Barclays Bank Delaware v. Schmaltz

2026-08-24

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appeal is dismissed because no final appealable order exists. When timely objections to a magistrate's decision are filed, the trial court must rule on them before a final appealable order can be issued, and the municipal court's failure to rule on Schmaltz's objection deprived the appellate court of jurisdiction.

Barclays Bank Delaware sued Schmaltz for a credit card debt. Schmaltz filed a counterclaim alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. A magistrate recommended dismissing the counterclaim, and Schmaltz timely objected. The municipal court issued an entry expressing uncertainty about whether Schmaltz's bankruptcy affected his claims and whether judicial estoppel would apply, but the court declined to actually rule on Schmaltz's objection. Instead, the court merely stated that the magistrate had "likely made the correct decision" without issuing formal findings or conclusions. Schmaltz appealed, but the appellate court found it lacked jurisdiction to proceed.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a final appealable order exists when a trial court declines to rule on timely objections to a magistrate's decision
Whether speculative observations about bankruptcy effects constitute a valid ruling on objections
Appellate jurisdiction over dismissal of a counterclaim

Procedural posture

Schmaltz appealed from a municipal court entry that declined to rule on his timely objection to a magistrate's recommendation to dismiss his counterclaim with prejudice.

Authorities cited

145 Ohio App.3d 170

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

[Cite as Barclays Bank Delaware v. Schmaltz, 2026-Ohio-3288.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

MADISON COUNTY

BARCLAYS BANK DELAWARE, :

CASE NO. CA2026-02-006

Appellee, :

OPINION AND

vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY

8/24/2026

SHANE SCHMALTZ, :

Appellant. :

CIVIL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT

Case No. CVF2300526

Corporation Service Company, for appellee.

Shane Schmaltz, pro se.

OPINION

SIEBERT, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Shane Schmaltz, appeals from a judgment of the Madison

County Municipal Court dismissing his amended counterclaim. Because the municipal

court failed to rule on Schmaltz's timely filed objection to the magistrate's decision, no

Madison CA2026-02-006

final appealable order exists.1 Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Barclays Bank Delaware ("Barclays") filed a complaint against Schmaltz

seeking to recover $2,924.69 allegedly owed on a credit card account. Schmaltz

answered and later filed a counterclaim alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act ("FDCPA"). Barclays moved to dismiss the counterclaim pursuant to Civ.R.

12(B)(6). Schmaltz responded and filed an amended counterclaim that retained some of

his original claims, added a claim under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act

("OCSPA"), and included additional factual allegations.

{¶ 3} While the motion to dismiss remained pending, Schmaltz filed for Chapter

7 bankruptcy, which automatically stayed the proceedings. Following discharge from the

bankruptcy proceedings, Schmaltz notified the municipal court, and the matter resumed.

{¶ 4} On July 29, 2025, the magistrate issued a decision recommending dismissal

of Schmaltz's counterclaim with prejudice. Schmaltz timely objected. In a January 27,

2026 entry, the municipal court raised concerns regarding the effect of Schmaltz's

bankruptcy on his counterclaim, including whether the claim became property of the

bankruptcy estate and whether judicial estoppel applied. The municipal court's entry is

difficult to discern. The court cited neither the record nor any legal authority supporting its

conclusions. Additionally, the entry is framed largely in speculative terms. The court

stated that the counterclaim had "presumably" transferred to the bankruptcy trustee,

acknowledged that it was "unknown" whether the trustee was aware of the claim, and

remarked that it "feels" the doctrine of estoppel would bar the action. Such tentative

1. Pursuant to Loc.R. 6(A), we hereby sua sponte remove this case from the accelerated calendar for purposes of issuing this opinion.

-2-Madison CA2026-02-006

observations do not constitute findings of fact, conclusions of law, or a ruling on the

pending objections. The municipal court then declined to rule on Schmaltz's objection,

although it stated that the magistrate had "likely made the correct decision." Schmaltz

now appeals, raising four assignments of error.

Appeal

{¶ 5} As a threshold matter, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of this

appeal. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b), permits a party to file objections to a magistrate's decision

within 14 days, and Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) requires the trial court to rule on those objections.

When timely objections are filed, the trial court must resolve them before a final

appealable order exists. Ludwick v. Ludwick, 2003-Ohio-2925, ¶ 5 (12th Dist.), citing

McCown v. McCown, 145 Ohio App.3d 170, 172 (12th Dist. 2001). Accord Drummond v.

Drummond, 2003-Ohio-587, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.); Peric v. Buccilli, 2002-Ohio-6234, ¶ 8 (8th

Dist.).

{¶ 6} Here, Schmaltz timely objected to the magistrate's decision, but the

municipal court declined to rule on that objection. The court neither sustained nor

overruled the objection, nor did it independently adopt, reject, or modify the magistrate's

decision as contemplated by Civ.R. 53. Because no final appealable order exists, we lack

jurisdiction to consider Schmaltz's assignments of error.

{¶ 7} Appeal dismissed.

PIPER, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.

-3-Madison CA2026-02-006

JUDGMENT ENTRY

Upon consideration of the appeal and the brief before this court, and the above Opinion, it is the order of this court that this appeal should be and hereby is dismissed because the order appealed from is not a final appealable order. This court is therefore without jurisdiction.

It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Madison County Municipal Court for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

Costs to be taxed 50% to appellant and 50% to appellee.

/s/ Robin N. Piper, Presiding Judge

/s/ Mike Powell, Judge

/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge

-4-