RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 2026
TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2025-SC-0310-OA
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY PETITIONER
V. IN SUPREME COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, RESPONDENT JUDGE, FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
AND
BENNY HODGE; BRIAN KEITH REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST/ MOORE; DAVID MATTHEWS; DAVID APPELLEES SANDERS; DONALD JOHNSON; KARU
GENE WHITE; KENTUCKY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
MITCHELL WILLOUGHBY; RALPH
BAZE; ROBERT FOLEY; ROGER
WHEELER; RONNIE BOWLING;
VICTOR TAYLOR; VIRGINIA CAUDILL;
AND WILLIAM THOMPSON
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER
DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
The Commonwealth obtained death penalty convictions for the parties
involved in these proceedings, and there has been extensive litigation over the
course of decades. The Commonwealth petitions this Court for a first-class
writ of prohibition directing the Franklin Circuit Court to dismiss a
longstanding declaratory judgment action, which includes current regulations
in dispute, on the grounds that the inmate-plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies under KRS 1 454.415. The issue is whether the
Franklin Circuit Court acted outside its jurisdiction by permitting deathsentenced inmates to litigate claims allegedly filed without exhausting said
administrative remedies.
This Court concludes that the Franklin Circuit Court had subject matter
jurisdiction over this type of case—declaratory and constitutional challenges to
administrative regulations—regardless of any unresolved questions about how
the exhaustion doctrine applies to particular claims and without deciding
whether exhaustion was required for some or all of them. Accordingly, firstclass writ relief is unavailable. Because exhaustion is a non-jurisdictional
procedural requirement, any alleged error concerning its application can be
addressed on appeal after final judgment.
As extraordinary writ relief is unavailable under these circumstances, we
deny the petition.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation originated in 2006, when several inmates, under sentences
of death, filed an action in Franklin Circuit Court seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief concerning Kentucky’s execution procedures. The inmates
alleged that the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) had implemented execution
protocols without promulgating them as administrative regulations in
accordance with KRS Chapter 13A, Kentucky’s Administrative Procedures Act
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
(“APA”). The inmates sought to enjoin executions until lawful procedures were
adopted and lawfully reviewed.
In Bowling v. Kentucky Department of Corrections, 301 S.W.3d 478 (Ky.
2009), this Court held that the DOC was required to promulgate execution
procedures through the formal administrative rulemaking process set forth in
the APA. We concluded that the execution protocols constituted administrative
regulations subject to KRS Chapter 13A and, therefore, could not be
implemented solely through internal departmental policies. Following that
decision, the DOC promulgated formal execution regulations which became
effective in 2010.
Extensive and ongoing litigation concerning the validity and sufficiency of
those regulations followed. See id.; Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). Over the
ensuing years, the DOC amended the regulations multiple times, while the
inmates repeatedly amended their pleadings to challenge revised provisions
relating to execution procedures, intellectual disability determinations, insanity
procedures, attorney access, and related matters. The parties engaged in
substantial motion practice, discovery, injunction proceedings, and
constitutional litigation. No executions have been performed during these
proceedings.
Following additional amendments to the execution regulations in 2023
and 2024, the inmates amended their pleadings to maintain certain unresolved
claims, conform existing claims to the revised regulations, and withdraw claims
rendered moot by the amendments. The remaining claims challenge various
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aspects of the current regulations, including provisions relating to intellectual
disability determinations, insanity procedures, attorney access, and execution
protocols.
In response, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the remaining claims
on the ground that the inmates failed to exhaust administrative remedies
under KRS 454.415 before pursuing judicial relief. The Franklin Circuit Court
denied the motion, concluding that the remaining claims principally challenged
the validity and sufficiency of the execution regulations themselves and that
exhaustion was not required under the circumstances presented because the
grievance process could not provide the relief sought or adjudicate the
constitutional and regulatory issues raised. The Commonwealth thereafter
filed the present petition for writ of prohibition, contending the alleged failure
to exhaust deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction to proceed further in the
underlying action.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court, when deciding a petition for writ, must first determine
whether the writ is appropriate. Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky.
