IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED
Aug 24 2026, 9:53 am
David E. Hollowell, CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Appellant-Defendant Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
August 24, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-52
Appeal from the Clark Circuit Court
The Honorable Nicholas Karaffa, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
10C01-2307-FA-1
Opinion by Judge Pyle
Judges Bradford and Kenworthy concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 1 of 28
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] In October 2024, a jury convicted David Hollowell (“Hollowell”) of Class A
felony rape,1 Class A felony child molesting,2 and Class A felony burglary3 for
acts that he committed in April 2003. He now appeals those convictions and
argues that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his DNA test
results; (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a
mistrial; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for Class
A felony burglary. Concluding that: (1) the trial court did not err in admitting
into evidence Hollowell’s DNA test results; (2) the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial; and (3) there is sufficient
evidence to support Hollowell’s conviction for Class A felony burglary, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
1
IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1.
2
I.C. § 35-42-4-3.
3
I.C. § 35-43-2-1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 2 of 28
1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence
Hollowell’s DNA test results.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
Hollowell’s motion for a mistrial.
3. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Hollowell’s
conviction for Class A felony burglary.
Facts
[3] In April 2003, thirteen-year-old K.O. (“K.O.”) lived with her mother
(“Mother”) and her stepfather (“Stepfather”) in a duplex apartment (“the
apartment”) in Charlestown. Stepfather routinely left the apartment early in the
morning to go to work and returned to the apartment at 6:00 a.m. to wake K.O.
up for school. Mother often left the apartment early in the morning to go to
work as well.
[4] In the early morning hours of April 14, 2003, K.O. heard Mother and
Stepfather leave the apartment for work. Before Stepfather had returned to the
apartment to wake her up for school, K.O. was “startled out of [her] sleep” by a
man (“the man”) rubbing her vagina. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 239). K.O., who could not
see the man in the dark room and who wondered if Stepfather had accidentally
touched her vagina as he was waking her up, said “Daddy?” (Tr. Vol. 2 at
240). The man responded, “I’m Kenny, b***h” and “put [a gun] to [her]
head[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 240, 241).
[5] The man told K.O. not to scream, ordered her to remove her clothes, and
removed his jeans. He then licked her breast, forced her to perform oral sex on
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 3 of 28
him, and performed oral sex on her before engaging in sexual intercourse with
her. K.O. noticed that the man smelled bad and that his facial hair was
“scraggly[,] scratchy[,] and rough.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 242).
[6] At some point during the sexual assault, K.O. heard Stepfather return to the
apartment. Terrified that Stepfather would confront the armed man, K.O. told
the man to go into her closet. As the man was attempting to put on his jeans,
Stepfather tried to open K.O.’s bedroom door. When the man pushed against
the door and told Stepfather to “[h]ang on a minute[,]” K.O. screamed “Daddy,
he’s got a gun.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 245). Stepfather “busted through the door” and
“tussled” briefly with the man before being shot in the head and falling to the
ground in the hallway. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 245).
[7] A naked K.O. jumped over Stepfather’s body and ran out of the apartment to a
neighbor’s (“the neighbor”) house. She banged on the neighbor’s front door
and told the neighbor that Stepfather had been shot and that she had been
raped. The neighbor called 911 and gave K.O. some clothes to wear. When
law enforcement officers arrived at the neighbor’s house, K.O. told them what
had happened. She was subsequently transported by ambulance to a local
hospital.
[8] At the hospital, nurse Ginger Ottersbach (“Nurse Ottersbach”) performed a
sexual assault forensic examination on K.O. During the examination, and
relevant to this appeal, Nurse Ottersbach took an external vaginal swab (“the
vaginal swab”) from K.O. When K.O. told Nurse Ottersbach that the man had
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 4 of 28
licked her breast, Nurse Ottersbach also took a swab from K.O.’s breast (“the
breast swab”).
[9] While K.O. was being medically examined, Stepfather, who had been
transported to a Louisville hospital, was undergoing surgery for a traumatic
brain injury.4 Also, during this time, law enforcement officers searched the
apartment, collected evidence, and took photographs. Specifically, law
enforcement officers collected from K.O.’s bedroom a bed cover (“the bed
cover”), a pair of size 34x32 men’s jeans (“the jeans”), and a magazine
containing .380 caliber ammunition. Further, law enforcement officers
collected a spent .380 caliber case from the hallway where Stepfather had fallen
after he had been shot. In addition, law enforcement officers took three
photographs of the apartment’s front door frame, which showed damage near
the strike plate (“the damaged front door frame photographs”).
