NUMBER 13-24-00567-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CHRISTOPHER DALE HAVENS, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 36TH DISTRICT COURT
OF ARANSAS COUNTY, TEXAS
OPINION
Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca
Opinion by Justice West
Appellant Christopher Dale Havens challenges his conviction for family-violence
assault by impeding breath or circulation, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 22.01(b)(2)(B). The jury assessed punishment at ten years’ imprisonment. Appellant
argues by three issues, which we reorder, (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his
conviction, (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State of Texas to admit extraneous evidence of an alleged second strangulation victim, and (3) the trial
court erred when it prevented defense counsel from asking the doctor who examined the
complainant about the doctor’s “personal domestic violence experience to show bias for
the State.” We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
At trial, 1 Jeana Hicks, the complainant, testified she and appellant dated for about
a year starting in 2017. On December 22, 2018, the couple worked at her mother’s food
truck. The food truck was in a local bar’s parking lot, and Jeana and appellant both drank
during their shift. Eventually, the two got into an argument. After they closed the food
truck down around midnight, appellant left, and Jeana went inside the bar and had a few
more drinks. Appellant later picked her up and took her to his father’s house where
appellant also lived.
Appellant parked the car in front of his father’s house, and the two argued in the
car for some time. At one point, appellant became angry about a man named “Ben” Jeana
was messaging on her phone. Jeana testified appellant asked her to perform oral sex on
him, and when she refused, appellant said, “I bet if I was Ben, or whoever, that you would
do it,” to which she replied, “I bet I would, too.” Jeana said appellant reacted by choking
her with both of his hands. She passed out and woke up in an empty field next to
appellant’s father’s house “hurting all over.” She went inside appellant’s father’s house to
seek help. When she entered, appellant “was sitting on the twin-size bed in the living
room with his headphones on playing a video game,” and his father was in his room with
the door closed. She tried to get appellant’s father’s attention, but she had trouble
1 Appellant was initially tried on July 13, 2021, and his first trial resulted in a mistrial. His second
trial began on October 28, 2024.
2
speaking. Appellant then threw her out the front door where she landed on the cement
walkway. Jeana went to the neighbor’s house where the neighbor called her mother at
her request.
Jeana went to the emergency room later that day. Images of Jeana’s injuries were
admitted and displayed at trial. The images showed Jeana with a black eye, swelling and
redness on her face and neck, bruises on her neck, and bruises and scrapes on both
arms. Apart from the bruises on her neck from where she testified appellant choked her,
she could not recall how she received her other injuries. Jeana confirmed on both direct
and cross examination that she was convicted in 2015 for felony possession of
methamphetamine. She denied being on methamphetamines on the night of the assault.
While at the hospital, Jeana made statements about the assault to a police officer
and the medical personnel who treated her. On cross examination, defense counsel
asked her about the alleged inconsistencies made in the officer’s video and in her trial
testimony. Jeana admitted she told the officer she and appellant had sex in his truck
outside appellant’s father’s house, and that she hid in her vehicle, but testified that in fact
she did not recall having sex or hiding from appellant. She also confirmed that she did not
know how she got her injuries. However, she explicitly remembered the short
conversation about “Ben” which caused appellant to choke her.
Sally Hicks, Jeana’s mother, testified Jeana and appellant started dating in 2017,
and the two lived together for a time. On the night in question, Jeana and appellant were
working at her food truck. Sally went to the food truck “several times to check to see if
they needed stuff or just how things were going.” The last time she went was around
11:00 p.m., and she observed the two “had gotten into some kind of a tiff with one
3
another.” Around 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. the following morning, she received a call from an
unknown number, and Jeana was on the other line. The couple “had gotten into a fight,”
and Jeana “was screaming and crying and saying that she was hurt and that she had
gotten strangled and that she had gotten hit and scraped and thrown . . . off of a porch
and had at some point woke up in a field next to [appellant’s father’s] house.” When she
picked Jeana up, Sally immediately noticed Jeana “looked like she had been beat to a
pulp.” On cross examination, Sally said appellant and Jeana regularly drank while they
worked at her food truck, and Jeana has a history of abusing “alcohol, marijuana and
methamphetamine.”
Medical records from Jeana’s admission to the hospital were admitted into
evidence. Nurse Practitioner David Alexander Hadden and Dr. Kim Thuy Nguyen Onufrak
treated Jeana. 2 Both Hadden and Dr. Onufrak testified that Jeana appeared alert and
oriented and did not appear to be intoxicated. They also testified Jeana’s physical injuries,
including “ligature marks” on her neck and a scan showing swelling in her neck, were
consistent with strangulation. On cross, Dr. Onufrak testified that just because an injury
is consistent with assault does not mean she knows how Jeana’s injuries came about.
