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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 24-11009
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SAMUEL ARTHUR THOMPSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cr-00026-BJD-LLL-1
Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
GRANT, Circuit Judge:
When the Jacksonville Jaguars’ jumbotrons glitched during
the first home game of the 2018 season, the Jaguars thought it was
just that—a glitch. After it happened two more times, though, all
heads turned to Samuel Thompson, the stadium’s former control
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room engineer. He had both the skills and the motive to cause
trouble: earlier that year, the Jaguars had fired him when his
conviction for child sodomy came to light.
The jumbotron investigation that followed revealed that
Thompson had also committed a host of other serious crimes,
including possessing and producing child pornography. Once
Thompson knew the FBI was on to him, he drained his bank
account and fled to the Philippines. But when all was said and
done, he was forced back to the United States to face a ten-count
indictment.
Thompson opted to represent himself at trial, and was
convicted on all counts. He now appeals, arguing that he did not
validly waive his right to counsel; that his Sixth Amendment rights
were infringed by a child victim testifying using two-way closedcircuit television; and that the district court wrongly denied his
motions to compel discovery, to continue trial, and to suppress
evidence. We are unpersuaded, and affirm his convictions.
I.
Thompson has a knack for computers. In 2013, he helped
the Jaguars with the design and installation of their stadium’s new
state-of-the-art videoboard system. He stayed on the Jaguars’
payroll for the next few years, completing various technical
projects and operating the jumbotrons on game days.
But Thompson’s time with the team came to an end when
an anonymous letter revealed new information about his past—he
had served time in prison for sodomizing a young boy he had
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“befriended” while working as a church youth leader in Alabama.
He had guessed—correctly, as it turned out—that because he was
an independent contractor, not an employee, the Jaguars would
not look into his background too closely. But once the truth came
out, his contractor status also made it easy for the team to sever
ties with him.
With Thompson out of the picture, the Jaguars brought in a
new engineer to run the video control room for the 2018 season.
Things got off to a rocky start. During the first home game, one of
the jumbotrons inexplicably went blank and then displayed color
bars across the screen. Thompson soon sent texts to his former
coworkers, saying that he saw the disruption, knew “exactly what
the problem” was, and could have fixed it in “less than a minute.”
The Jaguars scrambled to find the source of the disruptions,
but their efforts kept coming up short. By the second or third
outage, the team started to suspect that someone outside the
stadium was interfering with the videoboards. When Jaguars staff
discovered that someone had been remotely accessing a
decommissioned computer to break into the videoboard network,
they set up a “honeypot” to catch the intruder in the act. And it
worked: when the would-be hacker tried (and failed) to access the
videoboard network during the next home game, the team was
able to capture information that led investigators to the intruder’s
IP address.
The FBI then traced that address to Thompson, who had not
covered his tracks. FBI Special Agent Frank Norris obtained a
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search warrant and executed it at Thompson’s home. Agents
found and seized his gun, iPhone, iPad, laptops, hard drives, and a
desktop computer.
Thompson was relatively forthcoming during the search,
telling agents that he had another computer in a storage unit and
giving his consent for them to seize it. He also told agents that he
had recently returned home from a trip to the Bahamas, though
investigators later learned that he had not reported that trip in
accordance with his sex offender registration obligations. As for
the jumbotron disruptions, he denied any involvement—but
became “evasive” after the agents showed him the evidence they
had on him. About ten days later, Thompson emptied his bank
account and fled to the Philippines, again failing to report the trip.
In the meantime, investigators searched Thompson’s
devices, and the data they obtained corroborated his involvement
in the jumbotron intrusions. The search also uncovered something
else—a staggering amount of child pornography.
A grand jury returned a six-count indictment against
Thompson. And Thompson returned to the United States (under
pressure from both the American and Philippine governments to
do so), where he pleaded not guilty to all charges. Another grand
jury returned a nearly identical superseding indictment against
Thompson about a year later, again charging him with six counts:
• Possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2);
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• Receiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1);
• Intentionally causing damage to protected computers, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) and (c)(4)(B)(i);
• Failing to comply with sex offender registration obligations
regarding travel to the Bahamas, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2250(b);
• Possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2);
• Failing to comply with sex offender registration obligations
regarding travel to the Republic of Korea and the
Philippines, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(b).
