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State v. Harvey

2026-08-24

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed the trial court's summary denial of Harvey's successive postconviction petition, concluding that Harvey failed to satisfy the statutory requirements under Ohio Revised Code 2953.23(A) necessary to file a successive petition, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the petition on its merits.

Dominic Harvey pleaded guilty in December 2023 to aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, tampering with evidence, and receiving stolen property, receiving a sentence of 50 to 55½ years to life. He did not file a direct appeal but filed a timely postconviction petition in December 2024 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied and affirmed on appeal. In February 2026, he filed a second petition styled as a motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that he was never indicted on predicate offenses and that prior calculation and design were not found by the grand jury.

The court treated Harvey's second filing as a successive petition for postconviction relief, despite his disclaimer to the contrary. Since Harvey's convictions resulted from a guilty plea, and he could not show he was unavoidably prevented from discovering any alleged defect in the indictment, he failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for filing a successive petition. The trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition and properly denied it summarily without a hearing or findings of fact and conclusions of law. The claims were additionally barred by res judicata because Harvey should have raised any indictment defects before trial or on direct appeal.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether a motion styled as a jurisdictional challenge can be recast as a postconviction petition
  • Whether a successive postconviction petition satisfies the statutory exceptions required for filing after the deadline
  • Whether res judicata bars claims that should have been raised at trial or on direct appeal

Procedural posture

Harvey appealed the trial court's summary denial of his successive postconviction petition filed in February 2026, more than a year after his initial postconviction petition was denied and affirmed on appeal.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

[Cite as State v. Harvey, 2026-Ohio-3301.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2026-T-0013

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Criminal Appeal from the

- vs - Court of Common Pleas

DOMINIC MICHAEL HARVEY,

Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00582

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Decided: August 24, 2026

Judgment: Affirmed

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Charles L. Morrow, Assistant Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Dominic Michael Harvey, pro se, PID# A810-099, London Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 69, 1580 State Route 56, London, OH 43140 (Defendant-Appellant).

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Dominic Michael Harvey (“Harvey”), appeals the

decision of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas denying his successive

postconviction petition without issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the

following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

{¶2} Upon review, we conclude that the trial court was without jurisdiction to

consider Harvey’s successive postconviction petition as Harvey failed to satisfy R.C.

2953.23(A). As such, the trial court did not err or otherwise abuse its discretion by denying

Harvey’s petition for postconviction relief without issuing finds of fact and conclusions of law. Additionally, the claims raised in Harvey’s petition were barred by the doctrine of res

judicata.

{¶3} Accordingly, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas

is affirmed.

Substantive and Procedural Facts

{¶4} On July 27, 2022, a Trumbull County Grand Jury, in a four-count indictment,

charged Harvey with aggravated murder with an aggravating circumstances specification

and an accompanying firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) and (G),

2941.145, and 2941.146 (“Count 1”); attempted aggravated murder with a firearm

specification in violation of R.C. 2923.02(A) and (E)(1), 2941.145, and 2941.146 (“Count

2”); tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) and (B) (“Count 3”); and

receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A) and (C) (“Count 4”).

{¶5} Harvey pleaded guilty to all counts of an amended indictment on December

13, 2023. In exchange for his guilty plea, the State dismissed the aggravating

circumstances specification, eliminating the possibility of the death penalty. Harvey

waived a presentence investigation. The trial court proceeded directly to sentencing

hearing. The jointly recommended sentence of 50 to 55 1/2 years to life in prison was

imposed.1 Harvey did not file a direct appeal of his conviction.

{¶6} On December 19, 2023, six days after his hearing on sentencing, Harvey

requested to withdraw his guilty plea. The request was denied on January 4, 2024. Harvey

did not appeal from that decision.

1. The sentencing entry was filed on December 21, 2023.

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{¶7} On December 9, 2024, Harvey filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief

pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. The petition was denied by the trial court on February 13, 2025.

Harvey appealed to this court on March 6, 2025. State v. Harvey, 2025-Ohio-5475 (11th

Dist.). This Court affirmed the trial court’s decision on December 8, 2025.

{¶8} On February 3, 2026, Harvey filed a pro se pleading titled “Motion To

Dismiss Indictment – For Lack Of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.” In his pleading, he claimed

that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he “was never indicted on a

predicate offense of felonious assault to constitute aggravated or felony murder, and prior

calculation and design has never been proven or found by a grand jury.” Harvey sought

dismissal of the indictment and reversal of his convictions.

