In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00380-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF R.R., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 393rd District Court
Denton County, Texas1
Trial Court No. 22-6912-393, Honorable Tiffany Haertling, Presiding
August 19, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant, Dazie Diaz, appeals from the final order in a suit affecting the parentchild relationship. Appellee, Valente Ramirez Avila, did not file a response. The order
appointed Diaz and Avila joint managing conservators of R.R., set a week-on, week-off
possession schedule, allocated independent rights concerning the child’s medical, dental,
and other care, and required neither parent to pay child support. Diaz presents what we
construe as three issues: that material inaccuracies in the reporter’s record prevent
1 This case was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant to a docket
equalization order from the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. We apply that court’s precedent to the extent it conflicts with our own. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
meaningful appellate review, that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Avila
a joint managing conservator with week-long periods of possession, and that the trial
court denied her due process. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Diaz filed an original petition to determine conservatorship, possession, access,
and child support for R.R. Avila answered and counterpetitioned. Each parent asked to
be appointed sole managing conservator. Diaz further asked that Avila have no access
to the child, alleging a history or pattern of domestic violence. Avila asked that Diaz’s
possession be limited to daytime periods until she obtained stable housing.
R.R. was four years old at the time of trial. Her diagnoses include autism, cerebral
palsy, juvenile idiopathic arthritis, periventricular leukomalacia, and a seizure disorder
described as borderline epilepsy.
Diaz testified that R.R. came home from a visit with Avila with bruises on her leg,
which Diaz attributed to abuse. She never asked Avila how the bruises occurred,
explaining that she wished to keep the peace. She also acknowledged withholding R.R.
for the child’s safety, which cost Avila numerous weekends, Father’s Day, and his entire
summer possession up to the day of trial. R.R. lost her therapy, Diaz testified, “[p]rimarily
because of the nightmares [she] has been having . . . from the child abuse that occurred”
and because Avila failed to maintain health insurance. Of the “hundreds” of therapy
appointments R.R. had attended, Diaz estimated that Avila attended “maybe two
handfuls.” Avila gave a similar estimate, agreeing he had attended “about 10 or a few
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more,” and explained that he could take R.R. to her appointments if he had possession
of her.
Diaz testified that she left the relationship because Avila’s behavior “escalated to
violence” and because the isolation, control, and financial withholding worsened over
time. She clarified, however, that he was not physically abusive, and that what she
experienced was “a lot of property damage, intimidation tactics, [and] leaving his gun out
to make sure [she] could see it.” She also described a recording2 of Avila beating a dog
with a chain and throwing it out the front door after it urinated on the floor, but she agreed
the incident did not occur in front of R.R.
The trial court admitted two sets of messages between the parties. Diaz
characterized the first as showing Avila “blatantly and right out admitting to medical
negligence for [R.R.].” The message appears to concern his leaving the child’s helmet in
his vehicle; the record says little about the significance of that lapse. Diaz described the
second exchange as her “trying to be civil and trying to have a conversation,” which “ends
up where it’s him intimidating and trying to threaten [her].” In that exchange, Diaz asked
for Avila’s updated address, he declined to give it.3 Diaz then replied she would withhold
R.R. from the July visit, and Avila answered, “[Y]ou have until 6pm to bring [R.R.] or the
next time we go to court or [sic] the judge won’t be happy.”
2 No video was offered or admitted into evidence.
3 Although Appellee refused to provide his home address, he told Appellant that R.R. would be at
his parents’ house during the visit and provided that address.
3
Avila is employed by the Love County Sheriff’s Office and Marshall County EMS,
both in Oklahoma, and lives less than an hour’s drive from Denton. He testified that R.R.’s
bruises came from playing in the park. When he works, R.R. stays with his parents in
nearby Ponder, Texas, and he commutes from their home.
A Department of Family and Protective Services investigator also testified. She
stated that the allegations against Avila had been ruled out and that no safety plan
restricting his access to R.R. had been imposed. Neither party requested findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and none were filed.
ANALYSIS
A. The Reporter’s Record
Because Diaz’s remaining issues turn on the evidence developed at the final
hearing, we begin with her argument that the reporter’s record does not accurately reflect
the trial evidence. A party who believes the record is inaccurate must ordinarily seek
correction in the trial court. If the parties dispute the accuracy of the record, the appellate
court has discretion to submit the dispute to the trial court for resolution. TEX. R. APP. P.
34.6(e)(3). Diaz did not comply with the process for challenging the record.
Moreover, even if we accepted Diaz’s contention as true, we do not find any error
requiring correction. See Hilliard v. Holland, No. 02-03-00287-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS
10515, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 24, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.). Diaz directs us
to a single statement. Asked to identify the protective parent, the investigator is recorded
as saying, “I haven’t been able to personally speak with the biological father, but he seems
concerned and protective.” Diaz maintains the investigator said, “she seems concerned
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and protective.” We decline to submit the question to the trial court. Assessing which
parent struck the investigator as concerned and protective would not alter our disposition,
because the trial court remained free to weigh that impression against the balance of the
evidence. We overrule this issue.