After that indictment came down, Thompson told his courtappointed counsel that he wished to represent himself.
A magistrate judge held a Faretta hearing in February 2022
to probe Thomspon’s desire to waive his right to counsel. The
magistrate judge, with the government’s help, catalogued the
nature of the charges and the potential penalties Thompson faced,
as well as the risks associated with self-representation. Thompson
stood firm in his decision, but agreed to have standby counsel.
Finding that Thompson knew and understood the risks, the
magistrate judge accepted his decision to proceed pro se.
In early 2023, the FBI finally managed to “crack the
password” on Thompson’s iPad. Agents discovered still more child
pornography—around 280 videos and 3,000 images. And
Thompson appeared to have produced some of the materials
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himself, taking advantage of visits from several of his eight-year-old
stepson’s friends. That new evidence led to the return of a tencount, second superseding indictment against Thompson, which
included four additional counts:
• Enticing minors to engage in sexually explicit conduct for
the purposes of producing a visual depiction, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e);
• Committing the above offense while being required to
register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A;
• Receiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1);
• Possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2).
Five days later, Thompson appeared before a magistrate judge—
the same one that had conducted his Faretta hearing—for an
arraignment. During the arraignment, the government
summarized all the charges in the new indictment and detailed the
potential penalties. Thompson confirmed that he understood the
nature of the charges and their associated penalties.
Meanwhile, he set his sights on suppressing the evidence
obtained from the search of his home. He challenged the search
warrant’s execution, arguing that the FBI agents who conducted
the search failed to leave behind a copy of the attachments to the
warrant. He also argued that the warrant lacked probable cause,
and requested an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware to
challenge the search warrant’s truthfulness. See 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
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And after a preliminary evidentiary hearing—at which the agent
who executed the warrant testified—the district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny Thompson’s motion
to suppress and his request for a full-blown Franks hearing.
As trial approached, Thompson grew increasingly frustrated
by the government’s refusal to hand over certain devices in what
he called their “native form.” But the district court denied his
motions to compel, agreeing with the government that it was
statutorily barred from giving him unfettered control over any
devices alleged to contain child pornography. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3509(m). And in any event, the court reasoned, Thompson had
been given more than enough opportunities to inspect the devices’
data. Thompson also complained that he needed a continuance to
adequately prepare his expert for trial, but that motion met a
similar fate: the district court denied it on the ground that
Thompson had “ample access to the relevant discovery materials
and to any required experts.”
The government, for its part, sought to examine the three
child witnesses by closed-circuit television, rather than in front of
Thompson, as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1). The court held
a hearing, and after questioning each child, decided that one would
be unable to testify in Thompson’s physical presence. During trial,
the court ruled, the child would testify in the courtroom while
Thompson listened and observed from another room.
With that, the case proceeded to trial. It lasted nine days,
after which the jury found Thompson guilty on all counts. The
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district court subsequently sentenced him to 2,640 months’
imprisonment, followed by a life term of supervised release.
Thompson, now represented by counsel, timely appealed.
II.
Thompson first contends that he did not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel—a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.
United States v. Shamsid-Deen, 61 F.4th 935, 945 (11th Cir. 2023).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only the “right to
assistance of counsel,” but also “the correlative right to dispense
with a lawyer’s help.” Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
279 (1942); see U.S. Const. amend. VI. Those rights cannot be
simultaneously enjoyed—opting in to self-representation
necessarily requires opting out of the right to counsel. See United
States v. Hakim, 30 F.4th 1310, 1322 (11th Cir. 2022). Defendants
are free to make that choice, but doing so is not without
consequence: they must give up “many of the traditional benefits
associated with the right to counsel.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 835 (1975).
Before allowing a defendant to waive the right to counsel,
the trial court must be sure that “his choice is made with eyes
open.” Id. (quotation omitted). The best way to assure a waiver is
valid is to conduct a pretrial session—known as a Faretta hearing—
“at which the accused is informed of the charges, basic trial
procedures, and hazards of self-representation.” United States v.
