In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-25-00133-CV
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF STEVEN O. STEELE
AND RACHEL L. STEELE
On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Hopkins County, Texas
Trial Court No. FM20534
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce between Appellant, Rachel L. Steele, and
Appellee, Steven O. Steele. Steven petitioned the trial court for divorce from Rachel, asserting
the marriage had become insupportable. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.001. After the trial court
held its final hearing of the divorce proceeding, which began on August 6, 2025, and was
continued until September 17, 2025, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce. In her
appeal, Rachel argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) failing to implement courtordered accommodations in violation of her constitutional rights, (2) allowing the September 17
hearing to proceed despite Steven’s failure to provide specific evidence, and (3 and 4)
improperly dividing the marital assets. Because we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court,
we affirm the final decree of divorce.
I. Background
Rachel and Steven were married in April 2005 and had two children born in March 2006.
In his petition for divorce, Steven stated that the parties ceased living together in January 2025.
Steven stated in his petition that he believed he and Rachel would be able to enter into an
agreement regarding the division of the marital estate. Rachel, proceeding pro se, answered and
filed a counterpetition. In addition to alleging acts of family violence by Steven, Rachel sought a
disproportionate share of the estate. Rachel also filed a statement of inability to pay costs and a
request for court-appointed counsel, having been denied counsel by legal aid. Rachel also filed a
disability statement, wherein she stated she had “Central Auditory Processing Disorder
(CAPD),” which “affects how [her] brain processes auditory information.”
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On July 3, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying Rachel’s request for appointed
counsel, but granting Rachel’s request for certain accommodations, specifically (1) requiring
Steven to provide “all documents, written materials, photo[graph]s, or other exhibits at least
[fifteen] days in advance of any trial or hearing,” or else they would be excluded; (2) allowing
Rachel to have “one individual of her choice accompany her at counsel table to assist her in
understanding the plain meaning of the documents and, if necessary, the evidence in the case”;
and (3) allowing Rachel “the opportunity to take breaks” as needed for “her understanding of the
case.” Rachel filed a “Renewed Motion for Court-Appointed Counsel and [an Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)] Accommodation,” stating that she needed legal assistance and that the
accommodations provided for in the trial court’s order were insufficient. The renewed motion
was denied, but the trial court granted Rachel’s subsequent motion, which sought to allow her
additional time to provide certain materials. Rachel then sought a motion for a continuance,
which was denied.
Subsequently, Rachel filed an “Objection to Proceed Without Legal Representation,” in
which she argued that her disability substantially limited her and she objected to “moving
forward” without representation, which she could not afford. Rachel also filed numerous
motions related to the children, both of whom were over the age of eighteen, and motions related
to harassment from Steven.
On August 6, 2025, the trial court proceeded with the final hearing, at which Rachel
represented herself. The trial court acknowledged Rachel’s motions for assistance of counsel
and accommodations and explained that it denied the counsel request but had allowed for some
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accommodations to best allow Rachel to present her own case. During the August 6 hearing,
Rachel was called to the stand and questioned by Steven. During her testimony, it became clear
that she had numerous documents that Steven was unable to access via an email she purportedly
sent to him. The trial court, on Steven’s request, agreed to a continuance of the hearing so that
Steven could familiarize himself with the documentation and make for a more streamlined final
hearing. The trial court stated that there would be “no additional exchange of discovery,”
thereby freezing the state of the evidence exchanged.
Rachel then addressed the trial court, explaining that she had not received anything from
Steven with the exception of “[thirteen] videos, a tax assessment[,] and a listing of the videos.”
The trial court confirmed that those were the only items of evidence that Steven intended to
admit at trial and that was what Rachel was entitled to.
The final hearing was reconvened on September 17, 2025. At the outset of the hearing,
Rachel, who had been called as an adverse witness when the hearing initially began in August,
retook the stand. Steven questioned Rachel regarding the marital assets, including real estate,
vehicles, tools, home furnishings, livestock, and debt. Rachel testified that she sought to have
the marital home and land awarded to her; but while she insisted she would be able to buy out
Steven’s portion, she was unable to articulate how, agreeing that she had no source of income.
