NUMBER 13-26-00517-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN RE LA JOYA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca1
By petition for writ of mandamus, relator La Joya Independent School District (La
Joya ISD) asserts that the trial court 2 abused its discretion by ordering the production of
communications that are protected by the work-product doctrine and attorney-client
privilege. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.
1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number C-4039-25-F in the 332nd District
Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Juan R. Alvarez. See id. R. 52.2.
I. BACKGROUND
La Joya ISD employed real party in interest Cristina Flores as the Coordinator for
Human Resources. La Joya ISD terminated her employment, and Flores filed an internal
complaint of discrimination against La Joya ISD Superintendent Dr. Marcey Sorensen
pursuant to La Joya ISD’s “DIA” policy. 3 La Joya ISD had previously retained the law firm
of Trautmann & Garcia, Attorneys at Law, PLLC (Trautmann & Garcia) to assist in
investigations undertaken in connection with its policies. Attorney Jaime Garcia
investigated Flores’s claims, and after investigation concluded, he informed Flores that
“the District did not find merit in the allegations raised.” Nevertheless, Flores filed suit
against La Joya ISD for racial discrimination and retaliation.
During the litigation, Flores propounded interrogatories, requests for production,
and requests for admission to La Joya ISD. As relevant here, La Joya ISD objected to
responding to certain discovery requests on grounds that the information and documents
at issue were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine. Flores filed a motion to compel La Joya ISD to respond to her discovery
requests, and La Joya ISD filed a response thereto.
In its response, La Joya ISD asserted that it engaged Garcia to investigate Flores’s
internal employment complaint in “reasonable anticipation of litigation.” La Joya ISD
argued that Garcia’s report and investigatory materials were not subject to disclosure
based on attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. La Joya ISD supported
its response to the motion to compel with copies of: (1) Flores’s first set of interrogatories,
3 The parties do not define the acronym “DIA.” DIA is an alphabetic filing code used by the Texas
Association of School Boards to refer to a policy regarding “Freedom from Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation.” See, e.g., TEX. SCH. FOR THE BLIND & HEARING IMPAIRED, D Policy Index: Personnel, https://www.tsbvi.edu/administration/policies/d-policy-index-personnel (last visited Aug. 17, 2026).
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requests for production, and requests for admission; (2) La Joya’s second amended
objections and answers to these requests; (3) La Joya ISD’s contract for legal services
with Trautmann & Garcia, dated April 22, 2024, and signed on May 9, 2024; (4) Garcia’s
letter to Flores informing her that the investigation was complete and La Joya ISD did not
find her allegations meritorious; (5) a May 29, 2024 letter from Flores’s counsel to La Joya
ISD notifying it of her claims and including a copy of her complaint; and (6) Garcia’s
affidavit.
After a hearing, the trial court granted Flores’s motion to compel. By order signed
on June 30, 2026, the trial court ordered La Joya ISD to produce emails, texts,
memoranda, and letters sent or received by Garcia to Sorensen or Jaime Miller 4 regarding
Flores’s complaint under La Joya ISD’s DIA policy that Garcia investigated. The trial
court’s order encompassed “any video or audio recordings made by [Garcia] in the scope
of his investigation.”
This original proceeding ensued. The Court sua sponte ordered the June 30, 2026
order to be stayed pending the resolution of this original proceeding. See TEX. R. APP. P.
52.10(b). The Court ordered Flores and any others whose interests might be affected by
the relief sought to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See id. R. 52.4,
52.8. Flores filed a response to the petition for writ of mandamus, and La Joya ISD filed
a reply thereto. See id. R. 52.5.
II. MANDAMUS
Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy available only when (1) the trial court
4 The record reflects that Jaime Miller was La Joya ISD’s “Chief of Human Capital and Talent
Development” and records custodian.