Owen, 963 F.3d 1040, 1049 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted); see
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Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835–36. That said, a defendant can make a valid
waiver even without a formal Faretta hearing, so long as the record
shows that he “understood the risks of self-representation and
freely chose to face them.” Owen, 963 F.3d at 1049 (quotation
omitted); see also United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 645 (11th Cir.
2014).
Thompson initially waived his right to counsel at the 2022
Faretta hearing. During that proceeding, the magistrate judge
touched on each of the eight factors that this Court usually consults
when assessing a waiver’s validity—including, as relevant here,
Thompson’s knowledge of the nature of the charges and possible
penalties. 1 See Owen, 963 F.3d at 1049. Despite the magistrate
judge’s warnings about “the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation,” Thompson remained steadfast in his decision to
go it alone. Satisfied that he made that decision with a full
understanding of the risks, the magistrate judge accepted the
waiver and allowed him to proceed in his own defense.
1 The eight factors are “(1) the defendant’s age, educational background, and
physical and mental health; (2) the extent of the defendant’s contact with
lawyers prior to trial; (3) the defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the
charges, possible defenses, and penalties; (4) the defendant’s understanding of
rules of procedure, evidence, and courtroom decorum; (5) the defendant’s
experience in criminal trials; (6) whether standby counsel was appointed, and
the extent to which that counsel aided the defendant; (7) mistreatment or
coercion of the defendant; and (8) whether the defendant was trying to
manipulate the events of the trial.” Owen, 963 F.3d at 1049.
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That’s all fine with Thompson, who cites no problem with
the validity of his initial waiver. Instead, he challenges the
continued validity of that waiver after the second superseding
indictment. He contends that his waiver was no longer valid after
the new indictment, because it added four additional counts and
increased his sentencing exposure.
No—nothing changed in the risk calculus except the new
charges, and the record is clear that Thompson understood the
nature of those charges and the possible penalties. Shortly after the
return of the new indictment, Thompson appeared for an
arraignment. The same magistrate judge as before asked the
government to “discuss the superseding indictment,” giving
“specific attention to the new charges and possible penalties.” The
government proceeded to explain, for each of the ten counts, the
alleged offense and Thompson’s sentencing exposure—including
maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment, supervised
release, and fines. Thompson then confirmed that he understood
the nature of the charges and the possible penalties, and that he
received a copy of the indictment.
If that wasn’t enough (it was), Thompson reaffirmed over
the next days and months that he wished to continue representing
himself. At a suppression hearing three days after the arraignment,
for example, the magistrate judge asked if he was “able to move
forward” with self-representation, and he replied, “I am.” He was
ordered to “alert the Court” if that changed, and he affirmed that
he would. He never did. The magistrate judge brought the issue
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up three more times over the next day, and each time, Thompson
affirmed that his mind was made up. And three months later, when
the magistrate judge asked him whether he was “prepared to
continue to represent” himself, he again replied, “Yes, Your
Honor.” So although Thompson now claims that the court
“moved forward without careful consideration of Thompson’s
Sixth Amendment rights,” there is simply no support for that
assertion in the record.
Thompson presses the matter, asserting that a brand-new
Faretta hearing is required each time a superseding indictment
increases a defendant’s potential minimum or maximum sentence.
Our answer is a resounding no: Faretta requires no such mechanical
repetition. Even Thompson cannot explain what else needed to
happen at a new Faretta hearing, other than vague assertions that a
careful inquiry is needed. But here, as elsewhere, “matters of
reality, and not mere ritual, should be controlling.” McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 n.20 (1969) (alteration adopted and
quotation omitted).
In fact, it is not entirely clear why the colloquy at the
rearraignment did not, in substance, constitute a second Faretta
hearing. The only difference that Thompson could identify is that
the magistrate judge did not walk through each of the new charges
on an element-by-element basis, as was done during the initial
hearing. But again, no such formality is required. And when he
was given the choice between receiving more or less detail during
the arraignment, Thompson opted for less—allowing the
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government to present a “summary” of the charges as opposed to
a “formal reading of the indictment.” So we see no reason to
second-guess his understanding just because it was not confirmed
during a separate proceeding held purely for formality’s sake.