[10] Following her medical examination, K.O. spoke with a law enforcement
officer. Although she had not seen the face of the man who had sexually
assaulted her, she identified the man as forty-six-year-old Kenny Taul (“Taul”).
According to K.O., Taul was “just kind of the drunk guy” who sometimes
“hung out with the neighbors” in the duplex next door. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 250).
K.O. further explained that, on one occasion, Taul had asked her to get him a
beer, and she had told him that she was only thirteen years old. Later,
4
Stepfather spent two months in the hospital and seven months in rehabilitation but never fully recovered
from his traumatic brain injury.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 5 of 28
Stepfather had told Taul that no one should be asking a thirteen-year-old girl for
a beer.
[11] That same day, K.O. identified Taul in a photo array, and she also identified
his voice after hearing him speak at the police station. In addition, Taul wore
size 34x32 jeans, and he had a magazine with .380 caliber ammunition in his
pocket. On April 16, 2023, two days after K.O. had been sexually assaulted,
the State charged Taul with Class A felony attempted murder, Class A felony
rape, Class A felony child molesting, and Class A felony burglary.
[12] The following month, May 2003, a forensic scientist (“the forensic scientist”) at
the state police lab (“the lab”) tested K.O.’s vaginal and breast swabs and
determined that the swabs contained a mixture of K.O.’s DNA and an
unknown male’s DNA (“Unknown Male #1”). The forensic scientist further
determined that the bed cover contained K.O.’s DNA and seminal fluid from
another unknown male (“Unknown Male #2”). According to the forensic
scientist, Taul’s DNA was not consistent with the DNA of either unknown
male. Based on these test results, the State dismissed the charges against Taul.
[13] Although Mother gave law enforcement officers a list of additional suspects,
DNA testing revealed that the DNA of the additional suspects was not
consistent with the DNA of either of the unknown males. With no further
leads, in late 2003, law enforcement officers classified the case as a cold case.
[14] Seventeen years later, in September 2020, Mother contacted Charlestown
Police Department Detective Jason Broady (“Detective Broady”) and asked
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 6 of 28
him if there were any updates on the case. At that time, all of the original
investigating officers had retired, and Detective Broady, who had begun
working at the police department in 2004, after the 2003 investigation had
occurred, was not familiar with the case. However, after speaking with Mother,
“it didn’t sit well with” him that a thirteen-year-old girl had been sexually
assaulted and her stepfather had been shot in front of her and no one was
working on the case. (Tr. Vol. 5 at 18). Detective Broady reviewed the case file
and the evidence and met with K.O. in October 2020. He believed that if the
case was going to be solved, it would probably be through DNA.
[15] Detective Broady began his investigation by requesting DNA testing of
Stepfather, K.O.’s biological father (“biological father”), K.O.’s brother
(“brother”), and other potential suspects who had not had their DNA tested
during the 2003 investigation. The results of those DNA tests revealed that
none of the men’s DNA was consistent with Unknown Male #1’s DNA. In
addition, the DNA tests revealed that the DNA of K.O.’s brother, who had
been fifteen years old in 2003, was consistent with the DNA of Unknown Male
#2, whose DNA had been found on the bed cover. Following a further
investigation, Detective Broady concluded that the seminal fluid that had been
detected on the bed cover had likely come from K.O.’s brother when he had
stayed in K.O.’s room while she had visited biological father in Kentucky.
[16] In addition, Detective Broady discovered that the jeans had never been tested
for DNA, and he sent them to the state police lab for a DNA test. The results
of that test revealed that the DNA on the jeans was consistent with Unknown
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 7 of 28
Male #1’s DNA, which had also been found on K.O.’s vaginal and breast
swabs. With no additional leads regarding the identity of Unknown Male #1,
Detective Broady submitted Unknown Male #1’s DNA to a genetic genealogy
company (“the genetic genealogy company”).
[17] In late December 2022, Detective Broady received “a tip” from the genetic
genealogy company that the Unknown Male #1 “was likely a child of Mary
Jean Lozier [Hollowell] and Ronald Hollowell from Charlestown [(collectively
“parents”)].” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 52-53). After receiving this tip, Detective Broady
conducted a further investigation regarding the Hollowell family and learned
that parents had three daughters and three sons, Hollowell, Dennis (“Dennis”),
and Ronald (“Ronald”) (collectively “the brothers”).
