LAW.coLAW.co

In the Interest of S.G.H. and W.C.H, Children v. the State of Texas

2026-08-20

Summary

Holding. The trial court lacked plenary power to render the August 15, 2024 order in the original cause because it exceeded the time limits for exercising such power. The court vacated the August 15, 2024 order and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Mother appealed a trial court order modifying the parent-child relationship, challenging the court's earlier decision to grant Father's petition for bill of review. The bill of review had vacated a dismissal order from 2019 and allowed the case to proceed, but the trial court then issued the modification order in the original case rather than in the bill of review proceeding itself.

The appellate court held that the trial court lacked authority to sign the modification order because its plenary power over the original case had long expired by the time the order was issued in August 2024—nearly five years after the dismissal. Under procedural rules, once a bill of review is granted and vacates a judgment, any new proceedings must occur in the bill of review cause, not in the original case. Because the trial court acted without plenary power, the August 2024 order is void.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether trial court retained plenary power to enter judgment in original case after dismissal
  • Proper procedural venue for trial on merits after bill of review is granted
  • Whether appellate court may address merits of appeal from void judgment

Procedural posture

Mother appealed a trial court order modifying the parent-child relationship, which was entered in the original divorce case after the trial court had granted Father's bill of review to vacate an earlier dismissal order.

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

NUMBER 13-24-00515-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF S.G.H. AND W.C.H., CHILDREN

ON APPEAL FROM THE 361ST DISTRICT COURT

OF BRAZOS COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

Appellant (Mother) filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship based on

an underlying final decree of divorce and appellee (Father) filed a counterpetition in

response. 1 After four years of inaction in the case, the trial court signed an order

dismissing the suit for want of prosecution on November 6, 2019 (original cause). Father

subsequently filed a petition for bill of review in a separate cause (bill of review cause)

1 We refer to the parties by pseudonyms in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d).

which the trial court granted, vacating the earlier dismissal order. 2 On August 15, 2024,

the trial court signed an order in the original cause modifying the parent-child relationship.

Mother now challenges that order, arguing on appeal that the trial court erred in granting

Father’s bill of review. 3

We hold that the trial court lacked plenary power to render the August 15, 2024

order in the original cause. Therefore, without reaching the merits of Mother’s argument

regarding the bill of review, we vacate the August 15, 2024 order in the original cause

and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 4

I. JURISDICTION

We may sua sponte review our jurisdiction over an appeal as courts are obligated

to ascertain that subject matter jurisdiction exists regardless of whether the parties have

raised it. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Self, 690 S.W.3d 12, 20 (Tex. 2024); Nunu v. Risk, 567

S.W.3d 462, 465 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). “[A]ppellate courts

do not have jurisdiction to address the merits of appeals from void orders; rather, they

have jurisdiction only to determine that the order or judgment underlying the appeal is

void and make appropriate orders based on that determination.” Freedom Commc’ns,

Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam).

“A bill of review is an equitable proceeding brought by a party seeking to set aside

a prior judgment that is no longer subject to challenge by a motion for new trial or appeal.”

2 Mother appealed the grant of bill of review, but the Tenth Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal

for want of jurisdiction because the order “d[id] not dispose of the merits of the underlying controversy.” In re S.H., No. 10-24-00176-CV, 2024 WL 3616954, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 1, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).

3 Father has not filed a brief to assist us in the resolution of this appeal.

4 This case is before the Court on transfer from the Tenth Court of Appeals pursuant to a docketequalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 22.220(a), 73.001.

2

WWLC Inv., L.P. v. Miraki, 624 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting

Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)); see also TEX. R. CIV. P.

329b(f) (providing that on expiration of time within which trial court has plenary power, “a

judgment cannot be set aside by the trial court except by bill of review for sufficient

cause”). When a trial court grants a bill of review and sets aside an earlier judgment in a

prior case, the subsequent trial on the merits must occur in the bill of review proceeding

and not the underlying case in which the judgment is vacated. Alaimo v. U.S. Bank Tr.

Nat’l Ass’n, 551 S.W.3d 212, 216 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.); Retzlaff v.

Mendieta-Morales, 356 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.); see also

White v. Walsh, No. 04-18-00609-CV, 2019 WL 3432091, *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

July 31, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (collecting cases).

Here, the trial court granted Father’s petition for bill of review, thereby vacating the

judgment in the original cause so that the case could be retried. See Alaimo, 551 S.W.3d

at 216. However, instead of retrying the case in the bill of review cause, the trial court

signed an order modifying the parent-child relationship in the original cause. A judgment

in a bill of review proceeding does not restore a trial court’s plenary power in the

underlying cause. Alaimo, 551 S.W.3d at 217–18. The trial court signed the order of

dismissal in the original cause on November 6, 2019, and issued the modification order

in the original cause on August 15, 2024, long after its plenary power over the original

cause had expired. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(3); TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(4); see also In re

Off. of Atty. Gen. of Tex., No. 04-11-00671-CV, 2011 WL 6090173, at *2 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio Dec. 7, 2011, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.) (“[A] trial court that

has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction retains jurisdiction of the parties and matters, [but]

3

the trial court is not authorized to reinstate a dismissed case outside its plenary power.”).

Therefore, the August 15, 2024 order in the original cause is void. See In re

Dansby, 583 S.W.3d 838, 840 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.) (explaining that judicial

action taken after the trial court’s plenary power expires is void). We do not have

jurisdiction to address the merits of appeals from a void judgment or order. Freedom

Commc’ns, 372 S.W.3d at 623. When a party attempts to appeal a void order, the

appellate court must vacate the order and dismiss the appeal. Id.; see State ex rel. Latty

v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).

II. CONCLUSION

We vacate the trial court’s August 15, 2024 order and dismiss the case. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 43.2(e). Any pending motions are dismissed as moot.

L. ARON PEÑA JR.

Justice

Delivered and filed on the

20th day of August, 2026.

4