RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0899-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE KATHLEEN LAPE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CR-01762
KEVIN R. MASTER APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, ECKERLE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, the Commonwealth of Kentucky (“the
Commonwealth”), seeks review of the Kenton Circuit Court’s Order suppressing
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant issued for the residence of Appellee,
Kevin R. Master (“Master”). We review this issue for a second time, the Kentucky
Supreme Court having affirmed our prior decision vacating the Circuit Court’s
initial ruling to admit the evidence and remanding the matter for an evidentiary hearing on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Finding no barrier to
application of the good-faith exception after consideration of the record and
hearing oral arguments by the parties, we reverse the Circuit Court’s Order.
Factual and Procedural Background
This case began when United States Customs and Border Patrol
(“Customs”) intercepted a package addressed to Master that originated from China,
containing a sex doll with the physical proportions and anatomical features of a
child. After identifying the suspicious package, federal authorities referred the
case for investigation by the Kentucky State Police. Given the previous appeal of
this case, we note that the procedural history is discussed in significant detail in the
Kentucky Supreme Court’s opinion, which we will restate in part as follows:
On October 8, 2019, Det. Gatson swore out his
application and affidavit to the district court in Kenton
County. It states,
Affiant [i.e., Gatson] has been employed
with the Kentucky State Police for 25 years.
Affiant is assigned to the ICAC [Internet
Crimes Against Children] Task Force and is
specially trained in offenses involving the
abuse and exploitation of children, including
but not limited to child pornography and
child sexual abuse. Based upon Affiant’s
training and experience, Affiant believes any
person who orders a child sex doll from
China has gone to great lengths to achieve
sexual gratification for a sexual attraction to
children. Affiant believes anyone who
orders a child sex doll is also likely to be
-2-downloading, viewing, sharing, and/or
manufacturing child pornography. Affiant
knows child pornography to be readily
available via the internet from the same
types of illicit websites that sell child sex
dolls. Affiant also knows computers, smart
phones, and other electronic devises [sic]
often contain the illicit images even after
being “deleted” by the user. Affiant also
knows people who look at child
pornography often store collections of the
matter for future use.
Based upon all of the above, Affiant
requests that the search warrant be issued to
search [Kevin Master’s residence] in order
to further Affiant’s continuing investigation.
The search warrant was approved, and a search of
Master’s seized electronic devices revealed child
pornography predicating the charges described above.
On July 27, 2020, after an indictment had been obtained
and the case brought within the Circuit Court, Master
filed a motion to suppress.
In an Order dated October 22, 2020, the trial court
detailed that Master argued insufficient probable cause
for the warrant based on the lack of a nexus to criminal
activity. In other words, the affidavit listed electronic
devices to search for criminal activity related to child
pornography, based solely on the alleged purchase by
Master of a child-like sex doll—the possession of which
was not criminalized by any Kentucky or federal statute
at the time. The trial court denied the motion, employing
the test that the Fourth Amendment and Section 10 of
Kentucky’s constitution are satisfied when, under the
totality of circumstances, the four-corners of the affidavit
demonstrate a substantial basis to believe that probable
cause exists the criminal activity alleged is being
committed.
-3-The trial court concluded,
the affiant states that he is an experienced
police officer who has trained in and worked
on internet crimes involving child
pornography. Based on his experience,
Chinese web sites that sell the type of child
sex doll purchased and received by
Defendant also contain child pornography.
He also attests that, in his experience, a
person who goes through the lengths that
Defendant went through to obtain such a
prepubescent sex doll from China does so
for sexual gratification for a sexual
attraction to children and has likely
downloaded, viewed, shared, and/or
manufactured child pornography.
This court finds that the affidavit established
a substantial basis for a reasonable belief by
the warrant-issuing judge that because
Defendant, Kevin Master, ordered and
received a prepubescent sex doll designed
for sexual gratification from China, likely
through a web site containing child
pornography, there is a fair probability that
he downloaded, viewed, shared and/or
manufactured child pornography and
evidence of same would likely be found in
his home and/or on his electronic devices.
Commonwealth v. Master, 706 S.W.3d 140, 144-45 (Ky. 2024).
After the Circuit Court denied Master’s motion to suppress, it allowed
him to enter a conditional guilty plea on 20 counts of possession of matter
portraying a sexual performance by a minor, with the benefit of being allowed to
appeal the suppression issue. Master received a sentence of ten years in prison as a
-4-result of his guilty plea. On appeal, another panel of this Court vacated the Circuit
Court’s denial of suppression, finding that Gatson’s investigation failed to establish
a sufficient nexus between the ordering of a child sex doll, which was not
criminally prohibited at the time, and the probability that “child pornography”
would be found at Master’s residence. Id. at 146-47. However, this Court also
found that the Circuit Court had not previously allowed arguments on the “goodfaith exception,” described in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405,
82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), and remanded for further proceedings to address whether
applicability of the exception would bar suppression of evidence. See Master v.
Commonwealth, No. 2021-CA-0925-MR, WL 446897, *6-8 (Ky. App. Jan. 27,
2023).
The Commonwealth then sought discretionary review from the
Kentucky Supreme Court. In a split decision, that Court affirmed our holding and
remanded the case, as did we, for the Circuit Court to conduct a hearing on
whether the good-faith exception should apply to bar suppression of the evidence.
Although the three dissenting Justices disagreed with the majority’s determination
that the warrant lacked probable cause, all concurred with that Court’s affirmation
of this Court’s holding remanding the case for a ruling on whether the good-faith
exception would apply to bar suppression. Master, 706 S.W.3d at 144-45.
-5-On remand, the Supreme Court instructed that the Trial Court must
consider Gatson’s actions in the context of another case involving a child sex doll
that Gatson had worked at the time that he had sought the search warrant for
Master’s residence. Id. at 153-54. This related case was before the Kenton Circuit
Court in Case No. 18-CR-01315 and the Kenton District Court in Case No. 18-F01698, Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Scott Lee Phillips. As the Supreme Court’s
opinion noted, any determination regarding the application of the good-faith
exception in this case must include a fact-based inquiry into the state of the
Phillips prosecution at the time that Gatson conducted the investigation into the
package seized in the case sub judice. Accordingly, much of the evidence
provided to the Circuit Court on remand consists of material related to the
proceedings in the Phillips matter between 2018 and 2020.