[18] In addition, Detective Broady determined that Ronald had a prior felony
conviction and that his DNA was included in CODIS.5 Ronald’s DNA was not
consistent with Unknown Male #1’s DNA, and Ronald was excluded as a
suspect. Detective Broady then investigated Dennis, and a law enforcement
officer swabbed the door handle of Dennis’ truck while Dennis was at work. A
5
“CODIS is the combined index DNA system.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 53). In other words, “it’s a database that
contains DNA profiles for millions and millions of people.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 53). There are a variety of reasons
that DNA gets put into CODIS, and “[o]ne of the biggest uses that law enforcement gets out of it is when
certain persons are arrested or convicted of felonies, . . . , their DNA gets collected and it gets automatically
put into the CODIS system.” (Tr. Vol 5 at 54). Law enforcement officers do not have the ability to go into
CODIS, but they “can reach out to CODIS . . . to ask them questions or things like that.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 54).
In addition, “a lot of times [law enforcement officers] w[ill] get CODIS hits back[.]” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 54). The
CODIS hit “just comes in . . . an email and it tells you . . ., . . . this person’s DNA profile was found in
CODIS.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 54).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 8 of 28
DNA analysis of that swab revealed that Dennis’ DNA was not consistent with
Unknown Male #1’s DNA, and Dennis was also excluded as a suspect.
[19] Detective Broady subsequently located Hollowell’s truck at a garage where the
truck had been towed following an accident. A law enforcement officer
collected DNA swabs from various areas of the truck, but the forensic scientist
at the state police lab determined that none of the swabs contained sufficient
DNA for her to analyze.
[20] On July 20, 2023, Detective Broady prepared a twenty-two page affidavit (“the
affidavit”) in support of his request for a search warrant to collect Hollowell’s
DNA. In the affidavit, Detective Broady reviewed the facts of the case and the
2003 investigation. He further explained his 2020 conversation with Mother
that had led him to reopen the case. In addition, Detective Broady explained
that early in his investigation, he had obtained DNA samples from stepfather,
biological father, brother, and additional suspects and that none of those
people’s DNA had been consistent with Unknown Male #1’s DNA. He also
explained that he had had the jeans tested for DNA and that results of that test
had revealed that the DNA on the jeans was consistent with the DNA found on
K.O.’s vaginal and breast swabs.
[21] Detective Broady further explained that in December 2022, he had “received a
tip that [Unknown Male #1] was one of three brothers, [Hollowell], Dennis
Hollowell or Ronald Hollowell.” (Ex. Vol. 5 at 49). According to Detective
Broady, in April 2003, Hollowell was thirty-two years old, Dennis was thirtyCourt of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 9 of 28
one years old, and Ronald was twenty years old, and the brothers all lived
within close proximity of the apartment at that time.
[22] Detective Broady further explained that because Ronald had previously been
convicted of a felony, his DNA was in CODIS. According to Detective
Broady, Ronald’s DNA was not consistent with Unknown Male #1’s DNA.
[23] In addition, Detective Broady explained that he had located on social media
2006 photographs of Hollowell and Dennis and determined that both men
might have been capable of wearing size 34x32 jeans. Detective Broady further
explained that in 2003, Dennis had long scraggly hair, and his driver’s license
photograph suggested that he had scruffy facial hair as well. In addition, in
2003, Dennis lived in a house that was located approximately 500 feet from the
apartment.
[24] In the affidavit, Detective Broady explained that in January 2023, he and
another detective began conducting surveillance of Dennis. After discovering
that Dennis was operating his truck (“the truck”) with an expired registration,
Detective Broady arranged for another officer to conduct a traffic stop on
Dennis and to swab his driver’s license for DNA (“the driver’s license swab”).
In addition, Detective Broady noticed that when Dennis was inside the truck,
he opened his truck’s door handle (“the door handle”) by rolling down the
window and reaching through it. Based on this observation that Dennis
touched the door handle every time that he got into and out of the truck,
Detective Broady swabbed the truck’s door handle (“the door handle swab”) for
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 10 of 28
DNA. Detective Brody submitted both swabs to the state police lab, and tests
revealed that Dennis was not Unidentified Male #1.
[25] In addition, Detective Broady explained in the affidavit that he had learned that
Hollowell’s truck had been towed to a garage following an accident in October
2022 and that the garage had taken over ownership of the truck after Hollowell
had abandoned it. According to Detective Broady, he had gone to the garage
and had taken swabs from the steering wheel, the gearshift, and the ignition
key. However, there was not enough DNA on the swabs for the forensic
scientist at the state police lab to do an analysis. Another detective went back
to the garage and took additional swabs of Hollowell’s truck, but again there
was not enough DNA on those swabs to do an analysis.
[26] According to the affidavit, Detective Broady, who had no idea where Hollowell
was living or staying, believed that efforts to locate him were futile. Detective
Broady asked the forensic scientist about the possibility of performing “some
sort of kinship analysis” with the DNA that the lab had. (Ex. Vol. 5 at 52).