Clem Havens, appellant’s father, testified he was home in the back bedroom on
the night in question. Jeana and appellant came home in the middle of the night, and he
heard Jeana’s “voice real loud like arguing.” He “got up and told her she needs to leave.”
Clem later clarified he had witnessed “Jeana be unruly in [his] house on more than one
occasion” and did not like her in his house. Clem did not notice any injuries on Jeana,
2 Another doctor also treated Jeana but did not testify at trial.
4
and she did not say anything to him. He also testified that she looked drunk and high.
Clem went back to his bedroom and eventually “[i]t got quiet,” and “[s]he was gone.”
Appellant denied the accusations. According to him, on December 22, he worked
at the food truck from around 1:00 p.m. until it closed. Appellant saw Jeana finish a twelvepack of beer while he was there. During their shift, the couple got into an argument
because Jeana was acting “paranoid” and did not want to deliver food to customers inside
the bar. Appellant believed she was on drugs because of her behavior, and at one point
he witnessed her purchase a baggie containing “[a] green pill and a white crystalline
substance” from people outside the bar. Appellant delivered food inside, and when he
did, some of the patrons bought him shots at the bar. This caused another argument
between the couple. Because things were “off,” appellant decided to close the food truck
around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. While closing, Jeana kicked him in the back, and appellant left
her to close alone. About an hour later, after getting a beer at a different bar, appellant
came back to finish closing. Before they left, Jeana had four shots, and she fell outside
onto the gravel parking lot two or three times.
Appellant drove her to his father’s house, and he parked in front of the house while
Jeana yelled and screamed at him. Appellant left her in the car and talked to her from the
front porch. Jeana got out of the truck, fell down again, and appellant helped her sit down
on a lawn chair in the front yard. He went inside and she continued to yell and scream at
him. Appellant eventually told Jeana to leave, and she left. Appellant said Jeana left about
an hour or hour and half after they first arrived at his father’s house.
Later that night, Clem woke appellant up to confirm that Jeana had left. They went
outside and noticed Clem’s truck and two of appellant’s personal vehicles were open, and
5
the contents were strewn about. They locked up the cars and went back to bed. Appellant
was woken up again, this time by Jeana, who came in through the unlocked front door
and pulled appellant off the bed. He did not observe any injuries on Jeana. He told her to
leave, and she left again. He woke up a third time and went outside to smoke. When he
was outside, he saw Sally picking Jeana up from his neighbor’s house. He noticed then
that Jeana “had scrapes on her elbows and her shirt was messed up.”
After the defense rested, the trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the
jury regarding another alleged victim, Rhandi Hatfield. The trial court granted the State’s
request to allow Hatfield to testify in rebuttal. Hatfield testified she and appellant dated in
2021. On the night of September 21, 2021, she went to Clem’s house where the two
watched a movie and later made a bonfire outside. The two began drinking, and at some
point, got into an argument about Hatfield’s “phone, like [she] couldn’t talk to [her] mother
or stuff like that.” The argument escalated, and appellant threw things, screamed at her,
and “shoved [her] up against the pole on his house.” When she tried to get away from
him, he put his hands around her neck and choked her until she passed out. When she
woke up, appellant was gone. She called the police but told officers she did not want to
press charges. On cross examination, Hatfield confirmed appellant was charged “in that
case against [her],” and the case was “still open and pending.” She also testified she was
currently on probation for two separate felony DWI incidents for drinking while her toddler
was in the vehicle. She admitted that, as a term of her probation, she was not supposed
to drink, and she violated those conditions when she drank with appellant that night.
6
The jury found appellant guilty of the underlying offense and assessed punishment
at ten years’ imprisonment. The trial court sentenced appellant in accordance with the
jury’s verdict. This appeal followed.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
By his first issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
In conducting a sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We assume that the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the
testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences from the evidence in
a manner that supports the verdict. Id. “We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute
our judgment for that of the factfinder.” Id. We consider all the evidence in the record,
including evidence that was properly and improperly admitted. Clayton v. State, 235
S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence
are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish
guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The
hypothetically correct jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
7
restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried.” Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Tex. Crim. App.
2020) (citations omitted).
Here, such a charge would instruct the jury that a person commits an assault when
that person “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another,
including the person’s spouse.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1). An assault is enhanced
to a third-degree felony if the person commits the offense against a person with whom
the defendant has or had “a dating relationship” and “intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly imped[es] the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the person by
applying pressure to the person’s throat or neck.” Id. § 22.01(b)(2)(B); TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 71.0021(b).
A person acts intentionally with respect to the result of his conduct when it is his
conscious objective or desire to cause the result. TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(a). A person
acts knowingly with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct
is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b). A person acts recklessly with
respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur. Id. § 6.03(c). “Proof of a culpable
mental state generally relies on circumstantial evidence.” Gilder v. State, 469 S.W.3d 636,
639 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d
509, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). “Intent may be determined from a defendant’s words,
acts, and conduct, and ‘is a matter of fact to be determined from all of the circumstances.’”
Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).
8
B. Analysis
Jeana testified, both on direct and cross examination, that she distinctly
remembered appellant choking her until she passed out. See TEX. PENAL CODE §
22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B). She also remembered the preceding argument regarding her
messages to “Ben” which caused appellant to choke her. Photographs showing her
injuries were admitted, and Hadden and Dr. Onufrak observed injuries consistent with
Jeana’s claim, including swelling and “ligature marks” or bruises on her neck. This
evidence is sufficient to prove the essential elements of the offense, namely, bodily injury
by impeding normal breathing. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B); Marshall v.
State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (holding the evidence was legally
sufficient to support a finding that appellant impeded the normal breathing or circulation
of blood of the complainant by applying pressure to her throat or neck where the
complainant testified appellant held pillow against her face and she was unable to take
deep breaths); Guzman v. State, 552 S.W.3d 936, 942 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2018, pet. ref’d) (holding there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably
infer that complainant suffered bodily injury where the State presented evidence of the
complainant’s description of the struggle with appellant, the officers’ testimony regarding
the complainant’s physical injuries, and the photographs showing complainant’s injuries).
Based on Jeana’s testimony, a rational jury could also infer that appellant acted
with the requisite intent. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 6.03, 22.01(a)(1); Gilder, 469 S.W.3d
at 639. Finally, Jeana and her mother testified Jeana and appellant were in a dating
relationship for about a year before the assault occurred, and appellant does not dispute
this testimony. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(b)(2); TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 71.0021, 71.005.
9
Appellant argues given Jeana’s “extreme memory loss and intoxication . . . a
rational jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] was the one
who assaulted [her] on this occasion.” However, we cannot usurp the role of the factfinder
in assessing the weight and credibility of witnesses. See Sanchez v. State, 460 S.W.3d
675, 681 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015) (concluding “the factfinder [wa]s free to believe or
disbelieve a witness” where the appellant contended that “[b]ecause of [the
complainant’s] credibility, . . . without tangible evidence, expert testimony, or medical
records to support her allegations, the evidence [wa]s insufficient to show that he
assaulted [the complainant]”), aff’d, 499 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Smith v.
State, 352 S.W.3d 55, 62 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (noting “it was for the
jury to determine whether [the complainant]’s or Appellant’s testimony was more credible,
and we are not permitted to re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence”). We
hold the cumulative force of all the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. See Walker, 594 S.W.3d at 335;
Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 732. We overrule appellant’s first issue.
III. EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE
By his second issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it
allowed the State to admit Hatfield’s testimony because the evidence was unfairly
prejudicial and substantially outweighed any probative value under Texas Rule of
Evidence 403. See TEX. R. EVID. 403.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
The trial court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
10
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
TEX. R. EVID. 403. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it has ‘an undue tendency to
suggest that a decision be made on an improper basis.’” Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d
807, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g)). “Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant
evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than
prejudicial.” Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Williams
v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389.
The factors considered in whether evidence is admissible under Rule 403 include, but are
not limited to: “(1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential to impress the jury
in some irrational, yet indelible, way; (3) the time needed to develop the evidence; and
(4) the proponent’s need for the evidence.” Hernandez v. State, 390 S.W.3d 310, 324
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389–90); see Gigliobianco v.
State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
We review a trial court’s ruling under Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion. Pawlak,
420 S.W.3d at 810. The trial court’s ruling must be upheld as long as it is within the zone
of reasonable disagreement. Id. (citing Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 888 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002)).
B. Analysis
As to the first factor, the probative value of the evidence was high because the
assaults were almost identical. Hatfield testified the assault occurred while the two were
dating. Leading up to the assault, they drank alcohol in the evening, they got into a heated
argument, and appellant got angry at her using her phone. Appellant then choked her
11
until she passed out, which occurred outside appellant’s father’s house where she later
woke up alone. See Taylor v. State, 920 S.W.2d 319, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding
the defendant’s prior murder conviction was highly probative because of “the extreme
degree of similarity between the two murders”); Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205,
220 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. ref’d) (“[T]he district court could have reasonably
determined that the remarkable similarities between the extraneous offenses and the
charged offenses strengthened the probative force of the evidence.”); see also Redin v.
State, No. 06-25-00019-CR, 2026 WL 867024, at *7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 30,
2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding the probative value of
the extraneous-offense evidence of the “two other domestic violence victims” was
significantly probative because appellant “employed many of the same methods against
all three women”).