The Phillips case began in 2018 in the same manner as the case at bar,
with Customs intercepting a suspicious package from China, addressed to Scott
Phillips in Kenton County. Customs suspected, and confirmed, Phillips’s package
to contain a child-sized sex doll. Record (“R.”) at 427. Because the package was
ultimately addressed for delivery in Kentucky, federal authorities alerted Gatson at
ICAC. At the evidentiary hearing conducted after the Supreme Court’s remand in
Master, Gatson testified that he and the local Commonwealth Attorney’s Office
believed the Phillips doll to be illegal under the Kentucky law criminalizing the
-6-possession of matter portraying a minor in a sexual performance. Proceeding
under that theory, Gatson sought a warrant to conduct a controlled delivery of the
package to Phillips’s residence. R. at 391-92. Gatson postulated that a successful
delivery would allow a search of the residence once Phillips took possession of the
doll. Accordingly, he requested the following:
Upon occupant of said residence taking receipt of the
package containing the child sex doll, and after a
reasonable period of time, the Affiant and other members
of law enforcement anticipate executing a search warrant
at the above listed residence to recover the said package
containing the child sex doll and to search for any
electronic devices capable of searching for and
purchasing child sex dolls online, and any paper or other
documentation regarding the search for and purchase of
this and/or any other child sex doll. The Affiant requests
this search warrant be issued to the address with the
execution dependent only upon the stated circumstances.
The search warrant will not be executed unless the
controlled delivery takes place.
Based on the above stated facts, the Affiant believes that
Scott Phillips . . . is involved in the online purchase and
subsequent possession of matter portraying a sexual
performance by a minor. Evidence recovered from the
above-described residence will enable officers to further
investigate Scott Phillips and the online purchase of the
child sex doll, as information regarding the purchase
could help confirm the identities of the individuals
involved in the transaction. The Affiant therefore
believes the items listed in this Affidavit are currently at
the location for which the warrant is sought.
Id. (emphasis in original). The District Court Judge reviewed Gatson’s affidavit
and issued a search warrant for a variety of electronic devices and electronic
-7-storage devices containing information “related to the online search for and
purchase of items,” any documentation related to online purchases or deliveries to
the residence, and any financial documents containing information regarding the
purchase of items from online sellers. R. at 394. Gatson executed the warrant on
September 19, 2018, and conducted the search as planned. R. at 395. During the
search, officers located additional sex dolls, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. Id.
Gatson arrested Phillips on one count of possessing a matter portraying sexual
performance by a minor. R. at 396.
On September 19, 2018, the Kenton District Court held a preliminary
hearing, at which Gatson testified as the only witness. At the completion of his
testimony, Phillips moved for a dismissal of the charges due to lack of probable
cause. On September 27, 2018, the District Court issued an order dismissing the
felony charges against Phillips. R. at 397. In that order, the District Court
provided a clear, detailed analysis of Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 531.335,
discussing whether it could be considered to apply to a doll that was not alleged “to
be based on any actual person.” R. at 398. After analyzing caselaw from the
Kentucky and United States Supreme Courts, the District Court concluded that the
statute in question had been found constitutional specifically because it required
that the criminalized material depict sexually explicit images of a real person under
the age of 18. R. at 399-400. Ultimately, the District Court concluded as follows:
-8-As of the date of the alleged offense in this case the court
finds no Federal or Kentucky State law that has been
enacted and signed into law preventing the importation,
sale, purchase or possession of said dolls.
As repulsive as the court finds this doll and the
defendant’s actions and shares the Commonwealth’s
concerns regarding the exploitation of children, it is the
role of the Court to apply the law as written and follow
precedent of the Kentucky and Federal Appellate Courts
and not to make law or be a judicial activist by basing a
ruling upon their [sic] personal belief and/or moral
judgement [sic].
R. at 400. Accordingly, the District Court dismissed the felony charge of
possessing or viewing matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor against
Phillips due to lack of probable cause. However, the District Court kept on its
docket the other misdemeanor drug charges, which were brought based on the
marijuana and paraphernalia seized from Phillips’s home. R. at 401.
After dismissal of Phillips’s felony charge, Gatson requested
additional search warrants for certain electronics that had been seized from
Phillips’s home during the original search. In support of the warrant applications,
Gatson described the original investigation of the doll, and he included statements
made by Phillips at the time of the original search that suggested that Phillips had
used the internet to act on a sexual attraction toward children. R. at 402-17. The
District Court signed, and Gatson executed, these warrants in early October of
2018, and they resulted in the discovery of evidence that led to new charges against
-9-Phillips on possession of matter portraying a minor in a sexual performance,
including seven new counts charged in a superseding indictment in June of 2019.
On January 27, 2020, Phillips filed a motion to suppress all evidence, observations,
and statements obtained as a result of the two sets of warrants due to an alleged
lack of probable cause. R. at 419. On March 3, 2020, the Kenton Circuit Court
conducted an evidentiary hearing, and nearly six months later, on August 4, 2020,
it granted the motion and suppressed the incriminating evidence. R. at 426.
In its order, the Circuit Court opined that the fatal flaw in the case lay
in the affidavit supporting the original warrant, which allowed seizure of “devices
capable of storing information related to online purchases and searches for items to
purchase” what Gatson believed to be an illegal sex doll. R. at 427. The Circuit
Court in Phillips then conducted an analysis similar to the eventual appellate
reviews of the warrant in this case. It concluded that Gatson had not provided
sufficient evidence to establish a nexus between the doll, which was then legal to
purchase and possess, and Gatson’s belief that Phillips’s devices would contain
evidence of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. R. at 427-29. The
Circuit Court also noted that the affidavit supporting the warrants from October of
2018 relied, at least in part, on evidence and statements determined to have been
obtained improperly pursuant to the first invalid warrant, which had offered no
basis for the search other than Phillips’s taking possession of the delivered doll. R.