The forensic scientist told Detective Broady that she would contact a forensic
scientist on the paternity side of the lab (“the other forensic scientist”) to see if
he could do a kinship analysis.
[27] In May 2023, Detective Broady received a certificate of DNA analysis and
comparisons (“the certificate”) from the other forensic scientist. According to
the certificate, the other forensic scientist had compared the DNA profile from
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 11 of 28
the jeans to the DNA profile extracted from the door handle. The certificate
specifically provided as follows regarding that comparison:
The genetic results support the conclusion that Unknown Male
#1 and [the person whose DNA profile had been extracted from
the door handle] are related as full siblings. These genetic results
are 88.93 times more likely if Unknown Male #1 is a full sibling
of [the person whose DNA profile had been extracted from the
door handle] than if they are unrelated. The probability of
relationship (assuming a prior probability of 0.5) is 98.8880%.
(Ex. Vol. 5 at 53).
[28] In the affidavit, Detective Broady summarized the certificate as follows:
In layman’s terms the Certificate of Analysis indicated that the
DNA belonging to the perpetrator of the offenses to [Stepfather]
and KO was a full sibling to Dennis, with 98.8880% probability.
This leaves only a 1.112% possibility that they are not full
siblings; while the 1.112% is possible, it is not probable.
(Ex. Vol. 5 at 53).
[29] Detective Broady further explained that after he had received the certificate, he
had verified that Dennis’ male full siblings were Hollowell and Ronald. He had
also searched parents’ obituaries to verify that parents had not had more than
three sons. According to Detective Broady, he had found no evidence that
suggested that parents “had any other male children in common that would be
a full sibling to Dennis.” (Ex. Vol. 5 at 53).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 12 of 28 [30] According to the affidavit, in May 2023, Detective Broady had met with K.O.
and had briefed her about his investigative findings. He had also verified the
information that K.O. had provided during the 2003 investigation.
[31] Also, in the affidavit, Detective Broady summarized the results of his
investigation with “the following factors which have been indicated above that
[Hollowell] is the perpetrator to the offenses described in this probable cause
affidavit;”
• Past address history for [Hollowell] indicate[s] in and
around April 2003 he was living within close proximity of
[the apartment] . . .
• Photographs of [Hollowell] indicate that he would have
been the appropriate size to wear 34x32 jeans
• Driver’s license photos of [Hollowell] from 1999 through
2004 show that he had scruffy facial hair and at one point
a mustache
• [Hollowell] is the son of Mary Jean Hollowell and Ronald
Eugene Hollowell
• Mary Jean Hollowell and Ronald Eugene Hollowell had
six children in total, three females and three males;
[Hollowell], Dennis and Ronald
• Dennis and Ronald have been eliminated as suspects
through DNA analysis
• The suspect’s DNA profile as analyzed through DNA left
at the scene of the crime; a [vaginal] swab collected from
KO, [a breast swab collected from KO] and from the jeans
left by the suspect, indicate that he (suspect) is a full sibling
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 13 of 28
to the DNA profile collected from the exterior door handle
of Dennis’ truck
• Dennis has two male siblings, [Hollowell] and Ronald
• Ronald’s DNA profile had been entered into CODIS
following his felony arrests and no “CODIS hits” had been
received
• [The CODIS administrator] confirmed that Ronald’s
DNA profile was in CODIS as was the suspect profile
from the DNA collections on KO’s body. [The CODIS
Administrator] further advised that she checked the
profiles herself and Ronald was definitely not the suspect.
• Your affiant was unable to find any records that suggested
Mary Jean Hollowell and Ronald Eugene Hollowell had
any other male children aside from [Hollowell], Dennis
and Ronald
• By process of elimination it is more probable than not that
[Hollowell] is the perpetrator of the offenses described
herein.
(Ex. Vol. 5 at 54-55).
[32] The trial court issued a search warrant authorizing law enforcement to collect
Hollowell’s DNA. In addition, on July 20, 2023, the State charged Hollowell
with Class A felony rape, Class A felony child molesting, Class A felony
burglary, and Class A felony attempted murder.6 Law enforcement officers
arrested Hollowell that same day.
