[Cite as In re J.H., 2026-Ohio-3304.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: J.H.
Case No. 2026CA00085
Opinion And Judgment Entry
Appeal from the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case
No. 2023-JCV-1357
Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry: August 24, 2026
BEFORE: William B. Hoffman, Robert G. Montgomery, and Kevin W. Popham, Judges
APPEARANCES: Brandon J. Waltenbaugh, for SCJFS; Richard D. Hixson, for Mother
OPINION
Popham, J.,
{¶1} Mother appeals the March 26, 2026, judgment entry of the Stark County Court
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, terminating her parental rights and granting permanent
custody of minor J.H. to Stark County Job and Family Services (“SCJFS”). For the reasons
below, we affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} J.H. is the mother (“Mother”) of minor J.H., who was born on November 16,
2023. R.H. is the father (“Father”) of minor J.H.
{¶3} SCJFS initially became involved with Mother when it filed a complaint in Case
Number 2020JCV01167 concerning J.H.’s sibling, J.J. In 2021, J.J. was adjudicated to be an abused child after it was determined that her father, B.N., had sexually abused her. Mother
took J.J. and fled to North Carolina with B.N., refusing to believe the allegations of sexual
abuse. Mother failed to complete her case plan in J.J.’s case and continued to maintain B.N.’s
innocence even after J.J.’s rape kit returned a DNA match to B.N. On November 16, 2022,
J.J. was placed in the permanent custody of SCJFS.
{¶4} The present case began on November 17, 2023, when SCJFS filed a complaint
concerning J.H. The complaint detailed the prior case history with Mother and alleged that
Father had a concerning criminal history involving illegal substances dating back ten years,
including multiple convictions for drug possession.
{¶5} Following a shelter-care hearing on November 21, 2023, J.H. was placed in the
temporary custody of SCJFS. In a judgment entry following the hearing, the magistrate found
that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent the need for placement and/or make it
possible for J.H. to return home.
{¶6} On November 28, 2023, SCJFS filed an amended complaint - solely to indicate
that Father had established paternity of J.H. The remaining allegations were unchanged.
{¶7} On February 9, 2024, the magistrate held an adjudicatory hearing, during
which Mother and Father both stipulated to a finding of dependency, and SCJFS moved to
delete the allegations of neglect. Accordingly, the magistrate found J.H. to be a dependent
child. The matter proceeded immediately to disposition, and J.H. was placed in the temporary
custody of SCJFS. In a judgment entry entered on February 12, 2024, the magistrate found
that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent the need for placement and/or make it
possible for J.H. to return home.
{¶8} On September 12, 2024, SCJFS filed a motion to extend its temporary custody
of J.H. The trial court granted the motion.
{¶9} Additional review hearings were held on October 17, 2024, May 16, 2024,
April 17, 2025, and October 14, 2025. In judgment entries issued after each hearing, the
magistrate found that SCJFS had used reasonable efforts to eliminate the continued removal
of J.H. from the home and/or had made reasonable efforts to finalize permanency planning.
{¶10} On February 6, 2025, SCJFS filed a motion for permanent custody of J.H. The
permanent-custody hearing was originally scheduled for May 6, 2025. On April 28, 2025,
Father requested a continuance of the permanent-custody trial; the trial court granted the
motion and rescheduled the trial for July 16, 2025. On July 8, 2025, Mother filed a motion to
continue; the trial court granted the motion and rescheduled the trial for October 16, 2025.
The trial court heard testimony on October 16, 2025, and determined that a second day of
trial was necessary. The second day of trial occurred on March 13, 2026.
{¶11} Caseworker Amy Craig (“Craig”) testified that the initial concerns that led to
J.H.’s removal from the home were Father’s lengthy criminal and drug history and SCJFS’s
prior involvement with J.J., who had been placed in the agency’s permanent custody.
{¶12} Craig testified that both Mother and Father largely completed their case plans.
Mother engaged in mental-health services, maintained stable housing, and participated in
programs including Wellness Grove, the Active Parenting Program at the Early Childhood
Resource Center, and the Positive Parenting Program. Father also completed the lessintensive parenting programs, attending counseling, completed a drug-and-alcohol
assessment, and, when tested, was negative for drug use.
