In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00038-CR
SHANELLE ANQUINETTE CRAIG, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court 4
Tarrant County, Texas1
Trial Court No. 1782022, Honorable Andy Porter, Presiding
August 18, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant, Shanelle Anquinette Craig, appeals from the trial court’s judgment
adjudicating her guilty of injury to a child2 and sentencing her to nine years of confinement.
1 Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the
Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. Should a conflict exist between the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals and this Court on any relevant issue, we apply the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04(f).
Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders3 brief and a motion to withdraw,
concluding that no arguable ground for reversal exists. Appellant has filed a pro se
response. Because our independent review of the record confirms counsel’s
assessment, we modify the bill of costs and affirm the judgment as modified.
BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from an adjudication of guilt following an earlier order of
deferred adjudication. Appellant was indicted for the first-degree felony of injury to a child
causing serious bodily injury after the death of her three-month-old daughter. She then
pleaded guilty to the lesser third-degree felony of injury to a child causing bodily injury.
The trial court admonished Appellant of her rights, and she signed both a waiver of rights
and a judicial confession. Consistent with the plea agreement, the court deferred a finding
of guilt and placed Appellant on community supervision for seven years. Among other
conditions, Appellant was to commit no offense against the laws of this State, any other
state, or the United States; report to the Tarrant County Community Supervision and
Corrections Department at least monthly or as scheduled; submit undiluted urine
samples; and complete 472 hours of community service at a rate of no fewer than eight
hours per month.
About a year and a half later, the State moved to proceed with an adjudication of
guilt. The motion alleged that Appellant caused bodily injury to her boyfriend on two
occasions, submitted a diluted urine sample, failed to report, and completed no
3 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
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community service. Appellant pleaded not true to each allegation except the communityservice allegation, to which she pleaded true with an explanation.
The State offered the testimony of the two officers who responded to the assault
calls and of Appellant’s probation officer. Each officer testified that Appellant’s boyfriend
described an assault and that he appeared credible. The probation officer testified that
Appellant missed a scheduled reporting month and had performed no community service.
Appellant testified in her own defense. She testified that her boyfriend was the
aggressor and had lied to the court, and that a new job, visitations with Child Protective
Services, hearings, and required services left her with little time. She also testified that
homelessness made community service difficult, and that she sprained her ankle days
before her reporting date. The trial court found the two assault allegations, the failure to
report, and the failure to complete community service true.4 The court found the dilutedsample allegation not true. The court adjudicated Appellant guilty and assessed
punishment at nine years of confinement. This appeal followed.
ANDERS FRAMEWORK
An Anders brief must present a professional evaluation of the record and explain
why the appeal presents no arguable grounds for reversal. See In re Schulman, 252
S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). Counsel need not identify
specific arguable points where none exist, but the brief must include record references
4 The trial court found one of the assaults to constitute a misdemeanor.
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and pertinent legal authorities. Id.; Davis v. State, 683 S.W.3d 828, 829–30 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2023, no pet.).
Counsel has met these requirements, certifying that he found no reversible error
after a diligent search of the record, and he provided Appellant with the brief, the motion
to withdraw, and the appellate record. Counsel also notified Appellant of her rights to file
a pro se response and a pro se petition for discretionary review.
Appellant filed a response raising three complaints. She argues that she is
innocent of the offense to which she pleaded guilty, that the State withheld favorable
evidence,5 and that the attorneys who represented her before her guilty plea rendered
ineffective assistance, resulting in an involuntary guilty plea.
We find that none of the issues Appellant presents demonstrates an arguable
ground for reversal. The innocence claim challenges Appellant’s guilt of injury to a child.
Appellant pleaded guilty to that offense, signed a waiver of her rights and a judicial
confession, and accepted deferred adjudication under a plea agreement that waived her
right to appeal. A defendant placed on deferred adjudication must raise any complaint
about that original proceeding in an appeal taken when the deferred adjudication is first
imposed, and she may not raise it later in an appeal from the adjudication of guilt. Manuel
v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Wright v. State, 506
S.W.3d 478, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Appellant’s guilt is therefore not before us.
5 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1198, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).We note that Texas prosecutors are also under an obligation, in certain circumstances, to produce evidence in the “possession, custody, or control of the state or any person under contract with the state.” See State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (discussing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 39.14, et seq.).
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The ineffective-assistance claim founders on the same rule. Appellant contends
that counsel did not pursue a speedy trial, gave poor advice about the plea, and
disregarded her decisions about the objectives of the representation. Each allegation
concerns conduct that preceded the plea, so each belonged in an appeal from the order
of deferred adjudication. Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661–62 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999); see Wright v. State, 506 S.W.3d 478, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
That leaves the claim that the State failed to disclose a text message in which
Appellant’s sister recanted an earlier statement. Whatever the merits of that contention,
a defendant must first alert the trial court to the alleged violation through a timely request
for a continuance, an objection, or a motion for new trial. Keeter v. State, 175 S.W.3d
756, 759–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that an appellant cannot raise a Brady
complaint for the first time on appeal); Temple v. State, 342 S.W.3d 572, 591 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) aff’d on other grounds, 390 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
(finding no preservation where the appellant did not complain of the State’s untimely
disclosure as soon as the grounds for objection were apparent). Nothing in the record
reflects such a request, objection, or motion.
Appellant also asks this Court to add to the clerk’s record several pleadings she
filed pro se, before her guilty plea, while she was represented by counsel. A defendant
has no right to hybrid representation, so the trial court therefore had no obligation to treat
those filings as part of the record. See Ganther v. State, 187 S.W.3d 641, 648 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). The documents are also immaterial for the
reason discussed above: they predate the plea, and as noted above are therefore not
before us in this appeal. See Wright, 506 S.W.3d at 481. We deny the motion.
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MODIFICATION OF THE JUDGMENT
This Court has independently examined the entire record to determine whether
any nonfrivolous issue exists. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–28 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005). Our review confirms counsel’s assessment that there is no arguable ground
for reversal. Proof of a single violation of the conditions of community supervision
supports an adjudication of guilt. Anderson v. State, 621 S.W.2d 805, 805 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1981). Appellant’s plea of true to the community-service allegation, together with
her probation officer’s testimony, was enough to support the trial court’s decision to
adjudicate. Further, we note that the trial court, as the sole judge of the credibility of the
witnesses, was free to resolve the disputed allegations against Appellant. Hacker v.
State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Although we find no arguable ground for reversal, our review of the record
identified one item in the bill of costs that requires correction. The bill assesses a $15.00
time payment fee. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the pendency of an appeal
stops the clock for purposes of that fee, and that any time payment fee assessed while
an appeal is pending must be struck in its entirety, without prejudice to reassessment
after the appellate mandate issues. Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021). Here, the fee was assessed while this appeal was pending. We therefore modify
the bill of costs to delete it, without prejudice to reassessment if Appellant fails to timely
pay the amounts owed after the mandate issues. See id.
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CONCLUSION
We modify the bill of costs to delete the $15.00 time payment fee. The district clerk
is directed to prepare and file an amended bill of costs reflecting the modification and to
furnish a copy to this Court, Appellant, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
This modification extends to any order to withdraw funds from Appellant’s inmate account.
See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 501.014(e); Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. 2009).
Finding no arguable ground for appellate review, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw,
deny Appellant’s motion to send exhibits, and affirm the trial court’s judgment as
modified.6
Lawrence M. Doss
Justice
Do not publish.
6 Counsel shall, within five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the
opinion and judgment, along with notification of Appellant’s right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4. This duty is informational and ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and continues after this Court grants counsel’s motion to withdraw. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.33.
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