This is all the more true considering that Faretta hearings are
“preferred,” but “not required,” for a valid waiver. United States v.
Cash, 47 F.3d 1083, 1088 (11th Cir. 1995). At the end of the day,
what matters is “not the trial court’s express advice, but rather the
defendant’s understanding.” Owen, 963 F.3d at 1049 (quotation
omitted). Here, the record is flush with evidence that Thompson
understood the risks of self-representation, both before and after
the second superseding indictment came down. The fact that some
of those risks were realized does not change that fact, and we reject
his contention that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.
III.
Thompson next challenges the district court’s denial of his
pretrial motions to compel discovery and to continue trial.
Although we typically review denials of motions to compel
discovery and to continue trial for abuse of discretion, here
Thompson attacks these rulings primarily on due process grounds.
See Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Valladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2008). We
review that constitutional argument de novo. See United States v.
Watkins, 147 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 1998).
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Longstanding precedent tells us that several constitutional
provisions, taken together, guarantee that criminal defendants
have “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quotation omitted).
“The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in
essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s
accusations.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
Thompson contends that the district court’s decisions, whether
standing alone or taken together, denied him a “meaningful
opportunity to prepare his case on an equal footing with the United
States.” He is incorrect.
A.
First up is the district court’s denial of Thompson’s motion
to compel discovery. On this front, his due process argument
falters right out of the gate: “There is no general constitutional
right to discovery in a criminal case.” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545, 559 (1977). Outside certain well-defined exceptions for
exculpatory material, “the Due Process Clause has little to say
regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be
afforded.” Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973); see also Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972). Thompson does not contend that any exception
applies here, so his due process challenge fails.
In any event, the district court acted well within its
discretion in denying Thompson’s motion to compel. The federal
rules require, as a general matter, that defendants have a chance
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“to inspect and to copy” any devices or data in the government’s
possession. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). But that opportunity is
not absolute—and for good reason. Section 3509(m) of Title 18,
for example, bars the government from relinquishing control over
“any property or material that constitutes child pornography,” so
long as it is made “reasonably available” for the defendant’s
inspection or review. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(1)–(2). And above all,
the district court retains “broad authority” to “deny, restrict, or
defer discovery” upon a finding of good cause. United States v.
Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 995 (11th Cir. 2008); Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1).
Thompson claims that the government denied him
meaningful access to the data on his electronic devices. But from
day one, the government made his iPhone and other devices,
including those containing child sexual abuse material, available for
his review at the jail. The government also complied with
Thompson’s requests for copies of specific files on various
devices—at one point, reviewing 74,000 files on a hard drive to
ensure they were free from contraband before handing them over.
And all devices were made available for his inspection; Thompson
does not identify a single one that wasn’t. So the record supports
the district court’s finding that he “had more than an ample
opportunity to inspect all data” and that the government “provided
copies of that data when allowed by statute.”
Thompson pushes back, arguing that he was entitled to
receive personal, sanitized copies of entire devices so that he could
review them “without FBI oversight.” No. It bears emphasis that
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the devices he sought to copy either contained child pornography
or “facts strongly indicative of its presence,” which means the
government would have first needed to review each and every file
to ensure that contraband was not present. When feasible, the
government went to great lengths to do just that; otherwise, it gave
him ample access to the devices and granted his narrowed requests
for copies of specific files. On these facts, the district court
reasonably denied his request for access to sanitized versions of his
devices and hard drives.
Thompson also complains that rather than reviewing “the
data in its native format,” as he would have preferred, he was
forced to do so through a forensic program “with an FBI agent
looking over his shoulder.” That, to him, meant that the data was
not made “reasonably available” under § 3509(m)(2). Again, we
disagree. To start, the law does not demand that an alleged child
pornographer have unsupervised access to devices that contain or
likely contain child sexual abuse material. The statute requires that
Thompson be allowed “ample opportunity for inspection, viewing,
and examination” at a government facility, not that he be given
access to the data alone or in his preferred format. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3509(m)(2)(B). We accordingly reject his contention that the
district court’s discovery rulings deprived him of a “meaningful” or
“fair” opportunity to prepare his defense.