-10-at 429. Finally, the Circuit Court concluded that the validity of the warrants could
not be upheld by the “good-faith doctrine” for the following reason:
Detective Gatson, an officer with the Kentucky State
Police for more than 25 years who claims to have
investigated crimes involving sexual abuse and
exploitation, should have known that purchase and/or
possession of a sex doll has not been deemed illegal
before presenting his application for the warrant to the
Judges.
R. at 430.
Having been advised of these Phillips facts and procedure, the Circuit
Court, on remand of the case sub judice, conducted an evidentiary hearing on
March 31, 2025, at which Gatson appeared and testified regarding both the
proceedings in Phillips and their effects on the Master investigation and affidavit.
Following that hearing, the Circuit Court issued a written Order, which held as
follows:
The court has reviewed the entire record, including the
briefs filed by the parties with exhibits, considered the
testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing, as well
as the arguments of counsel. As always, this Court looks
to the decision of the Appellate Courts for direction.
Both the Kentucky Court of Appeals (COA) and the
Kentucky Supreme Court opinions in this case give clear
guidance to this Court in this matter.
While this Court believes that it is reasonable for the
detective to assume, because of his extensive expertise,
that ordering a child sized anatomically correct sex doll is
indicative of criminal activity and that these types of
purchases heighten the suspicion that someone
-11-purchasing these dolls are also availing themselves of
child pornography, this Court also hears loud and clear
the COA and Supreme Court analysis of the 4th
amendment applicable to this particular situation.
Thus, the detective’s belief that ordering or possession
(even with his extensive expertise in the field) of a child
sex doll does not under the law existing at the time of the
offense establish probable cause to search the defendant’s
home and devices. There is no factual nexus between the
legal ordering of the child sized sex doll and the
likelihood that child pornography would be found on the
defendants’ devices or home. The search warrant does
not allege facts that would constitute a crime at the time.
No substantial proof has been presented to establish the
probable cause that child pornography would be found in
defendants’ home or on his devices.
R. at 467-68. At the end of this portion of the Circuit Court’s Order, that Court
included a single footnote with citations to five cases decided by this Court, the
Kentucky Supreme Court, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit (“the Sixth Circuit”). The Circuit Court provided no analysis of the goodfaith exception or the cases that it merely cited, and it included no analysis of the
relevant procedural or factual background of the Phillips case. However, it did
quote the final lines of the District Court’s order dismissing Phillips’s first felony
charge for lack of probable cause. The Circuit Court then denied the
Commonwealth’s motion requesting additional findings of fact and a specific
ruling on good faith, issuing an Amended Order with the addition of the following
-12-sentence: “This order is amended to reflect that this order is final and appealable.”
R. at 490. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
As our Supreme Court has noted,
The proper test for appellate review of a suppression
hearing ruling regarding a search pursuant to a warrant is
to determine first if the facts found by the trial judge are
supported by substantial evidence, . . . and then to
determine whether the trial judge correctly determined
that the issuing judge did or did not have a “substantial
basis . . . for conclud[ing]” that probable cause existed.
Commonwealth v. Pride, 302 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Ky. 2010). Should a reviewing Court
determine that probable cause did not exist, that Court must then set the
appropriate remedy for improperly obtaining evidence.
Although suppression of the evidence through application of the
exclusionary rule is the primary remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, the
Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) has made clear that “[e]xclusion
is not a personal constitutional right, nor is it designed to redress the injury
occasioned by an unconstitutional search.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229,
236, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Instead, “deterrence of police misconduct is the primary, if
not the only, legitimate objective of evidentiary suppression.” Crayton v.
Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Ky. 1992). In so stating, the Kentucky
-13-Supreme Court adopted the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule as set
forth by SCOTUS in Leon, noting that “a technically defective search warrant
obtained in good faith after proper application to a judicial officer is preferable to
an unsupervised and potentially fraudulent warrantless search.” Crayton, 846
S.W.2d at 688-89.
In restating its adoption of the good-faith exception, our Supreme
Court summarized this holding as follows:
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82
L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), determined that evidence seized by
police should not be excluded if it is obtained pursuant to
a search warrant which may later be determined to be
flawed if the officers executing the warrant had an
objectively reasonable good-faith belief in the probable
cause determination by the magistrate and the sufficiency
of the warrant. In such cases, the evidence will not be
suppressed.
Moore v. Commonwealth, 159 S.W.3d 325, 327 (Ky. 2005). To determine whether
the good-faith exception is available to prevent suppression, our Supreme Court
further directed that reviewing Courts may “properly consider[] matters outside the
affidavit.” Id. at 328. However, we continue to review legal conclusions de novo,
including the Trial Court’s decision about whether the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies. See Valesquez v. Commonwealth, 362 S.W.3d 346, 349
(Ky. App. 2011).
-14-Analysis
As a preliminary matter, we note that the Commonwealth and Master
disagree on whether the Trial Court’s Order sufficiently followed the Kentucky
Supreme Court’s directive to consider whether the good-faith exception applied to
this case. Noting that Kentucky law requires a Trial Court to abide strictly by an
Appellate Court’s mandate, the Commonwealth argues that the Trial Court’s
failure to analyze specifically the effects of the Phillips case on the applicability of
the good-faith exception violated the Supreme Court’s directive on remand in this
case. Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. Master disagrees, noting that the Trial Court
quoted a portion of one of the orders issued in the Phillips case in its findings,
styled an order as a ruling on the good-faith exception, and cited to caselaw
relevant to the good-faith exception before finding suppression to be appropriate.
Appellee’s Brief at 18. At oral argument, Master conceded that the Circuit Court
could have offered greater detail or analysis in its findings. However, he still
contends that the Order substantially concluded that Gatson could not have had an
objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was supported by probable cause.
