RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 2026
TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2025-SC-0487-MR
JOSEPH GORDON YOUNG APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE JENNIFER WILCOX, JUDGE
NOS. 23-CR-001227 & 25-CR-001259
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NICKELL
AFFIRMING
Joseph Gordon Young was convicted of arson in the first degree, three
counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree, and being a persistent
felony offender in the first degree (PFO I) following a jury trial in the Jefferson
Circuit Court. He received a total sentence of thirty-two years’ imprisonment
and now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. 1 Following a careful review,
we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Tracie Wallace lived with her elderly grandmother, Kathy, and her
autistic minor sister, R.F., 2 on Taylor Boulevard in Louisville, Kentucky. Young
1 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).
2 We use initials to protect the privacy of the minor victim. See Kentucky Rules
of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 13(B).
approached Tracie and Kathy in mid-2023, offering to help with odd jobs in
exchange for food and money. Shortly thereafter, Young’s ex-wife kicked him
out of her home, so Tracie offered to let him stay in the family’s basement.
During his stay, Young mowed the yard, did woodwork on the deck, put a pool
together, and cleaned the garage.
About a week after he moved in, on May 16, 2023, Young awoke early
and left the house through the rear door. He walked to a nearby Thorntons gas
station where surveillance cameras captured his arrival at 5:38 a.m. Young
purchased a coffee, a pack of cigarettes, and a snack. After exiting the store,
Young walked to the gas pumps and began searching the trash cans. He
salvaged a small container from one of the cans and placed it next to a gas
pump. He then went back inside the store, paid for one dollar’s worth of
gasoline, then retrieved the container and filled it with gas at 5:51 a.m. Young
left Thorntons at 6:00 a.m. and began walking in the direction of Taylor
Boulevard.
A doorbell camera attached to the front of Tracie’s home recorded Young
arriving back at the residence at 6:19 a.m. and entering the enclosed front
porch carrying the small container in his hand. Approximately four minutes
later, the camera captured Young exiting the porch and placing his backpack
on the front sidewalk. Three minutes thereafter, Young is seen by the camera
leaning out the porch door, adjusting the adjacent window from the outside,
and observing traffic passing by the house. At 6:29 a.m., Young was recorded
bursting out the door as a large orange glow is seen behind him and sparks
2
swirling around him. Young quickly ran away from the house, grabbing his
backpack as he passed.
While these events were unfolding, Tracie was playing a video game in
her upstairs bedroom. She heard a loud bang and felt the house shake. When
she looked outside, she noticed smoke and proceeded downstairs to
investigate. After determining there was an active fire on the front porch, she
rushed to get her grandmother and sister out of the home. Tracie looked for
Young but could not find him. The home’s security system triggered a call to
emergency services, and the Louisville Fire Department (LFD) was dispatched
to the scene. Ultimately, four fire engines and two fire trucks responded to
battle the blaze. The home suffered significant damage from the fire and
smoke. The enclosed front porch was nearly destroyed; vinyl siding was melted
away; aluminum wall panels were melted and warped; several windows were
broken out; and the living room and two downstairs bedrooms had smoke and
soot stains. Once the fire had been suppressed, and because the cause could
not be readily ascertained, the on-scene incident commander called the LFD
Metro Arson Unit to investigate. LFD Captain Jason Sanders and LFD
Sergeant Jeffrey McNulty responded to begin the arson investigation. At some
point while the firefighters and arson investigators were on the scene, Young
returned to the house.
Captain Sanders interviewed Tracie, canvassed the neighborhood, and
collected video surveillance footage. He then interviewed Young, and the
interaction was captured by Captain Sanders’ body-worn camera. Young
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initially stated he had left the house between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m., but when
confronted with contradictory video evidence, he agreed it might have been
later than he thought. He stated he had been on the porch that morning to
“check things out” but didn’t see or smell anything out of the ordinary. He
denied smoking on the porch or having any involvement in starting the fire.
Young left the scene shortly thereafter.
