NUMBER 13-25-00685-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
LEE JOEL TAYLOR III, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 377TH DISTRICT COURT
OF VICTORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina
Appellant Lee Joel Taylor III was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a young
child, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 21.02(b), (c)(4), 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i),
(ii), (a)(2)(B); see also id. § 12.42(d)(2) (delineating the penalties for repeat and habitual
felony offenders). He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
By one issue, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the duration of the abuse occurred for thirty or more days. We affirm.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
In a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable
inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).
Sufficient evidence exists if “the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable
based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The
fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight
to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997)). The elements of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child are:
(1) during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits
two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual
abuse are committed against one or more victims; and (2) at the time of the
commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, the actor is 17 years of age
or older and the victim is a child younger than 14 years of age.
Render v. State, 316 S.W.3d 846, 857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. ref’d) (quoting TEX.
PENAL CODE § 21.02(b)). “Thus, to convict the appellant of this offense, the jury must have
found that [he] committed at least two acts of sexual abuse over a period of at least thirty
days.” See id.
2
An act of sexual abuse is an act that violates certain sections of the penal code
including, as pertinent here, aggravated sexual assault of a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 21.02(c)(4). A person commits aggravated sexual assault of a child, as charged here,
if the child was younger that fourteen years old at the time of the sexual abuse, and the
actor intentionally or knowingly: (1) penetrated the child’s sexual organ with his sexual
organ; (2) penetrated the child’s sexual organ with his fingers; (3) penetrated the child’s
sexual organ with his tongue; or (4) penetrated the child’s mouth with his sexual organ.
See id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii), (a)(2)(B).
II. THIRTY DAYS OR MORE IN DURATION
By his sole issue, appellant contends that there is no evidence that there were two
or more acts of sexual abuse over a period of at least thirty days.
A. Pertinent Facts
M.W., E.W.’s mother, testified that appellant is her cousin, and he lived with the
family for “approximately ten months” when E.W. was seven years old. 1 According to
M.W., appellant moved out of the home because E.W. told her that he “was sneaking in
her room watching her sleep.” M.W. testified that eventually, E.W. told her that appellant
“would come in her room and pull her panties down and lick her between the legs.” M.W.
stated that E.W. saw her therapist, Diane Herrero, the next day, and Herrero told M.W.
that E.W. “said it had happened more than once and then that she was going to proceed
1 To protect the identity of the child victim of this case, we refer to her and her mother by initials.
See TEX. CONST., art. I, § 30(a)(1) (providing that a crime victim has “the right to be treated . . . with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3) (protecting the privacy of “any person who was a minor at the time the offense was committed” by designating the minors’ names, dates of birth, and home address as “[s]ensitive data” requiring redaction); see also Perez v. State, 689 S.W.3d 369, 374 n.1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2024, no pet.) (“Out of an abundance of caution, we will also use initials to identify [her] immediate family members.”).
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with reporting it.”
Herrero testified that E.W. began therapy with her in 2023 when E.W. was thirteen
years old for treatment of, among other things, anxiety. According to Herrero, E.W.
eventually disclosed that she had been sexually abused “when she was about 5 or 6, or
maybe 7.” Herrero said, “She described that the abuse started with the alleged perpetrator
touching her leg and touching her stomach over her underwear but quickly moved . . . to
touching under her underwear.” Herrero stated, “Then she described him putting his head
between her legs and started licking her private part. And then . . . after that he penetrated
her private part with his finger.” According to Herrero, E.W. said that appellant also made
her perform oral sex on him and touch his penis. The State asked, “And did she say how
many times this happened to her?” Herrero replied, “She said—this is her quote. At least
twice a week for months, but doesn’t remember for how long.” The trial court admitted
Herrero’s progress notes stating:
[E.W.] reported abuse occurred for several months but is unsure exactly
how long; noted abuse occurred “at least twice a week for several months
and more often in the summer.” [E.W.] reported she recalls after several
months, she finally told her mom that when she woke up, perpetrator
(mom’s cousin) was standing by her bed watching her sleep.
E.W., who was fifteen years old, testified that her trust in appellant changed
“[w]henever [she] was 6 and 7 years old,” he moved into the home with her family.
According to E.W., on one occasion, after swimming in the family’s pool, appellant asked
her to come into his room. E.W. said, “He had laid me back on his bed and pulled my
bathing suit aside so that he could see my private areas between my legs clearly,” and
then appellant “spread my legs and eventually he put his mouth between my legs.” E.W.
testified that on another occasion, appellant “used his hands and felt [her] body” including
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her chest, stomach, and thighs. E.W. said, “I remember seeing his face and I remember
feeling his hands and his face between my legs again. And at this time, yes, I remember
him inserting his tongue in between my legs.” The State asked, “So do you . . . remember
the tongue going inside?” E.W. replied, “Yes, ma’am.” E.W. testified that appellant “would
take [her] hand and put it on his groin area.” E.W. stated that she did not remember telling
Herrero that appellant made her perform oral sex on him because she “can’t remember
most of it.” The State asked, “So you may not remember everything?” E.W. responded,
“Yes, ma’am.”