Regardless of the sufficiency of the Trial Court’s Order, both parties
agree that the issue is properly preserved for our review, as the Commonwealth
properly (although unsuccessfully) moved for additional findings of fact – an effort
that Master opposed. Vinson v. Sorrell, 136 S.W.3d 465, 471 (Ky. 2004). We note
-15-that the language of the Trial Court’s Order focuses primarily on the existence of
probable cause, largely restating the finding of the Appellate Courts that no
probable cause existed rather than complying with the Supreme Court’s mandate
and clearly applying the law governing the good-faith exception to the facts with
any specificity. Accordingly, where the Trial Court neglects to provide the basis
for its ruling, even when it has been explicitly instructed to do so, we are left to
decipher its reasoning by inference. Here, the Circuit Court provided no analysis
of the good-faith exception and only listed a citation to a series of cases in a
footnote. These actions are not compliant with the Supreme Court’s mandate.
So as not to engage in guesswork, we have considered the five cases
cited by the Trial Court, and we note that one, Beemer v. Commonwealth, 665
S.W.2d 912, 913 (Ky. 1984), merely adopts the “totality of the circumstances test”
set forth by SCOTUS in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed.
2d 527 (1983). Because Beemer pre-dates Crayton by several years, it offers no
insight into the application of the good-faith exception where the Gates test has
been applied and where no probable cause is found to support the issue of a
warrant. Of the remaining four cases cited, only one of the reviewing Courts found
that the good-faith exception would not apply, as the officer had no reasonable
basis to believe in the sufficiency of the warrant due to his own misconduct in
preparing the warrant application. See Hensley v. Commonwealth, 248 S.W.3d 572
-16-(Ky. App. 2007). No misconduct is alleged here. Although Master claims in his
brief that the affidavit is misleading, counsel for Master agreed at oral argument
that the record contained no evidence of willful misconduct or bad faith on
Gatson’s part. Hensley is thus distinguishable. In the final three cases cited, the
Kentucky Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit applied the good-faith exception to
prevent the suppression of evidence. See Beckam v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d
547 (Ky. 2009); United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2004); United
States v. White, 874 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2017).
Without any analysis or discussion from the Trial Court to review, we
cannot determine from the cited cases the grounds on which the Trial Court
determined that the good-faith exception would not apply to the case sub judice. In
this void, Master argues that we should read into the Order to find that “its
conclusion was Detective Gatson’s belief in probable cause was objectively too
unreasonable to justify the exception.” Appellee’s Brief at 27. He further asserted
this position at oral arguments, concluding that the Circuit Court appeared
convinced that the warrant lacked any possible justification for Gatson to conclude
it was supported by probable cause. The Commonwealth clearly disagrees with
such a conclusion, arguing that Gatson’s reliance on the search warrant was
reasonable given the totality of the circumstances. Appellant’s Brief at 13. At oral
arguments, the Commonwealth highlighted the testimony offered by Gatson
-17-regarding the Phillips investigation, the explanation of his reasoning for changing
his approach to the investigation in this case, and the sources on which he relied to
connect this doll to the possession of illicit material. In light of this evidence, the
Commonwealth asks that we reverse the Circuit Court’s suppression order, which
focused almost entirely on the existence of probable cause rather than the
requested good-faith analysis, and find admissible the evidence seized from
Master’s residence.
Despite the lack of clear analysis provided in the Order on appeal, our
de novo review must still comply with the Supreme Court’s directive on Master’s
original appeal. Thus, we are required to assess both the application of the goodfaith exception and the matter of Gatson’s prior experience with evaluating the
ordering of a child sex doll in Phillips. In making this determination, we must first
consider the circumstances in which the good-faith exception is not available to bar
suppression. Our Supreme Court in Crayton identified four instances in which the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would not apply. This Court has
summarized those instances as follows:
Exclusion of evidence remains an appropriate remedy
only where the circumstances reveal one of the following
circumstances: (1) the affidavit contains “false or
misleading information”; (2) the judge who issued the
search warrant has abandoned his “detached and neutral
role”; (3) the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable
cause such that the officer’s reliance cannot be
reasonable; or, (4) the warrant is “facially deficient by
-18-failing to describe the place to be searched or the thing to
be seized.”
Commonwealth v. Opell, 3 S.W.3d 747, 752 (Ky. App. 1999) (citing Crayton, 846
S.W.2d at 687-88).
On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that none of the listed
circumstances apply in this case, and therefore, the Trial Court should have applied
the good-faith exception to suppressing the evidence seized from Master’s home.
Neither party alleges any evidence that the signing magistrate, a Kenton District
Court Judge, abandoned her role or that the affidavit failed to identify the place to
be searched or the thing(s) to be seized. Instead, Master claims that the Trial Court
clearly and appropriately agreed with his position that either Gatson had provided
misleading information in his affidavit, thereby making his reliance on its probable
cause determination unreasonable, or that the affidavit was so “bare bones” that it
was entirely unreasonable for Gatson to rely on it. Appellee’s Brief at 18.
Accordingly, our review will focus on the parties’ dispute over whether Gatson
intentionally misled the Judge who issued the warrant or that the warrant was so
lacking in any indicia of probable cause as to make his reliance on it unreasonable.
First, Master’s brief argues that Gatson’s affidavit misled the
reviewing Court as to his training and experience regarding child sex dolls, his
investigation into the location that the doll had been purchased, and his possession
of any evidence that Master had ordered the doll in question. Intertwined with this
-19-argument is Master’s assertion that Gatson should have known from his experience
in the Phillips case that the act of ordering or possessing a child sex doll could not
provide probable cause to issue a search warrant. As a result, Master contends
that, even if Gatson did not intentionally mislead or offer false information in the
warrant affidavit, it was still objectively unreasonable for him to believe that there
was probable cause for a search warrant.
