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Pepe v. Pratt & Whitney
APPENDIX
ANDREA PEPE v. PRATT & WHITNEY,
A DIVISION OF RAYTHEON
TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION *1
Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford
File No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S
Memorandum filed April 15, 2025
Proceedings
Memorandum of decision on defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. Motion granted.
Anthony S. Califano and Nicole C. Chomiak, for the
defendant.
James V. Sabatini, for the plaintiff.
Opinion
CHAVEY, J. Before the court is a motion filed by the
defendant, Pratt & Whitney, a division of Raytheon
Technologies Corporation (now known as RTX Corporation), seeking summary judgment on the one count
gender2 discrimination complaint filed by the plaintiff, Andrea Pepe. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., when it failed to hire her because of her gender. The defendant now contends that it is entitled to summary judgment
because the factual record permits no reasonable inference of gender discrimination.
*
Affirmed. Pepe v. Pratt & Whitney, 241 Conn. App. 234, A.3d (2026).
2
The Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., prohibits, inter alia, discrimination because of “sex,” but the plaintiff’s complaint and the parties’ briefs use the term “gender” in place of “sex.” Neither party has argued or suggested that the difference between “gender” and “sex” is material in this case. For convenience, the court herein uses the term “gender,” as do the parties, rather than the statutory term “sex,” in its discussion of the plaintiff’s claims, and the parties’ positions.
Pepe v. Pratt & Whitney
After hearing the parties’ arguments on March 31,
2025, and after considering the parties’ briefs and the prevailing law, the court grants the defendant’s motion.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
“Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Dunn v. Northeast Helicopters Flight Services, LLC, 346 Conn. 360, 369–70, 290 A.3d 780 (2023).
“The party seeking summary judgment has the burden
of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts [that], under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle [such party] to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact [that] will make a difference in the result of the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Day v. Seblatnigg, 341 Conn. 815, 825, 268 A.3d 595 (2022). “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court’s
function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) HM Construction & Painting,
LLC v. 32 Wilmot Place, LLC, 222 Conn. App. 261, 269,
305 A.3d 302 (2023).
“When a court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is confronted with conflicting facts, resolution and interpretation of which would require determinations
of credibility, summary judgment is not appropriate.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sen v. Tsiongas, 192 Conn. App. 188, 196, 217 A.3d 657, cert. denied, 333
Conn. 940, 218 A.3d 1047 (2019); see also Straw Pond
Associates, LLC v. Fitzpatrick, Mariano & Santos, P.C.,
Pepe v. Pratt & Whitney
167 Conn. App. 691, 710, 145 A.3d 292, cert. denied,
323 Conn. 930, 150 A.3d 231 (2016).
FACTS
Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the summary judgment record reveals the following facts.
The plaintiff, who is female, applied for employment
at the defendant and was invited for an interview for the position of mechanical system servicer. The plaintiff is a certified mechanic and worked as an automotive technician and service advisor at Midas from 2006 to 2017. When she applied for employment at the defendant in
2021, she had not been employed outside the home since 2017.
On November 17, 2021, the plaintiff participated in a
telephonic first round interview, conducted by Brandon Updegraff for the defendant. At that time, Updegraff
told her “everybody was on board,” and they wanted her to “see the shop to make sure [she] was on board.” He also told her at that time that there were other people who would be involved in making the hiring decision.
Soon thereafter, the plaintiff had a second telephonic interview with Updegraff as well as Connor Sperry and
Darren Lawhorn, who were employees of the defendant.
During this second interview, the defendant told the
plaintiff about pay rates, union dues, and work schedules. The defendant told her: “We’re all on board, the job is yours if you like the shop when you come and see it.” The interviewers made her feel like she had the job and told her to bring steel-toed boots and safety glasses when she came to an on-site interview. At this point, the defendant knew the plaintiff was female.
On December 13, 2021, the plaintiff went to the defendant for the on-site interview. She met in an office with the same three employees of the defendant—Updegraff,
Sperry, and Lawhorn—but she felt that something was
not right and that their attitudes toward her had completely changed. Sperry refused to shake her hand. She
Pepe v. Pratt & Whitney
did not know if the change in attitude was “because I’m short, I’m tiny, and I have tattoos and I’m a girl. I don’t know.”
