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State v. Lee

2026-08-24

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's suppression order. The court affirmed the circuit court's determination that the search warrant was supported by probable cause and denied Lee's motion to suppress on that basis. The court reversed the suppression of evidence based on the delayed return of the warrant, holding that without a showing of prejudice to Lee's rights, suppression was not an appropriate remedy for the rule violation.

Lee was charged with promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree based on evidence obtained from a search of her vehicle. A search warrant was issued based on an affidavit describing a controlled buy of methamphetamine in which a confidential source purchased drugs from Lee at a specified location, and police officers observed Lee driving a white Lexus with specific license plate and rim characteristics that matched the description provided by the source. The circuit court granted Lee's motion to suppress on one ground (an officer's 50-day delay in filing the return of the search warrant violated procedural rules) but denied it on another ground (probable cause supported the warrant).

On appeal, the State challenged the suppression order, while Lee cross-appealed the denial of suppression. The court addressed two issues: whether the warrant was supported by probable cause, and whether the delayed return required suppression of evidence even absent prejudice to Lee.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether a search warrant was supported by probable cause based on observations from a controlled drug purchase
  • Whether suppression of evidence is required for delayed filing of a search warrant return without a showing of prejudice
  • Whether evidence connecting a particular vehicle to alleged drug activity provided sufficient probable cause

Procedural posture

The Intermediate Court of Appeals reviewed the circuit court's order granting Lee's motion to suppress in part (on procedural grounds) and denying it in part (on probable cause grounds), considering both the State's appeal and Lee's cross-appeal.

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

24-AUG-2026

07:54 AM

Dkt. 94 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

LAVERNE L. LEE, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

(CASE NO. 5CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

(By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, McCullen and Guidry, JJ.)

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee State of Hawaiʻi

(State) appeals, and Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant

Laverne L. Lee (Lee) cross-appeals, from the Circuit Court of

the Fifth Circuit's (circuit court) July 23, 2025 "Findings of

Fact; Conclusions of Law; and Order Granting in Part and Denying

in Part Motion to Suppress Evidence" (Suppression Order). 1

On May 4, 2023, the State charged Lee by Felony

Information with one count of Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the

1 The Honorable Randal G.B. Valenciano presided.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Second Degree, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)

§ 712-1242(1)(b)(i) (Supp. 2016). In November 2024, Lee moved

to suppress evidence "allegedly recovered by police on April 20,

2022," during a search of Lee's vehicle, pursuant to article I,

section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Hawaiʻi, and the

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The search

of Lee's vehicle was conducted pursuant to a Search Warrant

issued on April 14, 2022, and executed on April 20, 2022. The

Search Warrant was supported by Officer Tyler Yates' (Officer

Yates) "Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant" (Affidavit),

which included attachments setting forth Officer Yates'

"Training and Experience," and the "Observation of Affiant."

(Formatting altered.)

Officer Yates submitted the return of search warrant

on June 9, 2022. The return of search warrant included a

"Search Warrant Property Receipt for Case 22-04957" (Property

Receipt), which was signed on May 11, 2022. The Property

Receipt included an itemized list of the property that was

seized during the search of Lee's vehicle.

The circuit court heard Lee's "Motion to Suppress

Evidence" (Motion to Suppress) and entered its Suppression

Order. The circuit court granted the Motion to Suppress in

part, finding that Officer Yates violated Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal

Procedure (HRPP) Rule 41(d) by filing the return of search

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warrant fifty days after the search, and suppressing the

evidence seized from Lee's vehicle on that basis. The circuit

court denied the Motion to Suppress in part, rejecting Lee's

argument that the search was not supported by probable cause.

On appeal, the State raises a single point of error,

contending that "the circuit court erred by suppressing evidence

seized pursuant to the search warrant, reasoning that [HRPP Rule

41(d)] had been violated" where "the lead officer

unintentionally did not promptly file the search warrant return

and that [Lee] was not prejudiced by the 50-day delay in filing

the return." (Formatting altered) (footnote omitted.)

On cross-appeal, Lee also raises a single point of

error, contending that "[t]he circuit court erred when it denied

in part Lee's [M]otion to [S]uppress and determined that the

evidence underlying the search warrant was sufficient for

probable cause." (Formatting altered.)

We resolve the State's and Lee's points of error as

follows:

(1) Probable Cause: We first address Lee's contention

that the Search Warrant was not supported by probable cause

"when it allowed a search of Lee's vehicle, license plate number

KEH 764, and insufficient evidence was provided of any drug

activity associated with that particular vehicle." Lee contends

that the circuit court therefore erred in denying her Motion to

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Suppress in part, and in entering conclusion of law (COL) 4. 2

"[T]he determination of probable cause for the issuance of a

search warrant warrants de novo review on appeal." State v.

Navas, 81 Hawaiʻi 113, 123, 913 P.2d 39, 49 (1996) (formatting

altered).