To apply successfully for the good-faith exception, “[an] officer must
have an objectively reasonable belief in the sufficiency of the warrant and the
probable cause determination. If the affidavit contains false or misleading
information, the officer’s reliance cannot be reasonable.” Crayton, 846 S.W.2d at
687-88. As the Commonwealth notes, Master has offered no proof that Gatson
“omitted facts deliberately or recklessly” from his affidavit. Moore, 159 S.W.3d at
328. Instead, Master asserts that Gatson’s statements regarding his training and
experience suggested a greater expertise in his knowledge of child sex dolls than
his experience would support. Through counsel at oral argument, Master
suggested that the existence of a single, comparable case involving a similar doll
should be an insufficient basis to claim any meaningful experience in a warrant
affidavit. He also argues that Gatson’s framing of this experience and his
reference in the affidavit to “any person ordering a child sex doll” misled the
-20-reviewing Judge to believe that Gatson had evidence that Master was the person
who ordered the doll.
At the hearing, both the Commonwealth and Master questioned
Gatson regarding his investigation and preparation of the warrant affidavit, which
frequently became intertwined with questions regarding his previous experience in
other investigations. Gatson testified that he had viewed the package label, the doll
it contained, and either a packing label or invoice contained within the box. As the
Circuit Court noted in its Order, Gatson confirmed that the box label and internal
documentation were directed to Master at the same address. Gatson testified that
he had conducted surveillance of the address listed on the shipping labels and
identified a vehicle parked outside that was registered to Master. However, as the
Commonwealth reiterated, Gatson did not focus on the origin of the doll itself, as
he understood from the Phillips dismissal that the doll itself was not illegal
contraband. Regardless, counsel for Master asked a series of questions about the
sufficiency of the investigation and any steps taken to identify Master as the person
who ordered the doll or to identify the person or business from which the doll was
purchased.
Like many of the points raised by Master in arguments before this
Court, these questions addressed issues fundamental to the Supreme Court’s past
determination that Gatson had identified an insufficient nexus tying Master’s
-21-address to evidence of criminal activity – and not related directly to the current
dispute about the good-faith exception. In that vein, Master argues that Gatson’s
testimony confirms that he had no evidence linking Master to the commission of a
crime when he prepared the warrant affidavit. This assertion is generally
consistent with the Circuit Court’s findings in its Order. However, the
Commonwealth notes that Gatson also testified that, at that stage of his
investigation, he had not intended to identify Master conclusively as the person
who ordered the doll. Instead, Gatson described taking a different approach in that
investigation due to the still-unfolding events in the Phillips prosecution at the time
that he became aware of the package addressed to Master. Thus, the Supreme
Court’s order to consider the procedural posture of Phillips first comes strongly
into play.
At the time that Gatson began the investigation into the doll from the
package addressed to Master, the District Court had dismissed some of the Phillips
charges specifically because the possession of the doll was not in violation of KRS
531.335. Critically, the District Court’s order did not directly address the validity
of the search at all. In fact, and contrary to Master’s theory, the misdemeanor drug
charges based on the proceeds of that search were allowed to proceed. Moreover,
at the time that he began the Master investigation, Gatson had already requested
and executed new search warrants for Phillips’s devices, which were found to
-22-contain additional material that resulted in seven new counts of matter portraying a
minor in a sexual performance by superseding indictment in June of 2019. Despite
the references by Master to the eventual suppression order by the Phillips Circuit
Court, Phillips’s counsel had not yet filed a motion to suppress when Gatson began
his investigation into the package addressed to Master. Accordingly, while Gatson
then knew that possession of a child sex doll itself was not illegal, he had observed
a correlation. To wit, the only other doll that he had ever personally intercepted
had been ordered online by a person who admitted a sexual attraction to children
and also possessed other matter portraying a minor in a sexual performance.
Additionally, Gatson testified that the publicity of the Phillips case
had led to other conversations with law enforcement and policy specialists
regarding the issue of similar dolls and their roles in the types of crimes against
children that Gatson investigated. While counsel for Master suggested in his oral
arguments that the description of these conversations was too vague to be
meaningful, he failed to persuade us. Although Gatson did not recall the names of
any person he conversed with on the topic, the Commonwealth rightly observed
that Gatson provided details on several, specific, individual conversations.
Moreover, we take note that Gatson testified that he had ended his employment
with ICAC prior to the hearing in order to accept a position with another law
enforcement agency. As a result, he no longer had access to the official copies of
-23-his notes on either of the investigations in question, which had both taken place at
least five years prior to his testimony.
Under these circumstances, Gatson did not intentionally or recklessly
misrepresent his professional knowledge and experience in his affidavit for a
warrant to search Master’s address for any devices that could contain such
material. Gatson accurately described his experience in law enforcement, the
investigation he conducted into the package addressed to Master’s residence, and
the general information he knew about similar dolls. His failure to prove
conclusively that Master ordered the doll does not alter this fact. A search warrant
is not required to pin a particular person to a specific crime, but only to establish
the likelihood that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.
See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559-60, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1978, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 525 (1978). Accordingly, Gatson’s warrant application reasonably
connected the search warrant to the address on the package rather than Master as
the addressee.
Without reasonable question, Gatson failed to provide a sufficient
nexus to establish probable cause for a search warrant in his affidavit. We so held
in the last appeal of this case, as did our Supreme Court. However, we do not find
that Gatson misled the signing Judge as to any point in the affidavit, including his
recitation of the evidence bridging the doll with Master’s address and the grounds
-24-on which he believed that matter portraying sexual performance by a minor could
be located at that address. In fact, both Kentucky and Federal Courts have set a
high bar to defeat the good-faith exception on these grounds, doing so primarily in
cases where the officer completing the affidavit and executing the warrant has
knowingly misrepresented the evidence of a crime or the place to be searched, the
identity or reliability of an informant, or the dates that complaints of suspicious
activity had been received. See Guth v. Commonwealth, 29 S.W.3d 809 (Ky. App.
2000); United States v. Baxter, 889 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1989); Hensley, 248 S.W.3d
572.