1961). The petition must be dismissed if the remedy is not available. Id. See
also Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Ky. 2004) (“[O]nly after determining
that the prerequisites exist will the court decide whether an error occurred for
which a writ should issue.”).
A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that the Courts of the
Commonwealth have been cautious and conservative in entertaining and
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granting. Newell Enters., Inc. v. Bowling, 158 S.W.3d 750, 754 (Ky. 2005);
Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 808 (Ky. 2005); Bender, 343
S.W.2d at 799. "Extraordinary writs are disfavored...." Buckley v. Wilson, 177
S.W.3d 778, 780 (Ky. 2005). The merits of such a writ will not be considered
unless the requesting party can demonstrate a minimum threshold showing of
harm and lack of redressability on appeal. St. Luke Hosp., Inc. v. Kopowski,
160 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Ky. 2005).
Writs are generally divided into two classes: (1) those where the inferior
court is acting without jurisdiction; or (2) the court is acting within its
jurisdiction but erroneously. Grange, 151 S.W.3d at 808. A higher court may
issue an extraordinary writ, i.e. a writ of prohibition, if the lower court is acting
without jurisdiction. Indep. Order of Foresters v. Chauvin, 175 S.W.3d 610,
613 (Ky. 2005). If the inferior court is acting erroneously but within its
jurisdiction, a writ may be granted if “there exists no adequate remedy by
appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the
petition is not granted.” Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 10. However, irreparable harm
need not be shown “provided a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if
the lower court is proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is
necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration.”
Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801 (emphasis in original). The right to appeal does not
necessarily indicate an adequate remedy. Chamblee v. Rose, 249 S.W.2d 775,
777 (Ky. 1952).
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The decision whether to issue a writ always lies within the discretion of
the Court. Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 5. We exercise this discretion
conservatively because a “careful approach is necessary to prevent shortcircuiting normal appeal procedure.” Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801 (“Our cases
involving controversies in this second class, where it is alleged the lower court
is acting or proceeding erroneously within its jurisdiction, have consistently
[apparently without exception] required the petitioner to pass the first
test, i.e., he must show he has no adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise.”). A writ of prohibition is a remarkable remedy and proper only:
[U]pon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is
about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no
remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2)
[ ] the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously,
although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate
remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and
irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted.
Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 10.
When considering a writ of this type, a court must first
concern itself with the prerequisites—no adequate remedy on
appeal and great and irreparable harm—before consideration
of the merits. Caldwell v. Chauvin, 464 S.W.3d 139, 145 (Ky.
2015). “Even if the requirements are met and error found, the
grant of a writ remains within the sole discretion of the Court.”
Id. at 145-46.
Lynch v. Commonwealth, 718 S.W.3d 726, 729 (Ky. 2025).
As recently reiterated in Marcum v. Scorsone, 457 S.W.3d 710, 716 (Ky.
2015), the distinction between first-class and second-class writs remains
significant because the requirements applicable to each differ materially. A
first-class writ concerns situations in which a lower court is proceeding outside
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its jurisdiction, while a second-class writ concerns alleged erroneous action
occurring within the lower court’s jurisdiction. Id.; Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 10.
Here, the Commonwealth expressly seeks only first-class writ relief, contending
the alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies under KRS 454.415
deprived the Franklin Circuit Court of jurisdiction to proceed in the underlying
action. Accordingly, before addressing the merits of the Commonwealth’s
exhaustion arguments, this Court must first determine whether the alleged
defect implicates the circuit court’s jurisdiction in the sense contemplated by
Kentucky writ jurisprudence. Hence, before we look to the merits of the
petitioner's claim, we must decide whether a writ is the appropriate remedy.
Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Subject matter jurisdiction exists with the circuit court.
