NUMBER 13-26-00542-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN RE FLOR DE JESUS ESQUIVEL
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina1
By petition for writ of mandamus, relator Flor De Jesus Esquivel asserts that the
trial court 2 abused its discretion by granting a new trial in favor of real party in interest
Paulo Pedraza Jr. in a personal injury lawsuit arising from a motor vehicle collision. In one
1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”); id. R. 47.4 (explaining the differences between opinions and memorandum opinions).
2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number C-4455-24-M in the 476th District
Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Nereida Lopez-Singleterry. See id. R. 52.2.
issue, Esquivel contends that the trial court’s new trial order is facially invalid and there is
not a valid, merits-based reason to grant a new trial. Because we conclude that the trial
court’s new trial order is facially invalid, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of
mandamus in part and deny it in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Pedraza filed suit against Esquivel on grounds that he sustained “property damage
and serious personal injuries” when their vehicles collided on March 27, 2024, in McAllen,
Texas. Pedraza alleged that he was traveling northbound on North Second Street when
he was rear-ended by Esquivel. Pedraza asserted causes of action against Esquivel for
negligence and negligence per se. The parties’ dispute was ultimately submitted to a jury,
which heard testimony from five witnesses: Pedraza; Esquivel; two medical experts—Dr.
Matthew Kaplan, an anesthesiologist and specialist in pain management, who testified
regarding Pedraza’s treatment and medical bills, and Dr. Blaine Hendrick, a chiropractor
and nurse practitioner, who testified regarding Pedraza’s chiropractic care,
musculoskeletal injuries—and Adelino Young, a licensed biomechanical engineer who
provided expert testimony regarding the accident.
In response to the first question in the jury charge, the jury found that the
negligence of neither Pedraza nor Esquivel “proximately cause[d] the occurrence in
question.” In accordance with their instructions, the jury did not answer the second
question regarding the percentage of negligence attributable to each party. The third
question in the charge instructed the jury as follows:
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Answer Question No. 3 if you answered “Yes” for one or more of the
Defendants in Question No. 1 and if you found that [Pedraza] was not more
than 50% responsible in Question No. 2.
QUESTION NO. 3
What sum of money, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably
compensate [Pedraza] for his injuries, if any, that resulted from the
occurrence in question?
Even though the jury did not find that Esquivel, Pedraza, or both were negligent, and did
not find that Pedraza was not more than fifty percent responsible, the jury answered this
question and awarded Pedraza $16,500 for past medical care and $1,000 for past
physical pain and mental anguish.
Thereafter, Pedraza filed a motion for new trial asserting that the jury’s findings
were irreconcilable and the verdict was “fatally inconsistent.” Pedraza argued that “[t]he
verdict demonstrates that the jury believed [that he] suffered or was entitled to
compensable harm but was confused or misapplied the liability question,” and that “[t]his
is precisely the type of conflict that the remedy of a [n]ew [t]rial is reserved for and would
be in the best interest of justice in this matter.” In contrast, Esquivel filed a motion for entry
of judgment based on the jury’s verdict. Esquivel argued, in part, “that the damages
finding was immaterial once no liability was found, so the answers were reconcilable.”
Pedraza filed a reply to Esquivel’s response reasserting his request for a new trial.
The trial court held a hearing on Pedraza’s motion for new trial and took the matter
under consideration. On May 29, 2026, the trial court granted Pedraza’s motion for new
trial. The trial court’s new trial order states in its entirety:
On this day, the Court considered [Pedraza’s] Motion for New Trial and
[Esquivel’s] response, if any, and the record of this cause.
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After considering the motion, and the applicable law, the Court is of
the opinion that the motion should be GRANTED.
It is therefore ORDERED that:
1. [Pedraza’s] Motion for New Trial is GRANTED;
2. The Jury’s verdict for trial started on April 20, 2026 is VACATED;
3. This case is REINSTATED on the Court’s active docket with [a] new
Docket Control Conference to be scheduled at a later date; [and]
All relief not expressly granted herein is denied.