Although the Circuit Court cited Hensley in its Order, Master has not
alleged or provided any evidence of the severe deficiencies noted in that case,
which involved misrepresentation of complaints received regarding possible
manufacture of methamphetamine, a “general statement alleging knowledge of the
possibility of illegal conduct[,]” and a failure of the affidavit to connect the alleged
smell of “ether” to the manufacture of methamphetamine. Hensley, 248 S.W.3d at
577-78. Our Court in Hensley also expressed deep concern that the inclusion of
the smell of ether in the affidavit appeared to have been an agreed decision by the
investigating officers and that no source of ether was recovered on the premises
during the search. Because the Trial Court had relied heavily on that
misrepresentation to save an affidavit that it had found to be thoroughly deficient,
-25-the Court of Appeals concluded: “Clearly, the questionable veracity and reliability
of Officer Hodge’s assertion places a cloud upon his ‘good[-]faith’ reliance on the
search warrant.” Id. at 578.
In contrast, Master can point to no portion of Gatson’s affidavit in
which he materially misrepresented his investigation, his lengthy career in law
enforcement, or his recent experience with a similar doll. Instead, the few
omissions that Gatson made in the affidavit, such as Master’s payment information
on the slip inside the package and Gatson’s previous investigation of websites that
sold similar dolls, would instead bolster the details of an investigation that our
Supreme Court found to be too limited to establish probable cause. As the
Commonwealth emphasized at oral arguments, Gatson adjusted his approach to
investigating the case at bar based on the initial rulings in the Phillips case.
Accordingly, he chose not to emphasize information about the doll itself and its
purchase, focusing his affidavit instead on the knowledge he had gained about the
connection between possession of similar dolls and possession of child sex abuse
material. This effort appears consistent with Gatson’s decision to omit any further
details about Master’s payment information or any of Gatson’s other attempts to
identify the specific origins of the doll.
When considering a good-faith analysis, our Supreme Court has
reiterated the findings of Federal Courts and noted that “we must look to the
-26-totality of the circumstances, including any information known to the officer but
not presented to the issuing magistrate.” Moore, 159 S.W.3d at 328. Ultimately,
the available evidence is generally consistent with the Commonwealth’s assertion
that Gatson did not intend to try to link Master himself to the ordered doll at that
stage of the investigation or to mislead the signing Judge to that effect.
Finding no evidence for Master’s first contention that Gatson misled
the Judge in his affidavit for the warrant, we must next assess whether the evidence
supports the Commonwealth’s position that it was not otherwise unreasonable for
Gatson to rely on the signed warrant’s explanation of probable cause. Here again,
Master argues that Gatson’s experience in Phillips should preclude reliance on a
search warrant based on interception of a then-legal sex doll. However, given the
previously discussed procedural posture in Phillips at the time that Gatson
prepared the affidavit in this case, we do not find this contention convincing.
On the contrary, Gatson testified that his experience in the dismissal
of the Phillips charges led him to seek assistance from the Commonwealth
Attorney’s Office to articulate the connection between the order of the doll and his
inference that the person who ordered the doll from the subject residence would
also be in possession of other matter portraying sexual performance by a minor.
Unlike the Phillips warrant that cited the doll itself as contraband, Gatson framed
the affidavit for Master’s residence in terms of the experience that he had gained
-27-throughout his law enforcement career and in the wake of the Phillips
investigation.
This testimony introduces two factors that we must consider in
applying the good-faith exception. First, while an officer’s training and experience
cannot supplant the need to create a substantial nexus for a probable-cause
determination, they can be considered in a good-faith analysis to determine an
officer’s reasonable reliance on a warrant. United States v. Schultz, 14 F.3d 1093,
1098 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Moreover, although we have held that his ‘training and
experience’ were not sufficient to establish a nexus of probable cause between that
crime and the safe deposit boxes, the connection was not so remote as to trip on the
‘so lacking’ hurdle.”). Second, SCOTUS has also noted that the involvement of a
supervising officer and/or prosecuting attorney in the preparation of an affidavit
weighs in favor of finding reasonable reliance on that warrant. See Messerschmidt
v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 554-55, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249-50, 182 L. Ed. 2d 47
(2012). “Indeed, a contrary conclusion would mean not only that [the officers]
were plainly incompetent, but that their supervisor, the deputy district attorney, and
the Magistrate were as well.” Id. at 554, 132 S. Ct. at 1249 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
While it is certainly possible for a warrant to lack a sufficient nexus to
establish probable cause after such a review, as was determined in the original
-28-appellate reviews of the warrant in this case, the Courts have clearly determined
that the fact of an insufficient nexus for probable cause does not preclude
reasonable reliance for the purpose of the good-faith exception. Instead, we must
ask, as in Leon, whether the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S.
at 923, 104 S. Ct. at 3405 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S.
Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)).
It is this tension between Gatson’s attempt to establish probable cause
and the Circuit Court’s determination that he failed to do so that Master highlights.
In oral arguments, counsel for Master suggested that Gatson had done no more
than rely on stereotypes and biases to label Master a deviant and a criminal based
solely on his assumed ordering of what he characterized as a legal masturbatory
aid. Based on this conclusion, Master contends that, while Gatson did not
intentionally mislead the reviewing Judge, then he still offered a “bare bones”
affidavit that stated only his suspicion that evidence of a crime could be found at
Master’s residence. As the Sixth Circuit has noted,
a bare-bones affidavit is a conclusory affidavit, one that
asserts “only the affiant’s belief that probable cause
existed.” United States v. Williams, 224 F.3d 530, 533
(6th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Finch, 998 F.2d
349, 353 (6th Cir. 1993)). It provides nothing more than
a mere “guess that contraband or evidence of a crime
would be found,” United States v. Schultz, 14 F.3d 1093,
1098 (6th Cir. 1994), either “completely devoid” of facts
-29-to support the affiant’s judgment that probable cause
exists, United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 595-96
(6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), or “so vague as to be
conclusory or meaningless.” United States v. Frazier,
423 F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Carpenter,
360 F.3d at 596).
United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir. 2017). The Sixth Circuit
further elaborated on the difference between a bare-bones affidavit and one that,
“although falling short of the probable-cause standard,” contained some
“minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal activity and the place to be
searched.” Id. at 496-97 (quoting Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 596).