Due to inconsistencies in his statements, investigators located and
brought Young to their office for a formal interview. At first, Young indicated
the door to the front porch was cracked open when he returned, but he did not
see anyone on the porch when he looked. He denied intentionally or
accidentally starting the fire. As the interview progressed, Young’s story
shifted. He stated that he saw a spark on the front porch and that a neighbor
who had been threatening him previously was standing there pointing a gun at
him, so he ran away as the fire started behind him. Young claimed his
cellphone would “tell the story” and prove his claims. Sergeant McNulty
obtained consent to retrieve and look through the phone. A subsequent search
of Young’s phone revealed no information related to the fire or any additional
suspect. At the conclusion of the interview, Young was arrested and
subsequently charged with arson in the first degree and three counts of wanton
endangerment in the first degree. Prior to trial, he was separately indicted for
being a PFO I. Following a multi-day jury trial, Young was convicted on all
counts, with the jury recommending a sentence of twenty-two years for arson
and ten years on each of the wanton endangerment charges, with all to run
4
consecutively for a total sentence of fifty-two years. At final sentencing, the
trial court ordered the sentences for the wanton endangerment counts to run
concurrently with one another but consecutively to the arson charge for a total
sentence of thirty-two years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Young raises four allegations of error in seeking reversal. First, he
asserts his convictions for arson in the first degree and wanton endangerment
in the first degree violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Second, he
contends the trial court committed reversible error in failing to address his
pretrial request for new counsel. Next, Young alleges the trial court erred in
permitting the Commonwealth’s arson experts to testify to their beliefs that the
fire was intentionally started. Finally, he argues it was error to permit the
Commonwealth and Tracie to inform the jury that R.F. had severe autism. We
shall address each allegation in turn.
I. No Double Jeopardy Violation Occurred.
For his first contention of error, and raising what appears to be a matter
of first impression, Young argues the acts and dangers underlying his
convictions for wanton endangerment in the first degree were already
contemplated in the conviction for arson in the first degree, and therefore his
convictions of all charges violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. He
asserts the exact same facts of his singular act of setting the house on fire
could prove the commission of both offenses, and therefore the double jeopardy
clause mandates that he could be convicted of only one of the crimes. Young
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concedes this argument is unpreserved for appellate review and requests
palpable error review under RCr 3 10.26. In reviewing for palpable error, this
Court will only reverse the judgment if “the error is so manifest, fundamental
and unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process.”
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 676 S.W.3d 405, 417 (Ky. 2023) (quoting Martin v.
Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006)). “It should be so egregious that it
jumps off the page . . . and cries out for relief.” Id. (quoting Chavies v.
Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 313, 323 (Ky. 2012)). However, “we have long held
that double jeopardy questions may be reviewed on appeal, even if they were
not presented to the trial court.” Mullikan v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.3d 99,
102 (Ky. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb.” A virtually identical provision appears in § 13 of the Kentucky
Constitution. This Court has long acknowledged that the protections afforded
under these two provisions are parallel and that decisions of the United States
Supreme Court are relevant to a double jeopardy analysis under both
constitutions. Cooley v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ky. 1991).
“Double jeopardy does not occur when a person is charged with two crimes
arising from the same course of conduct, as long as each statute ‘requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not.’” Commonwealth v. Burge, 947
3 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
6
S.W.2d 805, 809 (Ky. 1996) (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932)). This foundational rule is also codified in KRS 4 505.020. At
bottom, when called upon to determine whether a single course of conduct may
establish more than one offense, courts must determine whether the conduct
violates two distinct statutes and, if so, whether each statute requires proof of
an element that the other does not. Id. at 811. Nevertheless, Young urges this
Court to adopt a different test and look to the legislative intent relative to the
harm underlying each offense rather than the statutory elements of the crimes
to determine whether a double jeopardy violation occurred. We decline to do
so. The plain text of the Fifth Amendment and § 13 prohibit multiple
prosecutions for the “same offence,” and an offense, for double jeopardy
purposes, is to be “measured by its statutory elements.” Currier v. Virginia,
585 U.S. 493, 507 (2018).
KRS 513.020, the first-degree arson statute, states in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to
destroy or damage a building, he starts a fire or causes an explosion,
and;
(a) The building is inhabited or occupied or the person has reason to
believe the building may be inhabited or occupied[.]
Wanton endangerment in the first degree is proscribed in KRS 508.060.
That statute provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of wanton endangerment in the first degree when,
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life, he or she wantonly engages in conduct which creates a
4 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
7
substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another
person.