6
The jury acquitted Hollowell of the attempted murder charge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 14 of 28 [33] Following his arrest, Hollowell agreed to speak to Detective Broady. During
the video-recorded police interview (“the police interview”), Hollowell told
Detective Broady that he did not know K.O. and that he had never been in the
apartment. Detective Broady told Hollowell that his DNA had been found on
the jeans and on K.O.’s body. In addition, Detective Broady asked Hollowell
multiple times how his DNA had gotten on K.O.’s body. Each time, Hollowell
responded that he had no idea or that he could not explain how that had
happened. According to Hollowell, the DNA evidence had to have been
incorrect. At the end of the police interview, a law enforcement officer
collected Hollowell’s DNA with a buccal swab.
[34] The results of the DNA test revealed that the DNA on the jeans was “at least
one trillion times more likely if it originated from David Edward Hollowell and
two unknown individuals than if it had originated from three unknown,
unrelated individuals. This statistical analysis provides very strong support for
the proposition that David Edward Hollowell is included.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 73).
Further, the DNA on the breast swab, which was consistent with Hollowell,
occurred in one in seventy-six quintillion within a Caucasian population of
unrelated individuals. (Ex. Vol. 9 at 109). Lastly, the DNA on the vaginal
swab, was “four thousand one hundred times more likely if it originated from
[K.O.] and David Edward Hollowell than if it originated from [K.O.] and an
unknown, unrelated individual. This statistical analysis provides moderate
support for the proposition that David Edward Hollowell is included.” (Tr.
Vol. 5 at 84).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 15 of 28 [35] In July 2023, Hollowell filed a motion to quash the search warrant wherein he
requested that the trial court order the State to “return or destroy any DNA
information obtained from the service of such warrant.” (App. Vol. 2 at 58).
Hollowell specifically argued that the search warrant had not been supported by
probable cause. Following a hearing, the trial court found “that reasonable
inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support[ed] probable cause
for the search warrant . . . for [Hollowell]’s DNA” and denied Hollowell’s
motion to quash. (App. Vol. 2 at 80).
[36] In August 2023, Hollowell filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his motion
to quash. In September 2023, before the trial court had ruled on his motion to
reconsider, Hollowell filed a motion to correct error wherein he asked the trial
court to vacate its order denying his motion to quash. That same month, the
trial court denied Hollowell’s motions to reconsider and to correct error.
[37] The following month, October 2023, Hollowell filed a motion requesting that
the trial court certify for interlocutory appeal its order denying his motions to
reconsider and to correct error. The trial court granted Hollowell’s motion and
certified its interlocutory order for appeal, and Hollowell filed a petition asking
this Court to accept jurisdiction of his interlocutory appeal. In December 2023,
this Court’s motions panel denied Hollowell’s petition.
[38] At Hollowell’s six-day trial in October 2024, the jury heard the facts as set forth
above regarding the offenses and the 2003 and 2023 investigations. In addition,
the trial court admitted into evidence, over Hollowell’s objection, the results of
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 16 of 28
his DNA test. The trial court also admitted into evidence the damaged front
door frame photographs. At the end of the trial, during the testimony of the
final witness, Detective Broady, the trial court admitted into evidence and the
jury watched the video of the police interview. Hollowell did not testify.
[39] In addition, during closing argument, the prosecutor argued as follows:
You heard David Hollowell in his police interview say that he’s
never met [K.O.], doesn’t know who she is, has never seen her,
but what you didn’t hear in that police interview was an
explanation how in the world would his DNA get on a thirteenyear old’s vagina if he’s never met her? If he’s never seen her?
How in the world would David Hollowell’s DNA get on her left
breast? How? He didn’t give you an explanation.
(Tr. Vol. 5 at 175). Hollowell requested to approach the bench and asked the
trial court to grant a mistrial. According to Hollowell, the prosecutor had
engaged in misconduct by improperly commenting on his failure to testify. The
prosecutor responded that she was “merely talking about what was shown in
the interview, which was exactly (inaudible) he was asked to explain, and he
couldn’t give an explanation.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 175). The trial court denied
Hollowell’s motion for a mistrial.
[40] When the prosecutor resumed its closing argument, she explained to the jury as
follows:
And so, we heard in the police interview that Detective Broad[y]
confronted Mr. Hollowell asking for an explanation. The
important thing is, Mr. Hollowell’s not required to provide an
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 17 of 28
explanation, ok? He’s not required to testify. But you saw the
video. So, think about the video, think about the interview.
(Tr. Vol. 5 at 176). During Hollowell’s closing argument, he contended that
Taul, who had died in 2016 or 2017, had committed the offenses in this case.
[41] Following closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury, in relevant part,
as follows:
[A] person charged with the commission of a crime cannot be
compelled to testify and is under no duty or obligation to testify.
The fact that [Hollowell] did not testify raises no presumption of
any kind against him. It shall not be commented upon, referred
to, or in any manner considered by the Jury in determining the
guilt or innocence of [Hollowell].