This original proceeding ensued. In one issue, Esquivel asserts that the trial court
clearly abused its discretion in granting Pedraza’s motion for new trial because: (1) the
new trial order is facially invalid; and (2) there is no valid merits-based reason for granting
the motion for new trial. Esquivel also filed a motion to stay the trial court proceedings
pending the resolution of her petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(a).
We granted Esquivel’s motion to stay, see id. R. 52.10(b), and we requested and received
a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from Pedraza. See id. R. 52.4, 52.8. 3
Esquivel filed a reply in support of her request for relief. See id. R. 52.5. Pedraza also
filed a motion to abate this original proceeding and remand it to the trial court for
clarification of the new trial order, and Esquivel filed a response in opposition.
II. MANDAMUS
Mandamus relief provides an “extraordinary remedy.” In re Rogers, 690 S.W.3d
296, 302 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting In re USAA Gen. Indem.
3 Pedraza filed a motion for extension of time to file his response to the petition for writ of
mandamus and a motion for leave to file his response. We grant both motions, and we consider Pedraza’s response on the merits.
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Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding)). Mandamus is discretionary in
nature and it is governed by equitable principles. In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d
653, 663 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam). To obtain mandamus relief, the relator must show that the
trial court clearly abused its discretion and the relator lacks an adequate remedy by
appeal. In re Dall. HERO, 698 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re
AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). In
this regard, there is no adequate remedy by appeal when the trial court abuses its
discretion by granting a new trial. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary,
L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 209–10 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding).
III. NEW TRIALS
Trial courts possess “considerable authority to grant new trials” and have the duty
“to do so when they observe problems that threaten the integrity of the process and,
therefore, the reliability of [a jury’s] verdict.” In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d 289,
302 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding). However, because “disregarding a jury’s verdict is an
unusually serious act that imperils a constitutional value of immense importance—the
authority of a jury”—the trial court may only do so “when clearly supported by sound
reasons.” Id.
Those reasons must be specifically set forth in the order. Id.; see In re Davenport,
522 S.W.3d 452, 456–56 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding). In other words, trial courts are
required to provide litigants with “an understandable, reasonably specific explanation” for
setting aside a jury verdict and ordering a new trial. In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Tex.
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2016) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213). Trial
courts must do so because:
[A] vague explanation in setting aside a jury verdict does not enhance
respect for the judiciary or the rule of law, detracts from transparency we
strive to achieve in our legal system, and does not sufficiently respect the
reasonable expectations of parties and the public when a lawsuit is tried to
a jury. Parties and the public generally expect that a trial followed by a jury
verdict will close the trial process. Those expectations may be overly
optimistic, practically speaking, but the parties and public are entitled to an
understandable, reasonably specific explanation why their expectations are
frustrated by a jury verdict being disregarded or set aside, the trial process
being nullified, and the case having to be retried.
In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213. Generally, this requirement is satisfied when
a trial court’s stated reason is “a reason for which a new trial is legally appropriate” and
“is specific enough to indicate that the trial court did not simply parrot a pro forma
template, but rather derived the articulated reasons from the particular facts and
circumstances of the case at hand.” In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173 (quoting In re United
Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 688–89 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding)). The new trial
order must show that it was granted “only after careful thought and for valid reasons.” In
re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d at 456 (quoting In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at
688). Granting a new trial “in the interests of justice and fairness” is not a sufficiently
specific reason to grant a new trial, and such a generic rationale renders the new trial
order facially invalid. In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 206, 213; see In re United
Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 689–90. Similarly, “the mere recitation of a legal standard,
such as a statement that a finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence, will not suffice.” In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 689.
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We may also look past the face of the new trial order to perform a merits-based
review of the validity of the trial court’s reasons for granting a new trial. In re Rudolph
Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 300; In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173. We do so because
“[t]ransparency without accountability is meaningless.” In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 758 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding). The Supreme Court of Texas
has further explained that “[i]t is simply impermissible for the district court, no matter how
strongly it disagrees, to substitute its own judgment for the jury’s as a basis for a new
trial.” In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 307.
IV. ABATEMENT
We first address Pedraza’s motion to abate and remand this original proceeding
to the trial court to allow it to “enter a clarified new[ ]trial order that states specific reasons”
for granting the new trial. Esquivel asserts that abating this original proceeding for such
a purpose is not authorized by the applicable law.