{¶13} Craig testified, however, that despite largely completing their case plans,
neither parent demonstrated an ability to safely parent J.H., protect her, or address the
concerns that initially led to her removal. Craig confirmed that J.H. had been in agency
custody for twelve of the last twenty-two months. She testified that although Mother
completed the required assessments and less-intensive parenting programs, Mother was
unable to retain the information presented to her.
{¶14} Both Mother and Father received only a “Certificate of Attendance” (rather
than a Certificate of Completion) from Goodwill Parenting, the intensive parenting program
recommended for both parents. Craig testified that this was considered unsuccessful.
Goodwill Parenting recommended that neither parent have unsupervised visitation with J.H.
or be reunified with her. The program further recommended that neither Mother nor Father
serve as J.H.’s primary caregiver.
{¶15} Craig testified that Mother and Father live together in a home that is safe and
appropriate for J.H. However, Craig was concerned that the home contained a large room,
larger than the room set up for J.H., devoted to J.J. Mother believes J.J. will return home,
and Father supports Mother’s belief.
{¶16} Craig observed visits between Mother, Father, and J.H, during which both
parents repeatedly changed J.H. into multiple outfits and engaged in “photo shoots,” which
took up a significant portion of the visits. Agency workers stopped the photo shoots because
they upset J.H. and removed the clothing from the visitation room. Mother would also tell
the workers about her medical history instead of engaging with J.H. Both parents had
difficulty recognizing and responding to J.H.’s cues.
{¶17} Dr. Aimee Thomas (“Thomas”) completed parenting evaluations of both
Mother and Father. Thomas testified that Mother functions at approximately the level of an
eleven-year-old with respect to verbal skills and an eight-year-old with respect to nonverbal
skills. Thomas has ongoing concerns regarding Mother’s judgment and reasoning. She also
remains concerned that Mother continues to deny that J.J. was sexually abused by B.N.
Thomas testified that Mother cannot make the changes necessary to protect J.H. in the future
if Mother does not acknowledge and understand what happened to J.J., despite receiving
counseling.
{¶18} Mother informed Thomas that her mother (“Maternal Grandmother”) abused
illicit drugs and forced Mother to have sex with drug dealers in exchange for drugs. Despite
acknowledging that Maternal Grandmother inflicted significant trauma upon her, Mother
continued to maintain a relationship with Maternal Grandmother.
{¶19} Mother requested that Thomas not recommend that she complete Goodwill
Parenting because Mother wanted to complete a less-intensive parenting program. Thomas
did not believe that a less-intensive parenting program would be sufficient.
{¶20} Thomas testified that Father fully defended Mother and does not believe that
J.J. had been sexually abused. Thomas also stated that Father demonstrated a lack of
understanding of what is normal or abnormal behavior for a child. Thomas’s concerns
regarding Father included his failure to recognize why Mother lost custody of J.J. and his
inability to safely parent J.H.
{¶21} Thomas testified that both parents filed a grievance against her because they
did not believe they should have to attend Goodwill Parenting based upon Thomas’ recommendations. Father also believed Thomas was “using his past against him” while
Mother accused Thomas of lying in her report.
{¶22} Jennifer Fire (“Fire”) is the supervisor at Goodwill Parenting. When Mother
attended the program in 2021, she received a “Certificate of Non-Compliance” because she
did not believe J.J. had been sexually abused and attempted to contact a parenting instructor
through Facebook to buy her things. Mother believed B.N. was a good father, and, even after
B.N. was incarcerated for abusing J.J., Mother continued to maintain contact with B.N.’s
family and, while B.N. was in jail, she sent B.N. pictures of J.J.
{¶23} In 2024, Mother received a Goodwill Parenting “Certificate of Attendance.”
Fire was particularly concerned about Mother’s results because Mother performed worse on
her post-test than on her pre-test. Fire also expressed concern about Mother’s actions
involving Maternal Grandmother. Mother told Fire that Maternal Grandmother was not an
appropriate person to be around Mother or J.H. Nevertheless, on two occasions during the
Goodwill program, Mother allowed Maternal Grandmother to live with her. Mother also
allowed Maternal Grandmother to attend a supervised visit in the lobby, where Mother
handed J.H. to Maternal Grandmother to hold and take a photograph with her. Fire testified
that these actions demonstrated Mother’s lack of boundaries and inability to protect J.H.