3
clearly abused its discretion, and (2) the party seeking relief lacks an adequate remedy
on appeal. In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re
Liberty Cnty. Mut. Ins., 679 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
“A court abuses its discretion if no evidence supports the finding on which its ruling rests
and if the court could reasonably have reached only a contrary conclusion.” In re
AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We
conduct a “benefits-and-detriments analysis” to determine if the relator possesses an
adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P’ship, 655 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. 2022)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124,
136–37 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
III. DISCOVERY
Under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the scope of discovery extends to “any
matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.”
See In re National Lloyds Ins., 532 S.W.3d 794, 802–03 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding)
(quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a)). The scope of discovery is generally within the trial
court’s discretion. In re UPS Ground Freight, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 828, 831 (Tex. 2022) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam); In re Cent. Or. Truck Co., 644 S.W.3d 668, 671 (Tex. 2022)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam). “Because the purpose of discovery is to enable courts to
decide disputes based on what the facts reveal, not by what facts are concealed, the rules
must be liberally construed to allow the litigants to obtain the fullest knowledge of the facts
and issues prior to trial.” In re K & L Auto Crushers, LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239, 248 (Tex. 2021)
(orig. proceeding) (citation modified).
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Nevertheless, “[a] discovery order that compels production beyond the rules of
procedure is an abuse of discretion for which mandamus is the proper remedy.” In re
Kuraray Am., Inc., 656 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(quoting In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins., 449 S.W.3d 486, 488 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam)). As relevant here, when the trial court abuses its discretion by ordering the
production of privileged information, the party claiming the privilege has no adequate
appellate remedy and mandamus is appropriate. See, e.g., In re Silver, 540 S.W.3d 530,
538 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding); In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d
276, 279 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
IV. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE
“The attorney-client privilege . . . is ‘the oldest and most venerated of the common
law privileges of confidential communications.’” Paxton v. City of Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247,
259 (Tex. 2017) (quoting United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2002)).
“The attorney-client privilege exists to facilitate free and open communication between
attorneys and their clients.” Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Franklin Ctr. for Gov’t & Pub. Integrity,
675 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tex. 2023). The “privilege is intended to encourage clients to
provide counsel with ‘full and frank’ disclosures so that the resulting legal advice is
accurate and helpful, ‘thereby promot[ing] broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice.’” Id. at 280 (alteration in original) (quoting Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). “The privilege ‘applies with special force’ in the
governmental context because ‘public officials are duty-bound to understand and respect
constitutional, judicial and statutory limitations on their authority; thus, their access to
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candid legal advice directly and significantly serves the public interest.’” Id. at 279 (quoting
Paxton, 509 S.W.3d at 260).
Texas Rule of Evidence 503 governs the attorney-client privilege and provides
that: a “client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition
of professional legal services to the client.” TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege protects
communication between the lawyer, the client, and their respective representatives. See
id. “A communication is ‘confidential’ if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other
than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal
services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” Id. R.
503(a)(5).
“The primary purpose of the work[-]product rule is to shelter the mental processes,
conclusions, and legal theories of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which
the lawyer can analyze and prepare his or her case.” In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins., 532 S.W.3d
at 803 (quoting Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex.
1991) (orig. proceeding)). “The work[-]product privilege is broader than the attorney-client
privilege because it includes all communications made in preparation for trial, including
an attorney’s interviews with parties and non-party witnesses.” In re Bexar Cnty. Crim.
Dist. Atty’s Off., 224 S.W.3d 182, 186 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (footnote omitted).
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.5 governs the work-product doctrine. See TEX.
R. CIV. P. 192.5. This rule explains that work product is defined as:
(1) material prepared or mental impressions developed in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for a party or a party’s representatives,
including the party’s attorneys, consultants, sureties, indemnitors,
insurers, employees, or agents; or
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(2) a communication made in anticipation of litigation or for trial between
a party and the party’s representatives or among a party’s
representatives, including the party’s attorneys, consultants,
sureties, indemnitors, insurers, employees, or agents.