B.
Next is Thompson’s request for a continuance. District
courts are afforded “great latitude” on scheduling, which includes
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requests to continue trial. United States v. Garmany, 762 F.2d 929,
936 (11th Cir. 1985). For that reason, only those rulings that are
“so arbitrary as to violate due process” will be disturbed on appeal.
United States v. Verderame, 51 F.3d 249, 251 (11th Cir. 1995)
(quotation omitted). No “mechanical tests” apply to that
determination; instead, the answer depends on the unique facts in
every case. Id. (quotation omitted). Considerations include “the
time available for preparation, the likelihood of prejudice from
denial, the accused’s role in shortening the effective preparation
time, the degree of complexity of the case, and the availability of
discovery from the prosecution.” United States v. Pendergrass, 995
F.3d 858, 870 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). And to succeed
on appeal, a criminal defendant must always show “specific
substantial prejudice” by identifying the relevant evidence he
would have presented had a continuance been granted. Valladares,
544 F.3d at 1262 (quotation omitted).
The district court’s decision not to continue trial was not
arbitrary—far from it. Thompson made no effort to identify the
specific evidence that he would have presented had his motion
been granted. He matter-of-factly stated that this is a “complex
cyber case,” and that he would benefit from an expert’s help in
reviewing the data. To get even a vague idea of the evidence that
he hoped to present requires piecing together stray lines from his
prior filings, the gist of which seems to be that an expert’s forensic
review would reveal evidence that someone within the Jaguars
organization had planted child pornography on his devices. Yet to
this day, he has pointed to nothing—nothing—in the record that
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supports that theory. In fact, the evidence outright refutes it. Just
to name an example, investigators uncovered child pornography
filmed in Thompson’s own home, with his own voice audible in
the background. Thompson’s request for a continuance fails for
the simple reason that he failed to show any “specific substantial
prejudice” caused by the denial. Id. (quotation omitted).
But that is not the only reason. The district court also found
that Thompson alone was responsible for any delays in preparing
his expert for trial. He had access to forensic experts for years—
since at least the fall of 2021, when he requested (and received)
funding to hire Roloff Digital Forensics. From then on, Thompson
had authorization to work with Roloff, which provided him with
preliminary forensic analysis. For reasons unknown, Thompson
decided to switch to a second digital forensics expert in August
2022, and then a third several months later. The district court
approved the final change in September 2023, more than a month
before trial was set to begin.
Thompson did not use that time wisely. Although he visited
the federal courthouse to review his data several times that month,
his expert never accompanied him, and he did not schedule any
time for the expert to review the evidence he sought to challenge.
He points the finger at the government, claiming that discovery
delays got in the way. But again, he has only himself to blame—
on several occasions, he refused to review the data unless and until
the government provided it in his preferred format. These facts
drove the district court’s reasonable conclusion that the delays
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Thompson experienced were nothing more than “a consequence
of the manner in which he chose to conduct his defense.”
* * *
Thompson had a fair opportunity to present his defense.
The district court’s orders denying his motions to compel and to
continue trial—whether considered alone or taken together—did
not change that. His due process argument fails.
IV.
Thompson also argues that the district court’s decision to
allow a child witness to testify by closed-circuit television violated
his Sixth Amendment rights twice over: first, by curbing his right
to confront the witnesses against him, and second, by impairing his
right to self-representation. Because he made only the
Confrontation Clause objection in the trial court, we review his
first argument de novo and his second for plain error. See United
States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc); United
States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 828 (11th Cir. 2024). The plain error
standard requires “that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was
obvious, and (3) the error affected his substantial rights.” United
States v. Tovar, 146 F.4th 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2025). “Even then,
we exercise our discretion to correct the error only if it seriously
impaired the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
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A.