During the on-site interview, the plaintiff discussed
her experience as an automotive technician as well as her general experience fixing things, such as motorcycles. Updegraff told her that she was more than qualified
for the job because of her mechanical experience. The
plaintiff knew that the defendant manufactures aircraft engines, not automotive engines, and she had no airplane hydraulics experience and only a little bit of pneumatics experience. The plaintiff left the on-site interview feeling she did not have the job, based on how the defendant treated her.
After December 13, 2021, the plaintiff spoke to her
uncle, who works for the defendant, and she told him
she had not gotten the mechanical system servicer position. He then asked around the shop and subsequently
told the plaintiff that “word around the shop is [Sperry] doesn’t like women.”
The defendant had eighty-eight applicants for the
mechanical system servicer position and interviewed
approximately fifteen of them, including the plaintiff. Sperry and Updegraff decided together to select Andrew J. Stoltz for the position, and they relied on input from two other employees of the defendant, Dan Neveu and
David Seidel, who had shown the plaintiff around the
defendant’s facility. Stoltz is a certified mechanic with over twenty-five years of machining experience, including over twenty years repairing hydraulic machine components. The plaintiff claims that, as compared to Stoltz, she was equally qualified.
ANALYSIS
The Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) [f]or an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent . . . to refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of the individual’s . . .
Pepe v. Pratt & Whitney
sex . . . .” General Statutes § 46a-60 (b). In its consideration of the defendant’s summary judgment motion, the
court applies the motivating factor test as the applicable causation standard for claims of discrimination under
the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. See
Wallace v. Caring Solutions, LLC, 213 Conn. App. 605,
626, 278 A.3d 586 (2022).
Assuming the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and given the plaintiff’s acknowledgment that the defendant has met its burden of production by proffering a nondiscriminatory basis for its decision not to hire the plaintiff, the court focuses on whether there is evidence from which a fact finder could draw a reasonable inference that the defendant was motivated
by gender when it decided not to hire the plaintiff. See Rossova v. Charter Communications, LLC, 211 Conn.
App. 676, 684–85, 273 A.3d 697 (2022) (setting forth
burden shifting framework under McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973)); Stubbs v. ICare Management, LLC,
198 Conn. App. 511, 522, 233 A.3d 1170 (2020) (“[t]o
defeat summary judgment . . . the plaintiff’s admissible evidence must show circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the defendant’s employment decision was more likely than
not based in whole or in part on discrimination” (internal quotation marks omitted)).3
The plaintiff relies on the following evidence in support of her argument that a reasonable inference of gender
discrimination could be drawn from this record: (1) the defendant told the plaintiff that she was qualified and 3
The plaintiff does not argue that the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to hire her was a pretext for discrimination. Rather, the plaintiff relies on the alternative theory that the plaintiff’s gender was a motivating factor in the defendant’s decision. See Docket Entry No. 123, p. 10 (citing Bart v. Golub Corp., 96 F.4th 566, 578 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 145 S. Ct. 173, 220 L. Ed. 2d (2024); see also Wallace v. Caring Solutions, LLC, supra, 213 Conn. App. 626 (Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act requires proof that protected characteristic was “motivating factor”).
Pepe v. Pratt & Whitney
that the job was hers, but then did not hire her; (2) the defendant’s employees, including the decision makers,
were unfriendly to the plaintiff at the on-site interview, and Sperry refused to shake her hand; and (3) an employee of the defendant who is also the plaintiff’s uncle told her that “word around the shop is [Sperry] doesn’t like women.”
As to the contrast between the defendant’s reaction
to the plaintiff during the phone interviews and at the on-site interview, no reasonable inference can be drawn that gender was the reason. The plaintiff herself suggested it could have been her short stature or her tattoos that led to the defendant’s alleged change of mind at the on-site interview.4 Nor is there any comparative evidence regarding the defendant’s treatment of other
interviewees on the phone and in person. On this record, it would be pure speculation to infer that the defendant’s employees, knowing that the plaintiff was female, were encouraging at the telephonic interview stage and even 4
At oral argument on the defendant’s motion, the plaintiff asserted that her theory could be viewed as “gender plus,” meaning that it was the plaintiff’s gender plus another factor, e.g., her petite, small stature that was a motivating factor in the defendant’s decision not to hire her. The plaintiff has not, however, presented legal authority for the application of such a theory here, nor does her complaint allege a gender plus theory.