{¶24} Fire was also concerned about Mother’s statements regarding B.N - Mother
told Fire that she knew B.N. was involved in “diaper pornography” and that she found a hole
in the wall beneath the bathroom sink containing dirty diapers. Mother informed Fire that,
despite knowing about these issues involving B.N., she believed it was safe to leave J.J. with
him.
{¶25} Fire also described problems with Mother’s visits, including Mother’s inability
to understand or follow J.H.’s cues regarding what she wanted and needed. For example,
Mother believed J.H. was tired when she was not and failed to recognize when J.H. was tired.
Fire also described Mother’s repeated efforts to change J.H. into numerous elaborate outfits
and photograph her.
{¶26} Father also received a Goodwill Parenting “Certificate of Attendance.” Fire
described concerns regarding Father’s visits. Father did not know what to do with J.H. during
visits and did not understand the basics of caring for J.H. Fire was also concerned because
Father repeatedly told her that he was financially dependent on Mother because they lived on
Mother’s SSI (Supplemental Social Security) and that he was indebted to Mother for his
sobriety.
{¶27} Fire testified that she told Father directly and repeatedly that he needed to
demonstrate that he could protect J.H., given Mother’s shortcomings. Fire stated that she was
“clear and direct” with Father about this issue. She attended team meetings at which it was
explained to Father that he would have to serve as J.H.’s primary parent. Father, however,
failed to demonstrate that he could protect J.H. or serve as her primary caregiver. Fire did not
believe Father could protect J.H.
{¶28} Fire testified that Mother and Father had a room set up for J.H. in their home
with a crib and other supplies. However, the home also contained a larger room for J.J. that
contained numerous unopened gifts.
{¶29} Fire acknowledged that both parents wanted to repeat Goodwill Parenting.
She explained, however, that the program permits parents to repeat the program only when
they are close to “getting it,” and neither Mother nor Father was close to “getting it.”
{¶30} During the second portion of the hearing, Craig testified that J.H. is a normally
developing two-year-old child. She is placed in a foster home with her sibling J.J., to whom
she is very attached. J.H. is also strongly bonded to her foster mother. Craig believes it is in
the best interest of J.H. for permanent custody to be granted to SCJFS.
{¶31} The Gurdian ad Litem (“GAL”) report filed prior to the hearing also described
several concerns. First, the GAL was concerned that both parents were “forcing” J.J.’s
interests on J.H. The GAL further stated a continuing concern that J.J. appeared to be
Mother’s main focus, with Father supporting Mother in that endeavor. The GAL was
concerned that, if J.H. were returned to the parents, they would continue to focus on the
unattainable goal of having J.J. returned, causing J.H. to suffer as a result. The GAL noted
that Mother had recently been using artificial intelligence to insert J.J. into family
photographs, further reinforcing the GAL’s concern that J.H. was not the parents’ primary
focus.
{¶32} On March 26, 2026, the trial court issued a judgment entry containing detailed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court made the following findings: Mother
previously had her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of J.H.
and failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that, notwithstanding the prior
termination, she could provide a legally secure placement and adequate care for the health,
welfare, and safety of the child in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(E)(11); the child had been
in agency custody for a period of greater than twelves of the last twenty-two months; the child
cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with
either parent within a reasonable time; and, considering all the factors contained in R.C.
2151.414, it was in the best interest for J.H. to be placed in the permanent custody of SCJFS.
{¶33} The court also found that any harm caused by terminating parental rights was
outweighed by the benefits of permanency.
{¶34} Mother appeals the March 26, 2026, judgment entry of the Stark County Court
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, and assigns the following as error:
{¶35} “I. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in finding that permanent
custody was in the best interest of the minor child.”
{¶36} “II. The agency failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family prior to
the termination of parental rights and the trial court erred when it found that reasonable efforts
were made.”
Permanent Custody
{¶37} “[T]he right to raise [a child] is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.” In re
Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). An
award of permanent custody must be based on clear and convincing evidence. R.C.
2151.414(B)(1).
{¶38} Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence “which will produce in the mind
of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.”
Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477 (1954). “Where the degree of proof required to sustain
an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine
whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of
proof.” Id. If some competent and credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the
case supports the trial court’s judgment, an appellate court must affirm the judgment and not
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio
St.2d 279 (1978).