Id. at 192.5(a). Rule 192.5 provides that core work product, which is “the work[-]product
of an attorney or an attorney’s representative that contains the attorney’s or the attorney’s
representative’s mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, or legal theories,” is not
subject to discovery. Id. R. 192.5(b)(1). In contrast, “other work[-]product is discoverable
only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the party’s case and that the party is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the material by other means.” Id. R.
192.5(b)(2). Rule 192.5(c) explains that certain items, such as witness statements, do not
constitute work-product that is protected from discovery. See id. R. 192.5(c)(1)–(5).
“Pleading and producing evidence establishing the existence of a privilege is the
burden of the party seeking to avoid discovery. The party asserting the privilege must
establish by testimony or affidavit a prima facie case for the privilege.” In re Christus Santa
Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d at 279 (quoting In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464
S.W.3d 686, 698 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (internal citations omitted)); see In re
WHC, LLC, 570 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, orig. proceeding). Once the
party claiming privilege presents a prima facie case that the documents are privileged,
the burden shifts to the party seeking production to prove that an exception to the privilege
applies. In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d at 279–80; In re Starr Indem.
& Liab. Co., No. 12-24-00191-CV, 2024 WL 3858473, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 15,
2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re WHC, LLC, 570 S.W.3d at 353.
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V. ANALYSIS
La Joya ISD asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by compelling it to
produce materials regarding the investigation of Flores’s complaint because those
materials are protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine.
Flores asserts that the trial court acted within its discretion because: (1) Garcia’s affidavit
was conclusory; (2) Garcia was not acting as an attorney when he compiled the disputed
materials; (3) Garcia failed to identify the parties he communicated with regarding the
investigation; (4) the attorney-client privilege does not protect facts; there is no evidence
that La Joya ISD anticipated litigation; and (5) Garcia did not compile the information in
anticipation of litigation.
A. Prima Facie Case
Because La Joya ISD alleges that the documents at issue are privileged, we first
consider whether La Joya ISD presented a prima facie case in support of this contention.
See In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d at 279. To make a prima facie
case, La Joya ISD was required to produce only the minimum quantum of evidence, in
the form of testimony or affidavits, necessary to support a rational inference that the
allegation of fact is true. See In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins., 532 S.W.3d at 804; In re Kona Coast
Venture, Ltd., 730 S.W.3d 683, 699 (Tex. App.—Austin 2026, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]); In re Stoehr, No. 12-25-00197-CV, 2025 WL 2985035, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler
Oct. 22, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
Here, La Joya ISD provided Garcia’s affidavit in support of its claimed privilege.
Garcia’s affidavit provides in relevant part:
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2. I am an owner of the law firm of [Trautmann & Garcia] in Laredo,
Texas. I have served as outside legal counsel for [La Joya ISD] on
various legal matters.
3. On May 9, 2024, my firm entered into an agreement with La Joya
ISD to provide legal services and representation with third-party
investigations associated [with] Board Policy DIA complaints
pursuant to District policies, procedures, and regulations for one
year. The contract went into effect that day after the La Joya ISD
Board of Managers voted to approve the agreement. The agreement
specified that the State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes
professional misconduct. Professional misconduct includes breaking
of client confidentiality and inappropriate breaches of privilege. A true
and correct copy of the engagement letter is attached.
4. On May 29, 2024, [Flores] filed a DIA complaint, in which she alleged
claims of disparate impact discrimination and racial discrimination.
The complaint was forwarded to my office so that I could investigate
and provide legal services to La Joya ISD in response to the
complaint. The complaint prompted the investigation that my firm
was legally obligated to perform, in light of the contract and
engagement letter that was approved by La Joya ISD and my firm on
May 9, 2024.
5. Given the allegations of Flores’s complaint—and the fact that
Flores’s complaint was filed on her behalf by her private attorney—I
believed that there was a substantial chance that litigation would
result from the complaint. In particular, based on my prior experience
representing school districts, I believed it was likely that Flores would
file a Charge against La Joya ISD with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Texas Workforce Commission, or both. I
also believed, after conclusion of that administrative matter, that
Flores would file a lawsuit against La Joya ISD. I informed La Joya
ISD of that belief. Through my investigation, La Joya ISD was
operating under reasonable anticipation of litigation by Flores.