Rachel also sought spousal support and child support, but agreed that the children, twins,
were nineteen years old at the time of the hearing and were not physically disabled. The children
were seniors in high school, and both also had jobs.
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Rachel then put on testimony regarding her desired division of the marital estate. Many
of the documents she sought to admit were denied on hearsay grounds. However, the trial court
continued to allow her to testify to the contents therein.
II. Standard of Review
The Texas Family Code requires the trial court to divide a marital estate in a “just and
right” manner, considering the rights of the parties. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001. “Because
the standards for dividing a community estate involve the exercise of sound judgment, a trial
court must be accorded much discretion in its decision.” In re Marriage of Lewis, No. 06-19-00046-CV, 2020 WL 34919, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(quoting Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2018)). “The division ‘should be
corrected on appeal only where an abuse of discretion is shown in that the disposition made of
some property is manifestly unjust and unfair.’” Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d at 543).
“The appellate court cannot merely reweigh the evidence.” Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d
at 543). “Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment only where it ‘clearly abused
its discretion and if the error materially affects the court’s just and right division of the
property.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Williams, No. 06-18-00041-CV, 2018 WL 6424245,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 7, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). “Under an abuse of
discretion standard, legal and factual sufficiency are relevant factors in assessing whether the
trial court abused its discretion, but they are not independent grounds of error.” Id. (quoting
In re Marriage of Williams, 2018 WL 6424245, at *4 n.7). “If there is any reasonable basis for
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doing so, we must presume that the trial court properly exercised its discretion.” Id. (quoting
In re Marriage of Williams, 2018 WL 6424245, at *4).
“The party complaining of the trial court’s property division must demonstrate from
evidence in the record that the division was so unjust that the trial court abused its discretion.”
Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Williams, 2018 WL 6424245, at *4). “In determining whether an
abuse of discretion has occurred, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the court’s
decision and indulge every legal presumption in favor of its judgment.” Id. (quoting In re
Marriage of Ford, 435 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.)).
III. Court’s Accommodation Order
In her first issue, Rachel asserts that the trial court failed to “meaningfully implement[]”
the accommodation order it entered during the September 17 final hearing. Specifically, she
states that she was not provided structured breaks, Steven failed to provide her with all
documents at least fifteen days prior to trial, and the trial court found that she did not have a
disability.
Rachel, however, asserts these violations without actual support from the record. While
she asserts that Steven failed to provide her with all of his documents prior to the final hearing,
the order was clear that Rachel was to receive any exhibits Steven intended to use during the
final hearing, which was complied with, undisputedly. Furthermore, Rachel asserts that the trial
court allowed her to have a support person at counsel’s table during trial but seemingly faults the
trial court for her choice not to do so. She asserts that the trial court should have asked if she
needed assistance in arranging for a support person, but there was no obligation on the part of the
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trial court to do so. Rachel was not prevented from having a support person; she just did not
bring such a person to the table. And lastly, she complains that the trial court did not
“proactively offer breaks for comprehension purposes” and instead instructed Rachel to answer
the questions asked of her. Again, Rachel misconstrues the trial court’s accommodation order.
The order states that Rachel would be given the opportunity to take breaks as necessary but did
not state that the obligation to suggest such breaks was that of the trial court’s. At no point in the
record before us did Rachel request a break and was denied same. Simply put, Rachel’s
arguments are not factually supported by the record, and we decline to address them further on
this issue. See Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver, 262 S.W.3d 796, 797 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam)
(“[W]e do not consider factual assertions that appear solely in briefs and are not supported by the
record.” (quoting Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex. 2006)));
see also In re of R.M.H., No. 05-13-01426-CV, 2014 WL 5581042, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Nov. 4, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (refusing to address appellant’s assertions which were not
factually supported by the record). Rachel’s first issue is overruled.