(Tr. Vol. 5 at 196).
[42] The jury convicted Hollowell of Class A felony rape, Class A felony child
molesting, and Class A felony burglary. Following a sentencing hearing, the
trial court sentenced Hollowell to an aggregate sentence of sixty (60) years.
[43] Hollowell now appeals.
Decision
[44] Hollowell argues that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his
DNA test results; (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion for a mistrial; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction for Class A felony burglary. We address each of his contentions in
turn.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 18 of 28
1. Admission of Evidence
[45] Hollowell first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
into evidence his DNA test results. Although we generally review claims
relating to the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, to the extent
those claims implicate constitutional issues, we review them de novo. Ramirez
v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 189 (Ind. 2021). Here, Hollowell specifically contends
that “[t]he search warrant affidavit which led to the collection of this evidence
was not supported by probable cause, and therefore, [his] right against
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment was violated.”
(Hollowell’s Br. 18). We disagree.
[46] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant. State v. Rivera, 255 N.E.3d 1223,
1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “Probable cause is a fluid concept
incapable of precise definition and must be decided based on the facts of each
case.” Id. at 1230-31 (cleaned up). “Significantly, probable cause requires only
a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of
such activity.” Id. at 1231 (cleaned up). Further, “[p]robable cause is not a
high bar.” Id. (cleaned up). “In deciding whether to issue a search warrant, the
issuing magistrate’s task is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a fair
probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id.
(cleaned up).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 19 of 28 [47] When reviewing whether a search warrant was supported by probable cause,
our duty as the reviewing court is to determine whether the magistrate had a
“substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed. Id. In
considering whether the trial court had a substantial basis for its decision, we
consider only the evidence presented to the trial court. Id. In addition, in
determining whether an affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant, doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of upholding the
warrant. Id. We presume that the search warrant was valid, and “the burden is
upon the defendant to overturn that presumption.” Albrecht v. State, 185 N.E.3d
412, 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.
[48] Here, Hollowell argues that the affidavit was insufficient to support a finding of
probable cause and the issuance of the search warrant because the affidavit did
not support the reliability of the informant who gave the tip. “The United
States Supreme Court has held that uncorroborated hearsay from a source of
unknown credibility, standing alone, is insufficient to support a finding of
probable cause and issuance of a search warrant.” Ware v. State, 859 N.E.2d
708, 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)), reh’g
denied, trans. denied. Similarly, INDIANA CODE § 35-33-5-2(b) requires that
probable cause affidavits based on hearsay either:
(1) contain reliable information establishing the credibility of
the source and of each of the declarants of the hearsay and
establishing that there is a factual basis for the information
furnished; or
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 20 of 28
(2) contain information that establishes that the totality of the
circumstances corroborates the hearsay.
[49] “Independent police investigation corroborating an anonymous informant’s
statements will establish the trustworthiness of the hearsay for the purposes of
establishing probable cause.” Ware, 859 N.E.2d at 716. “However, the
confirmation of easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the
tip is insufficient to establish an informant’s credibility.” Id. (cleaned up).
[50] Here, our review of the affidavit reveals that after Detective Broady had
received the tip that Unknown Male #1 was likely a child of Mary Jean Lozier
Hollowell and Ronald Hollowell from Charlestown, Detective Broady
undertook an extensive investigation to verify the tip. Specifically, as set forth
in his twenty-two-page affidavit, he determined that parents had three sons,
Ronald, Dennis, and Hollowell. After ruling out both Ronald, whose DNA
was located on CODIS, and Dennis, whose DNA was not consistent with
Unknown Male #1’s DNA, Detective Broady focused his investigation on
Hollowell. During the course of that investigation, Detective Broady obtained
the following information about Hollowell: (1) his past address history revealed
that, in 2003, he was living in close proximity to the apartment; (2) old
photographs that Detective Broady found on social media revealed that he
would have been the appropriate size to wear 34x32 jeans; and (3) 1999 to 2004
driver’s license photographs revealed that Hollowell had scruffy facial hair
during that time.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 21 of 28 [51] In addition, Detective Broady asked the lab to do paternity testing to compare
Dennis’ DNA to Unknown Male #1’s DNA. As a result of the testing,
Detective Broady learned that there was a high probability that Dennis and
Unknown Male #1 were full biological siblings. Further, Detective Broady
searched parents’ obituaries and found no evidence that suggested parents had
any other male children that would be a full sibling to Dennis.