{¶39} Issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to the
evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. Seasons Coal Co., Inc., v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77
(1984). Deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility is “crucial in a child custody case,
where there may be much evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does not translate
to the record well.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419 (1997).
{¶40} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth guidelines a trial court must follow when deciding a
motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) mandates the trial court schedule a
hearing and provide notice of the filing of a motion for permanent custody of a child by a
public children services agency.
{¶41} Following the hearing, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) authorizes the court to grant
permanent custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court determines, by clear
and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to
the agency, and that any of the following apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned,
has not been in the temporary custody of the children services agencies for twelve or more
months of a consecutive twenty-two month period, and the child cannot be placed either of
the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents;
(b) the child is abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who
are able to take permanent custody; (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or
more public children services agencies or private child placement agencies for twelve or more
months of a consecutive twenty-two month period; or (e) the child or another child in the
custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been
adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court
in this state or another state.
{¶42} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court
must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, a trial court will
usually determine whether one of the circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)
through (e) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the
child. In this case, as to Mother, the trial court made a finding pursuant to R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a) (reasonable time) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) (temporary custody of the
agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period).
Manifest Weight
{¶43} In her assignments of error, Mother argues the trial court’s decision was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. The standard of review for manifest weight in a civil case
is identical to the standard in a criminal case: a reviewing court is to examine the entire record,
weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and
determine “whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury [or finder of fact] clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction [or decision]
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).
{¶44} Because the finder of fact is in the best position to weigh the credibility of the
witnesses and observe their demeanor, a reviewing court will always be mindful of the
presumption in favor of the trial court’s factual findings. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179.
I.
{¶45} Mother’s first argument is that the grant of permanent custody to SCFS, as
being in the best interest of J.H., was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother
contends that J.H. was bonded to her parents, the parents substantially completed their case
plan, and visitation between J.H. and her parents went well.
{¶46} We have frequently noted, “[t]he discretion which the juvenile court enjoys in
determining whether an order of permanent custody is in the best interest of a child should be
accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s
determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.” In re Mauzy Children, 2000 WL
1700073, *3 (5th Dist. Nov. 13, 2000), citing In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 316 (8th Dist.
1994).
{¶47} In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing,
R.C. 2151.414(D) mandates the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including, but
not limited to the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the
child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents, and out-of-home providers, and any other
person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child as expressed directly
by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) the child’s need for a legally secure placement
and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody;
and (5) whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation
to the parents and child.
{¶48} The court must consider all of the elements in R.C. 2151.414(D), as well as
other relevant factors. There is not one element that is given greater weight than the others
pursuant to the statute. In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513. The Schaefer Court made it clear that a
trial court’s statutory duty, when determining whether it is in the best interest of a child to
grant permanent custody to an agency, does not include finding - by clear and convincing
evidence - that no suitable relative was available for placement. Id. R.C. 2151.414 “requires
the court to find the best option for the child once a determination has been made pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d). The statute does not make the availability of a
placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor.
The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than others.”
Id. at ¶ 64.
{¶49} The focus on the “best interest” determination is upon the child, not the parent,
as R.C. 2151.414(C) specifically prohibits the court from considering the effect a grant of
permanent custody would have upon the parents. In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d at 316.
{¶50} Here, competent and credible evidence supports the trial court’s best-interest
determination. Craig testified that J.H. is placed in a foster home with her sibling, J.J., to
whom she is very attached. J.H. is also bonded to her foster mother. Craig believes it is in the
best interest of J.H. for permanent custody to be granted to SCJFS. Craig acknowledged that
J.H. has a bond with both parents but testified that any bond severed by the termination of
parental rights is outweighed by the permanency J.H. needs. Although the GAL did not make
an express best-interest determination, he identified several concerns regarding J.H.’s
potential return to her parents. Specifically, the GAL was concerned that Mother, with
Father’s support, continued to focus on the unattainable goal of having J.J. returned, and J.H.
will suffer because of it.
{¶51} The remainder of Mother’s argument is essentially that, because she
substantially completed her case plan, it was not in J.H.’s best interest for permanent custody
to be granted to SCJFS. However, successful completion of a case plan is not dispositive on
the issue of reunification. In re O.S., 2021-Ohio-3729, ¶ 90 (5th Dist.). While it may be in
Mother’s best interest to complete the case plan, this is only one factor for a trial court to consider when determining what is in the best interest of the child. Id.; In the Matter of D.P. and
G.P., 2011-Ohio-1907 (5th Dist.).