Even a cursory reading of these two statutes reveals the elements of the two
crimes are quite different. Starting a fire or causing an explosion with the
intent to damage or destroy a building is required to convict of arson in the
first degree but is not necessary to convict of wanton endangerment in the first
degree. Engaging in conduct manifesting an extreme indifference to the value
of human life is mandatory for a conviction of wanton endangerment in the
first degree, but such conduct is irrelevant to an offense of arson in the first
degree, as the building does not actually have to be inhabited or occupied at
the time the fire is set, so long as the defendant had a reasonable belief a
person was present. In addition, arson in the first degree is a crime against
property while wanton endangerment in the first degree is in the nature of a
crime against a person. Although there may be an overlap of proof covering the
two offenses in this case, that does not, in and of itself, constitute a double
jeopardy violation. See Clark v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.3d 668, 677 (Ky.
2008).
The proof adduced at trial was sufficient to prove that Young’s conduct in
intentionally setting ablaze the front porch of a home he knew was occupied by
three people plainly violated both KRS 513.020 and KRS 508.060. And each of
those two statutes requires proving elements of a crime that the other does not.
It cannot be said that either crime is “included within” the other, as they
simply do not have the same elements. Burge, 947 S.W.2d at 811. Young
intended to start a fire to destroy or damage the home while simultaneously
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acting wantonly and with utter indifference to the value of the lives of the three
women lying in their beds inside the house. Contrary to Young’s averments, it
is not logical to assume the General Assembly intended for wanton
endangerment in the first degree to be subsumed within arson in the first
degree. The crimes here are distinct offenses directed at different harms with
dissimilar elements. They are separate offenses subject to multiple
punishments, even when a single discrete act forms the factual basis for both
crimes. Thus, we conclude Young’s convictions under both statutes did not
constitute a double jeopardy violation.
II. The Trial Court Adequately Addressed Young’s Request for New
Counsel.
Young next asserts the trial court erred in failing to address his pretrial
request for substitute counsel. We disagree.
At a pretrial conference some nine months before trial began, Young
informed the trial court he wanted a new attorney because he did not “feel like
[he was] being represented properly” by his court-appointed counsel. The trial
court took up the matter and asked for counsel’s position. Defense counsel
acknowledged Young was not completely happy with his performance to that
point and there were issues surrounding potential defenses at trial. However,
after discussing the case “at length” with him, because of concerns which had
arisen during recent conversations with Young, counsel moved the trial court
for a competency evaluation as he believed Young might not possess the
“ability to work with his attorney” and participate meaningfully in his own
defense.
9
The trial court then informed Young that it had no control over which
attorney the Department of Public Advocacy assigned to a particular case. It
told Young his current counsel had been before the court before and always did
a good job representing his clients. Further, the trial court gave Young the
option of hiring his own attorney or remaining with the counsel selected by the
public defender’s office as having the skill level appropriate to handle the
issues presented. After additional discussions, the trial court indicated
appointed counsel would remain on the case and granted the motion for a
competency evaluation. Young did not again raise any issues or concerns with
his counsel, but he now contends the trial court reversibly erred by not
inquiring further into his concerns about his perceived deficiencies in counsel’s
performance or granting his request for new counsel.
Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, criminal
defendants have a right to be represented by counsel. See Samuels v.
Commonwealth, 512 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Ky. 2017) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 345 (1962)). In Kentucky, indigent defendants are provided
court-appointed representation primarily through the Department of Public
Advocacy. Pillersdorf v. Dep’t of Pub. Advoc., 890 S.W.2d 616, 619 (Ky. 1994).
However, “a defendant who is represented by a public defender or appointed
counsel does not have a constitutional right to be represented by any particular
attorney, and is not entitled to the dismissal of his counsel and the
appointment of substitute counsel except for adequate reasons or a clear abuse
by counsel.” Henderson v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Ky. 1982)
10
(citations omitted). A defendant is not entitled to force the government to
provide him with the attorney of his choosing. Luis v. United States, 578 U.S.
5, 12 (2016). Rather, he must show that good cause exists for a replacement in
order to obtain a new court-appointed attorney. Dunn v. Commonwealth, 573
S.W.2d 651, 654 (Ky. 1978). “Whether good cause exists for substitute counsel
to be appointed is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Deno v.
Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 753, 759 (Ky. 2005) (citing Pillersdorf, 890 S.W.2d
at 622).
Our review of the record reveals no adequate reason or abuse by counsel
sufficient to warrant removal and replacement that was presented to the trial
court. Indeed, Young presents nothing more than his own subjective beliefs
that counsel was not providing proper representation and hypotheticals of what
he “may have felt” when expressing his dissatisfaction to the trial court. But
“mere dissatisfaction with appointed counsel’s performance” is an improper
basis for the relief sought. Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 70, 81 (Ky.
