[Cite as In re C.M., 2026-Ohio-3283.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
HANCOCK COUNTY
IN RE: CASE NO. 5-25-34
C.M.,
ADJUDICATED NEGLECTED AND
DEPENDENT CHILD. OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
[JAMES M. - APPELLANT]
Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court
Juvenile Division
Trial Court No. 2023 AND 0025
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 24, 2026
APPEARANCES:
W. Alex Smith for Appellant
Miranda M. Lobdell for Appellee
Case No. 5-25-34
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Father-appellant James M. (“Father”) brings this appeal from the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Hancock County, Juvenile Division
terminating his parental rights and granting permanent custody of C.M. to the
Hancock County Job and Family Services – Children’s Protective Services Unit
(“the Agency”). Father claims on appeal that the trial court erred by 1) relying on
hearsay evidence, 2) finding that Rachel K. (“Mother”) suffered from a chronic
mental illness and that Father failed to remedy the conditions causing the removal
of C.M. from the home, and 3) finding that the termination of parental rights was in
C.M.’s best interest. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} In August 2016, C.M. was born to Mother and Father. On April 4, 2023,
C.M. was removed from the home via an ex parte order of the trial court and placed
in the temporary care of the Agency. That same day, the Agency filed a complaint
alleging that C.M. was a neglected and dependent child. The Agency then filed a
case plan requiring Father to 1) maintain safe and stable housing by not smoking
around C.M. due to the medical needs of C.M., 2) attend visits with C.M., 3)
participate in and complete a parenting program, 4) engage in mental health
services, and 5) participate in home coaching. On June 15, 2023, the trial court
conducted an adjudicatory hearing. Father and Mother admitted that C.M. was a
dependent child. The parties all agreed to proceed with disposition immediately.
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By the agreement of the parties, the trial court ordered that C.M. remain in the
temporary custody of the Agency.
{¶3} On September 13, 2023, the Agency filed a semi-annual review. The
review noted that Father had completed his parenting class, but there were concerns
that he was not implementing the skills he learned. The case worker noted that
Father appeared not to be smoking at the home anymore and Father reported that he
no longer smoked. The review indicated that Father was compliant with the home
coach, but had not demonstrated an understanding of the parenting skills being
taught. James had completed an intake through OhioGuidestone (“OGS”), but had
not used the recommended services, despite OGS reaching out to him multiple
times. Overall, the Agency noted that Father had made some progress, but needed
to continue the case plan.
{¶4} On March 5, 2024, the Agency filed the second semi-annual review.
The Agency again noted that Father had made some progress, but determined it
would be best to continue with C.M. in the Agency’s custody. Additionally, the
Agency recommended that both Father and Mother submit to psychological testing.
The review noted that neither Father nor Mother believed they had done anything
wrong to justify the Agency removing C.M. from their care and both refused to take
accountability. The Agency also noted that Father had been diagnosed with
adjustment disorder. The trial court granted the Agency’s request for a six-month
extension.
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{¶5} On September 4, 2024, the Agency again filed for an extension of the
case. The Agency also filed a third semi-annual review. The Agency noted that
Father was making insufficient progress regarding his mental health and had been
observed pinching C.M.’s brother at a visit. The Agency also expressed concerns
that Father had missed several visits after he was deemed “high risk” and required
two monitors for his visits. Father was also caught being dishonest with his home
coach. As a result, the Agency noted that Father was making insufficient progress
as to his parenting techniques. The Agency was also concerned that Father had
shown aggressive behavior during visitations. Although the Agency noted it was
still waiting on the evaluation reports from the psychological evaluations, the
Agency was concerned that Mother and Father were no longer making progress in
the case and that they were engaging in “concerning behaviors” during visits.
{¶6} On October 9, 2024, the Agency filed a motion for permanent custody
of C.M. The motion alleged that 1) the child could not be placed with Father or
Mother within a reasonable time, 2) the child had been in the temporary custody of
the Agency for more that twelve months in a consecutive twenty-two month period,
and 3) the child was abandoned. The Agency claimed that terminating the parental
rights would be in C.M.’s best interest. Prior to the hearing on this motion, the
Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) filed her report. The GAL noted that Mother seemed
to care more about C.M.’s well-being than her own wishes and would be devastated
to lose all contact with him. The GAL noted that Father meant well, but lacked the
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ability to appreciate the needs of C.M. According to the GAL, C.M. was torn as to
where he would like to live, with Mother, Father, and the foster mother all being
choices at some time. The child was afraid to hurt someone’s feelings. The GAL
recommended that the Agency’s motion for permanent custody be granted because,
despite Mother and Father loving C.M., “neither parent has been able to improve
their parenting skills enough to provide adequately for [C.M.’s need], physical,
emotional, social, or spiritual.” GAL report at 6.