[52] These facts set forth in the affidavit, which were not easily obtained,
corroborated the informant’s tip and provided sufficient evidence to support the
trial court’s probable cause determination. Accordingly, the trial court did not
err in admitting into evidence Hollowell’s DNA results.7
7
Hollowell also argues that the affidavit was not supported by probable cause because Detective
Broady misrepresented the mathematical likelihood of a sibling relationship between Dennis and
Unknown Male #1. Specifically, although Hollowell acknowledges that Detective Broady properly
quoted the following language from the lab’s certificate: “The probability of relationship (assuming a
prior probability of 0.5) [was] 98.8880%[,]” Hollowell contends that Detective Broady misstated the
evidence when he claimed that “[t]his le[ft] only a 1.112% possibility that they [were] not full siblings
while the 1.112% is possible, it is not probable.” (Ex. Vol. 5 at 53). Assuming, without deciding, that
Detective Broady misstated the mathematical likelihood of a sibling relationship, our Indiana Supreme
Court has explained that “[a] warrant is not invalid simply because it contains slightly inaccurate
material that is immaterial to the warrant’s validity.” Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1136 (Ind. 2003).
Rather, “[a] warrant is invalid where the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
the affidavits used to obtain the warrant contain perjury by the affiant, or a reckless disregard for the
truth by him, and the rest of the affidavit does not contain materials sufficient to constitute probable
cause.” Mercado v. State, 200 N.E.3d 463, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (cleaned up), trans. denied.
“Mistakes and inaccuracies of fact stated in a search or arrest warrant will not vitiate the reliability of
the affidavits so long as such mistakes were innocently made.” Id. Here, we have found nothing in the
record to support a finding that Detective Broady intentionally misrepresented in the affidavit the
mathematical likelihood of a sibling relationship. Further, the alleged misstatement was not material to
the determination of probable cause. See Darring v. State, 101 N.E.3d 263, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)
(explaining that the typical formulation of material facts is that they cast doubt on the existence of
probable cause). In other words, where Detective Broady correctly stated the probability set forth in the
lab’s certificate, there was nothing about his alleged misstatement that negated the probable cause set
forth above.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 22 of 28
2. Denial of Motion for a Mistrial
[53] Hollowell next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion for a mistrial. He specifically contends that the trial court should
have granted his mistrial motion because “[t]he Prosecutor committed
misconduct and deprived [him] of a fair trial when she commented in closing
arguments on his failure to testify.” (Hollowell’s Br. 14). We disagree.
[54] We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial for
an abuse of discretion. Juvinall v. State, 271 N.E.3d 144, 148 (Ind. Ct. App.
2025). A mistrial is an extreme remedy that is justified only when other
remedial measures are insufficient to rectify the situation. Id.
[55] Our Indiana Supreme Court has recently explained that:
[w]hen reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct properly
raised in the trial court, we determine (1) whether misconduct
occurred, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all the
circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to
which he or she would not have been subjected otherwise.
Whether a prosecutor’s argument constitutes misconduct is
measured by reference to case law and the Rules of Professional
Conduct. The gravity of the peril is measured by the probable
persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury’s decision rather
than the degree of impropriety of the conduct.
Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1077 (Ind. 2025) (cleaned up).
[56] “The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is
violated when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 23 of 28
interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from the
defendant’s silence.” Juvinall, 271 N.E.3d at 148. “However, our Supreme
Court has indicated that, if in its totality the prosecutor’s comment is addressed
to other evidence rather than the defendant’s failure to testify, it is not grounds
for reversal.” Id. (cleaned up).
[57] Here, during closing argument, the prosecutor commented that, during the
police interview, Hollowell had stated that that he had never met K.O. but had
not provided, during that police interview, an explanation for how his DNA
had gotten on thirteen-year-old K.O.’s vagina. After Hollowell had objected
and moved for a mistrial, the prosecutor responded that she was simply
commenting on the video of the police interview that had just been shown to
the jury.
[58] We conclude that the prosecutor’s comments did not explicitly refer to
Hollowell’s decision not to testify at trial and that no reasonable person could
have interpreted them as such. See Bryant v. State, 41 N.E.3d 1031, 1036 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that the prosecutor’s comments did not explicitly
refer to Bryant’s decision not to testify and that no reasonable person could
have interpreted them as such). Rather, the comments addressed other
evidence in the case and are not grounds for reversal. See id.
[59] We further note that after the prosecutor had resumed her closing argument,
she reminded the jurors that in the police interview, Detective Broady had
asked Hollowell for an explanation. The prosecutor further explained that
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 24 of 28
Hollowell was not required to provide an explanation and that he was not
required to testify. In addition, the prosecutor told the jurors that they had seen
the video and asked them to think about it.