2011). Young alleged no conflict of interest, no complete breakdown of
communications, nor that counsel was prejudicing his legitimate interests, any
of which could be adequate and sufficient cause for removing counsel from the
case. Baker v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Ky. App. 1978). He did
not do so and cannot now be heard to complain.
His contention that the trial court should have done more to determine
whether he had legitimate concerns with counsel’s performance is also
unavailing. Indeed, the trial court was not required to make a “searching
11
inquiry” into his complaint as its only determination under the circumstances
was whether counsel had “the ability and the preparedness to effectively assist”
Young in his defense. Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Ky.
2010). The trial court adequately undertook this task and concluded it was
inappropriate to remove counsel at that time. Over the nine months that
followed, Young never again expressed any dissatisfaction or concerns with
counsel’s performance, although he showed little difficulty in speaking up
during his multiple appearances to raise issues and ask questions of the trial
court and prosecutor. To now imply that he was reserving some complaint
about counsel throughout those numerous hearings and discussions with the
trial court is disingenuous at best. There was no abuse of the trial court’s
discretion.
III. No Error in the Testimony of the Commonwealth’s Arson Experts.
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth disclosed that it anticipated Captain
Sanders and Sergeant McNulty to give expert testimony as arson investigators.
The disclosure indicated Sergeant McNulty would testify to his opinion that the
fire had been set intentionally. During trial and before Captain Sanders took
the witness stand, Young preemptively objected to him or Sergeant McNulty
testifying consistently with their written reports opining the fire was started
intentionally, asserting only the jury could make that determination. He
further requested that the written report be redacted to remove reference to the
findings of intentional conduct. The trial court overruled the motions. On
cross-examination, and in response to counsel’s assertion to the contrary,
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Captain Sanders indicated the video recordings and other evidence from the
scene led him to believe the fire had been started intentionally. Likewise, on
direct examination, Sergeant McNulty opined that the fire was incendiary and
intentional, having been caused by using an open flame to ignite available
combustibles assisted by an ignitable liquid. He further testified he had ruled
out any accidental ignition sources based on his examination of the scene and
all available evidence.
Young now argues this testimony constituted inadmissible expert opinion
testimony which invaded the province of the jury on the ultimate issue. He
further asserts Captain Sanders and Sergeant McNulty were not qualified to
testify that he set the fire intentionally. We disagree.
Trial courts act as gatekeepers of expert testimony, Miller v. Eldridge, 146
S.W.3d 909, 913 (Ky. 2004), and must scrutinize such testimony to ensure it is
admissible and scientifically reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). “To fulfill this role, the trial court must undertake a
two-part analysis wherein it must first assess whether the methodology or
reasoning underpinning the proposed expert testimony has valid scientific
reliability. Second, the trial court must determine whether the expert’s
testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand a fact in issue.” Renot v.
Secura Supreme Ins. Co., 671 S.W.3d 282, 287-88 (Ky. 2023) (citing Daubert,
509 U.S. at 592-93). See also KRE 5 702. We review a trial court’s decision to
5 Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
13
admit expert testimony for abuse of discretion. Hollingsworth v.
Commonwealth, 718 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Ky. 2025). “The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English,
993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). “An abuse of discretion exists only when we
are ‘firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.’” Rossi v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 357 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Ky. App. 2010) (quoting Overstreet v. Overstreet,
144 S.W.3d 834, 838 (Ky. App. 2003)).
Here, Young does not challenge the expert qualifications of Captain
Sanders or Sergeant McNulty as arson investigators. Nor does he raise any
issue relative to the reliability of their principles and methods or that they
failed to appropriately apply those principles and methods to the facts of his
case. Instead, he contests only their ability to opine that he intentionally
started the fire, which he contends is the ultimate issue in the case to be put to
the jury for a decision. However, Kentucky has conclusively abandoned the
“ultimate issue rule” relative to expert testimony. Stringer v. Commonwealth,
956 S.W.2d 883, 891 (Ky. 1997). Additionally, a review of the testimony reveals
neither investigator testified as Young suggests.
“In a criminal case, the ultimate fact in issue is whether the defendant is
guilty or not guilty.” Id. Had either Captain Sanders or Sergeant McNulty
testified he believed Young was guilty of the crimes charged, such testimony
would have constituted improper opinion testimony.