6. My investigation was subject to the work-product doctrine and to the
attorney-client privilege, to ensure the opportunity for a robust and
candid assessment of legal issues affecting La Joya ISD’s
employment practices and Human Resources office.
7. On August 23, 2024, I submitted my investigation report to La Joya
ISD Board of Managers President Julian Alvarez III. The report
includes my findings of fact and legal analyses, which I created in my
capacity as an attorney. The report is labeled as a confidential
investigation report.
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8. On August 26, 2024, I sent a letter to Flores and her attorney, stating
that my investigation had concluded. I also stated that La Joya ISD
did not find merit in Flores’s allegations raised.
9. My firm has treated the documents from this representation as
privileged and confidential at all times. I am not aware of any public
disclosures of my draft report, final investigation report, or of any
materials related to my investigation to any person who is not a
representative of La Joya ISD. I have discussed the investigation
only with authorized La Joya ISD senior executives and trustees.
Flores asserts that Garcia’s affidavit is conclusory and therefore fails to constitute
evidence in support of La Joya’s claimed privilege. Flores’s assertion is based on the
tenet that a party resisting discovery “must do more than ‘make conclusory allegations
that the requested discovery is unduly burdensome.’” In re K & L Auto Crushers, 627
S.W.3d at 253 (quoting In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 181 (Tex. 1999)
(orig. proceeding)). An affidavit is conclusory and constitutes no evidence of the
assertions therein when it does not contain the underlying facts that support its conclusion
and instead contains bare, baseless opinions. See Nw. Mut. Inv. Servs., LLC v. Fabik ex
rel. Howley, No. 12-25-00136-CV, 2025 WL 3237398, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 19,
2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); Mogged v. Lindamood, No. 02-18-00126-CV, 2020 WL
7074390, at *15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 3, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “An
objection that an affidavit is conclusory is a defect of substance that may be raised for the
first time in an original proceeding.” In re Regency IHS of Longview, LLC, No. 12-25-00082-CV, 2025 WL 2180535, at *7 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 31, 2025, orig. proceeding)
(mem. op.).
Garcia’s affidavit, however, is based on his personal knowledge of the work that
he performed in this case. The affidavit includes specific facts supporting his opinions and
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provides a reasoned basis for those opinions. See Nw. Mut. Inv. Servs., LLC, 2025 WL
3237398, at *3; Mogged, 2020 WL 7074390, at *15. We conclude that Garcia’s affidavit
is not conclusory, and we reject Flores’s contentions otherwise. Accordingly, we
determine that, through Garcia’s affidavit, La Joya ISD has established a prima facie claim
of privilege. See In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins., 532 S.W.3d at 804; In re Kona Coast Venture,
Ltd., 730 S.W.3d at 699; In re Stoehr, 2025 WL 2985035, at *2. Therefore, we turn our
attention to whether Flores has met her burden to prove that any exception to the claimed
privileges applies in this case. See In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d at
280.
B. Garcia’s Investigation
Flores asserts that the discovery at issue is not protected by the attorney-client
privilege or work-product doctrine because it was compiled by Garcia in his capacity as
an investigator. “[T]he privilege does not apply if the attorney is acting in a capacity other
than that of an attorney.” In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch., 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); see Harlandale Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Cornyn, 25 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied). In determining
whether this exception applies, we examine whether the attorney’s investigation was
related to the rendition of legal services and was performed for the purpose of providing
legal advice. See Harlandale, 25 S.W.3d at 334–35. In doing so, we review the terms of
the engagement agreement and the surrounding circumstances. See Univ. of Tex. Sys.,
675 S.W.3d at 283–84 (determining whether an investigator acted as a lawyer’s
representative for purposes of applying the attorney-client privilege).
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We review the terms of the contract between La Joya ISD and Garcia’s law firm.
