IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. PD-0692-25
JEMADARI CHINUA WILLIAMS, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
KERR COUNTY
PARKER, J., filed a concurring opinion in which KEEL, J., joined.
CONCURRING OPINION
A person commits aggravated promotion of prostitution “if he knowingly
owns, invests in, finances, controls, supervises, or manages a prostitution
enterprise that uses two or more prostitutes.”1 The indictment in this case tracked
1
TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.04(a) (West 2018).
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 2
the statutory language, disjunctively alleging all six methods of promoting
prostitution without further description. When the case was first before it, this
Court held that alleging all six methods was permissible.2 Now we are asked to
decide whether some or all of these six methods must be further described to
convey adequate notice.
The Court correctly holds that the failure to describe some or all of these six
methods—even if error—was harmless. The Court correctly explains that, due to
his receipt of pretrial discovery, Appellant was fully aware of the State’s theories of
the case and yet chose to rely solely on a defensive theory that had nothing to do
with any uncertainty regarding the six methods of promoting a prostitution
enterprise—that there was in fact no prostitution enterprise. Having found no
harm, the Court can legitimately decline to address the issue of error.3
But this is a case where an appealing party’s claim lacks merit for multiple
independent reasons, and while the Court need only rely on one such reason, I
choose to address other reasons why—in my estimation—Appellant’s notice claim
fails. First, the sole reason articulated by defense counsel at the motion-to-quash
2
Williams v. State, 685 S.W.3d 110, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).
3
State v. Plambeck, 182 S.W.3d 365, 367 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“A court is not required to address issues that become moot because of the resolution of other issues.”).
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 3
hearing for saying that each of the six methods were insufficiently specific was that
they overlap with each other. That reason is foreclosed by our earlier holding that
the State can pursue all six methods and by the fact that the State did pursue all six
methods. Because Appellant knew that all six methods were in play, any overlap
between them was inconsequential. Second, even if Appellant’s claim were
broader than an “overlap claim,” it would still lack merit because the words
codifying the six methods are reasonably specific in the context in which they
appear—describing actions toward a business. And finally, the ways in which a
defendant promotes the prostitution enterprise are merely different means of
committing a single offense. So, when Appellant found out what evidence the
State had against him through discovery, he knew he had to defend against
everything that conformed to the indictment allegations.
A. Overlap challenge is foreclosed.
In its prior decision in this case, the Court held, “The State is not required
to elect between alternative statutory methods of committing an offense alleged in
an indictment.”4 The Court specifically pointed out that Appellant’s claim at trial
treated the six methods of promoting prostitution as alternative means of
4
Williams, 685 S.W.3d at 111.
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 4
committing the same offense and that he did not raise a claim that the different
methods codified separate offenses.5 Consequently, Appellant forfeited any claim
that the six methods codified separate offenses.6 So, this Court operated under the
assumption that the six methods are merely alternative means of committing the
same offense.7 Under that assumption, the indictment did not err to allege all six
methods.8
So on remand, Appellant advanced a claim that each of the six methods of
committing the offense needed to be further defined. And the court of appeals
agreed that at least some of them did, having a variety of meanings in standard
dictionaries.9
But defense counsel’s argument at the motion-to-quash hearing was based
solely on the different methods overlapping each other. Initially, defense counsel
focused on the natural overlap in the meaning of the six words to claim there was a
notice problem:
5
Id. at 114.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 114-15.
9
Williams v. State, 720 S.W.3d 454, 463-64 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2025).
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 5
The legislature includes words in the statute with intent, with a
specific intent intended, okay, and if there was not in their mind when
they wrote this statute a different definition for “invests in” and
“finances,” they wouldn’t have used both of those words. That would
have been redundant, or “controls” or “supervises” or “manages.”
Those three words could be used interchangeably, as well, but the
legislature, in their great wisdom, used those three words, for some
reason or other, and we have to give the fact that they put those in
there for a purpose. What that purpose was, was that each one of
those have a different meaning. Otherwise, once again, it would have
been redundant to do so.