[60] Further, the trial court subsequently instructed the jurors regarding Hollowell’s
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and advised them that in determining
Hollowell’s guilt or innocence, they were not to comment upon, refer to, or in
any manner consider Hollowell’s failure to testify at trial. We presume that
jurors follow their instructions. Juvinall, 271 N.E.3d at 149 (cleaned up).
[61] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hollowell’s motion
for a mistrial. See id. (concluding that the prosecutor’s comments during
opening argument were not a reference to Juvinall’s right to remain silent, the
prosecutor did not engage in misconduct, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Juvinall’s motion for mistrial).8
8
We note that Hollowell’s reliance on Reynolds v. State, 797 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) and Herron v.
State, 801 N.E.2d 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) is misplaced because the facts of those cases are distinguishable
from the facts before us. Specifically, in Reynolds, during closing argument, the prosecutor pointed out that
Reynolds had “take[n] the 5th Amendment” while on the witness stand at trial and that “[y]ou take the 5th
Amendment when you got something to be concerned about.” Reynolds, 797 N.E.2d at 868. We concluded
that the prosecutor’s argument included a “direct comment on Reynolds’s exercise of his right against selfincrimination” and reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 869-70. In the Herron case, Herron had
been charged with attempted murder for shooting another man, and the gun had not been found. During
closing argument, the prosecutor stated that Herron was “the only one in the courtroom that can certainly tell
us where that gun is[.]” Herron, 801 N.E.2d at 765. “Because the prosecutor’s comment reasonably c[ould]
[have] be[en] interpreted to suggest that it was Herron’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination that prevented the State from producing the nine-millimeter handgun that
[had] shot [the other] man, and this comment was not invited by Herron, [we concluded that] Herron ha[d]
met his burden of establishing a Fifth Amendment violation. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded the
case for a new trial. Id. at 766. Here, as previously discussed, the prosecutor’s comments simply addressed
other evidence in the case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 25 of 28
3. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[62] Lastly, Hollowell argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for Class A felony burglary. We disagree.
[63] “Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well
established, as we have made clear that it is the fact-finder’s role, not that of
appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to
determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d
at 1090 (cleaned up). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if there
is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense
such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). We review only the evidence
most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom and will
reverse “only where it is shown that no reasonable fact-finder could find the
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1090-91
(cleaned up).
[64] To convict Hollowell of Class A felony burglary, the State had to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Hollowell broke and entered the building or structure of
another person with intent to commit a felony in it and that the offense resulted
in bodily injury or serious bodily to a person other than Hollowell. See I.C. §
35-43-2-1. Hollowell’s sole argument is that “[t]here is no evidence of the
‘breaking’ element in this case.” (Hollowell’s Br. 34).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 26 of 28 [65] “[A] ‘breaking’ is proved by showing that even the slightest force was used to
gain unauthorized entry.” Wilburn v. State, 177 N.E.3d 805, 814 (Ind. Ct. App.
2021) (cleaned up). For example, even opening an unlocked door or pushing a
door that is slightly ajar constitutes “a breaking” if the entry was unauthorized.
Id. However, “walking through an open door does not constitute a ‘breaking’
as such element is known in the crime of burglary.” Id. (cleaned up). Further,
the element of breaking may be proved entirely by circumstantial evidence.
Wadsworth v. State, 750 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Ind. 2001), reh’g denied.
[66] Hollowell contends that “[t]he State did not present any evidence that [he]
committed any force when he allegedly entered [Stepfather] and K.O.’s
residence[,]” and that there was “no evidence regarding whether [Stepfather]
closed the front door . . . [when] leaving for work or whether he left it open.”
(Hollowell’s Br. 34, 35). First, our review of the evidence reveals that the trial
court admitted into evidence the damaged door frame photographs, which
showed damage to the front door frame near the strike plate. Based on this
evidence, a reasonable juror could have determined that Hollowell caused that
damage when he “broke” and entered the house. Second, “when determining
whether an element exists, the jury may rely on its collective common sense
and knowledge acquired through every day experiences.” Halsema v. State, 823
N.E.2d 668, 674 (Ind. 2005). Thus, a reasonable juror could have also
determined that Mother and Stepfather would have shut, if not locked, the front
door when leaving their sleeping thirteen-year-old daughter alone in the house.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 27 of 28
As a result, we hold that there is sufficient evidence to support Hollowell’s
conviction for Class A felony burglary, and we affirm it.
[67] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Matthew J. McGovern
Fishers, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Steven J. Hosler
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-52 August 24, 2026 Page 28 of 28