In Iwatate, this court reiterated that,

[U]nder the safeguards of the fourth amendment to the

United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the

Hawaiʻi Constitution, all arrests and searches must be based

upon probable cause.

Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances

within one's knowledge and of which one has reasonably

trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to

warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an

offense has been committed. Direct evidence, however, is

not necessary for a probable cause determination by the

[judge]. The issuance of a search warrant is prohibited

except upon a finding of probable cause supported by oath

or affirmation.

108 Hawaiʻi at 368, 120 P.3d at 267 (quoting Navas, 81 Hawaiʻi at

115-16, 913 P.2d at 41-42).

Officer Yates' Affidavit established probable cause

for the Search Warrant. The Affidavit represented that, in

2 COL 4 states,

In the present case, although Officer Yates does not indicate any

information that [Lee] allegedly used the subject vehicle to

conduct alleged drug sales and no assisting officer is quoted as

clearly seeing [Lee] utilize the subject vehicle at the time of

(or immediately before) the controlled buy, there is sufficient

information to link the subject vehicle to [Lee] and the

information from assisting officers do create a permissible

inference that there is a nexus between [Lee's] alleged drug

sales and the subject vehicle. [See State v. Iwatate, 108 Hawaiʻi

361, 120 P.3d 260 (App. 2005)].

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April 2022, Officer Yates obtained information from a

confidential Cooperative Source (CS) that Lee "was distributing

crystal methamphetamine on the island of [Kauaʻi]." The CS

described Lee, and related that Lee "drives a white colored

Lexus SUV with black colored rims."

Between April 6 and 12, 2022, CS participated in a

controlled buy of crystal methamphetamine from Lee in

coordination with Officer Yates and other Kauaʻi Police

Department (KPD) officers. Prior to the controlled buy, CS met

with Officer Yates at a prearranged meet location. CS was

instructed to follow a prearranged route directly to a

prearranged buy location, and CS was provided traceable money by

the KPD to purchase an agreed upon amount of crystal

methamphetamine from Lee. CS's person and vehicle were searched

to ensure that CS did not have "illegal narcotics, contraband,

weapons, and money."

Officer Yates and other KPD officers monitored CS

travelling directly from the meet location to the prearranged

buy location. At the buy location, two KPD officers

participating in the operation "observed a white colored Lexus

SUV with tinted windows and black rims." A third KPD officer

related that the white colored Lexus SUV bore the license plate

number "KEH764." A KPD officer observed CS arrive at the buy

location, "approach the white colored SUV bearing [Hawaiʻi] State

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License plate KEH764 and make contact with [Lee]," and "leave

the prearranged buy location."

Officer Yates and the other KPD officers monitored CS

travel directly from the buy location to the meet location. At

the meet location, Officer Yates "obtained the agreed amount of

crystal methamphetamine that [CS] just purchased from [Lee]."

Following the controlled buy, the crystal methamphetamine

purchased by CS from Lee was tested and "reacted positive for

the presence of methamphetamine." Officer Yates conducted a

State of Hawaiʻi Motor Vehicle Inquiry, and "learned that [the]

vehicle bearing [Hawaiʻi] State license plates KEH764 is

described as [a] white colored 2007 Lexus MPVH . . . registered

to [Lee]."

Officer Yates' sworn statement represented that, based

on the above observations,

[Officer Yates] believes that crystal methamphetamine

and/or Drug Paraphernalia can be located within the vehicle

described as a white colored 2007 Lexus MPVH bearing

[Hawaiʻi] State License plate KEH764, registered to [Lee]

. . . . [Officer Yates] therefore requests the issuance of

a search warrant for the following:

A motor vehicle bearing [Hawaiʻi] State license plates

KEH764 described as a white colored 2007 Lexus MPVH

registered to [Lee] . . . , including but not limited to

purses, backpacks, bags, fanny-packs, hand-held electronic

devices, containers, packages, luggage, receipts,

documents, and clothing found within the vehicle.

Lee argues on appeal that "[t]he evidence presented in

the [A]ffidavit failed to sufficiently link the vehicle searched

(the vehicle with license plate KEH 764) with any drug

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activity." Probable cause is based on the reasonable inferences

drawn from the totality of the circumstances. See State v.

Chong, 52 Haw. 226, 231, 473 P.2d 567, 571 (1970) ("[P]robable

cause is generally based upon a combination of factors, which

together form a sort of mosaic, of which any one piece by itself

often might not be enough to constitute probable cause, but

which, when viewed as a whole, does constitute probable

cause."); State v. Ferrer, 95 Hawaiʻi 409, 431, 23 P.3d 744, 766

(App. 2001) ("[W]e consider the totality of the circumstances to

determine, de novo, whether [a police officer] had probable

cause to arrest [the defendant]." (formatting altered)). Here,

the Affidavit established that the observations of CS and KPD

officers who participated in the controlled buy, taken as a

whole, support a reasonable inference that Lee is the registered

owner of a white Lexus with license plate number KEH 764, and

that, while in this vehicle, Lee sold crystal methamphetamine to

CS at a controlled buy location.