The Commonwealth argues the Franklin Circuit Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to proceed on the inmates’ remaining claims because the
inmates failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by KRS 454.415.
Relying principally upon Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Edwards, 434 S.W.3d
472, 476-79 (Ky. 2014), Commonwealth v. DLX, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 624 (Ky. 2001),
Ky. State Police v. Scott, 529 S.W.3d 711 (Ky. 2017), and Popplewell’s Alligator
Dock No. 1, Inc. v. Rev. Cabinet, 133 S.W.3d 456 (Ky. 2004), the Commonwealth
contends exhaustion of administrative remedies constitutes a jurisdictional
prerequisite to judicial relief where the General Assembly has mandated
exhaustion by statute. The Commonwealth maintains KRS 454.415 expressly
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requires inmates to exhaust all available administrative remedies before
commencing litigation concerning prison conditions and further requires
verification of exhaustion within the pleadings themselves. According to the
Commonwealth, the inmates’ surviving claims—including challenges
concerning execution procedures, competency and intellectual disability
determinations, medical procedures, attorney access, and related execution
protocols—constitute grievable “conditions-of-confinement” claims subject to
the statute’s mandatory exhaustion provisions. The Commonwealth further
argues the inmates improperly attempt to avoid exhaustion requirements by
characterizing operational and fact-dependent claims as facial constitutional
challenges even though, in the Commonwealth’s view, many of the claims
necessarily depend upon individualized circumstances, implementation
procedures, factual development, and prison administration. Thus, the
Commonwealth contends the circuit court lacked authority to proceed on nonexhausted claims altogether and that any continued adjudication of such
claims constitutes action outside the court’s jurisdiction sufficient to warrant
extraordinary first-class writ relief without any additional showing of
irreparable injury or lack of appellate remedy.
In response, the inmates contend the Franklin Circuit Court plainly
possesses subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions and
constitutional challenges to administrative regulations. Citing Spears v.
Goodwine, 490 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Ky. 2016), the inmates emphasize that “[t]he
court has subject matter jurisdiction when the ‘kind of case’ identified in the
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pleadings is one which the court has been empowered, by statute or
constitutional provision, to adjudicate.” The inmates further maintain that
circuit courts possess general jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions
pursuant to KRS 23A.010 and KRS 418.040 and note that this Court itself
reopened the underlying action in 2010 under CR 2 60.02 and expressly
directed the filing of amended petitions challenging the execution regulations
promulgated pursuant to Bowling and KRS Chapter 13A. See Bowling v. Ky.
Dep’t of Corr., No. 06-CI-574 (Franklin Cir. Ct. May 21, 2010 Order). With this,
they argue the Commonwealth improperly conflates alleged legal error
concerning exhaustion with the absence of subject matter jurisdiction itself. In
the inmates’ view, even assuming some claims may ultimately be subject to
administrative exhaustion requirements under KRS 454.415, such disputes
concern whether the circuit court correctly exercised its authority in particular
instances, not whether the court lacked the fundamental adjudicative power to
entertain this longstanding declaratory judgment action altogether. See also
Romines v. Coleman, 671 S.W.3d 269, 276 (Ky. 2023) (recognizing that a court
may act “within its jurisdiction” even where legal error is alleged).
This Court finds this matter to be appropriately before us.
Subject matter jurisdiction is an issue readily addressed
“before the trial court and, if unsuccessful at the trial court
level, ultimately in the normal appellate process.” (emphasis
added). Not only is such an issue capable of resolution via
direct appeal, but it is also subject to determination by a
higher court via a writ of prohibition. CR 81; Spears v.
Goodwine, 490 S.W.3d 347, 351-52 (Ky. 2016).
2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
9
Bd. of Educ. of Paris v. Earlywine, 719 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2025), reh'g denied
(Aug. 14, 2025) (internal citations omitted).
