United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 24-1686
25-1026
ALDENIR PEREIRA ALVES; CRISTIANA BARROS ALVES; I.B.A.; J.B.A.,
Petitioners,
v.
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,*
Respondent.
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Gelpí, Howard, and Dunlap,
Circuit Judges.
Randy Olen for petitioners.
Anthony J. Nardi, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, with whom Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, Jessica E. Burns and Kohsei Ugumori,
Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, were
on brief, for respondent.
August 24, 2026
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2),
Attorney General Todd Blanche is automatically substituted for
former Attorney General Pamela J. Bondi as respondent.
DUNLAP, Circuit Judge. Petitioners are Aldenir Pereira
Alves and Cristiana Barros Alves and their two minor children,
natives and citizens of Brazil. Petitioners challenge the Board
of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") dismissal of their appeal from an
Immigration Judge's ("IJ") denial of their applications for asylum
and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality
Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1), 1231(b)(3), and protection
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), as
well as the BIA's denial of their motions to reopen and reconsider.
We deny the petitions for review.
I.
A. Background Facts
Petitioners entered the United States without
authorization on or about October 24, 2021, at or near Otay Mesa,
California. That same day, Petitioners were served with notices
to appear from the Department of Homeland Security, charging each
of them with removability under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA.
Through counsel, Petitioners each conceded their removability and
filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
protection. 1 Petitioners appeared before the IJ for merits
hearings in March and December 2023.
1 Petitioners' removal proceedings were initially
consolidated with those of Cristiana's siblings, Poliana and
Robson, and Poliana's minor child. The IJ eventually severed the
proceedings, however, because the siblings could not derive asylum
- 2 -Cristiana testified before the IJ as follows.
Petitioners left Brazil because their family had been "persecuted
and threatened" by two particular Brazilian military police
officers between approximately 2012 and 2020, with the period
between 2013 to 2014 being "the most painful." The police officers
targeted Petitioners' family on account of Cristiana's brother,
Jaider, who was the boss of a Brazilian gang for around two years
prior to his arrest on July 27, 2015. Jaider has since been
serving a twelve-year prison sentence. Prior to his arrest,
Jaider lived at his and Cristiana's mother's house, where their
siblings, Poliana and Robson, and Robson's two daughters, also
lived. Before she married Aldenir in 2012, Cristiana had also
lived at her mother's house, but thereafter she lived about fifteen
minutes away.
Although the two police officers never confronted
Petitioners in their home, Petitioners observed the officers
mistreat Cristiana's mother and siblings when they visited at her
mother's house. Cristiana's mother's house was the gathering
place for Cristiana and her siblings. Cristiana was present in
her mother's house around ten to twelve times when the police
officers were there, and she also was aware of approximately ten
other times when the police officers were at her mother's house
from each other's claims and "the nature of the harms to each
family unit" differed.
- 3 -when she was not present. Each time Cristiana witnessed the police
officers' visits to her mother's house, the same two police
officers were always present. The officers threatened to arrest
the family if they would not open the door and threatened to charge
Cristiana's mother with drug trafficking if she would not
cooperate. Cristiana's mother would allow the officers to enter
her house without a warrant "because she was very humble," and,
with one exception, the family would allow the officers into the
home because they were afraid of the officers. Once, in 2014, the
officers arrested Poliana for contempt when she tried to keep them
from entering the home to look for Jaider. Upon entering the
house, the officers -- armed with guns and brandishing
sticks -- threatened the family with arrest and broke furniture in
the house. The officers accused the family of being criminals
like Jaider, and threatened to use them as an example and send a
message about the treatment that gang members' families could
expect. Cristiana believed she could have been arrested if she
had opposed the police officers.
In addition to arresting Poliana, the police also beat
Robson with their fists and a stick on several occasions, both in
the house and in the street, though Robson did not go to the
hospital to treat the pain out of fear of the police. Although
Cristiana's husband, Aldenir, was never "personally harmed,
threatened, or mistreated by anyone in Brazil," he testified that
- 4 -he witnessed a police officer beat and kick Robson a couple times,
though Aldenir did not know the reason for the police brutality.
Cristiana also testified that the police officers never
found any evidence of criminal activities in her mother's house,
and she believed that the officers would just come to scare her
family and make known that criminals' families would be so treated.