14
However, an opinion that a result is consistent with a factual
scenario is not an opinion that the scenario occurred.
The real question should not be whether the expert has rendered
an opinion as to the ultimate issue, but whether the opinion “will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue.” KRE 702. Generally, expert opinion testimony is
admitted when the issue upon which the evidence is offered is one
of science and skill, Greer’s Adm’r v. Harrell’s Adm’r, 306 Ky. 209,
206 S.W.2d 943 (1947), and when the subject matter is outside the
common knowledge of jurors. O’Connor & Raque Co. v. Bill, Ky.,
474 S.W.2d 344 (1971). Presumably, jurors do not need
assistance in the form of an expert’s opinion that the defendant is
guilty or not guilty. However, they usually do need the assistance
of [an] expert in determining the cause of a physical condition in
order to understand the evidence and determine the ultimate fact
in issue. KRE 401; KRE 702.
Id. at 889-90. Here, both Captain Sanders and Sergeant McNulty provided the
jury with opinions which concerned a subject peculiarly within the knowledge
of a trained arson investigator relating to the cause and manner of the origin of
the fire. Their opinions were scientific in nature and were outside the common
knowledge of a layperson. Thus, the testimony served to “assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” and was admissible.
KRE 702. We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in so
concluding.
IV. Testimony Regarding R.F.’s Autism Was Not Improper.
Finally, Young contends the trial court erroneously overruled his pretrial
motion in limine to exclude testimony that R.F. was autistic and compounded
the error by allowing testimony and commentary from Tracie and the
Commonwealth that R.F. was severely autistic and required assistance with
basic activities of daily living. He asserts this evidence was not relevant and
15
any potential probative value it held was outweighed by the danger of undue
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. His assertions are
without merit.
“[A] certain amount of background evidence regarding the victim is
relevant to understanding the nature of the crime.” Bussell v. Commonwealth,
882 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Ky. 1994). During the guilt phase of a trial, the
Commonwealth is permitted to introduce evidence that is intended to identify a
victim as a living person rather than a simple statistic. McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 669 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Ky. 1984). This type of evidence may
include, among other things, “the victim’s age, job, interests, and level of
education.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2009). Victim
background evidence is not deemed unduly prejudicial “as long as the victim is
not glorified or enlarged.” Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293, 302 (Ky.
1997). On the contrary, “introduction of victim impact evidence during the
guilt phase is reversible error.” Tackett v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.3d 20, 33
(Ky. 2014). The difference between victim impact and victim background
evidence is that the former is “generally intended to arouse sympathy for the
families of the victims, which, although relevant to the issue of penalty, is
largely irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence.” Bennett v. Commonwealth,
978 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Ky. 1998).
Here, when discussing R.F.’s autism, the Commonwealth and Tracie
spoke evenly and without excess emotion. The statements were brief and
targeted toward R.F.’s mental condition and the physical assistance she
16
required on a daily basis to accomplish basic tasks. They were intended to
humanize R.F rather than to villainize Young. Further, because Young was
aware of R.F.’s mental and physical limitations, the testimony was relevant to
the jury’s ability to determine that Young’s action in starting the fire
constituted “circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life” which is an essential element of wanton endangerment in the first
degree. KRS 508.060.
As with all relevant evidence, “[t]his evidence . . . was prejudicial . . . but
it was not unfairly prejudicial.” Meece v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.3d 627, 667
(Ky. 2011). The danger of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the
probative value of the testimony. KRE 403. Neither the Commonwealth nor
Tracie unduly emphasized R.F.’s autism, nor did any of the statements
improperly glorify or enlarge her status as a victim or attempt to garner the
jurors’ sympathies. Brown, 297 S.W.3d at 560-61. Further, nothing in
Tracie’s testimony or the Commonwealth’s statements in opening and closing
arguments was “overly emotional, condemnatory, accusative, or demanding
vindication.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 953 S.W.2d 924, 937 (Ky. 1997). As
such, we conclude there was no misuse of victim background evidence during
the guilt phase of Young’s trial, and no error by the trial court in permitting its
admission.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and sentence of the Jefferson
Circuit Court are affirmed.
17
All sitting. Lambert, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Goodwine, and Keller, JJ.,
concur. Thompson, J., concurring in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Steven J. Buck
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ryan D. Mosley
Assistant Solicitor General
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