B. Conservatorship and Possession
Diaz also contends the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Avila a joint
managing conservator, by awarding him week-long periods of possession, and by
allocating independent rights to each parent. We review possession and access orders
in suits affecting the parent-child relationship for an abuse of discretion. In re A.G.D.M.,
No. 07-24-00397-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 4, 2025, no
pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court abuses its discretion when the decision is arbitrary and
unreasonable or lacks reference to guiding principles. In re A.M., 604 S.W.3d 192, 196–
97 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied). Legal and factual sufficiency are not
independent grounds of reversal in this setting, but are factors bearing on whether the
court abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Tuttle, 602 S.W.3d 9, 12 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2020, no pet.). This standard requires us to affirm the trial court’s decision if it
is meritorious on any ground, including those not mentioned by either the trial court or the
parties. In re A.G.D.M., 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *3.4
The child’s best interest is always the primary consideration in determining
conservatorship, possession, and access. TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.002; Holley v. Adams,
4 We consider only the evidence presented at the final hearing.
See Moreno v. Perez, 363 S.W.3d
725, 735 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); In re M.B.D., 344 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2011, no pet.).
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544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). The Legislature has declared it the policy of this
State to assure children frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown
the ability to act in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.001(a). It has stated
that a court shall appoint both parents joint managing conservators “unless the court finds
that appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest of the child
because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical health or
emotional development” TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.131.
Diaz frames her appellate argument around the facts as she sees them, that R.R.
is a medically and developmentally vulnerable child and that Avila is a negligent and
abusive father. The trial court, as factfinder, was the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility and of the weight to give their testimony, was free to believe one witness over
another, and was charged with resolving conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Renteria,
726 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.). As this Court has
explained, “[b]ecause of the fact-intensive nature of reviewing family law issues, [we] must
afford great deference to the factfinder on issues of credibility and demeanor because the
child’s and parents’ behavior, experiences, and circumstances are conveyed through
words, emotions, and facial expressions that are not reflected in the record.” In re
Marriage of Featherston, 675 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2023, no pet.).
Because no party requested findings of fact, we imply every finding necessary to support
the judgment. In re W.C.B., 337 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).
Applied here, the evidence of physical abuse was for the trial court to weigh. The
proof that Avila harmed R.R. consists of the child’s return from a visit with bruises on her
leg. Diaz’s own evidence established that R.R. bruised frequently from falls, including
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repeated landings on the fireplace hearth. Avila denied hurting the child and testified that
the bruises came from playing in the park. The investigator testified that the allegations
against Avila had been ruled out without any restriction on his access. On that record,
the trial court could have declined to find abuse. See Garza, 726 S.W.3d at 898.
The evidence of medical neglect was likewise subject to the trial court’s
assessment. That allegation rests on Avila leaving R.R.’s helmet in his vehicle. The
record contains little about what the helmet does, how long it stayed in the vehicle, or
what consequence followed. The therapy-attendance evidence was similarly two-sided.
Avila did not dispute that he attended few appointments, and he explained that
possession would allow him to take R.R. himself.
The allegations of intimidation permitted more than one reading as well. Diaz told
Avila she would not send R.R. for his summer possession because he would not supply
his updated address. When Avila replied that the judge would not be happy, Diaz
characterized the statement as an intimidation tactic. Avila, for his part, denied
allegations of property destruction and the fits of rage Diaz described. From this
evidence, and from Diaz’s concession that he was never physically abusive to her, the
trial court could have concluded that Avila’s testimony was more credible. See id.
These conclusions leave the order well within the trial court’s discretion. We
cannot say the possession and access order or the independent rights granted to each
parent was arbitrary or unreasonable. We overrule Diaz’s issue.
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C. Due Process
By her final issue, Diaz argues the trial court violated her due process rights by
failing to provide accommodations, procedural modifications, communication-related
inquiry, or other safeguards in light of her self-disclosed autism diagnosis and traumarelated behaviors.5
The governing question is not whether such accommodations were available, but
whether she asked for them. A party must preserve error, including error of constitutional
dimension, by presenting a timely request, objection, or motion to the trial court and
obtaining a ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. 2003).
Diaz appeared at the final hearing with counsel, testified at length, offered exhibits, and
cross-examined the witnesses against her. Assuming without deciding that Diaz held
some right to special consideration of her alleged disability, the record contains no
request for accommodation of any kind and no indication of what form such an
accommodation would have taken. Nothing was presented for the trial court to rule on,
and nothing is preserved for our review. The final issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Lawrence M. Doss
Justice
5 Appellant also complains that the trial court treated violations of temporary orders unequally and
improperly or inadequately considered evidence of the child’s best interest. However, these matters are considered and subsumed into our analysis of the trial court’s possession and access orders.
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