The contract specifies that it “is a CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES.” The contract
states that La Joya ISD “retains Law Firm to provide legal services and representation to
District in connection with third-party investigations undertaken by Law Firm pursuant to
District policies, procedures, and/or regulations.” Further, Garcia’s affidavit provided that
he “investigate[d] and provide[d] legal services” to La Joya ISD in response to Flores’s
complaint. Based on these facts and circumstances, we determine that Garcia’s
investigation was related to the rendition of his legal services and was performed for the
purpose of providing legal advice to La Joya. See Univ. of Tex. Sys., 675 S.W.3d at 283–
84; Harlandale, 25 S.W.3d at 334–35. We disagree with Flores’s assertions otherwise.
C. Scope of Communication
Flores asserts that La Joya ISD cannot claim that the disputed materials are
protected by attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine because Garcia failed
to identify the individuals that he communicated with, along with their authority within La
Joya ISD. Flores speculates that “if information was disclosed to [Flores], any privilege
would be lost.” However, Garcia provided testimony that his “firm has treated the
documents from this representation as privileged and confidential at all times,” and he
has “discussed the investigation only with authorized La Joya ISD senior executives and
trustees.” “Rule 503(b) protects not only confidential communications between the lawyer
and client, but also the discourse among their representatives.” In re XL Specialty Ins.,
373 S.W.3d 46, 49-50 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding); see In re Textron, Inc., No. 09-25-00240-CV, 2025 WL 3293884, at *7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 26, 2025, orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.). We conclude that the record does not indicate any
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waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine by virtue of disclosure to
unauthorized persons. Accordingly, we reject Flores’s speculative argument otherwise.
Flores also asserts that the attorney-client privilege “does not protect facts, and
facts cannot be protected by reporting them to an attorney.” This is incorrect. “Rule 503
does not exempt privileged communications that contain ‘factual statements’ about the
underlying case from the category of privileged attorney-client communications.” In re
Kona Coast Venture, Ltd., 730 S.W.3d at 703 (discussing TEX. R. EVID. 503); see Huie v.
DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (stating that “the privilege
extends to the entire communication, including facts contained therein,” however, “a
person cannot cloak a material fact with the privilege merely by communicating it to an
attorney”). This is so because “[i]t is inconceivable that an attorney could give sound legal
advice on a client’s case if he or she did not include an application of the law or opinion
to the specific facts of that case.” In re ExxonMobil Corp., 97 S.W.3d 353, 357 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (quoting Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v.
Caldwell, 861 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding)).
Thus, while “the relevant facts of a case may not be hidden under the guise of privilege,”
“those facts are discoverable through other proper means of discovery, without forcing
the production of a privileged document which may also contain that factual information.”
Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 861 S.W.2d at 425. We conclude that Flores’s argument here
is misplaced.
D. Anticipation of Litigation
Flores asserts that Garcia did not compile the information in anticipation of litigation
but rather prepared the materials “for a DIA investigation, which occurred in the ordinary
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course of business and pursuant to public requirements.” Citing Enron Corp. Savings Plan
v. Hewitt Associates, L.L.C., 258 F.R.D. 149, 162 (S.D. Tex. 2009), Flores asserts that
the work-product doctrine does not protect materials created in the ordinary course of
business or pursuant to public requirements that are not related to litigation.
The Supreme Court of Texas has explained that an investigation is conducted in
anticipation of litigation if it meets a two-pronged test. Nat’l Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851
S.W.2d 193, 203 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (modifying the test as articulated in Flores
v. Fourth Ct. of Apps., 777 S.W.2d 38, 40–41 (Tex.1989) (orig. proceeding)). Specifically,
an investigation is conducted in anticipation of litigation if (1) “a reasonable person would
have concluded from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigation that
there was a substantial chance that litigation would ensue” (the objective prong); and (2)
“the party resisting discovery believed in good faith that there was a substantial chance
that litigation would ensue and conducted the investigation for the purpose of preparing
for such litigation” (the subjective prong). Id. at 207. A “substantial chance of litigation”
does not “refer to any particular statistical probability that litigation will occur” but “simply
means that litigation is ‘more than merely an abstract possibility or unwarranted fear.’” Id.
at 204. “Although the subjective prong requires the investigation to be conducted for the
purpose of preparing for litigation, Rule 192.5 does not require that the sole or primary
purpose of the material or communication be for preparing for litigation.” In re Triple C
Project Servs., LLC, No. 01-26-00594-CV, 2026 WL 2339560, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Aug. 13, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (discussing TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.5);
see In re Mid-Century Ins., 549 S.W.3d 730, 734 (Tex. App.—Waco 2017, orig.
proceeding).