A bare-bones affidavit should not be confused with one
that lacks probable cause. An affidavit cannot be labeled
“bare bones” simply because it lacks the requisite facts
and inferences to sustain the magistrate’s probable-cause
finding; rather, it must be so lacking in indicia of
probable cause that, despite a judicial officer having
issued a warrant, no reasonable officer would rely on
it. United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812, 824 (6th Cir.
2003). The distinction is not merely semantical. There
must be daylight between the “bare-bones” and
“substantial basis” standards if Leon’s good-faith
exception is to strike the desired balance between
safeguarding Fourth Amendment rights and facilitating
the criminal justice system’s truth-seeking
function. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07, 913-21, 104
S.Ct. 3405; Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 595.
White, 874 F.3d at 497.
In applying the good-faith exception, Kentucky Courts have followed
a similar rationale. This Court, in Beckam v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 547
-30-(Ky. App. 2009), addressed the very role of the good-faith exception in cases in
which a warrant falls somewhere in between the “bare bones” judgment that no
officer could find reasonable and the “substantial basis” for finding probable cause.
In Beckam, this Court found that a search warrant for Beckam’s residence
contained a substantial basis for probable cause based on a line of federal, FourthAmendment cases noting that an officer could reasonably infer a “common sense”
connection between evidence of a suspect’s drug dealing and the likelihood that
additional evidence could be found at the suspect’s home. Id. at 549-50. Our
Beckam Court also cited our Supreme Court’s decision in Moore, in which
computer-generated checks were found to create a sufficient nexus between
Moore’s passing of the fraudulent instruments and a search of his home, where he
would be most likely to use a computer to create the instruments. Id. at 550
(quoting Moore, 159 S.W.3d at 330). However, this Court also recognized in
Beckam that our holding there was not entirely consistent with our previous
decision in Guth, where the lack of clear connection between a controlled drug
deal at a separate location was not considered a sufficient nexus to search Guth’s
residence. Beckam, 284 S.W.3d at 551 (citing Guth, 29 S.W.3d at 810-11). In
finding that the good-faith exception would bar suppression regardless of its
ultimate probable-cause determination, the Beckam Court concluded:
Were we to have relied upon Guth as opposed to Moore
and the weight of the federal cases, we could not have
-31-held that the officer’s belief in the existence of probable
cause below was wholly unreasonable. See 29
Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 616 (2008) (“[w]here evidence is
sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and
competent judges as to the existence of probable cause, it
cannot be said that police officers who provide a truthful
affidavit to a neutral magistrate who then issues a warrant
are not objectively reasonable in believing that they have
probable cause”).
Id.
As our Supreme Court’s divided opinion in Master reveals, the
question of a substantial nexus for probable cause in this very case was not
immediately straightforward or clear. In fact, the only point on which every
reviewing member of the Appellate Courts agreed was that the available facts did
not preclude applicability of the good-faith exception. In large part, both the
Supreme Court’s and this Court’s hesitation to consider the good-faith exception in
Master turned on the minimally-developed record regarding the Phillips
prosecution. But now, with the benefit of hindsight and a complete record, we find
that Gatson made reasonable inferences in drafting his affidavit with the
information and guidance then available to him. Although all of the Phillips
warrants would eventually be invalidated and the resulting evidence suppressed, no
such determination had been made at the time Gatson completed the affidavit in
this case. Instead, it appears that Gatson received the District Court’s ruling on the
legality of ordering and possessing the type of doll in question, while also
-32-continuing an investigation that his experience suggested would result in finding
the evidence of a crime.
Ultimately, we find no evidence that Gatson deliberately falsified
information or misled the reviewing Judge. Gatson’s affidavit permissibly relied
on his training and experience to create a minimally-sufficient nexus between the
address on the intercepted package and the likelihood that “child pornography”
could be found at any location tied to the doll that it contained. Under the totality
of the circumstances, we find Gatson’s reliance on the signed warrant to be
objectively reasonable. As the only legitimate purpose of suppression is to deter
future misconduct by law enforcement, we cannot conclude that suppression is
appropriate in a case in which the officer appears to have made concerted attempts
to establish probable cause for a search warrant and then relied on the
determination of the Commonwealth’s Attorney and the reviewing Judge that he
had succeeded. Despite Master’s assertions to the contrary, we are ultimately
persuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument that suppression is not an appropriate
remedy for any of the alleged errors.
Finally, we must note that we understand the Circuit Court’s
trepidation in making the ruling at issue here. When it first denied suppression and
was reversed, it could seem that the Appellate Courts wanted the evidence
suppressed. But what we asked for was a further evidentiary hearing and ruling on
-33-the facts and law of the good-faith exception, regardless of what the ultimate
outcome would prove to be. The Trial Court has now conducted the hearing,
although it was reticent to continue to deny suppression of the evidence or delve
into the nuances of the law on the good-faith exception. As our review is de novo,
and as we now have a fully developed record, we are enabled to discuss and rule
upon the issues of law without further edification from the Circuit Court.
However, we would have liked to have heard its opinion on the matter in further
detail. But we disagree strongly with the dissent’s characterization of our de novo
review of the law, which is required, as fact-finding, which this Opinion plainly
shows we have not done. We needed the Trial Court to obtain evidence through a
hearing, which it ultimately did. We neither disturb that Court’s findings of fact
nor create our own. The Trial Court’s legal analysis, however, was unfortunately
lacking. And it is well within our role and ability, not to mention duty, to make
conclusions as a matter of law upon the undisputed facts heard by the Trial bench.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, and after full consideration of the record,
briefs, and oral arguments in this case, we find that the good-faith exception
applies, and we reverse the Circuit Court’s Order to suppress the evidence seized
from Master’s residence. With the application of the good-faith exception, the
evidence against Master becomes admissible once again, just as it was when
-34-Master entered his conditional guilty plea. Because that plea has never been
challenged or set aside, there is no cause to remand this case to the Circuit Court
for further proceedings. That plea of guilty, and Master’s resulting convictions,
remain in place, as does the non-suppressed evidence that supports them.