While Cristiana stated that, to the best of her knowledge, none of
her family members other than Jaider had been in a gang or had a
criminal record, evidence in the administrative
record -- including her own affidavit -- indicates that Robson had
a prior drug trafficking conviction in Brazil. She was aware that
Robson had been arrested in Brazil due to what she believed was
planted evidence, but Cristiana stated that she did not know if he
was convicted for drug trafficking and that she had never talked
to Robson about his arrest because she felt uncomfortable doing
so. Still, Cristiana said she never saw any drugs or criminal
activity in her mother's house before or after she was married.
She testified that the last time the police entered her mother's
home was around February 2020.2
2 Thisdate is inconsistent with Petitioners' affidavits,
which state that after Robson was released from prison around
March 2021, "the police continued entering [the mother's] home
looking for any excuse to file additional false charges against
Robson."
- 5 -Petitioners also feared the police officers due to media
reports that the two officers had planted evidence against a man,
arrested him, and raped his wife -- allegations for which the
officers were never arrested, although they were "set apart" before
eventually returning to work. Because she is Jaider's sister,
Cristiana fears that if she returns to Brazil, she or her kids
could be harmed like the woman who was reportedly raped by the two
police officers. Although she was never physically harmed or
arrested in Brazil, the police officers did call Cristiana a
criminal and threatened to detain her due to her association with
Jaider. She only encountered the police at her mother's house,
however -- never at her own -- and had never opposed any police
officers at any point in her life. Still, even if she stayed away
from her mother's house, Cristiana fears returning to Brazil
because she would be Jaider's only family member in the country,
given that her mother passed away in March 2020. She believes
that the police would go after her to affect Jaider, who is still
imprisoned.
Cristiana fears the Brazilian police in general, in
addition to the two local officers who would visit her mother's
house. She believes that the local military police communicate
with the federal and state police throughout Brazil. She believes
that she could not live safely anywhere in Brazil.
- 6 -B. Immigration Court Decisions
On December 22, 2023, the IJ issued an oral decision
denying Petitioners' applications and ordering them removed to
Brazil. Although the IJ found Petitioners' testimony to be
credible and corroborated, the IJ determined that Petitioners
failed to establish past persecution or reasonable fear of future
persecution.
The IJ first concluded that Petitioners "individually
and collectively failed to establish that the harm, mistreatment,
and suffering they endured in Brazil rises to the level of past
persecution." The IJ noted that Cristiana and Aldenir both
testified that they had never been "physically harmed or mistreated
in Brazil," nor were they "directly threatened," despite observing
the mistreatment of Robson and Poliana. The IJ observed that the
fact the police only went to Cristiana's mother's house was "not
coincidental" as it was the place where Jaider was arrested and
"so the police had identified this as a potential locus of criminal
misconduct." The IJ also found that Petitioners failed to present
"evidence that the threats they did receive while they were
visiting [Cristiana's] mother's house were so menacing as to cause
significant actual suffering and harm." The IJ noted that
Petitioners had not submitted any type of medical report showing
that their experiences had caused "long-lasting, significant
mental or physical effects." The IJ further stated that
- 7 -Petitioners never experienced the police misconduct in their own
home, "only witnessed it approximately [fifty] percent of the time
when they happened to be visiting [Cristiana's] mother's home,"
and "could essentially avoid that mistreatment if they had just
not visited that house or perhaps relocated to another part of
Brazil."
Further, the IJ concluded that there was insufficient
evidence that Petitioners had a well-founded fear of future
persecution. The IJ noted that Petitioners had avoided physical
harm and mistreatment in Brazil from 2014 through 2021 and that
they only witnessed mistreatment and threats while visiting
Cristiana's mother's house. The IJ also noted the speculative
nature of Cristiana's belief that the police would seek her out if
she returned to Brazil, as it appeared that the police officers
were motivated to go to Cristiana's mother's house specifically
because Jaider "was a notorious gang member who had attempted to
kill someone and also was involved in drug trafficking" and that
was his "household." There was no evidence the police sought out
Cristiana elsewhere and no "evidence as to why it would be
unreasonable for [Petitioners] to go back and live away from their
mother's house and avoid the locus" of the police misconduct. The
IJ further observed that the police were motivated to target the
mother's house because "they believed that there was continued
criminal misconduct" there. The IJ recognized that Robson had
- 8 -been convicted of a drug offense, and that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that he had been a victim of police corruption.