When the trial judge asked, “Do you have any authority for doing this?” defense
counsel specifically claimed that the overlapping meanings of these words in
common parlance was why they needed to be individually defined:
[T]he fact that they were not defined, Your Honor, by statute is
important, and the fact that they included six different manner and
means that are very closely related to each other tells me that the
intent of the legislature was that each one of those had their own
separate individual definition, because it would be absurd for them to
include three words that meant the exact same thing such as the
control, supervises or manages. Those are very similar and could be
used interchangeably, and it would be absurd for us to read the statute
to be a person commits an offense if he knowingly owns, invests in,
invests in, controls, controls or controls a prostitution enterprise that
uses two or more prostitutes, and for us to read it that they are -- to
read it in any other way, that’s the way it would sound. Because they
are so closely interchangeable, they have to have their own meaning,
and I think that Mr. Williams is entitled to a definition to each one of
those or which one they choose to proceed forward on. That way we
are not reading it in an absurd way, which is the way I just read it. It
would be absurd to read the statute that way, but that’s the way you
have to read it without definitions.
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 6
All the trial participants understood that tracking the language of the statute was
the general rule for conveying notice.10 The only reason defense counsel gave at
the hearing for deviating from that rule was that the words codifying the six
methods in the statute had overlapping meanings in common parlance.11
The problem with defense counsel’s reasoning is that the State alleged all six
methods. Because all six methods were in play, any variability in meaning due
solely to an overlap could not affect the degree of notice conveyed by the State.
Whether the meanings overlapped or not, Appellant knew that he needed to
defend against all the conduct that those six methods covered. And under the trial
participants’ assumption that the six methods were merely alternative methods of
committing a single offense, a jury would not need to unanimously agree on any
10
Defense counsel himself acknowledged, “But an indictment must go beyond statutory language only when the statute is not completely descriptive of the offense.” He also acknowledged this in his written motion to quash.
11
Similarly, defense counsel’s written motion to quash focused on the “interchangeable” meanings of the various words. The one exception is that the motion asked if “invest” could cover a “John” (a customer) that pays money to utilize the services of the business. But when given the opportunity, defense counsel did not raise this argument at the hearing, so he forfeited it. Moreover, that argument was a nonstarter, because no “person of common understanding,” see infra at n.16 and associated text, would think that a person invests in a business by merely purchasing its services as a customer and because a separate prostitution statute at the time of Appellant’s conduct proscribed the hiring of a prostitute. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.02(b) (West 2018).
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 7
one method.12 Consequently, if the trial court was correct that the indictment
could validly allege all six methods of the offense, then it was also correct that any
overlap between the methods had no effect on the notice the indictment provided
to Appellant. Appellant failed to provide the trial court with a valid reason to
quash the indictment.
The suggestion on appeal that the six methods needed to be further defined
because the words each had very different possible meanings—apart from their
redundancy with each other—was not a reason that was conveyed to the trial court.
To preserve error, a party must “state[] grounds for the ruling that the
complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the
trial court aware of the complaint.”13 While Appellant preserved a Mays claim,14
the only reason he gave for finding notice insufficient under Mays was that some of
the words in the indictment overlapped. The trial court should not be faulted for
finding that reason to be insufficient to quash the indictment.
12
See Floyd v. State, 714 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (“The robbery by threat to place Diane Porter in fear of imminent bodily injury or death or the robbery causing bodily injury to Diane Porter were simply alternative methods of committing the same robbery offense. Hence, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that it was required to be unanimous as to whether Appellant was guilty of aggravated robbery by threat or bodily- injury aggravated robbery as no such unanimity was required.”).
13
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).
14
State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 8
B. The methods of commission are reasonably specific.
An indictment must state “[e]verything . . . which is necessary to be
proved.”15 An indictment is sufficient if it
charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise
language in such a manner as to enable a person of common
understanding to know what is meant, and with that degree of
certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense
with which he is charged, and enable the court, on conviction to
pronounce the proper judgment.16
Ordinarily, an indictment sufficiently alleges an offense if it tracks the statutory
language.17 An indictment does not have to plead evidentiary matters.18 But when
a statute “uses an undefined term of indeterminate or variable meaning,” a “more
specific pleading” can be required “in order to notify the defendant of the nature
of the charges against him.”19
When a word is not defined, it may have “any meaning which is acceptable
15
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.03.
