deliver merchandise of
that class or kind to the person by whom or for whose account it was imported unless
that person … deposits with the appropriate customs officer an estimated antidumping
duty in an amount determined by the administering authority.” 19 U.S.C. § 1671h(a)
establishes the same with regard to duties deposited under CVD orders.
The use of the language “no customs officer may” in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673g(a) and
1671h(a) explicitly prohibits Customs from releasing merchandise subject to AD/CVD
orders unless estimated antidumping and/or countervailing duties have been deposited
on that merchandise. Sunpreme Inc. v. United States, 946 F.3d 1300, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (citing both statutory provisions in support of the proposition that “Customs is Court No. 24-00062 Page 12
legally prohibited from releasing goods that are subject to an antidumping or
countervailing duty order, ambiguous or not, unless the importer pays a cash deposit.”).
There is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to this issue; both parties
agree that Plaintiff has not paid any duties on Entry 2. Joint Status Rep. (Dec. 18, 2025)
at 5; Def.’s Reply at 3. Plaintiff’s claim that “payment is not a prerequisite to secure
release of the tires” is antithetical to the plain language of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673g(a) and
1671h(a). See Pl.’s Reply at 2. Those statutory provisions bar Customs from releasing
merchandise prior to the deposit of antidumping and/or countervailing duties on
merchandise like that at issue here.
As such, Plaintiff is not entitled to the release of Entry 2 as a matter of law.
Plaintiff’s recourse is with the agency and all current claims related to the release of
Entry 2 are dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
/s/ Lisa W. Wang
Lisa W. Wang, Judge
Dated: August 20, 2026
New York, New York