Moreover, the IJ noted that the U.S. Department of State Country
Report submitted by Petitioners showed "a mixed picture of police
impunity and corruption," as there were resources to address
corruption. The Country Report thus undercut Petitioners'
argument that they had a reasonable basis for fear of persecution
by the two officers, who had been "dismissed for sexual violence"
and later reinstated. Accordingly, the IJ made a "predictive
finding that [Petitioners] do not have a reasonable possibility of
being persecuted on account of their family should they return
there." Because the IJ found that Petitioners could not prove
asylum eligibility, "they were necessarily unable to meet the
higher standard required to succeed on the claim for withholding
of removal."3
Petitioners appealed the IJ's decision, raising the
arguments already made to the IJ and additionally arguing that the
same IJ who had denied their applications thereafter granted
Poliana's asylum application. They contended that their
applications and Poliana's application were based on "virtually
the same facts," except that Poliana had resisted the police and
been arrested in 2014, had lived in the mother's house, and been
3 TheIJ (and BIA) also rejected Petitioners' CAT claim, and
Petitioners do not challenge that decision here.
- 9 -present more often than Petitioners when the police officers came.
To support this argument, Petitioners included a form order from
the IJ dated February 8, 2024, that granted Poliana asylum but
included no reasoning for the IJ's decision in her case.
The BIA dismissed the appeal. It affirmed the IJ's
decision that the cumulative harm Petitioners experienced did not
constitute persecution, as Petitioners "were never physically
harmed or arrested in Brazil, and the threats of arrest they
experienced from military police officers were not sufficiently
severe so as to rise to the level of persecution." The BIA stated
that the physical harm that Cristiana's siblings experienced
"constitutes only limited and indirect harm" to Petitioners, as
the siblings were not "targeted by military police for the purpose
of harming the [Petitioners] themselves." The BIA also affirmed
the IJ's decision that Petitioners had failed to show a
well-founded, objectively reasonable fear of persecution. The BIA
reasoned that Petitioners had not alleged that they had been
threatened by military police after 2020; the "threats and
mistreatment . . . from military police officers between 2013 and
2020 occurred exclusively at the [house of the mother], who is now
deceased," and Petitioners could reasonably avoid that house;
Petitioners had never experienced harm from police apart from the
mother's home, even though they lived fifteen minutes away; and
Petitioners and their family had been harmed only by two specific
- 10 -police officers, so fear of future harm countrywide by Brazilian
military police generally was not well-founded. As to
Petitioners' argument that Cristiana would be the "sole target of
the same corrupt police officers," the BIA agreed with the IJ that
this fear was speculative, "particularly given the police
officers' interest in her brother, who also resided [at] their
mother's house." The BIA affirmed the IJ's denial of Petitioners'
asylum applications, and also affirmed its conclusion that
Petitioners had necessarily failed to satisfy the higher bar for
withholding of removal.
One judge on the BIA panel dissented, however,
concluding that remand to the IJ was warranted "to consider whether
and to what extent it is relevant that [Cristiana's] sister
received a grant of asylum a few weeks after the [IJ] denied asylum
in [Cristiana's] case." The dissent also expressed concern that
the IJ improperly required Petitioners to show they could not
relocate within Brazil, without acknowledging the presumption
against the reasonability of internal relocation where applicants
are persecuted by the government or a government sponsor.
The majority rejected the dissent's conclusions,
reasoning that arguments based on new evidence on appeal are
generally treated as a motion to remand and that -- because Poliana
"experienced past physical harm in Brazil," rendering her "not
similarly situated" to Petitioners -- the IJ's form order granting
- 11 -Poliana asylum was "insufficient to establish [Cristana's] own
prima facie eligibility for asylum." Further, the majority
disagreed that the IJ had made an implicit internal relocation
finding, as avoiding the mother's house does not constitute
relocation. Petitioners initially challenged the BIA's decision
in this court in No. 24-1686.
Thereafter, Petitioners filed a compound motion to
reopen and motion to reconsider with the BIA, arguing that they
had "newly discovered material facts that were not available to be
presented at the former hearing" and that the BIA had erred in
applying the law in its dismissal of their appeal. Petitioners
argued that the IJ's grant of asylum to Poliana was new and
material evidence and that their claims were based "on virtually
the same material facts and circumstances" as Poliana's.