16
Id. art. 21.11.
17
Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Mays, 967 S.W.2d at 407.
18
Curry, supra.
19
Mays, 967 S.W.2d at 407.
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 9
in common parlance.”20 But while dictionary definitions are relevant to the
meaning of an undefined word, a word must also be construed in context,
according to the rules of grammar and common usage.21
In concluding that the six methods of promoting a prostitution enterprise are
“terms of indeterminate and variable meaning,” the court of appeals cited a
number of definitions that simply do not fit the statutory context in which the
defined word appears. For example, one of the court of appeals’s definitions of
“control” is “to reduce the incidence or severity of especially to innocuous
levels.”22 That definition applies to something like a fire or disease. No one would
think that someone “controls” a prostitution enterprise by trying to reduce the
enterprise to an innocuous level. And several of the court of appeals’s definitions
of “manage” are patently inapplicable.23 To “make and keep compliant,” applies
20
Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).
21
Milton v. State, 721 S.W.3d 300, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). And the context of the entire statutory scheme might also be relevant. See Becerra v. State, 685 S.W.3d 120, 134 & n.66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). See also supra at n.11 (mere customer not an investor in light of separate prostitution statute).
22
Williams v. State, 720 S.W.3d at 463.
23
See id. for definitions.
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 10
to a living creature, not a business entity.24 And one can “direct the professional
career of” a person, not a business entity.25 And the “succeed in accomplishing”
definition applies to a task, not a business.26
In other instances, the court of appeals cited definitions that— at least in the
“prostitution enterprise” context—are not that different from each other. The
three monetary definitions of “invest” and the three definitions of “finance” given
by that court all involve causing money or something of monetary value to flow to
the organization.27 And various definitions of control—exercising influence over,
having power over, incorporating controls in—all amount to the same thing in a
prostitution enterprise.28 And while one might point to a theoretical difference
between having power and exercising that power, a person who has power in a
criminal organization is inevitably going to exercise it, eliminating any practical
distinction. And “manage” really has one business-oriented definition: “to
24
See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manage (entry 1c, ex. “can’t manage their child”) (viewed on May 27, 2026).
25
See id. (entry 2, ex. “an agency that manages entertainers”).
26
See id. (entry 3, ex. “managed to escape from prison”).
27
See Williams, 720 S.W.3d at 463, for definitions.
28
See id. for definitions.
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 11
exercise executive, administrative, and supervisory direction of.”29 To the extent
other definitions of that term could be shoehorned into the business context—such
as “treat with care” or “to work upon or try to alter for a purpose”30—they would
at worst be subsets of the business definition and subsumed by it.
And in some instances, the multiplicity of definitions for a particular term
merely shows overlap with another term in the statute. Various definitions of
“control,” “supervise,” and “manage” reveal overlap between those words. And
the non-monetary definitions of “invest”—investing time, effort, or
emotion”31—if they have any applicability at all, would simply cause that term to
overlap with the aforementioned overlapping terms. And the monetary definitions
of “invest” cause it to overlap to some degree with “finance.” But as I have
previously explained, our earlier decision in Williams already settled that matter.32
The indictment includes all six of the different methods of promoting a
prostitution enterprise, and under our prior decision in Williams, that is allowed.
29
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manage (entry 1a, first ex. “manage a business”) (viewed on May 27, 2026).
30
See Williams, 720 S.W.3d at 463, for definitions.
31
See id. for definitions.
32
Williams, 685 S.W.3d at 111.
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 12
Any variability in meaning that is due solely to an overlap does not affect the degree
of notice conveyed by the State.
Ultimately, the aggravated-promotion-of-prostitution statute covers people,
other than mere prostitutes or customers, who are entitled to proceeds from the
prostitution business or who make the business operate through personal effort or
financial support. A “person of common understanding” would have no trouble
understanding this.
C. Everything Appellant did with the prostitution enterprise was all
one offense anyway.