As to the second factor, the potential to impress the jury was minimal because the
extraneous offense was no more serious than the charged offense. See Taylor, 920
S.W.2d at 323 (“[T]he first murder, being no more heinous than the second, was not likely
to create such prejudice in the minds of the jury that it would have been unable to limit its
consideration of the evidence to its proper purpose.”); Rodriguez v. State, 678 S.W.3d
375, 387 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, pet. ref’d). Moreover, any tendency to draw
impermissible inferences of character conformity “can be minimized through a limiting
instruction,” and the jury charge instructions contained such an instruction. Rodriguez,
678 S.W.3d at 387 (quoting Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
The time needed to develop the evidence was also minimal. The extraneous
offense evidence covered only fourteen pages of the roughly 250-page-record for the
12
State’s case-in-chief and only came in through Hatfield’s testimony. See id.; Robisheaux,
483 S.W.3d at 221 (holding the extraneous offense evidence “did not consume an
inordinate amount of time” because it “was only admitted through the testimony of [the
alleged victim],” and “[the alleged victim]’s testimony was only eight pages long” in a
record that spanned hundreds of pages).
As to the last factor, the State’s need for the evidence was high. Jeana was the
only witness to the offense, the defense challenged her credibility at trial, appellant
testified to a different version of events which characterized Jeana as the aggressor, and
a mistrial had already occurred without Hatfield’s testimony. 3 Hatfield, by testifying about
a strangulation which took place in the same location under similar circumstances, helped
rebut appellant’s defensive theory and testimony. See Taylor, 920 S.W.2d at 323 (holding
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the defendant’s prior murder
conviction in part because appellant’s identity and intent “were hotly contested issues” at
the underlying murder trial and two key witnesses whom appellant confessed to the
murders “were crack-smoking prostitutes, thus vulnerable to at least some degree to
attacks on their credibility”); Rodriguez, 678 S.W.3d at 387; Robisheaux , 483 S.W.3d at
220; see also Redin, 2026 WL 867024, at *8 (holding the State needed the evidence
because the appellant called the complainant’s credibility into question, the complainant’s
mother’s “testimony was largely circumstantial,” and the complainant’s “testimony was
the only direct evidence of” the assault).
Given our standard of review, the presumption in favor of admissibility, and the
factors discussed above, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
3 Hatfield’s alleged assault occurred after appellant’s first trial.
13
overruling appellant’s Rule 403 objection. See Davis, 329 S.W.3d at 806; Montgomery,
810 S.W.2d at 389; Hernandez, 390 S.W.3d at 324; Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42.
We overrule appellant’s second issue.
IV. WITNESS BIAS
By his last issue, appellant argues the trial court erred when it prevented defense
counsel from impeaching Dr. Onufrak about her history of domestic abuse for bias. Before
Dr. Onufrak’s testimony, the trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to
address the State’s motion in limine to exclude “[a]ny reference or mention of Dr. Onufrak
being assaulted or abused in the past.”4 Afterwards, the court granted the State’s motion
in limine and would not allow the defense to inquire on her history of domestic abuse.
“We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of
discretion standard, and we must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was within the zone of
reasonable disagreement.” Wells v. State, 611 S.W.3d 396, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
The erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence is nonconstitutional error governed by
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 44.2(b) if the trial court’s ruling merely offends
the rules of evidence. See Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001);
Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7, 38 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2011), aff’d, 416
S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Nonconstitutional error under Rule 44.2(b) requires
reversal only if it affects the substantial rights of the accused. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).
Even if we assume without deciding the trial court erred when it prevented defense
counsel from cross-examining Dr. Onufrak about her domestic violence experience, we
cannot find that appellant’s substantial rights were affected. See id. We already held the
4 The trial court initially denied the State’s motion in limine to exclude evidence related to Dr.
Onufrak past assault. The State re-urged its motion before Dr. Onufrak’s testimony.
14
evidence sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. We noted Dr. Onufrak’s testimony
was generally similar to Hadden’s testimony. “If the evidence is generally cumulative of
other evidence introduced in the case, no harm attaches.” Celis, 354 S.W.3d at 38
(collecting cases).
Both Hadden and Dr. Onufrak testified about Jeana’s injuries and conditions at the
hospital, and both testified her injuries were consistent with her allegations of abuse.
Appellant does not challenge Hadden’s bias on appeal. In fact, he states in his appellate
brief that Hadden, in contrast to Dr. Onufrak, was “an objective witness.” We cannot find
reversible error where appellant was unable to impeach a witness for potential bias
because her testimony was cumulative of another unbiased or objective witness. See id.
(“[E]ven if the ruling were an abuse of discretion, it would not be reversible error because
the same or similar evidence was admitted through the testimony of appellant and his
witnesses.”). We overrule appellant’s last issue.
V. CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
JON WEST
Justice
Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the
20th day of August, 2026.
15