The court notes that, although a gender plus theory has been adopted in federal courts; see, e.g., Laiscell v. Board of Education, Docket No. 20-CV-01463 (VLB), 2023 WL 6200325, *7 (D. Conn. September 22, 2023) (“gender plus” theory is “a judicial convenience developed in the context of Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2024)] to affirm that plaintiffs can, under certain circumstances, survive summary judgment even when not all members of a disfavored class are discriminated against” (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 2024 WL 5182916 (2d Cir. December 20, 2024)); no Connecticut appellate decisions have addressed the issue.
In any event, there is no more evidence of a “gender plus” motivation here than there is evidence of gender alone as a motivating factor. Rather, it would be pure speculation for a fact finder to conclude, on this record, in the absence of any evidence regarding comparators (including, for example, evidence of Stoltz’s stature) or other indicia of the defendant’s motivation, that the defendant was motivated by either the plaintiff’s gender or her gender plus small stature when it decided not to hire her.
Pepe v. Pratt & Whitney
said “the job is yours,” but then were motivated by her gender when they changed their minds at the on-site
interview.
Similarly, as to the defendant’s employees’ unfriendliness to the plaintiff at the on-site interview, even refusing to shake her hand, it would be pure speculation for a fact finder to conclude that the plaintiff’s gender was a motivating factor underlying this unfriendliness. It is no doubt true, as the plaintiff argues, that discrimination claims most often must be proven through inferences based on circumstantial evidence, but it also is true that, to defeat summary judgment, the plaintiff
must cite evidence from which a reasonable inference of discrimination could be drawn. Here, there is no evidence that the unfriendliness related to the plaintiff’s gender. There is no evidence, for example, that male candidates were treated differently in terms of the friendliness of the defendant’s employees at the on-site interview.
Finally, the plaintiff relies on her testimony about the statement her uncle made to her after she learned that the defendant had not selected her for the mechanical
system servicer position. The uncle’s statement to her referred to “word around the shop” that Sperry did not like women. The defendant argues that this statement is inadmissible, multilevel hearsay and, as such, cannot be considered. See Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 533–34, 923 A.2d 638 (2007); Walker v.
Housing Authority, 148 Conn. App. 591, 600, 85 A.3d
1230 (2014); DeOliveira v. PMG Land Associates, L.P.,
105 Conn. App. 369, 375 n.7, 939 A.2d 2 (2008). The
plaintiff contends, by contrast, that the statement should not be excluded by the hearsay rule because it was made by an employee of the defendant and thus is permissible under § 8-3 (1) (D) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.
The court concludes that the uncle’s statement may
not be considered. Regarding whether the statement is
subject to the hearsay exception in § 8-3 (1) (D), the record is barren as to whether the plaintiff’s uncle made the statement “within the scope of the . . . employment . . . .”
Pepe v. Pratt & Whitney
As § 8-3 (1) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: “The hearsay statement itself may not be considered to establish the . . . existence or scope of the relationship under (D) . . . .” Other than the hearsay statement (which, in any event, does not establish the scope of the uncle’s relationship with the defendant), there is no evidence in the record as to the uncle’s role at the company, the scope of his employment, or whether he made the statement
at issue in the scope of his employment.
Rather, in her deposition, the plaintiff described the information from her uncle as follows: “Well, when I
told my uncle I was, like, wow, I didn’t get that job. I really thought I had it, and I didn’t end up getting it. He must have went back and, I don’t know, heard or talked to someone. But he said, yeah, word around the shop is [Sperry] doesn’t like women.” She further testified that she did not know her uncle’s position with the defendant.