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Here, Garcia testified by affidavit that: Flores filed a DIA complaint on May 29,
2024, alleging claims of disparate impact discrimination and racial discrimination; Garcia
was provided with Flores’s complaint so that he “could investigate and provide legal
services to La Joya ISD in response to the complaint”; and Garcia believed that there was
a substantial chance that litigation would result from the complaint “[g]iven the allegations
of Flores’s complaint—and the fact that Flores’s complaint was filed on her behalf by her
private attorney.” Garcia specifically stated that “[i]n particular, based on [his] prior
experience representing school districts, [he] believed it was likely that Flores would file
a [c]harge against La Joya ISD with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Texas Workforce Commission, or both,” and that he “also believed, after conclusion of
that administrative matter, that Flores would file a lawsuit against La Joya ISD.”
While the record indicates that the materials at issue were generated “pursuant to
District policies, procedures, and regulations,” the record also reflects that the
investigation was performed “to provide legal services and representation” to La Joya
ISD. See In re Triple C Project Servs., LLC, 2026 WL 2339560, at *3; In re Mid-Century
Ins., 549 S.W.3d at 734. We determine that a reasonable person would have concluded
from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigation that there was a
substantial chance that litigation would ensue. See Nat’l Tank Co., 851 S.W.2d at 207.
We further conclude that the record shows that La Joya ISD believed in good faith that
there was a substantial chance that litigation would ensue and conducted the
investigation for the purpose of preparing for such litigation. See id.
Finally, Flores asserts that the applicable law requires the party itself to anticipate
litigation, as opposed to its counsel, and here there is no evidence that La Joya ISD
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anticipated litigation. In determining whether communications were made in anticipation
of litigation for purposes of applying the work-product privilege, “the inquiry is not whether
counsel possessed a good faith belief that litigation would ensue but rather whether the
party invoking the privilege possessed a good faith belief.” In re Bonding, 522 S.W.3d 75,
87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding). In this case, the record lacks
testimony from a representative of La Joya ISD regarding the anticipation of litigation.
However, Garcia’s affidavit stated that he informed La Joya ISD of his belief that litigation
was forthcoming, and that “[t]hrough [his] investigation, La Joya ISD was operating under
reasonable anticipation of litigation by Flores.” The record fails to indicate that Flores
objected to this statement. Accordingly, while the record is not as robust as it could be
regarding La Joya ISD’s anticipation of litigation, we conclude that the record
nevertheless supports the application of the work-product doctrine.
E. Summary
La Joya ISD presented unrebutted prima facie evidence supporting its claim of
privilege, and Flores failed to meet her burden to show that any exception applied. See
In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d at 279. Thus, the trial court abused
its discretion by ordering the production of the materials at issue. See id. Further, La Joya
ISD lacks an adequate remedy by appeal to address this error. See In re Silver, 540
S.W.3d at 538; In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d 2at 279. Accordingly,
we sustain the sole issue that La Joya ISD presented in this original proceeding.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,
the response filed by Flores, La Joya ISD’s reply, and the applicable law, is of the opinion
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that La Joya ISD has met its burden to obtain relief. Accordingly, we lift the stay previously
imposed in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b). We conditionally grant the petition for
writ of mandamus, and we direct the trial court to vacate its June 30, 2026 order and to
proceed in accordance with this memorandum opinion. Our writ will issue only if the trial
court fails to promptly comply.
YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
20th day of August, 2026.
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