Kentucky appellate courts have recognized that exhaustion disputes
often depend heavily upon the nature of the claims asserted, the statutory
authority of the relevant agency, and the procedural posture of the underlying
action. See DLX, 42 S.W.3d at 626–29; Cunningham v. Lexington-Fayette Urb.
Cnty. Gov’t, 326 S.W.3d 5, 9–10 (Ky. 2010); Popplewell’s Alligator Dock, 133
S.W.3d at 471–72. This Court has recognized that exhaustion may not be
required where an agency lacks authority to resolve the issue presented, such
as certain constitutional challenges or requests for relief beyond the agency’s
statutory power. See DLX, 42 S.W.3d at 626–29; Cunningham, 326 S.W.3d at
9–10. At the same time, Kentucky cases have also recognized that exhaustion
requirements may operate jurisdictionally within particular statutory
administrative-review schemes. See Edwards, 434 S.W.3d at 476–79; Ky. State
Police v. Scott, 529 S.W.3d 711, 716–18 (Ky. 2017). Accordingly, the
applicability and effect of exhaustion principles must be evaluated within the
particular statutory and procedural context presented.
We recognize the Commonwealth has not advanced a generalized
exhaustion argument, but rather contends on a claim-by-claim basis that the
inmates’ remaining allegations constitute grievable conditions-of-confinement
claims subject to KRS 454.415 requiring administrative exhaustion before
judicial review. Those arguments are not insubstantial and may bear upon
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whether certain claims should ultimately proceed, whether particular claims
are properly characterized as facial or operational, or whether the circuit court
correctly denied dismissal. But those questions concern the propriety of
proceeding on individual claims, not whether the Franklin Circuit Court lacked
fundamental subject matter jurisdiction over this class of case altogether. The
underlying action remains a declaratory judgment and constitutional challenge
to administrative execution regulations—a category of controversy plainly
within the general jurisdiction of the circuit courts. Thus, even assuming
portions of the circuit court’s exhaustion analysis may ultimately prove
erroneous, any such error would constitute alleged legal error occurring within
the court’s jurisdiction rather than action wholly outside it sufficient to justify
extraordinary first-class writ relief.
B. Exhaustion of administrative remedies favors denying the writ.
The Commonwealth’s exhaustion argument is further undermined by the
procedural posture and extraordinary history of this litigation. This action has
been pending in various forms for nearly two decades. Since this Court’s
decision in Bowling, supra, the parties have engaged in repeated rounds of
regulatory amendments, amended pleadings, discovery, injunction practice,
and substantive adjudication concerning the validity of Kentucky’s execution
regulations. Numerous claims presently before the Court have remained
pending for more than seven years. During that time, the Commonwealth
actively litigated the merits of those claims and, at multiple junctures,
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expressly contemplated that the remaining constitutional and regulatory issues
would proceed toward adjudication.
Against that backdrop, the Commonwealth now seeks extraordinary writ
relief on the theory that the circuit court lacked authority to entertain the
action because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The timing
of that argument raises substantial concerns regarding the practical purposes
underlying the exhaustion doctrine. Exhaustion requirements are generally
intended to afford administrative agencies the first opportunity to resolve
disputes, develop factual records, apply agency expertise, and potentially
obviate the need for judicial intervention. Those purposes have largely already
been fulfilled—or rendered inapplicable—in this case.
The record before the Court is extensive and well-developed. The DOC
has repeatedly articulated its substantive positions regarding the challenged
regulations through formal rulemaking proceedings, Statements of
Consideration, discovery responses, motion practice, and litigation positions
advanced over many years. The record reflects that the DOC itself has, at
times, asserted that it lacks authority to implement certain changes requested
by the inmates absent formal regulatory amendment. The Commonwealth has
likewise litigated the constitutional and statutory validity of the regulations on
the merits for years before renewing its exhaustion objection in the present
procedural posture.