We previously addressed the propriety of abatement to clarify an order granting a
new trial. See In re Space Expl. Techs. Corp., 718 S.W.3d 293, 298–99 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2024, orig. proceeding), subsequent mand. proceeding, 716
S.W.3d 576 (Tex. 2025). There, we questioned whether Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 44.4 applied to original proceedings, and we considered the nature of the trial
court’s responsibility to provide a reasonably specific explanation for granting a new trial.
See id. We concluded that Rule 44.4, by its terms, applies to appeals rather than original
proceedings. See id. at 298 (“On its face, Rule 44.4 applies to appeals rather than original
proceedings.”). We further concluded that abatement, which is generally reserved to
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address ministerial or perfunctory actions, was inappropriate to address the trial court’s
significant exercise of discretion in determining why it should set aside a jury verdict and
grant a new trial. See id. (collecting cases regarding limitations on abatement). We reach
the same conclusion here. See id. Accordingly, we deny Pedraza’s motion for abatement
of this original proceeding and all relief sought therein.
V. ANALYSIS
In one issue, Esquivel asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by granting
a new trial because the new trial order is facially invalid and there is no valid merits-based
reason supporting the trial court’s reasoning. We begin our analysis with the facial validity
of the order.
The Supreme Court of Texas has repeatedly instructed us that a trial court acts
arbitrarily and abuses its discretion if it disregards a jury verdict and grants a new trial but
does not specifically set out its reasons for doing so. See In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674
S.W.3d at 302; In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d at 456–56; In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173;
In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 212–13. Here, the trial court’s order does not
provide a rationale for granting a new trial. Further, the order’s reference to Pedraza’s
motion for new trial and the applicable law does not supply the required rationale. See In
re Lemus, No. 13-25-00120-CV, 2025 WL 1722401, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg June 20, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Accordingly, the trial court abused
its discretion by granting a new trial because its order doing so is facially invalid. See In
re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 302; In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d at 456–56; In re
Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173; In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 212–13. Esquivel has
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established that she is entitled to mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate its
order.
Esquivel also seeks a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to sign a judgment
in accordance with the jury’s verdict. She asserts that the only ground Pedraza asserted
in his motion for new trial was that the jury’s answers were irreconcilable, and she
contends that merits-based reason is invalid. Esquivel thus contends that we should order
the trial court to enter judgment in her favor based on the jury’s no-negligence finding.
We disagree. See In Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 215 (directing the trial court to
specify its reasons for granting a new trial but denying “without prejudice” relator’s request
to instruct the trial court to vacate the new trial order and enter judgment on the verdict);
In re Lemus, 2025 WL 1722401, at *6 (“In general, when appellate courts conclude that
a new trial order is facially invalid, they do not proceed to address the merits of the order
before allowing the trial court an opportunity to provide a sufficient explanation for its
ruling.”); In re Foerster, No. 04-23-00920-CV, 2024 WL 1293964, at *2 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Mar. 27, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (rejecting the relator’s contention
that judgment should be entered on the verdict because the relator “is not entitled to such
relief”); In re Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., No 01-19-00742-CV, 2020 WL 573249, at *4
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 6, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“The remedy
for a facially invalid order is a remand to the trial court, which then has the option to deny
the motion for new trial or to sign an order that comports with Texas law.”). Under the
circumstances presented here, where the new trial order fails to include any explanation
for setting aside the jury’s verdict, we conclude that a review of the merits would be
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premature. See In re Lemus, 2025 WL 1722401, at *6. Accordingly, to the extent that
Esquivel requests merits review and seeks the rendition of judgment in her favor, we deny
her petition for writ of mandamus without prejudice.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus
and the applicable law, is of the opinion that Esquivel has met her burden to obtain
mandamus relief as stated herein. Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed in this
case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b). We conditionally grant the petition for writ of
mandamus, in part, and we direct the trial court to vacate its order of May 29, 2026, and
to proceed in accordance with this memorandum opinion. Our writ will issue only if the
trial court fails to promptly comply. We deny the petition for writ of mandamus, in part, as
to all other relief sought.
JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice
Delivered and filed on the
18th day of August, 2026.
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