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause ordinarily
“guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses
appearing before the trier of fact.” Pitts v. Mississippi, 607 U.S. 1, 2
(2025) (quotation omitted). But as the Supreme Court recognized
in Maryland v. Craig, that promise “must occasionally give way” to
protect “child witnesses from the trauma of testifying.” 497 U.S.
836, 849, 855 (1990) (quotation omitted). The Craig Court
approved a state statute that allowed child witnesses to testify by
closed-circuit television, but only with a case-specific finding that
the procedure is “necessary to protect the welfare of the particular
child witness who seeks to testify.” Id. at 855.
The Court laid out the ground rules for that determination:
The government must present evidence, and the trial court must
find, “that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the
courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant.” Id. at
856. The emotional distress the child would suffer must be “more
than de minimis”—that is, “more than mere nervousness or
excitement or some reluctance to testify.” Id. (quotation omitted).
And during trial, the court must ensure that other essential
elements of the confrontation right—“oath, cross-examination,
and observation of the witness’ demeanor”—are “otherwise
assured.” Id. at 851, 850.
Congress passed the Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990
following the Court’s decision in Craig. The Act allows child
victims to testify by two-way closed-circuit television in federal
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trials upon a finding that they are “unable to testify in open court
in the presence of the defendant . . . because of fear.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3509(b)(1)(B)(i). That “fear” must come from testifying in the
defendant’s presence—not from the ordinary stress associated with
testifying in court. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 856–57. And though the
Supreme Court in Craig expressly declined to specify the minimum
finding of emotional distress needed to dispense with the face-toface requirement, it held that the state statute challenged in that
case—which required that the child be unable to “reasonably
communicate”—“clearly” sufficed. Id. at 856 (quotation omitted).
The federal statute sets a similar standard, requiring that a
child be “unable to testify” because of fear or trauma. That does
“not mean that the child must be traumatized to the extent of being
unable to utter any responses to questions whatsoever.” United
States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d 885, 889 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993). “Rather, as was
the case with the child witness in Craig, the child’s emotional
trauma must be such that he or she ‘cannot reasonably
communicate’ in the defendant’s presence.” Id. So it is enough for
the trial court to find that testifying in the same room as the
defendant “would impair”—not completely subdue—“the child’s
ability to communicate.” Craig, 497 U.S. at 857 (emphasis added).
The record here provides more than enough support for the
district court’s conclusion that one of the child witnesses—who
was eight years old at the time of the abuse and once so close to
Thompson that he considered himself Thompson’s “son”—needed
to testify by two-way television. In response to the court’s
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questioning before trial, the then eleven-year-old estimated that he
faced a “50/50” chance of having an anxiety attack on the stand and
“would probably lock up” in Thompson’s presence. Given his
history of anxiety attacks, he explained that testifying before
Thompson—who had “exploited” him and made him “really
nervous”—might trigger an attack on the stand. That risk, he said,
would be diminished if he could testify without Thompson in the
room.
The district court, after observing the child on the stand,
found it credible that he “would experience paralyzing and
traumatic anxiety when faced with recounting his abuse” in
Thompson’s presence. 2 Based on that finding, using a two-way
monitoring system was appropriate for this child’s testimony. Cf.
United States v. Cox, 871 F.3d 479, 485 (6th Cir. 2017). And when it
came time for trial, there is no doubt that other essential elements
of the confrontation right were satisfied—the child “testified under
oath,” was subject to “full cross-examination,” and was “able to be
observed by the judge, jury, and defendant.” Craig, 497 U.S. at 857.
Thompson’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were not
infringed when the child testified as provided by § 3509(b)(1).
2 Thompson’s self-representation made this problem even worse. Not only
would he have been present in the courtroom, but he would have personally
conducted the child’s cross-examination. Although the district court did not
discuss this fact with the child, one can reasonably infer from the pretrial
testimony that it would make it significantly harder for the child to
communicate on the stand. That would, in turn, undermine “the truth-finding
function of the trial itself.” Craig, 497 U.S. at 857 (quotation omitted). USCA11 Case: 24-11009 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 08/24/2026 Page: 22 of 28
22 Opinion of the Court 24-11009
B.