This prolonged course of merits litigation materially distinguishes the
present matter from cases in which exhaustion objections are timely raised at
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the outset of proceedings before substantial judicial and party resources have
been expended. While jurisdictional principles cannot be disregarded merely
because litigation has progressed extensively, courts considering extraordinary
writ relief may appropriately evaluate whether the requested intervention would
meaningfully advance the policies underlying the asserted procedural doctrine
or instead produce duplicative proceedings, additional delay, and inefficiency.
The Court is also mindful that the Commonwealth seeks a writ—“an
extraordinary remedy” that is “disfavored” and reserved for exceptional
circumstances. Marcum, 457 S.W.3d at 716. Here, the challenged litigation is
not in its infancy. Rather, it approaches final adjudication after years of
judicial supervision and substantive rulings.
Permitting the action to proceed to final judgment preserves the
availability of ordinary appellate review while avoiding the substantial risk that
issuance of a writ at this late stage would merely restart already extensive
litigation concerning claims long known to the parties and the Court.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the Commonwealth’s belated invocation of
exhaustion principles weighs against the exercise of extraordinary writ
authority in this matter.
The Commonwealth alternatively contends that, even if the Franklin
Circuit Court possessed general subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory
judgment actions, the circuit court nevertheless exceeded its lawful authority
by permitting this action to proceed absent exhaustion of administrative
remedies under KRS 454.415. Framed variously as a statutory limitation on
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judicial authority, an exclusivity requirement, and a prerequisite to judicial
review, the Commonwealth’s theories ultimately seek the same result:
treatment of the alleged exhaustion defect as one depriving the circuit court of
authority to proceed for purposes of first-class writ relief.
We decline to adopt such an expansive conception of jurisdiction.
Kentucky circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction. They
unquestionably possess constitutional and statutory authority to adjudicate
declaratory judgment actions, constitutional challenges, requests for injunctive
relief, and disputes involving the validity of administrative regulations. The
underlying action falls squarely within that category of cases. Whether the
circuit court correctly interpreted and applied exhaustion principles in this
particular case is a distinct question from whether the court possessed subject
matter jurisdiction to entertain the action at all. Kentucky law has long
recognized that “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction does not mean jurisdiction over
‘this case’; rather, it means jurisdiction over ‘this kind of case.’” Spears, 490
S.W.3d at 351.
The Commonwealth’s reliance upon the mandatory language of KRS
454.415 does not alter that conclusion. To be sure, the statute imposes
important procedural obligations upon inmate litigants and may, in
appropriate circumstances, require dismissal of claims filed without
exhaustion. But mandatory statutory language does not automatically
transform a procedural prerequisite into a jurisdictional limitation depriving a
circuit court of adjudicatory power. The General Assembly did not expressly
14
state that noncompliance with KRS 454.415 divests circuit courts of subject
matter jurisdiction, and this Court declines to infer such a sweeping
jurisdictional consequence absent unmistakable legislative direction.
Nor are we persuaded by the Commonwealth’s characterization of the
DOC’s grievance process as an exclusive administrative forum whose
invocation is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review in every
circumstance. The claims remaining in the underlying action include
substantial constitutional and regulatory challenges to the validity of execution
regulations themselves. Kentucky precedent has long recognized that facial
constitutional challenges occupy a distinct posture within exhaustion
jurisprudence because administrative agencies lack authority to adjudicate the
constitutional validity of statutes and regulations. See DLX, 42 S.W.3d at 626;
Commonwealth v. AT&T Corp., 462 S.W.3d 399, 401 (Ky. 2015). Without
deciding the precise scope of those exceptions as applied to each remaining
claim, their presence alone counsels against treating the exhaustion issue
presented here as a clear jurisdictional defect appropriate for extraordinary
writ intervention.