{¶7} A hearing was held on the Agency’s motion on September 29, 2025,
and October 1, 2025. The first witness for the Agency was Dr. Mark Babula
(“Babula”), a psychologist who performed an evaluation on Mother and Father.
Babula identified exhibit 2 as his report regarding Father and exhibit 3 as the report
regarding Mother. Babula’s testing showed there were no major emotional
problems, but there were aspects of personality, such as cynicism, present.
Although Father’s testing showed that he was aware of the appropriate responses to
certain issues, he struggled to appropriately address health concerns a child could
have. When a child was acting in a manner Father did not like, he would not look
for the underlying cause, instead classifying the behavior as bad and just addressing
the behavior instead of the cause. The common pattern was that Father would
address the symptom of a situation, but not look for a way to prevent the situation.
Babula noted that during his observations of Father with C.M., there were times that
Father’s health prevented him from fully interacting with C.M. However, the
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interactions between the two were generally positive. Babula’s opinion was that
although Father could appropriately parent C.M. for a period of time without
supervision, he could not properly parent for extended periods of time. Babula
recommended that Father engage in a parenting class to teach him child
development and parenting skills. Babula also recommended that Father participate
in counseling to learn to address his stressors. Babula testified that he would not
recommend Father have custody of C.M. at that time.
{¶8} Babula also conducted a screening on Mother. Babula was concerned
regarding Mother’s decision making as her typical response to stressors were ones
that could “potentially put her in danger.” Tr. 30-38. Babula’s opinion was that
Mother could not parent C.M. at that time, but could visit with him unsupervised
for about four hours. Babula testified that he would not recommend Mother have
custody of C.M. at that time.
{¶9} Lexi Goedde (“Goedde”) testified that she was the ongoing caseworker
in this matter until April of 2025. Goedde testified that the Agency filed for
permanent custody of C.M. on October 9, 2024. C.M. entered the custody of the
Agency on April 4, 2023. C.M. was adjudicated a dependent child on June 15, 2023.
Since the removal of C.M. from the home, he has remained in the temporary custody
of the Agency. Goedde testified that the first case plan required Father to utilize
mental health services, complete parent education, provide safe and stable housing,
and refrain from smoking around C.M. Referrals were provided for mental health
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services, parenting classes, and visitation with C.M. In March of 2024, the case
plan was amended to require psychological evaluations for Mother and Father.
While the case was pending, Goedde met with Mother and Father monthly, as well
as any contact that was needed. Goedde testified that Father did alleviate the
concern regarding smoking around the children. Father worked with a home coach
to help him learn parenting skills, but he did not implement the skills he learned.
Father completed the mental health assessment as requested and went to counseling.
However, he was discharged from services due to concerns that he was not being
forthcoming with the counselors. Father completed the parenting classes, but again
did not implement what he learned. Goedde was concerned that Father would not
give C.M. the medications prescribed to him on the schedule set by the doctor.
{¶10} Goedde testified that visitations started out at one hour a week, but
later were increased to two hours a week. The visits did not go smoothly. During
the initial visits, the parents behaved appropriately, but began “showing more
inappropriate behavior towards” C.M. as visits progressed. Tr. 96. Visits became
worse after Mother and Father separated. The number of rule violations by Mother
and Father increased. Father received a rule violation for pushing C.M. to exercise
to excess when C.M.’s asthma is exercise induced. During another visit, Father kept
encouraging C.M. to keep running even after the monitor pointed out that C.M. was
overdoing it and an asthma attack was triggered. The Agency had to set a rule that
if Father had three rule violations in one visit, the visit was terminated immediately.
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Throughout the course of this case, neither Father nor Mother made significant
progress on the case plan. Father was unable “to show that he could implement
anything learned from any of the case plan services, and continued to be hostile
towards providers and continued to show that it would be an unsafe environment if
he were to have [C.M.].” Tr. 113.
{¶11} Goedde testified that when she observed C.M. in the foster home, he
was “always a happy child.” Tr. 117. If C.M. were to get upset, he ran to his foster
mother for comfort. Goedde testified that C.M. had been in the custody of the
Agency for 12 out of a consecutive 22 month period and was in need of a legally
secure and permanent placement. According to Goedde, neither parent ever
accepted responsibility for why C.M. was initially removed.