{¶52} Where a parent has participated in his or her case plan and completed most or
all of the plan requirements, a trial court may still properly determine that such parent has not
substantially remedied the problems leading to agency involvement. Id.; In the Matter of A.L.
and J.L., 2012-Ohio-481 (5th Dist.). Here, although Mother substantially completed her case
plan, both Fire and Craig described how Mother failed to alleviate the risks that existed at the
time of J.H.’s removal and how those same concerns continued to exist at the time of the
permanent-custody hearing.
{¶53} We find the trial court properly considered and weighed the factors in R.C.
2151.414(D) and the trial court’s conclusion that the granting of permanent custody to SCJFS
is in the best interest of the child is supported by competent and credible evidence. Further,
the trial court did not lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice such that the
decision must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Mother’s first assignment of error is
overruled.
II.
{¶54} In her second assignment of error, Mother argues the trial court erred in finding
that SCJFS made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with J.H. Mother’s primary argument
is that she substantially completed her case-plan requirements. Specifically, Mother contends
that the agency’s refusal to allow her to retake Goodwill Parenting, and its refusal to consider
her completion of other parenting programs as “successful completion” of the
recommendation made by Thomas, demonstrate that the agency failed to make reasonable
efforts to reunify her with J.H.
{¶55} First, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held the trial court is not obligated by
R.C. 2151.419 to make a determination that the agency used reasonable efforts to reunify the
family at the time of the permanent custody hearing unless the agency has not established that
reasonable efforts have been made prior to that hearing. In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104; R.C.
2151.419. The trial court is only obligated to make a determination that the agency has made
reasonable efforts to reunify the family at “adjudicatory, emergency, detention, and
temporary-deposition hearings, and dispositional hearings for abused, neglected, or
dependent children, all of which occur prior to a decision transferring permanent custody to
the state.” Id. at ¶ 41; In the Matter of L.J., 2019-Ohio-5231 (5th Dist.).
{¶56} In this case, the record reflects the magistrate made reasonable-efforts findings
at various points throughout the case, as demonstrated in judgment entries after hearings held
on February 9, 2024, October 17, 2024, May 16, 2024, April 17, 2025, and October 14. 2025.
Mother did not object to any of these findings by the magistrate. Consequently, the agency
did not need to prove at the permanent custody hearing that it made reasonable reunification
efforts. Id.
{¶57} Notwithstanding the previous findings of reasonable efforts, SCJFS also
established at the permanent custody hearing that its case planning and efforts were
reasonable and diligent under the circumstances. A “reasonable effort” is “an honest,
purposeful effort, free of malice and the design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage.” In re Weaver, 79 Ohio App.3d 59, 63 (12th Dist. 1992). The child’s health and
safety are paramount in determining whether reasonable efforts were made. In re R.P., 2011-Ohio-5378, ¶ 47 (5th Dist.).
{¶58} With regard to Mother’s required successful completion of Goodwill Parenting,
Thomas testified that completion of an intensive parenting program was essential to any
potential reunification between Mother and J.H. Thomas further testified that she did not
believe any of the less-intensive parenting programs were sufficient.
{¶59} Craig testified that, while it was admirable that Mother completed the required
less-intensive parenting programs, Mother was unable to retain the information presented to
her. Fire also explained why she did not recommend that the agency permit Mother to retake
Goodwill Parenting. First, Mother had already participated in the course in 2021 and had not
successfully completed it. Second, Fire explained that the program permits parents to repeat
the course only when they are close to “getting it,” and Mother was not close to “getting it.”
{¶60} The issue is not whether there was anything more the agency could have done,
but whether the agency’s case planning and efforts were reasonable and diligent under the
circumstances of the case. In the Matter of J.H., 2019-Ohio-5184 (5th Dist.). We find there is
competent and credible evidence to support the trial court’s determination that SCJFS’ efforts
were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances of the case, and the trial court did not
lose its way in so finding. Mother’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶61} Based on the foregoing, Mother’s assignments of error are overruled. The
judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
{¶62} For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Stark County Court
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division is affirmed.
{¶63} Costs to Appellant/Mother.
By: Popham, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Montgomery, J., concur