{¶9} The trial court summarily denied this motion two days later, on February 5,

2026. Harvey appeals.

The Appeal

{¶10} Harvey raises a single assignment of error for review:

[1] Appellant’s Constitutional rights of Due Process and Equal

Protection of the Law, as guaranteed by the United States and

Ohio Constitutions, were Violated and Denied as the result of

An Abuse of Discretion, in which the Trial Court Denied

Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment-For Lack Of SubjectMatter Jurisdiction without the Required Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law.

Harvey’s Filing is a Petition for Postconviction Relief

{¶11} In Harvey’s “motion” he expressed to the trial court that his filing was “NOT

A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and therefore, Not Subject to the

Limitations/Restrictions set out it . . . R.C. 2953.21/2953.23.” Such disclaimer has no

bearing on the trial court.

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Case No. 2026-T-0013

{¶12} “Courts may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to

identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged.” State v. Schlee,

2008-Ohio-545, ¶ 12, citing State v. Bush. 2002-Ohio-3993, citing State v. Reynolds,

1997-Ohio-304. “[W]here a criminal defendant, subsequent to his or her direct appeal,

files a motion seeking vacation or correction of his or her sentence on the basis that his

or her constitutional rights have been violated, such a motion is a petition for

postconviction relief as defined in R.C. 2953.21.” Reynolds at ¶ 12; accord State v.

Parker, 2024-Ohio-5058, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.).

{¶13} Harvey’s pleading asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction because he “was never indicted on a predicate offense of felonious assault to

constitute aggravated or felony murder, and prior calculation and design has never been

proven or found by a grand jury.” Similar requests have been recast and denied pursuant

to R.C. 2953.21.

{¶14} The Second District Court of Appeals recently reviewed a similar claim in

State v. Parks, 2026-Ohio-2311 (2d Dist.). Parks filed a “motion to dismiss indictment for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 6. Parks asserted that he had not been validly

indicted, that the essential elements in the indictment were never found by the grand jury,

and that the indictment failed to meet constitutional requirements of the Fifth and Sixth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Ohio Const., art I, § 10. Id.

Parks contended that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case

because he was not validly indicted. Id. The trial court construed the motion as a

postconviction petition and denied the motion. The trial court reasoned that Parks should

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have raised his argument in a direct appeal and therefore the claim was barred by res

judicata. Id. at ¶ 8.

{¶15} The Second District Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court properly

treated the petition as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(1).

Id. at ¶ 21. The appellate court explained:

Parks's indictment charged him with ten felonies and one

misdemeanor of the first degree. All the charges fell within the

subject matter jurisdiction of the Montgomery County Court of

Common Pleas. Although Parks couches his argument in

terms of subject matter jurisdiction, the defects he raises

regarding the manner in which he was indicted constitute

alleged procedural errors, not jurisdictional defects.

Consequently, Parks should have raised the alleged defects

prior to trial. See Reed, 2022-Ohio-3461, at ¶ 18 (2d

Dist.); Crim.R. 12(C). After his conviction, the proper avenue

to challenge the validity or sufficiency of the indictment was

by direct appeal. State ex rel. Beaucamp v. Lazaroff, 1997-Ohio-277, ¶ 5.

Id. at ¶ 19.

{¶16} The Fifth District Court of Appeals also found a similarly titled motion

seeking comparable relief to be properly construed as a petition for postconviction relief.

See generally State v. Kelly, 2026-Ohio-2149, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.).

{¶17} Here, Harvey alleged violations of his constitutional rights and sought

dismissal of the indictment and reversal of his convictions. The indictment in this case

charged Harvey with crimes which fell within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Trumbull

County Court of Common Pleas. The alleged deficiencies raised by Harvey are

procedural errors and should have been raised before trial or on direct appeal. Therefore,

Harvey’s request is properly construed as a motion for postconviction relief as defined

by R.C. 2953.21.

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Case No. 2026-T-0013

Postconviction Relief

{¶18} An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion for postconviction relief

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Mitchell, 2019-Ohio-844, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.), citing State

v. Adams, 2005-Ohio-348, ¶ 37 (11th Dist.). “An abuse of discretion is the trial court's

‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” Id. quoting State v.

Cline, 2013-Ohio-1843, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62

(2d Dist.), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.2004).

{¶19} Before considering Harvey’s claims raised in his petition, we must first

determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the successive petition for

postconviction relief.

{¶20} R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i) provides:

Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense . . .

and who claims that there was such a denial or infringement

of the person's rights as to render the judgment void or

voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the

United States, . . . may file a petition in the court that imposed

sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and

asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or

sentence or to grant other appropriate relief.

{¶21} A petition under R.C.2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i) must be filed

no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on

which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the

direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication . . .

If no appeal is taken, except as otherwise provided in section

2953.23 of the Revised Code, the petition shall be filed no

later than three hundred sixty-five days after the expiration of

the time for filing the appeal.