{¶12} Jessica Achey (“Achey”) testified that she was the ongoing
caseworker for this case after Goedde. According to Achey, C.M. has been in the
temporary custody of the Agency since the initial removal. Achey testified that
Father was not understanding the severity of C.M.’s medical needs. Although
Father did go to OGS for counseling, he was discharged in February of 2024 for
lack of engagement. Father never returned to counseling even after Babula’s report
stated that he needed to continue counseling and it being included on the case plan.
Although Father kept telling Achey he was going to return to counseling, he never
did so. Achey admitted that the Agency was satisfied that Father had safe and stable
housing. However, she then testified that Father had not alleviated this concern
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because he was still vaping and had a dog in the home which could possibly trigger
C.M.’s asthma. Despite Father’s completion of the parenting classes, he was still
encouraging behavior by C.M. which would trigger C.M.’s asthma, such as
excessive running. Although Father worked with a home coach, when asked, Father
could not state what the current goals were. In Achey’s opinion, Father has not
made significant progress towards reunification. On cross-examination, Achey
admitted that she had never observed C.M. with either parent and that the Agency
did not offer specific services to teach the parents about handling C.M.’s asthma.
The home coach would help the parents set up a schedule to care for C.M., but would
not address caring for the asthma. Achey admitted that the Agency never added
teaching the parents to deal with C.M.’s specific issues and the Agency did not really
work with either parent on addressing those issues. Instead, the Agency focused on
basic parent education.
{¶13} Achey testified that C.M. had a good relationship with the foster
mother and that he is bonded with her. The foster mother cared for his basic needs
and met his medical needs. C.M. had a “great brother relationship” with his sibling
who is also in the foster home with C.M. In Achey’s opinion, the children should
remain together as it would be detrimental to them to be parted. The father of C.M.’s
brother was unknown. Since the motion for permanent custody was filed in October
of 2024, no concerns were alleviated. Achey testified that C.M. was in need of a
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legally secure placement and this was not achievable without granting the motion
for permanent custody.
{¶14} Kelli Miller (“Miller”) testified that she is the Agency’s administrator.
Miller testified that throughout the case, both parents had numerous rule violations
during visits with C.M. In 2024, visits were reduced to one hour per parent because
the rule violations increased after one hour. According to Miller, visits would have
been better if the parents completed their mental health recommendations as that is
“the bottom layer of their parenting choices.” Tr. 224. The failure to do so indicated
that the parents were not interested in taking the steps to address the concerns of the
Agency. Miller testified that Father needed mental health services to address the
“root cause” of his parenting issues, but he refused to address them. In Miller’s
opinion, C.M. needed a permanent and safe placement and she believed he could
achieve this through adoption. She testified that she believed that C.M. would “100
percent” be adopted. Tr. 228. After speaking with the foster mother, Miller believed
that she would like to adopt C.M. and his brother. Due to the bond between the
brothers, Miller believed it was important they not be separated. Finally, Miller
testified that C.M. had been out of the home for almost 900 days at the time of the
hearing.
{¶15} After the Agency closed its case-in-chief, Father testified on his own
behalf. He denied vaping in his home or that his dog caused any issues with C.M.’s
asthma. Father testified that C.M. liked playing soccer and suffered no health issues
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when he went to a soccer camp at the YMCA. According to Father, he did
encourage C.M. to run and exercise, but he claimed that he did so pursuant to
recommendations from C.M.’s allergist. The one incident where he allowed C.M.
to run during a visitation, there was no issue and the inhaler was not needed. The
one time Father recalls the inhaler being needed during a visitation was due to
environmental allergies rather than exercise. Father denied the allegation that he
“forced” C.M. to run, instead claiming that C.M. wanted to run and he merely
allowed him to do so. Tr. 247.
{¶16} As to transportation, Father admitted that the Agency did provide gas
cards, but claimed they only covered three months of visits due to the long distance
he had to drive for visits. The gas cards also did not cover the additional costs for
the added mileage on the car.
{¶17} Father also testified that he was tired during many visits because he
was receiving chemo therapy for cancer during part of these proceedings. At the
time of the hearing, Father was in remission. Father believed he could handle
C.M.’s medical concerns.
{¶18} When questioned about his home, Father described it as a twobedroom apartment. Father testified that there would be room for C.M. if he were
to be permitted to return. Father indicated that he was employed earning $25 per
hour working a 40 hour week. As a result, Father was not concerned about paying
for C.M.’s expenses.
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{¶19} Shana James (“James”) testified that she was the family and wellness
coach that worked with Father and Mother. James testified that she had discussed
using child-led play, healthy diets, and how to set up doctor’s appointments and
follow up appointments. James found Father to be receptive and testified that Father
had shown her evidence that he was implementing what he learned. When James
worked with Father, he appeared to be using the lessons appropriately. On crossexamination, James testified that Father had taken responsibility for the actions
which caused the case to be opened.