Likewise unavailing is the Commonwealth’s suggestion that the circuit
court lacked authority to proceed because the claims were insufficiently ripe or
because further factual development should first have occurred through
administrative review. The underlying litigation has been pending in various
forms for nearly two decades. During that time, the parties have engaged in
extensive motion practice, discovery, rulemaking proceedings, and substantive
15
litigation regarding the challenged regulations. The record before the circuit
court is substantial and fully developed in many respects. Whatever force such
arguments might carry at the inception of litigation, they do not establish the
sort of patent jurisdictional defect necessary to support issuance of a first-class
writ in the present posture of this case.
Ultimately, the Commonwealth’s alternative theories amount to
assertions that the circuit court committed legal error in declining to dismiss
some or all claims on exhaustion grounds. Even assuming arguendo that the
circuit court erred in some respect, such alleged errors would constitute, at
most, erroneous action within the court’s jurisdiction—not action outside it.
Kentucky’s extraordinary writ jurisprudence carefully distinguishes between
those categories. A first-class writ is reserved for situations in which a lower
court wholly lacks jurisdiction over the type of case before it. That
circumstance is not present here.
Moreover, the extraordinary procedural history of this matter further
counsels against writ relief. The parties have litigated these issues extensively
over many years, and the Commonwealth itself has participated in substantial
merits litigation concerning the challenged regulations. At this advanced stage
of the proceedings, ordinary appellate review following final judgment provides
an adequate mechanism for review of any preserved exhaustion arguments or
alleged legal errors committed by the circuit court.
Accordingly, because the Franklin Circuit Court possessed subject
matter jurisdiction over the underlying declaratory judgment action, and
16
because the Commonwealth has failed to establish the type of jurisdictional
defect necessary to justify extraordinary intervention by first-class writ, the
petition for writ of prohibition is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether some, all, or none of the remaining claims ultimately required
exhaustion under KRS 454.415 is a question that may be addressed, if
necessary, through ordinary appellate review following final judgment. The
present writ proceeding does not require this Court to definitively resolve those
questions because the Franklin Circuit Court unquestionably possessed
subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions of this type, and
any alleged exhaustion error would constitute, at most, potential legal error
within that jurisdiction.
All sitting. Bisig, Goodwine, and Nickell, JJ., concur. Lambert, C.J.,
concurs in result only by separate opinion which Conley and Thompson, JJ.,
join.
LAMBERT, C.J., CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: As the Majority
opinion states, the underlying action is a declaratory judgment and
constitutional challenge to the administrative execution regulations. Although
some claims may ultimately be subject to dismissal under KRS 454.415, the
Franklin Circuit court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over claims of this
type. Should the Commonwealth believe the Franklin Circuit Court erred by
failing to dismiss any claims pursuant to KRS 454.415, it may seek review from
this Court. Until then, we must refrain from exercising our extraordinary writ
17
jurisdiction to resolve matters that remain within the ordinary appellate
process.
I write separately to emphasize that in reaching that conclusion, I
express no view on the merits of the underlying case, nor the policy concerns it
may present. These claims arise against the backdrop of extensive litigation
and complex issues surrounding the death penalty. Those considerations,
however, are not before us. The sole question presented is whether the
extraordinary remedy of a first-class writ is warranted. It is not. Therefore, I
concur in result only.
Conley and Thompson, JJ., join.
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COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER:
Russell M. Coleman
Kentucky Attorney General
John H. Heyburn
Assistant Attorney General
Christopher Henry
Assistant Attorney General
RESPONDENT:
Judge Phillip J. Shepherd
Pro Se
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, KENTUCKY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS:
Angela Turner Dunham
Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Legal Services
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES/REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST: RALPH BAZE;
RONNIE BOWLING; VIRGINIA CAUDILL; ROBERT FOLEY; BENNY HODGE;
DONALD JOHNSON; DAVID MATTHEWS; BRIAN KEITH MOORE; DAVID
SANDERS; VICTOR TAYLOR; WILLIAM THOMPSON; ROGER WHEELER; KARU
GENE WHITE; AND MITCHELL WILLOUGHBY:
David Michael Barron
Assistant Public Advocate
Dennis James Burke
Assistant Public Advocate
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