Nor has Thompson shown that the district court’s
application of § 3509(b)(1)(D) violated his right to selfrepresentation—much less plainly so. See Tovar, 146 F.4th at 1325.
As we have discussed, the Sixth Amendment includes the “right to
self-representation for criminal defendants.” Barnes v. Sec’y, Dep’t
of Corr., 888 F.3d 1148, 1159 (11th Cir. 2018); see Faretta, 422 U.S. at
819. But “the right is not absolute”—in some circumstances the
court may appoint standby counsel to aid a defendant even over
the defendant’s objection. Barnes, 888 F.3d at 1159. And that may
even include allowing standby counsel to participate at trial, so
long as that participation “does not seriously interfere” with the
“core” of the self-representation right: the defendant’s ability “to
preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present to the
jury.” Id.; McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
Thompson contends that his right to self-representation was
hampered during the child witness’s closed-circuit television
testimony, because he was excluded from the courtroom and
prevented from “directly examining” the child. But that fact does
not show that his right was obviously and erroneously infringed.
Tovar, 146 F.4th at 1325. Thompson contemporaneously watched
and listened to the child victim’s testimony from another room.
And standby counsel conferred with Thompson and asked
questions as he directed during the cross-examination. In fact, the
record reflects that throughout the trial Thompson exercised
control over all “significant tactical decisions” and “the questioning USCA11 Case: 24-11009 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 08/24/2026 Page: 23 of 28
24-11009 Opinion of the Court 23
of witnesses”—even when he was sequestered for the child
witness. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 178.
We are thus not convinced that the district court plainly
erred in applying § 3509(b)(1)(D) to Thompson as a pro se
defendant. Because he was given the opportunity to direct standby
counsel’s questioning of the witness, the “core” of his Sixth
Amendment right remained intact. Id. at 178.
V.
Thompson’s final set of arguments relates to the search
warrant issued for his home.
First, Thompson challenges the denial of his request to issue
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b) subpoenas to certain
witnesses in support of his motion for a Franks v. Delaware
evidentiary hearing. See 438 U.S. at 154. We review this decision
for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Muho, 978 F.3d 1212,
1219 (11th Cir. 2020).
A Franks hearing is required “when a defendant makes a
substantial preliminary showing that statements or omissions
made in an affidavit supporting a [search warrant] are deliberately
false or made with reckless disregard for the truth,” and that those
statements or omissions are “necessary to the finding of probable
cause.” United States v. Goldstein, 989 F.3d 1178, 1197 (11th Cir.
2021) (quotation omitted). Rule 17(b), in turn, allows an indigent
defendant to subpoena witnesses at the government’s expense, but
only if those witnesses are a “necessity” for an “adequate defense.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(b); see Muho, 978 F.3d at 1219.
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24 Opinion of the Court 24-11009
Thompson claims that the magistrate judge erred in
declining to subpoena five witnesses who would have testified, on
his telling, that he had permission to access the Jaguars’ computer
network at the time of the jumbotron outages. If so, Thompson
says, the warrant was misleading when it catalogued his
supposedly unauthorized intrusions.
The district court reasonably concluded that witness
testimony was not a “necessity” for Thompson to show his
entitlement to a Franks hearing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(b). None of
his subpoena applications claimed that the witnesses would testify
that he had access to the Jaguars’ computer network at all relevant
times, or that Agent Norris knew about his purported access or
recklessly disregarded that fact.3
Those claims were not enough: Rule 17(b) is not a
“discovery device.” United States v. Rinchack, 820 F.2d 1557, 1567
(11th Cir. 1987). It requires “facts that show the relevancy and the
necessity” of the testimony—not just “a feeling” that a witness
could “shed some light” on the relevant subject. United States v.
Hegwood, 562 F.2d 946, 952, 953 (5th Cir. 1977) (quotations
3 In fact, the Chief Legal Officer later testified at trial that Thompson had no
right to access the Jaguars’ stadium after the termination of his contract in
March 2018—he had no continuing duties, and nothing else required his
presence there. And other testimony at trial established that Thompson had
no right to access the Jaguars’ computer systems, either.