{¶20} Marquien W. (“Grandmother”) testified that she is the paternal
grandmother of C.M. Prior to the removal, Grandmother witnessed interactions
between Father and C.M. regularly. She described Father’s relationship with C.M.
as loving and attentive. Grandmother testified that the only time she saw C.M. have
any issues with his asthma was if he ran around too much outside or if he became
overly upset. When it occurred, Father provided C.M. with the inhaler and would
hold him to calm him down, which was generally helpful.
{¶21} On October 31, 2025, the trial court entered its judgment granting the
Agency’s motion for permanent custody of C.M. Father filed a notice of appeal
from this judgment on November 18, 2025. Mother did not appeal. On appeal,
Father raised the following assignments of error.
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First Assignment of Error
The juvenile court erred by admitting and relying on hearsay and
non-personal knowledge testimony in a permanent custody
hearing where the Rules of Evidence apply.
Second Assignment of Error
The juvenile court erred in finding by clear and convincing
evidence that [Mother] suffered from a chronic mental illness so
severe that she could not provide an adequate permanent home
within one year, and in finding under [R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)] that
both parents failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially
remedy the conditions causing removal.
Third Assignment of Error
The juvenile court’s best interest determination under [R.C.
2151.414(D)(1)] is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶22} In Father’s first assignment of error, he claims that the trial court erred
by relying on hearsay evidence. In support of the argument, Father challenges 1)
the use of the GAL report and 2) reliance by the case workers on reports rather than
firsthand observations. Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement offered for
the truth of the matter asserted. Evid. R. 801(C). It is generally not admissible.
Evid.R. 802.
{¶23} Father first argues that the trial court should not have relied upon the
GAL report as it contained hearsay. “The purpose of a GAL’s report is to give the
court information in addition to that elicited at the hearing to guide the juvenile court
in making its decision.” In re S.W., 2012-Ohio-3199, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.). Generally,
the report is not considered evidence and is only used as additional information,
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similar to that of a presentence investigation report in a criminal proceeding. In re
R.J.E., 2017-Ohio-886 (11th Dist.). Thus, Ohio courts allow consideration of the
GAL report, despite it containing hearsay, as long as the trial court insures due
process requirements are met by making the GAL available for cross-examination.
In re Sherman, 2005-Ohio-5888 (3d Dist.).
{¶24} In this case, the GAL participated in the hearing. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the trial court asked the parties if they wished to cross-examine the GAL
about her report. Counsel for all parties indicated they did not wish to do so and did
not object to the admission of her report. Since the trial court provided the parties
with the opportunity to cross-examine the GAL on the contents of her report, the
due process requirements were met. This means that the GAL report could be
considered by the trial court. Additionally, as the trial was one to the bench, we
may presume that the trial court disregarded any inadmissible hearsay contained in
the report. S.W., supra at ¶ 15.
{¶25} Father also claims that the trial court erred by considering the
testimony of the social workers regarding information in the Agency’s records
rather than their personal knowledge. We note that Father’s brief does not
specifically cite to any testimony he believes to be prejudicial. Evidence Rule
803(6) permits the information contained within regularly kept business records to
be admitted as a hearsay exception. Goedde testified to her personal knowledge and
gave her opinion. Achey testified to her personal knowledge after Goedde, but also
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testified to what was in the records that were regularly kept in the course of business.
This testimony was permitted by the rules of evidence. This Court also notes that
the trial court was made aware of the fact that Achey was testifying to things that
were in the records rather than her personal knowledge. As noted above, the trial
court in a bench trial is presumed to ignore inadmissible hearsay evidence.
{¶26} The record contains no indication that the trial court considered any
improper hearsay evidence. Therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶27} Father claims in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred
by 1) finding that Mother suffered from a chronic mental illness and 2) finding that
Mother and Father failed to substantially remedy the conditions which caused the
removal of C.M. from the home. Father initially challenges the trial court’s finding
of fact regarding Mother. We note that Mother has chosen not to appeal. “[A]n
appealing party may not ordinarily complain of an error committed against a nonappealing party” unless it is prejudicial to the rights of the appellant. In re J.T.,
2008-Ohio-1650, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.). Since he has not made this showing, this first
argument is without merit. Father next challenges the trial court’s finding that
neither parent had remedied the conditions which caused the removal of the child
from the home. Both of these arguments essentially claim that the trial court’s
decision that the case plan was not completed is against the weight of the evidence.