IV. Disclosures
In her second issue, Rachel asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding
to final judgment “despite [Steven’s] failure to provide required disclosures and the profound
disclosure imbalance.” Rachel asserts that Steven failed to produce several types of documents
in violation of Rule 194 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 194. She
further asserts, correctly, that Rule 193.6 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure creates the
remedy for failure to provide a required disclosure. Rule 193.6(a) provides as follows:
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(a) Exclusion of evidence and exceptions. A party who fails to make,
amend, or supplement a discovery response, including a required disclosure, in a
timely manner may not introduce in evidence the material or information that was
not timely disclosed, or offer the testimony of a witness (other than a named
party) who was not timely identified, unless the court finds that:
(1) there was good cause for the failure to timely make, amend, or
supplement the discovery response; or
(2) the failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the discovery
response will not unfairly surprise or unfairly prejudice the other parties.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a).
Here, assuming without deciding whether Steven failed to meet his disclosure
requirement, Steven did not seek to introduce anything into evidence that had not already been
disclosed. Rachel does not complain that evidence was admitted that should not have been, but
rather, she argues that Steven should have given her certain documents so that she could have
prepared her side better. She presents no citations to authority to support this argument. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.
Rachel also makes the argument that the trial court should not have proceeded to final
judgment because she did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard because she was not
given access to most of the documents she thinks were necessary, such as Steven’s financial
records, thus limiting her cross-examination of Steven on the topic. To the extent that Rachel
requested disclosure of those items, we note that she did so after the period for requesting such
documents had expired. Rachel made her request for disclosures of certain items on September
2, 2025, after the final hearing began on August 6, 2025, and had recessed until September 17,
2025. The trial court was clear, the hearing had already started, and all matters were “frozen” in
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time until the hearing resumed. Rachel’s complaint on appeal regarding the amount of
documents she turned over compared to what she received does not bring anything to our
attention for review. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding to final
judgment. Rachel’s second issue is overruled.
V. Division of Property
In her third and fourth issues, Rachel complains of the trial court’s determination of what
constituted separate property as opposed to community property, specifically arguing that
Steven’s oral testimony alone did not meet the standard to rebut the presumption of community
property.
Separate property is the property owned “before marriage” as well as property acquired
during marriage through “gift, devise, and descent.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001. All other
property that is not separate property is community property. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002.
“Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be
community property.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a). To rebut this presumption, the person
seeking to prove the separate character of the property must do so by “clear and convincing
evidence.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(b). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.007 (Supp.). “Any doubt as to the character of property should be resolved in favor of the
community estate.” In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d 701, 706 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2013, no pet.) (citing Garza v. Garza, 217 S.W.3d 538, 548 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no
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pet.)). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it characterizes property as separate without
legally sufficient evidence to do so.” Landry v. Landry, 731 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Tex. 2026)
(per curiam) (citing In re Marriage of Williams, 646 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam);
Fuentes v. Zaragoza, 555 S.W.3d 141, 162 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“A
trial court abuses its discretion in dividing the community estate if insufficient evidence supports
the division.”)). The Texas Supreme Court has stated
[C]ourt[s] may consider many [other] factors[,] . . . such . . . as the spouses’
capacities and abilities, benefits which the party not at fault would have derived
from continuation of the marriage, business opportunities, education, relative
physical conditions, relative financial condition and obligations, disparity of ages,
size of separate estates, and the nature of the property.
Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981) (citation omitted). Courts may also consider
whether one spouse contributed less than an equal share to the family’s finances or the
development of the community estate. See Zorilla v. Wahid, 83 S.W.3d 247, 252–53 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, no pet.), disapproved of on other grounds by Lliff v. Lliff,
339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011); Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 60 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism’d w.o.j.).
“The party complaining of the trial court’s property division must demonstrate from
evidence in the record that the division was so unjust that the trial court abused its discretion.”
In re Marriage of Lewis, 2020 WL 34919, at *4 (quoting In re Marriage of Williams, 2018 WL
6424245, at *4). “In determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, we view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the court’s decision and indulge every legal presumption in
favor of its judgment.” Id. at *3 (quoting In re Marriage of Ford, 435 S.W.3d at 350); In re
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Marriage of Pearson, No. 06-24-00052-CV, 2025 WL 300827, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
Jan. 27, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re Marriage of Lewis, 2020 WL 34919, at *3).