The evidence does not support any inference that the
uncle had a role in hiring generally at the defendant or as to this position specifically, that the uncle worked with Sperry or in the area in which the mechanical system servicer position would work, that the uncle was a manager or supervisor, or any other fact from which
it could be inferred that he made the “word around the shop” statement within the scope of his employment at
the defendant. Accordingly, the uncle’s statement to the plaintiff does not fall within the hearsay exception in § 8-3 (1) (D) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.
Moreover, even if the uncle’s statement to the plaintiff were subject to a hearsay exception, the uncle’s statement itself contains an additional level of hearsay insofar as it refers to “word around the shop,” and thus refers to the statements of others in the defendant’s shop. It is unclear from the plaintiff’s testimony about her uncle’s statement whether he was conveying what one person said to
him or what more than one person said to him. Either
way, even if the court assumes the person or persons who made statements to the uncle about Sperry were themselves employees of the defendant, there is no evidence
Pepe v. Pratt & Whitney
as to the identity, much less the scope of employment, of such employees, and thus the “word around the shop,”
as it was told to the uncle who told it to the plaintiff, is not subject to the hearsay exception at § 8-3 (1) (D) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.5
The plaintiff also seeks to overcome summary judgment by citing Johnson v. Connecticut Judicial Branch, 798 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 (D. Conn. 2011), and earlier
federal cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that evidence that someone outside the protected class was hired constitutes evidence of discrimination. On
this basis, the plaintiff argues that the mere fact that Stoltz, the successful candidate, was male should defeat summary judgment.
Johnson and the other cited cases, as well as more
recent Connecticut state court cases,6 make clear, however, that this principle—that evidence of someone
outside the protected class being hired is evidence of discrimination—applies in the context of the four elements of the McDonnell Douglas Corp. prima facie case, where the burden on the plaintiff is a burden of production and is “minimal . . . .” Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 638, 791 A.2d 518 (2002). The plaintiff does not cite any cases where the sole evidence deemed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the defendant’s motivation, thus precluding summary judgment,
is evidence that someone outside the protected class was 5
The defendant also argued at oral argument that the uncle’s statement was inadmissible lay opinion, but it did not brief this issue—other than making passing references to the uncle’s statement as “hearsay opinion”—and thus the court does not consider this as an alternative ground for deeming evidence of the uncle’s statement impermissible on summary judgment.
6
See, e.g., Taing v. Camrac, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (October 2, 2017) (Noble, J.) (holding that plaintiff had satisfied fourth element of prima facie case with evidence she was “replaced by a male” but nonetheless granting summary judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether employer’s proffered reason for termination was pretextual), aff’d, 189 Conn. App. 23, 206 A.3d 194 (2019).
Pepe v. Pratt & Whitney
treated better. Here, mere evidence that the plaintiff is female and the successful candidate was male is an insufficient basis upon which to deny summary judgment.
Finally, the parties dispute whether the plaintiff must show, on her discriminatory failure to hire claim, that the successful candidate had superior qualifications or merely equal qualifications. This court need not resolve this issue here, however, because, even if the plaintiff were required to show only that her qualifications were equal to those of the successful candidate, and even if the court accepted for purposes of this motion that she was as qualified as Stoltz, the summary judgment record still fails to include any basis upon which a fact finder could draw a reasonable inference that her gender was a motivating factor in the defendant’s decision not to hire her. Indeed, the plaintiff does not claim, nor could she on this record, that a fact finder could reasonably conclude she was more qualified than Stoltz. Additionally, the
undisputed evidence is that approximately fifteen people were interviewed for the mechanical system servicer position and that Stoltz was the only successful candidate, and yet there is no comparative evidence regarding the plaintiff’s qualifications vis-à-vis the other thirteen unsuccessful candidates or the genders of those interviewed. There is no basis upon which to infer that, as between allegedly equally qualified candidates, gender was a motivating factor in the selection of a male over the plaintiff, especially in the context of the defendant’s rejection of approximately thirteen other interviewed
candidates whose qualifications and genders are not in the record.
Accordingly, viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, the evidence provides no basis for a reasonable inference that gender was a motivating factor
in the defendant’s decision not to hire the plaintiff as a mechanical system servicer.
Pepe v. Pratt & Whitney
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
So ordered.