{¶28} “Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and
management of their children.” In re Leveck, 2003–Ohio–1269, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.).
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These rights may be terminated, however, under appropriate circumstances and
when all due process safeguards have been followed. Id. When considering a
motion to terminate parental rights, the trial court must comply with the statutory
requirements set forth in R.C. 2151.414. These requirements include, in pertinent
part, as follows:
(B)(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the court
may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court
determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section,
by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the
child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed
the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply:
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies
or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies
or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division
(D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was
previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in
another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's
parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the
child's parents.
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or
more public children services agencies or private child placing
agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twentytwo-month period, or the child has been in the temporary
custody of one or more public children services agencies or
private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in
division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the
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child was previously in the temporary custody of an
equivalent agency in another state.
For the purposes of division (B)( 1) of this section, a child shall be
considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the
earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to [R.C. 2151.28]
or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.
R.C. 2151.414(B). “A court’s decision to terminate parental rights will not be
overturned as against the manifest weight of the evidence if the record contains
competent, credible evidence by which a court can determine by clear and
convincing evidence that the essential statutory elements for a termination of
parental rights have been established.” In re Da.R., 2019-Ohio-2270, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.).
{¶29} The determination whether to grant a motion for permanent custody
requires a two-step approach. In re L.W., 2017-Ohio-4352 (3d Dist.). The first step
is to determine whether any of the factors set forth in R.C.
2151.414(B)(1) apply. Id. If one of those circumstances applies, then the trial court
must consider whether granting the motion is in the best interest of the child by
considering the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D). Id.
{¶30} Father is arguing that the trial court’s decision pursuant to R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a) was not supported by the evidence because the factors set forth
in R.C. 2151.414(E) did not apply so the trial court could not find that C.M. could
not be placed with him in a reasonable time. However, even if Father was correct
in his argument, it would be moot as the trial court is only required to find that one
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of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) apply. A review of the record
shows that C.M. was adjudicated a dependent child on June 15, 2023. Doc. 33. The
motion for permanent custody was filed on October 9, 2024. This means that at the
time of the filing of the permanent custody motion, C.M. had been in the temporary
custody of the agency for approximately 17 months. The trial court made a finding
that the statutory requirements of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) were met and the record
supports this finding. Thus, there is no need to consider whether the trial court’s
findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) were also met. For this reason, the second
assignment of error is overruled.
{¶31} Finally, Father claimed that the trial court erred in finding that
termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of C.M.
(D)(1) In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held
pursuant to division (A) of this section . . . the court shall consider all
relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following.
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or
through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity
of the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
agencies . . . for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two
month period . . . .
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(d) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency.
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
apply in relation to the parents and child.
R.C. 2151.414(D).
{¶32} The trial court in this case specifically considered all of the statutory
best interest factors. In regards to C.M.’s relationships with his parents, siblings,
foster parents, and others, the trial court noted that Father could not parent for more
than a couple of hours at a time and the testimony indicated that he could not safely
parent C.M. full time. The GAL noted that Father loves C.M., but recommended
permanent custody be granted to the Agency. The trial court found that C.M. was
very bonded with his brother and the foster mother and that C.M. was thriving in
the foster home. This factor weighed in favor of granting the motion.
{¶33} The second factor is the wishes of the child. The trial court noted that
C.M. had told the GAL he wanted to live with his mother, his father, and the foster
mother. The trial court noted that C.M. wanted it all. Based upon this, the trial
court found this factor to be neutral in his consideration.
{¶34} Next the trial court considered the custodial history of C.M. The trial
court determined that C.M. had been out of the home, as of the date of the hearing,
for 851 days and that visitation had not progressed past two hours. The trial court
found this factor weighed in favor of granting the motion.
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{¶35} The fourth factor the trial court considered was C.M.’s need for a
legally secure permanent placement. The trial court noted that Achey and Miller
both testified that C.M. needed a legally secure placement and it was only
achievable through permanent custody. The GAL report indicated that although
Mother and Father love C.M., they lacked the ability to care for him. Thus, the trial
court found this factor weighed in favor of granting the motion.
{¶36} Based upon all of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a-d)1,
the trial court determined that it would be in C.M.’s best interest to grant the
Agency’s motion for permanent custody. A review of the record shows that the trial
court’s findings were supported by the testimony at the hearing. As the judgment
is supported by competent, credible evidence, this Court will not reverse it. The
third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶37} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Hancock
County, Juvenile Division is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER and WALDICK, J.J., concur.
1
The trial court found that no factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) applied.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
John R. Willamowski, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
DATED:
/hls
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