“[E]ven if the trial court mischaracterizes property in its division of the marital
estate, the error does not require reversal ‘unless the mischaracterization would
have had more than a de minimis effect on the [] court’s just and right division of
the property.’” In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d at 706 (second alteration
in original) (quoting Vandiver v. Vandiver, 4 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi[–Edinburg] 1999, pet. denied)). “The burden to show that a trial
court’s error caused a manifestly unjust property division is a high one and, even
with adequate briefing, more difficult when the record contains no findings as to
the value of the estate assets.” [In re]Marriage of Rangel & Tovias-Rangel, 580
S.W.3d 675, 683 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
In re Marriage of Nash, 644 S.W.3d 683, 711 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.) (first and
second alterations in original).
“When a court mischaracterizes separate property as community property, the error
requires reversal because a spouse is divested of separate property.” In re Marriage of Case, 28
S.W.3d 154, 161 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (citing Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554
S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977)). “If the mischaracterized property has value that would have
affected the trial court’s just and right division, then the mischaracterization is harmful and
requires the appellate court to remand the entire community estate to the trial court for a just and
right division of the properly characterized community property.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing
McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 189 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ
denied)).
A. Separate Property
Rachel argues in her third issue that the trial court erred in awarding Steven as his
separate property the 2003 Honda van, the 2001 Dodge Ram truck, the 1991 Ford truck, the 2009
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Haulmark trailer, certain tools, and the precious metals in his possession. Rachel argues that
“[n]o documentary evidence was introduced by [Steven] to corroborate any of [his] claims” that
the property was his separate property.
Here, we assume without deciding that Steven failed to rebut the presumption that the
property in question was community property. As such, we move to determine whether Rachel
showed that any error caused a “manifestly unjust property division.” See In re Marriage of
Rangel, 580 S.W.3d at 683. Rachel does not address how any mischaracterization of property
caused a manifestly unjust division of their estate. Rachel does not present any valuation of the
estate she received versus what Steven was awarded, nor does she claim that she received an
unfair or unjust division. Accordingly, because Rachel was not harmed by any error, if any
exists, we overrule her third issue.
In her fourth issue, Rachel asserts that the trial court failed to recognize her “traced
separate property contributions and reimbursement claims.” Rachel asserts that she was able to
trace the proceeds of the sales of several of her properties which were reinvested into the marital
home, as well as the interest rights of her children in the properties.
“The burden of tracing is a difficult, but not impossible, burden to sustain.” In re
Marriage of Born, No. 06-08-00066-CV, 2009 WL 1010876, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
Apr. 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). “Courts have no difficulty in following separate funds
through bank accounts.” Id. at *3. “A showing of community and separate funds existing in the
same account does not divest the separate funds of their identity and establish the entire amount
as community, if the separate funds may be traced and the trial court is able to determine
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accurately the interest of each party.” Id. (citing Holloway v. Holloway, 671 S.W.2d 51, 60 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1983, writ dism’d)). That said, “[i]f separate property and community property
have been so commingled as to defy resegregation and identification, the statutory presumption
of community property prevails.” Id. at *2.
The trial court found that Rachel “failed to overcome the community property
presumption with any sufficient or credible evidence.” Furthermore, the trial court found the
properties that Rachel challenged as her separate property were not part of the estate at the time
of the divorce and that “[n]o reimbursement from those properties was supported by the
evidence” and that “no credible traceable reimbursement evidence was presented.” While
Rachel asserts on appeal that the three properties sold amounted to “approximately
“$232,382[.00] in separate property contributions,” her evidence does not support her contention.
The evidence related to one of the properties establishes the “SELLER(S)” as both Rachel and
Steven. The record does not reflect any additional tracing of her separate funds or property, nor
does the evidence admitted at the final hearing support her contention. Rachel relies heavily on
her testimony and assertions but does not legally trace the funds to her separate property nor how
they were used to purchase the marital estate. Given our deference to the trial court’s findings,
we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Rachel did not present evidence
of reimbursement or separate property. We overrule her fourth point of error.
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VI. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s final decree of divorce.
Charles van Cleef
Justice
Date Submitted: July 13, 2026
Date Decided: August 19, 2026
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