Moreover, Petitioners contested the BIA's characterization of the
evidence concerning persecution. 4 To support their motions,
Petitioners submitted additional affidavits from Cristiana and
Poliana, stating that the police never visited Poliana's workplace
or Cristiana's house because the police "did not need to," but
could instead threaten and intimidate them at their mother's house.
The affidavits also stated that the sisters did not seek treatment
4Petitioners also made an equal protection and due process
argument under the Fourteenth Amendment, not pressed before us,
arguing that Petitioners were similarly situated to Poliana and
thus should have also been granted asylum.
- 12 -for their psychological or mental health because they feared police
retaliation based on reports of police corruption and misconduct.
The BIA denied Petitioners' motions to reopen and
reconsider, noting that Petitioners' arguments as to persecution
and similarity to Poliana's case were "the same as or substantially
similar to the arguments they raised on appeal," and thus could
not be reconsidered.5 As to the motion to reopen, the BIA noted
that the form order granting Poliana asylum had also been
previously submitted with Petitioners' appellate brief and
addressed by the BIA in its prior decision. Further, the
affidavits filed with the motion to reopen did not show prima facie
eligibility for asylum and even if they had, Petitioners had not
explained why the affidavits were unavailable earlier.
Petitioners subsequently petitioned this court for review of the
BIA's denial of their motions to reopen and reconsider in
No. 25-1026. We granted Petitioners' motion to consolidate
Nos. 24-1686 and 25-1026 for appeal.
II.
Petitioners challenge the BIA's denial of their asylum
and withholding of removal applications. When the BIA affirms the
holdings of the IJ but "adds its own analysis -- as it did
here -- we review both decisions as a unit." Mayancela v. Bondi,
The BIA also concluded that Petitioners had failed to
5
provide authority to support their constitutional claims.
- 13 -136 F.4th 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Lee v. Barr, 975 F.3d 69,
73 (1st Cir. 2020)). We review the portions of the IJ's decision
that the BIA adopted, "and the BIA's decision as to [any]
additional ground." Esteban-Garcia v. Garland, 94 F.4th 186, 190–
91 (1st Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting López-Pérez
v. Garland, 26 F.4th 104, 110 (1st Cir. 2022)). "We review the
entirety of the agency's determination of past persecution or a
well-founded fear of future persecution -- both the underlying
factual findings and the application of the INA's standard for
persecution to those findings -- using the deferential,
'substantial evidence' standard." Maldonado-Ruiz v. Bondi, 169
F.4th 315, 322 (1st Cir. 2026) (quoting Urias-Orellana v. Bondi,
607 U.S. 537, 543 (2026)). "[S]ubstantial evidence 'means -- and
means only -- such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. (quoting
Urias-Orellana, 607 U.S. at 544). Under the substantial evidence
standard, the BIA's persecution determination is "conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude
to the contrary." Urias-Orellana, 607 U.S. at 545 (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). "Questions of law, of course, are
reviewed de novo." Mayancela, 136 F.4th at 10 (quoting Vasili v.
Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2013)).
- 14 -A. Asylum
In general, to be eligible for asylum, Petitioners must
prove that they meet the INA's definition of a refugee. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1). As relevant here, the INA defines "refugee" as
someone "who is unable or unwilling to return to" his native
country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A). "Establishing persecution requires proof of
three discrete elements: a threshold level of past or anticipated
serious harm, a nexus between that harm and government action or
inaction, and a causal connection to one of the five statutorily
protected grounds." Maldonado-Ruiz, 169 F.4th at 322 (quoting
Ramos-Hernandez v. Bondi, 163 F.4th 44, 51 (1st Cir. 2025)). Under
the first element, applicants must either "(1) demonstrat[e] past
persecution, thereby creating a presumption of a well-founded fear
of future persecution; or (2) otherwise demonstrat[e] a
well-founded fear of future persecution." Hernandez-Mendez v.
Garland, 86 F.4th 482, 486 (1st Cir. 2023). In the absence of
proof of past persecution, applicants must "demonstrate a
well-founded fear of future persecution that is 'both subjectively
genuine and objectively reasonable.'" Esteban-Garcia, 94 F.4th
at 191 (quoting Ang v. Holder, 723 F.3d 6, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2013)).
"A well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a
- 15 -protected ground means a 'reasonable possibility' of harm for
purposes of asylum." Hernandez-Mendez, 86 F.4th at 486 (quoting
Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 2007)). On both
past and future persecution claims, applicants will be denied
asylum if they fail to establish any one of the three persecution
elements. Esteban-Garcia, 94 F.4th at 191.