R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a).

{¶22} The sentencing entry was filed on December 21, 2023. Harvey’s notice of

appeal was due on or before January 22, 2024. Harvey did not file a direct appeal.

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Case No. 2026-T-0013

Therefore, Harvey’s postconviction petition was due on or before January 22, 2025.

Harvey filed his initial postconviction petition on December 9, 2024, which was timely. In

that petition, Harvey asserted that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.

{¶23} The trial court denied the initial petition finding that “there is nothing in the

record or in [Harvey’s] postconviction relief petition which indicates that he was denied

effective assistance of counsel.” This court affirmed the trial court’s decision concluding

that Harvey did not meet his burden pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 as he did not produce any

evidence outside of the record that could not have been adduced at the time of trial.

Harvey, 2025-Ohio-5475 (11th Dist.).

{¶24} Nearly two months after this court affirmed the denial of his postconviction

petition, Harvey filed his second request for postconviction relief on February 3, 2026.

{¶25} In order for a court to entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the

period set for in R.C. 2953.21, a second petition, or successive petitions for similar relief

on behalf of a petitioner, the petition must meet either exception provided under R.C.

2953.23(A)(1) or (2).

{¶26} Under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1), for the trial court to entertain a successive

petition for postconviction relief, both of the following must be met:

Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably

prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the

petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or,

subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of

section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an

earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized

a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to

persons in the petitioner's situation, and the petition asserts a

claim based on that right.

The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that,

but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder

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would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which

the petitioner was convicted. . . .

(Emphasis added.)

{¶27} In other words, a petitioner must establish that: “(1) a new federal or state

right has been recognized or that he or she was unavoidably prevented from the discovery

of facts upon which the successive petition for postconviction relief is premised; and (2)

he or she would not have been convicted in the trial court by a reasonable factfinder but

for the constitutional error.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Miller, 2025-Ohio-4639, ¶ 11

(11th Dist.). Because these two prongs are framed in the conjunctive, both must be met.

Id.

{¶28} Harvey’s convictions were the result of a guilty plea, therefore he cannot

meet the requirements of R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b). Mitchell, 2019-Ohio-844, at ¶ 14 (11th

Dist.), citing State v. Pough, 2004-Ohio-3933, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.); accord State v. Mehring,

2026-Ohio-1511, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.). Further, Harvey was not unavoidably prevented from

discovering any defect in the indictment. As Harvey cannot satisfy both prongs under R.C.

2953.23(A)(1), the exception does not apply.2

{¶29} A trial court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a

successive postconviction petition if a petitioner fails to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A). Miller at

¶ 12, citing State v. Apanovitch, 2018-Ohio-4744, ¶ 36; see State v. Noling, 2008-Ohio2394, ¶ 37 (11th Dist.).

{¶30} Because Harvey failed to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A), the trial court was without

jurisdiction to consider his successive postconviction petition. Where a trial court is

2. R.C. 2953.23(A)(2) addresses DNA evidence that establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, actual innocence. Harvey also does not contend any exculpatory DNA evidence was discovered. Accordingly, that subsection does not apply to the instant matter.

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without jurisdiction to entertain the petition, “it follows that the trial court did not err in

failing to conduct a hearing prior to denying the petition.” Miller at ¶ 16, citing Noling at ¶

102 (11th Dist.). Furthermore, when a trial court dismisses an untimely [or successive

petition] postconviction petition, the trial court is not required to issue findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Mitchell, 2017-Ohio-8440, at ¶ 40 (11th Dist.), citing State ex rel.

James v. Coyne, 2007-Ohio-2716, ¶ 5, citing State ex rel. Kimbrough v. Greene, 2002-Ohio-7042, ¶ 6.

{¶31} Additionally, “a trial court may also dismiss a petition for postconviction relief

without holding an evidentiary hearing when the claims raised in the petition are barred

by the doctrine of res judicata.” Adams, 2005-Ohio-348, at ¶ 38 (11th Dist.). Harvey

should have raised his claims regarding any procedural defect in the indictment before

trial or on direct appeal from his conviction. As such, res judicata bars his claims.

{¶32} As the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider Harvey’s untimely and

successive postconviction petition, the trial court did not err or otherwise abuse its

discretion when it summarily denied Harvey’s motion without issuing findings of fact and

conclusions of law and without holding hearing.

{¶33} Accordingly, Harvey’s sole assignment of error is without merit.

Conclusion

{¶34} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.

MATT LYNCH, P.J.,

SCOTT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignment of error

is without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Trumbull

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Costs to be taxed against appellant.

JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON

PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH,

concurs

JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH,

concurs

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate

pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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