We conclude that the circuit court was not wrong in

determining that the Search Warrant was supported by probable

cause. We therefore affirm the circuit court's denial of Lee's

Motion to Suppress on that basis, and we affirm COL 4.

(2) HRPP Rule 41(d): We next address the State's

contention that the circuit court erred by suppressing the

evidence seized based on the violation of HRPP Rule 41(d). The

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State contends that the evidence should not have been suppressed

because Lee "was not prejudiced by [Officer Yates'] 50-day delay

in filing the return" of the search warrant, and that "noncompliance with HRPP Rule 41(d)," standing alone, "does not

require suppression of evidence." 3 (Formatting altered)

(emphasis omitted.) The State contends, on this basis, that the

circuit court erred in entering COL 7, which states,

Although the [State] argues that the requirement of a

prompt return should be treated as ministerial and Officer

Yates did not have ill intent, the length of the delay in

this case is sufficient to justify treatment of the prompt

return requirement as substantive and justify suppression

in order to incentivize the police and other law

enforcement to comply with the promptness requirement of

HRPP Rule 41(d).

In State v. Stachler, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court held

that,

[W]here, as here, there has been no showing that a

violation of [HRPP] Rule 41(d) procedures has resulted in

prejudice to the defendant's rights, a suppression remedy

is not appropriate.

This, of course, should in no way be interpreted as a

license to law enforcement officers to disregard the

procedures of [HRPP] Rule 41(d). We will not hesitate to

call into play the suppression remedy where a sufficient

showing of prejudice is made.

3 HRPP Rule 41(d) states, in pertinent part,

Execution and return with inventory. The officer taking

property under the warrant shall give to the person from

whom or from whose premises the property was taken a copy

of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken or

shall leave the copy and receipt at the place from which

the property was taken. The return shall be made promptly

and shall be accompanied by a written inventory of any

property taken.

(Emphasis added.) The State represents that it "does not dispute the circuit court's conclusion that a 50-day delay between execution of the search warrant and the filing of the search warrant return is not prompt." (Emphasis added.)

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58 Haw. 412, 422-23, 570 P.2d 1323, 1330 (1977) (citation

omitted). A finding of prejudice to the defendant's rights is

therefore required to "call into play the suppression remedy."

Id.

Here, it appears the circuit court ordered the

suppression of evidence seized in the search of Lee's vehicle on

the sole ground that "the length of the delay in this case is

sufficient to justify treatment of the prompt return requirement

as substantive and justify suppression in order to incentivize

the police and other law enforcement to comply with the

promptness requirement." 4

The record reflects that Lee failed to satisfy her

burden of demonstrating that Officer Yates' delayed return of

the search warrant resulted in prejudice to Lee. See id. at

4 At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, the circuit court explained its ruling that Officer Yates' delayed return of the search warrant violated HRPP Rule 41(d), as follows:

[I]n regards to the [HRPP] Rule 41(d) [violation], the

[circuit] [c]ourt finds that Officer Yates didn't have bad

intent in filing the return. The return was filed June

9th. The search warrant was April 20th. The [circuit]

[c]ourt finds that the return -- search warrant return was

not filed promptly in accordance with [HRPP] Rule 41(d).

The [circuit] [c]ourt's concern is that if the [circuit]

[c]ourt treats this as ministerial and there is no

consequence, then there's no incentive for the police to

comply with -- there's no incentive for law enforcement to

comply with [HRPP] Rule 41(d). Based on that, the

[circuit] [c]ourt will grant the [M]otion to [S]uppress for

failure to comply with Rule -- HRPP Rule 41(d).

(Emphasis added.)

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422, 570 P.2d at 1330 (adopting the proposition that "a motion

to suppress because of violations of [HRPP] Rule 41(d) should be

granted only in instances where the defendant demonstrates

prejudice from the violation" (citation omitted)). Lee did not

introduce any evidence that would demonstrate that she suffered

any prejudice, nor did she argue to the circuit court that she

suffered prejudice. Given the lack of prejudice to Lee, we

conclude that the circuit court erred in suppressing the

evidence obtained from the search of Lee's vehicle based on the

violation of HRPP Rule 41(d).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and

reverse in part the Suppression Order.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, August 24, 2026.

On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka

Presiding Judge

Sara K. Haley,

Deputy Public Defender, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen for Defendant-Appellee/ Associate Judge

Cross-Appellant.

/s/ Kimberly T. Guidry

Tracy Murakami, Associate Judge

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

County of Kauaʻi,

for Plaintiff-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee.

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