1. Past Persecution
Substantial evidence supports the BIA's determination
that the IJ did not err in finding that Petitioners failed to
establish past persecution. Establishing past persecution is a
"heavy burden" and a "daunting task." Martínez-Pérez v. Sessions,
897 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Vasili, 732 F.3d at 89).
"Past persecution requires evidence that the asylum applicant
suffered 'discriminatory experiences' that 'reached a fairly high
threshold of seriousness' and occurred with 'some regularity and
frequency.'" Medina-Suguilanda v. Garland, 121 F.4th 316, 321–22
(1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Vasili, 732 F.3d at 89). Persecution
requires more harm than "unpleasantness, harassment, and even
basic suffering." Urias-Orellana v. Garland, 121 F.4th 327, 335
(1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Santos Garcia v. Garland, 67 F.4th 455,
461 (1st Cir. 2023)), aff'd sub nom. Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607
U.S. 537. "'[C]redible, specific threats can amount to
persecution if they are severe enough' -- particularly if they are
death threats." Montoya-Lopez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 71, 80 (1st
- 16 -Cir. 2023) (quoting Aguilar-Escoto v. Garland, 59 F.4th 510, 516
(1st Cir. 2023)). "Unfulfilled threats," however, "rarely prove
past persecution unless they are 'so menacing as to cause
significant actual suffering or harm.'" Vargas-Salazar v.
Garland, 119 F.4th 167, 173 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Touch v.
Holder, 568 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2009)).
We first note that the record contains no evidence, much
less compels the conclusion, that Petitioners received any death
threats or other menacing threats that caused actual suffering.
At most, the record reflects that the police officers threatened
Cristiana with arrest if she would not open the door to her
mother's house to allow the police to enter and accused her of
being a criminal like her brother, Jaider. For his part, Aldenir
confirmed that he was never "personally harmed, threatened, or
mistreated by anyone in Brazil."6
6
Petitioners argue that the IJ's statement that Petitioners
were not "directly threatened" by the police is contrary to the
evidence. Error is not readily apparent, except as to Cristiana.
The record reflects that, among Petitioners, only Cristiana
experienced threats along with her mother and siblings at the
mother's house. Aldenir confirmed that he was never threatened,
and there is no evidence that the minor children were ever
threatened. In any event, after stating that Petitioners were
never directly threatened, the IJ noted three times in the next
two paragraphs of his decision that there was insufficient evidence
to conclude that the threats Petitioners had received were menacing
enough to result in actual suffering or harm. Accordingly, the
IJ clearly understood that at least Cristiana had experienced
threats when she was at her mother's house. The IJ's statement,
to the extent erroneous, is harmless. See Avelar Gonzalez v.
Whitaker, 908 F.3d 820, 825 n.2 (1st Cir. 2018) ("[M]istake of
- 17 -Persecution "normally involves severe mistreatment," and
we have affirmed that unfulfilled threats of kidnapping, even where
the victim was at the same time robbed of "all of his belongings,"
did not cause "significant actual suffering or harm" sufficient to
amount to past persecution. Hernandez-Mendez, 86 F.4th at 487–88
(quoting Ordonez-Quino v. Holder, 760 F.3d 80, 87 (1st Cir. 2014)).
The record is devoid of evidence that Petitioners were physically
harmed, mistreated, or arrested. And despite Petitioners'
assertions that they were "deeply traumatized by what happened to
[them and their] family members in Brazil," they have not made a
showing that compels a finding of severe mistreatment amounting to
significant actual suffering or harm.
Further, it was not unreasonable for the BIA to conclude
that Cristiana's siblings' arrests and beatings were "only limited
and indirect harm" to Petitioners. Indeed, the record does not
suggest, much less compel, a conclusion that such harm to
Cristiana's siblings was inflicted for the purpose of harming
Petitioners. It was not unreasonable to conclude that Cristiana's
brothers were being investigated for suspected crimes, given their
subsequent arrests and convictions; and it is uncontested that
Poliana was arrested for refusing the police entry to her home.
True, Petitioners stated that they believed that the police were
fact by an IJ constituted harmless error because it did not affect
the outcome of the decision.").