Sandra Pardo, the sexual assault nurse examiner coordinator for Driscoll
Children’s Hospital, testified that State’s Exhibit 10 is the report documenting the sexual
assault exam performed on E.W. and “contains every part of the exam conducted which
is including lab results and documentation of those results.” The report was shown to the
jury as Pardo explained its contents. Pardo testified that E.W. “did provide a history of
sexual assault,” meaning there had been “penetration of a female sexual organ,” and
specifically, E.W. reported penetration “[w]ith a digit, meaning fingers, and a penis and
tongue.” Pardo stated that E.W. reported that appellant sexually assaulted her “several
times.” The report states M.W.
said that [E.W.] told her that multiple times, [appellant] ‘pulled her panties
down and licked between her legs.’ [M.W.] said that when [E.W.] went to
therapy on Friday (3/22/24), she disclosed more to the therapist to include
[appellant] putting his fingers inside her vaginal area and him putting his
private in [E.W.’s] mouth.
The report indicates that E.W. “is considered a victim of sexual assault by
[appellant] based on her history . . . of penile/oral, digital/vaginal, and oral/vaginal
penetration by him.” In a section entitled “HISTORY,” the report documents that E.W. said
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appellant “sexually assaulted” her “for about 6 months to a year; it’s hard to say, it
happened a lot.” E.W. reported that appellant threatened to “beat” her “silly” if she
reported the abuse and “he bribed” her so that she would “do things with him.” The report
documents that E.W. stated the following:
The first time that I remember, he caught me coming inside from the pool
and I was going through the living room after getting my clothes. He said
that he’d give me $100 that he had in his truck if I’d let him do it. He showed
me his dick and told me where it would go (patient points to female organ).
I told him I was scared. He told me everything was okay. He wasn’t
aggressive or anything. So, I took my bottoms off, because in my mind at
that time I thought money was everything. He opened my legs up and licked
me there (patient indicates female sexual organ by pointing) and he
penetrated me with his finger and tongue. A different time, he wanted me to
suck his cock. He was forcing my head down and sticking it in my mouth. I
don’t have a gag reflex, so I wasn’t choking. He came inside my mouth and
all over my hands and face. He’d lock himself in the bathroom with me a
couple of times and sometimes take me to his car. The last time that I can
remember, he locked me in the bathroom and sat me down on the toilet on
his lap. He touched my torso down on my bottom private (patient indicates
female sexual organ by pointing). I told him it hurt, and he said, “everything’s
okay,” and the next thing I know he broke my hymen. He had blood on his
fingers. After that I told him I wanted him to let me go, so he let me go. I was
sore for a few days after that.
In a section of the report entitled “At time of assault(s)/incident,” it asks how the
penetration occurred, and boxes next to oral, digit, female sexual organ, penis, and
tongue are marked.
B. Discussion
Appellant argues:
At first blush, it might seem that E.W.’s recounting of her allegations seem
consistent based upon what she reported to the different professionals in
this case. What is missing in this record is any evidence that would allow a
rational jury to determine whether her allegations occurred during a period
of 30 days or more without speculating. This is in part because her age
when the alleged abuse occurred was conflicting. At times, it appears that
the witnesses trying to establish a time frame provided conflicting times and
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dates leading to confusion. At times, the testimony controverts itself. What
the evidence establishes is that Appellant lived in the home that E.W. was
in for what was probably ten months. Review of the record establishes that
the evidence produced to meet the State’s burden regarding the frequency,
or period of duration, of any alleged acts of sexual abuse is either scant or
would require the jury to engage in one of the few things a fact finder cannot
do—guess and speculate.
Evidence showed that appellant penetrated E.W.’s mouth and sexual organ with
his sexual organ, and penetrated E.W.’s sexual organ with his fingers and tongue. There
is evidence that appellant “sexually assaulted” E.W. “for about 6 months to a year.” See
Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“As factfinder, the jury
is entitled to judge the credibility of witnesses, and can choose to believe all, some, or
none of the testimony presented by the parties.”). There is also evidence that the sexual
“abuse occurred ‘at least twice a week for several months and more often in the summer.’”
Therefore, the jury was not made to speculate about whether the sexual assaults
occurred during a period that was thirty or more days in duration. See id. (explaining that
the jury did not have to speculate “whether, in the face of [the child’s] recantation, there
was sufficient evidence to show appellant committed the offense” because other evidence
“which tended to corroborate the child’s prior videotaped statement” had been admitted);
Williams v. State, 305 S.W.3d 886, 889–90 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.)
(determining that although the child victim could not “speak to the span of time over which
the abuse occurred,” the evidence was nonetheless sufficient to support that the appellant
committed the acts in a duration that was thirty days or more because there was testimony
that appellant put his finger and penis “‘in [her] bottom’ . . . more than twice’”; “the abuse
happened more than once”; and the victim indicated that the abuse occurred “[j]ust about
every time that I went out there to stay with grandmother,” which occurred “during a five7
month period alleged in the indictment”); see also Cantu v. State, No. 13-10-00270-CR,
2011 WL 3667450, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 22, 2011, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding the evidence sufficient to support that
the appellant committed two acts of sexual assault during a period that is thirty or more
days in duration because there was testimony establishing that the victim “was sexually
abused” by the appellant “prior to Chava’s visit and continued” throughout her “stay with
the family,” which occurred for “a period of at least three months”). Accordingly, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of
fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed two or more
predicate acts of sexual abuse during a period that was thirty or more days in duration.
Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166; Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903. Therefore, the evidence is
sufficient to establish that element of the offense. See Williams, 305 S.W.3d at 890. We
overrule appellant’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the
20th day of August, 2026.
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