CALDWELL, JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent. Rather than reversing
the circuit court’s order entered June 18, 2025, as amended on July 3, 2025, I
would vacate and remand this action back to the circuit court to comply with the
Kentucky Supreme Court’s mandate in Commonwealth v. Master, 706 S.W.3d 140,
153-54 (Ky. 2024).
Therein, the Supreme Court, concluding that there was insufficient
probable cause to issue the warrant, remanded this case back to the circuit court for
an evidentiary hearing, to address whether the good-faith exception applies to this
case to validate the otherwise unreasonable search. Id. at 153-54. The circuit court
conducted the evidentiary hearing on March 31, 2025. Detective Gatson was the
only witness. And, as the majority correctly notes, the court below provided no
analysis regarding the good-faith exception, no discussion or analysis of the
-35-Phillips1 case as pertains to this case as instructed, and failed to state the specific
facts relied on by the court to conclude that the good-faith exception does not
apply in this case. Rather than vacate and remand, the majority has elected to step
into the shoes of the circuit court and by way of de novo review, address the
evidence presented directly on the merits. I believe this is reversible error.
In Kentucky, when an appellate court remands a case to a trial court, a
“trial court must strictly follow the mandate of the appellate court.” Inman v.
Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Ky. 1982) (quoting 5 AM. JUR. 2D, Appeal and
Error, § 744). In James v. James, 636 S.W.3d 549 (Ky. App. 2021), this Court
held:
Where an appellate court has passed on a legal question
and remanded the case to the court below for further
proceedings, the legal determinations may not be
revisited on a subsequent appeal in the same case.
[Citing Inman]. The trial court must strictly follow the
mandate set out in the prior appellate decision. In a
subsequent appeal following remand, this Court’s role is
limited to whether the trial court properly construed and
applied the mandate.
Id. at 554 (citations omitted).
The majority has effectively assumed the role of fact-finder, which I
believe does not comply with the Supreme Court’s mandate or the limitations on
1
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Scott Lee Phillips, Case No. 18-F-01698, Kenton District Court (2018).
-36-our review as set out in James. In the alternative, if this Court is permitted to
engage in fact-finding regarding the application of the good-faith exception, I
believe the majority has also erred for several reasons.
First, the majority failed to address relevant facts consistent with the
mandate from the Supreme Court. Specifically, the Supreme Court was concerned
about the lack of development of underlying facts as pertains to the individual
involved, Kevin Master.2 Master, 706 S.W.3d at 149. At the evidentiary hearing,
Detective Gatson admitted that he did not conduct a criminal background check on
Master, that he personally did not conduct an open source intelligence review,3 and
that he failed to subpoena any internet or social media platforms/websites to
determine Master’s involvement in child pornography or other related criminal
activity. In my opinion, Detective Gatson’s failure to research or investigate
Master’s background clearly looks to whether Gatson acted in good faith in
obtaining or relying upon the search warrant. In other words, the actual
investigation by Gatson into underlying facts to support the warrant was minimal
at best. As the Supreme Court noted, there must be “‘more than conclusory
2
The Supreme Court expressed concern with the Commonwealth’s logic that common sense dictated that one who purchased a child sex doll was also engaged in other criminal acts regarding children without other supporting facts. These underlying facts are equally relevant to determine whether Gatson acted in good faith in obtaining and relying upon the warrant. 3
Gatson testified that an Intelligence Unit confirmed where Master lived and relayed that information to him.
-37-allegations’ in the affidavit to pass constitutional muster.” Master, 706 S.W.3d at
148 (quoting Hensley v. Commonwealth, 248 S.W.3d 572, 576 (Ky. App. 2007)).
A police officer relying only upon one’s experience and background, without
more, especially in failing to investigate the background of the person to be
searched, does not constitute good faith in relying on a warrant procured by that
officer. Master, 706 S.W.3d at 152. And, mere suspicion of criminal activity does
not overcome the necessity of specific underlying facts to support the warrant. Id.
at 149.
Second, as concerns Detective Gatson’s extensive experience
involving child exploitation, he admitted that his experience involving the
possession of child sex dolls was limited to his involvement with the Phillips case
and two phone conversations with employees at Homeland Security Investigations,
one being in Washington D.C. and one being in Hawaii. He could not identify the
individuals names or their official positions. Given that possession of a child sex
doll in October of 2019, was not illegal under federal or state law, when Gatson
gave his affidavit for the warrant, I harbor grave doubt that his experience in
dealing with child sex dolls and child exploitation alone was sufficient to constitute
good faith in obtaining or relying upon the warrant. At best, Gatson appeared to be
doing an “end run” to avoid the problems he experienced upon obtaining the
warrant in the Phillips case.
-38-Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, I posed to counsel for the
Commonwealth the following hypothetical at oral argument: Could a search
warrant be issued to search my home if a friend committing a prank, or a foe
seeking to frame me, ordered a child sex doll from China and had it delivered to
my home, assuming of course I had no criminal history or background as a sexual
predator, offender, child molester, or consumer of child pornography? Counsel’s
answer was “yes.”4 In my opinion, neither Section 10 of the Kentucky
Constitution nor the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution can
condone such an egregious violation of one’s constitutional rights under this
hypothetical. Yet in this case, with nothing more than a box containing a child sex
doll addressed to Master, Gatson believes he acted in good faith to search Master’s
residence. Notwithstanding the repulsiveness of an adult owning a child sex doll,
the constitutional protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment must be upheld
to protect all citizens from unreasonable searches.
Accordingly, based on the evidence presented at the March 31, 2025,
hearing, in my opinion there are not sufficient underlying facts to support the
application of the good-faith exception.
4
Ironically, at the evidentiary hearing, Gatson was posed a similar question which he effectively affirmed would justify the issuance of a warrant. March 31, 2025, Hearing Transcript at 4:11:00 – 4:12:55.
-39-For these reasons, I would vacate and remand for the circuit court’s
compliance with the Supreme Court mandate, or in the alternative, affirm the
circuit court’s order granting the motion to suppress.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
Russell Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky Steven J. Buck
Frankfort, Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-40-