- 18 -threatening and mistreating their family members in order to send
a message and make an example out of them. "An alien who claims
that harm to a relative is evidence that she herself has been
persecuted," however, "must present more than gossamer strands of
speculation and surmise." Moreno v. Holder, 749 F.3d 40, 45 (1st
Cir. 2014).
Petitioners' reliance on Precetaj v. Holder, 649 F.3d 72
(1st Cir. 2011), is misplaced. In Precetaj, members of the
Socialist Party of Albania repeatedly threatened the petitioner so
that he would not report their crimes, and told him to "expect
retribution when the Socialist Party won the election," which it
ultimately did. Id. at 74. In addition to issuing those threats,
they beat him twice; set his car on fire; kidnapped his son and
beat his son twice; assaulted, raped, and kidnapped his daughter,
holding her for three days; and attacked and beat him again. Id.
In that case, we vacated and remanded the BIA's decision finding
no past persecution and denying asylum because the BIA failed to
adequately account for the abuse of the petitioner's children,
which we said was "specifically designed to send a message" to the
petitioner. Id. at 76, 78. By contrast, here, Petitioners have
not presented similarly compelling evidence that the mistreatment
of their family members was "specifically designed" to send
Petitioners a message. See id. Rather, the record supports the
- 19 -BIA's conclusion that the police viewed Cristiana's mother's home
as the potential locus of criminal activity.
Because substantial evidence supports the BIA's
conclusion that Petitioners did not suffer past persecution in
Brazil, they are "not entitled to the presumption of future
persecution." See Santos Garcia, 67 F.4th at 462.
2. Future Persecution
Likewise, substantial evidence supports the BIA's
conclusion that the IJ did not err in finding that Petitioners
failed to show a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Petitioners have not demonstrated that their fear of persecution
by the military police is objectively reasonable. As discussed,
Petitioners -- at most -- suffered only indirect harm from the
military police from 2012 to around February 2020, the latest date
that, according to Cristiana's testimony, the police had entered
her mother's house. 7 Further, as Petitioners left Brazil on
October 19, 2021, they remained in Brazil for over a year and a
half without experiencing any harm or threats. See Villafranca
v. Lynch, 797 F.3d 91, 96 (1st Cir. 2015) (stating that petitioner
7 Although Petitioners' affidavits vaguely assert that police
continued to search the mother's home post-March 2021 to look for
criminal evidence against Robson, there is no evidence that compels
us to conclude that it was unreasonable for the IJ to credit
Cristiana's testimony and conclude that the police had not
threatened Petitioners since 2020. See Bopaka v. Garland, 123
F.4th 552, 559–60 (1st Cir. 2024) (stating that we review IJ
credibility determinations for substantial evidence).
- 20 -remaining in his homeland unharmed for around six months after an
attack supported conclusion that petitioner's fear of persecution
was not objectively reasonable). This period without harm or
threats likely reflects the fact that Robson was in prison from
November 2020 to March 2021 and then left Brazil for the United
States in April or May 2021. Further, from 2012 to 2021, the
police never came to Petitioners' home, which was only about
fifteen minutes from the mother's house. Cristiana testified that
her mother's house was the police officers' target, and it was not
unreasonable for the IJ to conclude based on the evidence presented
that the police officers were targeting the mother's house due to
Jaider's suspected criminal activities. While Cristiana testified
that she believed the motive of the police was to send a message
to family members of criminals, the evidence does not compel that
conclusion. The evidence that both her brothers were convicted
in Brazil for criminal activities and the fact that the police did
not visit Petitioners' house (ever), or the mother's house after
the brothers were both in prison, reasonably supports the
conclusion that the police targeted the house where the brothers
lived because they suspected that the brothers were criminals.
Similarly, Petitioners' stated subjective fear of
Brazilian police does not compel a conclusion that their fear of
future persecution is well-founded. Petitioners testified that
two specific police officers were the persecutors of their family.
- 21 -These officers appear to have been previously punished for alleged
misconduct. And Petitioners submitted evidence in the Country
Report that though there are problems with police impunity and
lack of accountability and judicial inefficiency in Brazil, the
government has made efforts to address corruption. Moreover,
Petitioners' argument that Cristiana would be the police's sole
remaining target among her family members upon her return to Brazil
is undercut by the evidence that Petitioners remained in Brazil
for at least five months after Robson entered the United States
without experiencing any visits from the police. Thus, the BIA
was not unreasonable to conclude that Cristiana's fear of being
targeted upon return to Brazil is speculative.
