NUMBER 13-24-00597-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
WILLIE MAXWELL Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO.3
OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña
Appellant, Willie Maxwell, 1 was convicted of robbery, a second-degree felony. See
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TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.02. The trial court found a punishment enhancement paragraph
1 The indictment and other filings associated with this cause number also identify the appellant as
Willie Maxwell Jr.
true and sentenced him to twenty-five years’ confinement. Appellant raises one issue on
appeal, arguing the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND 2 1F
A. Offense
On February 21, 2024, a grand jury indicted appellant for intentionally or knowingly
threatening or placing Adell Brumfield in imminent fear of bodily injury or death while in
the course of committing theft. See id. § 29.02(a)(2). At trial, the evidence showed that on
December 26, 2023, appellant visited a Dollar General where Brumfield was working as
a manager. Brumfield observed signs that appellant was intoxicated and asked him to
leave. Shortly after, appellant returned and Brumfield saw him trying to hide and take
items from the store. Brumfield asked him to return the items, but he refused and
threatened her by saying he would “fight[] back.” After Brumfield tried to deescalate the
situation, appellant punched her in the face.
B. Challenged Questioning
The State called five witnesses during the guilt phase. Pertinent here, the State
called Officer Stephanie Lopez, who gave her account of the incident as a responding
officer. Regarding the charge appellant was arrested for in the present case, the following
questioning transpired on cross-examination:
[DEFENSE]: —the arrest for the charge involving Adell Brumfield
was theft?
[OFFICER LOPEZ]: Correct.
[DEFENSE]: I pass the witness.
2 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant
to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 22.220(a), 73.001.
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THE COURT: Redirect.
Immediately after, the State questioned Officer Lopez on re-direct examination:
[STATE]: So, Officer Lopez, the arrest for the Defendant, what
was he arrested for, just to make it clear to the jury?
[OFFICER LOPEZ]: The Defendant was arrested for aggravated robbery,
theft with previous convictions,—
[DEFENSE]: Objection.
[OFFICER LOPEZ]: —resisting arrest and transport—
[DEFENSE]: Objection. Your Honor, under 403, under 404(b), I
object to the statement made by the witness.
THE COURT: All right. This objection is sustained.
[DEFENSE]: And I request that a mistrial be granted in this case
because of the statement that was uttered.
THE COURT: Do you wish an instruction to disregard?
[DEFENSE]: Yes.
The trial court instructed the jury to disregard Officer Lopez’s statement and denied
appellant’s motion for mistrial. The jury found appellant guilty of robbery, and the trial court
sentenced him to twenty-five years’ confinement. On direct appeal, appellant argues that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial for an abuse
of discretion. Hallman v. State, 721 S.W.3d 307, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025); Archie v.
State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a
motion for mistrial, we must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was within the zone of
reasonable disagreement. Hallman, 721 S.W.3d at 313.
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“Ordinarily, a prompt instruction to disregard will cure error associated with an
improper question and answer, even one regarding extraneous offenses.” Irsan v. State,
708 S.W.3d 584, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (quoting Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 783
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). “Mistrial is appropriate for only ‘highly prejudicial and incurable
errors.’” Id. (quoting Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). In
determining whether a mistrial should have been granted, we apply the test set out in
Mosley, which balances three factors: “(1) severity of the misconduct (the magnitude of
the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks), (2) measures adopted to cure the
misconduct (the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge), and (3) the certainty
of conviction absent the misconduct (the strength of the evidence supporting the
conviction).” Hallman, 721 S.W.3d at 313–14 (quoting Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249,
259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). “Only in extreme circumstances, where the prejudice is
incurable, will a mistrial be required.” Archie, 221 S.W.3d at 699 (quoting Hawkins v. State,
135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). “The determination as to whether a given
error calls for a mistrial must be made by examining the peculiar facts and circumstances
of each case.” Hallman, 721 S.W.3d at 313 (quoting Hernandez v. State, 805 S.W.2d 409,
414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
B. Motion for Mistrial
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
for mistrial based on Officer Lopez’s testimony regarding the charged offense. Appellant
specifically challenges the State’s questioning on re-direct examination of Officer Lopez,
wherein she stated that appellant was arrested for “aggravated robbery, theft with
previous convictions,” and “resisting arrest and transport.” Appellant contends that the
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jury was unfairly prejudiced when the State elicited testimony that appellant’s charge in
the current case was predicated on extraneous offenses, and the trial court erred to permit
the State’s questioning.
As widely recognized, the asking of an improper question alone will seldom call for
a mistrial, and any harm from such a question will in most cases be cured by an instruction
to disregard the question. Hernandez, 805 S.W.2d at 413–14. First, as to the severity of
the alleged misconduct, the matter regarding the reason for arrest and charged offense
was first raised on cross-examination by defense counsel. Though Officer Lopez testified
that appellant’s arrest was based in part on prior extraneous offenses, no further
testimony, documents, or other evidence was ever put forth before the jury regarding the
extraneous offenses. See id. The State did not offer any details about any extraneous
offense and offered no proof aside from Officer Lopez’s testimony as to whether those
convictions had occurred. See id. at 413; Irsan, 708 S.W.3d at 614.
Second, the trial court followed with a prompt instruction to the jury to disregard
the challenged portion of Officer Lopez’s testimony. See Irsan, 708 S.W.3d at 614; Ovalle,
13 S.W.3d at 783–84; Hernandez, 805 S.W.2d at 413–14. Appellant points to nothing in
the record indicating the jury failed to comply with this instruction and did not challenge
its substantive sufficiency. See Reed v. State, 680 S.W.3d 620, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023)
(“We generally presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions.”).
Lastly, the jury heard from multiple witnesses and the State admitted evidence
supporting the strength of the conviction aside from the challenged testimony. Overall,
the record weighs against the magnitude of any potential prejudicial effect, reflects
effective measures to cure, and shows ample evidence to support the conviction. See
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Hallman, 721 S.W.3d at 313–14. This case does not present an “extreme circumstance”
where the alleged prejudice is incurable. See Archie, 221 S.W.3d at 699.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s
motion for mistrial. We cannot say that the challenged questioning was “so ‘highly’ and
‘clearly’ prejudicial as to leave an indelible impression on the jurors’ minds” such that a
mistrial was warranted. Irsan, 708 S.W.3d at 614. Thus, the trial court acted within its
discretion and we overrule appellant’s sole point of error.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
L. ARON PEÑA JR.
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the
18th day of August, 2026.
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