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omitted). 4 So although Thompson speculates that the requested
witnesses might “shed some light” on his motion for a Franks
hearing, the Rule demands more. Id. (quotation omitted). The
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his subpoena
requests.
Second, Thompson challenges the denial of his motion to
suppress, for which we review the district court’s legal conclusions
de novo and its factual findings for clear error, while construing the
facts in the light most favorable to the government as the prevailing
party. See United States v. Rivers, 134 F.4th 1292, 1302 (11th Cir.
2025).
Thompson contends that the evidence obtained from the
execution of the search warrant should be suppressed because the
warrant was unsupported by probable cause. “Probable cause
requires a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.” United States v. McCall, 84 F.4th
1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). It deals with
“probabilities,” not “hard certainties,” and thus turns on a
“common-sense” reading of the supporting affidavit. Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quotation omitted). For that
reason, we “give great deference” to the issuing magistrate judge’s
4 This Court has adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the Fifth Circuit
issued before October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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26 Opinion of the Court 24-11009
probable cause determination. United States v. Carroll, 886 F.3d
1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted).
Here, the warrant was supported by a “fair probability” that
a search of Thompson’s home would yield evidence that he
violated 18 U.S.C. § 1030. McCall, 84 F.4th at 1324 (quotation
omitted). Section 1030(a)(5)(C) makes it unlawful to intentionally
access a computer “without authorization, and as a result of such
conduct, cause[] damage and loss.” In Thompson’s view, the
magistrate judge had no reason to believe that the disruption of the
Jaguars’ jumbotrons during three NFL games caused “damage and
loss.” But that argument defies common sense: outage to a sports
stadium’s jumbotrons during a live game with thousands of fans in
attendance surely amounts to “damage and loss.” The statute
makes this explicit, defining “loss” to include “any revenue lost,
cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of
interruption of service.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11).
The statute also defines “loss” as “any reasonable cost to any
victim, including the cost of responding to an offense.” Id. The
affidavit sufficiently identified such loss, as it detailed the internal
response and investigation to the jumbotron disruptions within the
Jaguars organization. From there, the magistrate judge could
reasonably infer that the Jaguars spent time and money responding
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24-11009 Opinion of the Court 27
to the offense. See id. We therefore reject Thompson’s argument
that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause. 5
Thompson also argues that the evidence should be
suppressed because the search warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement that warrants “particularly describ[e]
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The application for a search warrant
included two attachments, Attachment A and Attachment B,
which respectively identified the location to be searched and the
items to be seized, and the magistrate judge incorporated the
attachments by reference when issuing the warrant.
Thompson concedes that the attachments were “properly
referenced in the warrant.” But according to him, the copy he
received on the day of the search did not include the attachments,
rendering the warrant invalid. The district court rejected that
contention, crediting Agent Norris’s competing account: he
testified that the copy given to Thompson included both
Attachments A and B, in accordance with FBI policy.
When a law enforcement officer’s testimony conflicts with
a defendant’s, “the trial judge’s choice of whom to believe is
conclusive on this Court.” United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1, 11
(11th Cir. 2022) (alterations adopted and quotation omitted). That
5 Given our determination that probable cause existed for a violation of
§ 1030(a)(5)(C), we need not consider Thompson’s alternative argument that
it was lacking for § 1030(a)(2)(C).
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28 Opinion of the Court 24-11009
is, of course, “unless the judge credits exceedingly improbable
testimony.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the magistrate judge
found Agent Norris’s testimony “credible.” Because that finding
was not clearly erroneous, suppression was not warranted on this
basis.
* * *
What began with a disgruntled ex-contractor interfering
with the jumbotrons in the middle of several NFL games turned
out to be much more—a case about child pornography possession
and production, unlawful possession of a firearm, sex-offender
registration obligations, and of course, computer hacking. Because
none of Thompson’s arguments warrant a reversal of his
conviction on appeal, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.