Petitioners latch on to the BIA dissent's concern that
the IJ improperly required them to demonstrate that they were
unable to internally relocate within Brazil to avoid government
persecutors. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(3)(i)–(ii)
(2026). We agree with the BIA majority, however, that the IJ did
not actually make a relocation finding. As the majority noted,
by simply avoiding the mother's house, Petitioners would not be
required to relocate at all -- Petitioners already lived fifteen
minutes away from that targeted house and had not experienced any
police misconduct at their own home.8
8 As to the IJ's passing suggestion that Petitioners could
"perhaps relocate[] to another part of Brazil," an internal
- 22 -3. Similarly Situated Argument
Petitioners argue that the IJ erred by denying their
asylum applications while granting Poliana's application. They
argue that the sisters were similarly situated and that the BIA
should have remanded their case for a reconciliation between the
cases. Our review of a denial of a motion to remand9 is for abuse
of discretion, which is "highly deferential." Moreno v. Garland,
51 F.4th 40, 46 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Adeyanju v. Garland, 27
F.4th 25, 51 (1st Cir. 2022)). Petitioners cannot prevail on a
motion to remand if, inter alia, they fail to "make a showing of
prima facie eligibility for the relief [sought]." Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting Rivera-Medrano v. Garland, 47 F.4th 29, 35
(1st Cir. 2022)).
The BIA did not err in rejecting Petitioners' similarly
situated argument. The BIA noted that Petitioners had supported
their argument for similarity to Poliana's case by submitting to
the BIA the IJ's form order granting Poliana asylum. The form
relocation analysis is only applicable where, unlike here, there
is a finding of persecution. In other words, even if there is a
presumption that internal relocation is unreasonable for
Petitioners, there is no need to relocate where there is no finding
of past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); Caz v. Garland, 84 F.4th 22,
27–28 (1st Cir. 2023); Khattak v. Holder, 704 F.3d 197, 202–03
(1st Cir. 2013).
9 When Petitioners appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA, the
BIA construed Petitioners' similarly-situated argument as a motion
to remand.
- 23 -order forwarded by Petitioners includes neither the IJ's reasoning
for granting Poliana asylum nor any facts about her particular
case. In considering Petitioners' similarly situated argument,
the BIA was correct to not assume any facts about Poliana's case.
And given the facts in evidence in Petitioners' case, including
evidence that Poliana had been arrested and lived in the mother's
home, there was a sound basis for the BIA to conclude that
Poliana's case differed from Petitioners'. The BIA thus did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that the new evidence submitted
by Petitioners on appeal to the BIA did not make a prima facie
showing of their own eligibility for asylum.
B. Withholding of Removal
The standard of proof for withholding of
removal -- clear probability -- is higher than that for asylum.
Cortez-Mejia v. Garland, 121 F.4th 938, 945 (1st Cir. 2024). "To
obtain relief in the form of withholding of removal, an [applicant]
must establish a clear probability that, if returned to his
homeland, he will be persecuted on account of a statutorily
protected ground." De La Cruz-Quispe v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 17,
24-25 (1st Cir. 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting Mendoza v.
Bondi, 133 F.4th 139, 142 (1st Cir. 2025)). Thus, "[a] petitioner
who cannot clear the lower hurdle for asylum will necessarily fail
to meet the higher bar for withholding of removal."
Vargas-Salazar, 119 F.4th at 173 (quoting Paiz-Morales v. Lynch,
- 24 -795 F.3d 238, 245 (1st Cir. 2015)). As Petitioners have not proven
their case for asylum, their withholding-of-removal claim
necessarily fails too. See De La Cruz-Quispe, 161 F.4th at 24–
25.10
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are
denied.
10 While
Petitioners have also appealed the BIA's denial of
their compound motions to reopen and reconsider, they present
neither argument as to how the BIA erred in denying reconsideration
of their similarly situated argument, nor any arguments whatsoever
with respect to the BIA's dismissal of the new affidavits submitted
by the sisters. They have thus waived that claim. See
Varela-Chavarria v. Garland, 86 F.4th 443, 452 n.7 (1st Cir. 2023);
see also Xirum v. Bondi, 141 F.4th 345, 355 (1st Cir. 2025) (noting
that "issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by
some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived"
(quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
1990))).
- 25 -