An analysis of the aggravated-promotion-of-prostitution statute shows that
all the methods of promoting a prostitution enterprise, between or within the six
terms codifying those methods, constitutes but a single offense. “[T]he focus or
‘gravamen’ of a penal provision should be regarded as the ‘best indicator’ when it
comes to determining whether the Legislature intended to define more than one
offense.”33 In determining focus, “three overarching types of gravamen” exist:
“(1) the result of conduct, (2) the nature of conduct, or (3) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct.”34 If an offense has both a nature and a circumstance
33
Floyd, 714 S.W.3d at 13.
34
Ex parte Cook, 630 S.W.3d 65, 66-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 13
element, we must determine which conduct is the statute’s focus.35 “A
circumstance element can prescribe the gravamen of the offense if it makes
otherwise innocent conduct criminal.”36
In the present case, the statute contains a “circumstance” that ties all the
different methods of commission together: the existence of a “prostitution
enterprise.” This is similar to the offense of failure to stop and render aid, in
which the different methods of commission—the failure to do a number of
different things—are tied together by the existence of an “accident.”37 And there
is nothing inherently criminal in “owning, investing in, financing, controlling,
supervising, or managing” something. What makes the activity criminal is that the
“something” is a “prostitution enterprise.” Under that reasoning, the offense of
aggravated promotion of prostitution has a circumstance focus, and that
circumstance defines the number of offenses. So, a single “prostitution
enterprise” gives rise to a single offense, and the acts of owning, investing,
financing, controlling, supervising, and managing are all alternative means of
35
Id. at 67.
36
Id.
37
See Huffman v. State, 267 S.W.3d 902, 908-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 14
commission.38
Also, the fact that the six words codifying these acts have overlapping
definitions suggest that the acts are alternative means rather than separate
offenses.39 This contrasts with sex offenses, where the touching of separate body
parts—sexual organ, anus, and breast—are completely independent acts.40
And if these different methods of commission are part of the same offense, it
would seem to follow that different acts that fall within the individual methods are
part the same offense. If, for example, both “investing” and “managing” a
prostitution enterprise are part of a single offense, how can one say that different
instances of investing or managing create separate offenses? Even if that were
possible, various terms suggest continuous operation rather than a single discrete
event. One “owns” a prostitution enterprise over a period of time. Likewise,
“managing” and “controlling” suggest more than a single event. Even if
investing, financing, and supervising might be ambiguous, they take—under the
38
See id. at 909 (Failure to do various things is part of one offense of failure to stop and render aid when there is one accident and one victim.).
39
Cf. id. at 909 (“Unlike the touching of various body parts found in sex offenses, which are independent acts, the ‘stop,’ ‘return,’ and ‘remain’ requirements are not independent of each other. Rather, they are serial requirements that all relate, step-by-step, to what an actor must do with respect to the scene of an accident.”).
40
See id.
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 15
doctrine of noscitur a sociis—the character of these other words in the series.41
And if all the different acts of promoting a prostitution enterprise are part of
a single offense, then the defendant knows he has to defend against all of them.
And he would know what those were from the discovery provided by the State
(which defense counsel acknowledged was complete).
D. Conclusion
As the Court has held, Appellant has suffered no harm because he knew the
State’s theories of the case and advanced a defense that had nothing to do with any
ambiguity in the indictment. But Appellant’s claim would fail for other reasons
that I have explored: (1) his narrow “overlap” claim lacks merit under Williams II,
(2) a broader Mays claim also lacks merit because the words codifying the different
methods of commission were reasonably specific, and (3) any uncertainty in the
terms was of no consequence because all conduct promoting a prostitution
enterprise was part of a single offense, requiring him to defend against all the
41
See McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 568-69 (2016) (“Under the familiar interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’ While ‘not an inescapable rule,’ this canon ‘is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth’” to a statute.). Of course, there is a point at which one would want to say that a defendant has committed aggravated promotion of prostitution more than once—at the very least, when the defendant engages in the proscribed conduct after a previous conviction of the offense. But one can simply view that situation as activity relating to a new, and thus different, “prostitution enterprise.”
WILLIAMS CONCURRENCE — 16
conduct the State knew about that conformed to the indictment’s allegations.
With these comments, I join the Court’s opinion.
Filed: August 20, 2026
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