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State v. Acevedo
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PEDRO ACEVEDO
(AC 48259)
Alvord, Moll and Palmer, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted, on pleas of guilty, of the crimes of assault in the first degree, assault of a peace officer, and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of assault in the first degree. Held:
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of assault in the first degree, as the record indicated that, contrary to the defendant’s claim, the defendant understood the nature of the charges and the sentence that would be imposed under the plea agreement, and, although the defendant claimed that his plea resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel, during the court’s thorough plea canvass, he expressly confirmed that he was satisfied with the advice that he had received from defense counsel.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s motion to withdraw his appearance, as the record supported the court’s determination that no substantial reason or exceptional circumstances existed to justify defense counsel’s withdrawal from the case and the appointment of new counsel.
Argued April 14—officially released August 25, 2026
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, assault of a peace officer, evasion of
responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, larceny in the second degree and larceny in the fourth degree,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Hartford, where the defendant was presented to the
court, Gold, J., on pleas of guilty to assault in the first degree, assault of a peace officer and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle; judgment
of guilty in accordance with the pleas; thereafter, the
court denied defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and
the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to
State v. Acevedo
assault in the first degree, and the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Nicole S. Shepter, for the appellant (defendant).
Lauren R. Williams, special deputy assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Sharmese L.
Walcott, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The defendant, Pedro Acevedo, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered in accordance
with a plea agreement, of assault in the first degree in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1), assault of a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1), and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-224
(b) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
improperly denied (1) his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea to the charge of assault in the first degree, and (2) defense counsel’s motion to withdraw his appearance.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as set forth by the prosecutor as
the factual basis underlying the defendant’s guilty plea, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of
this appeal. On September 20, 2021, the police responded
to a report that an individual was stealing items from a
car in a parking lot on Talcott Forest Road in Farmington. Officer James O’Donnell of the Farmington Police
Department, who was the first officer to arrive at the
scene, observed the defendant getting into a vehicle.
With his police cruiser’s lights and sirens activated,
O’Donnell drove his cruiser closer to the defendant. As
he did so, the defendant put his vehicle in reverse, driving backward several feet and up onto a curb.
O’Donnell positioned his cruiser to block the defendant’s vehicle from fleeing. As O’Donnell opened his
door and began to exit the cruiser, the defendant drove
between the driver’s side of the cruiser and other
cars parked in the parking lot. The defendant struck
State v. Acevedo
O’Donnell, pinning him against the cruiser, and then
fled the scene. O’Donnell was seriously injured and spent more than one month in a hospital recovering from his
injuries. He also spent several months in rehabilitation
learning to walk again.
The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged
with assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (1), assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (1), assault of a peace officer in violation of § 53a-167c (a) (1), evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of § 14-224 (b) (1), larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (1), and larceny in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-125 (a).
On June 27, 2024, the state and the defendant reached
a plea agreement with respect to all the charges. Pursuant to that agreement, the defendant pleaded guilty under
the Alford doctrine1 to the charge of assault in the first degree and entered straight guilty pleas to the charges of assault of a peace officer and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle. In exchange, the state
agreed to a sentence recommendation of fifteen years
of incarceration. The trial court, Gold, J., accepted the pleas following a thorough canvass, during which the
defendant affirmed that he understood the terms of the
agreement, including the nature of the charges and the
sentence to which he was exposed. He further stated,
inter alia, that he was satisfied with his counsel’s advice.
The defendant’s sentencing was scheduled for September 24, 2024. When the hearing began on that date,
however, the defendant indicated that he was not prepared to go forward with sentencing because he had not
understood the terms of the plea agreement. Specifically, he stated that he believed he was pleading guilty to assault in the second degree, instead of assault in the first degree, and that he would receive a maximum sentence
1
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
State v. Acevedo
of ten years of incarceration.2 The court interpreted
the defendant’s statements as a request to withdraw
his guilty plea to assault in the first degree.3 The court continued the matter to October 31, 2024, to consider
the defendant’s request and to review the transcript
from the plea hearing.
On October 28, 2024, defense counsel filed a motion to
withdraw his appearance as the defendant’s counsel on
the ground that a conflict had arisen between him and
the defendant during a phone conversation that day.
Defense counsel explained that the defendant was “likely
to assert that [defense] counsel was ineffective in the
representation of him during the plea negotiations and
misadvised him on the law,” and, further, that counsel
had concerns he could not explain fully due to reasons of client confidentiality but which implicated professional
ethical issues for counsel.4 Although defense counsel
“[fundamentally] disagree[d]” with the defendant’s allegations, counsel believed that his “continued representation [of the defendant] is not appropriate.”
At the hearing on October 31, 2024, the court first
addressed defense counsel’s motion to withdraw his
appearance. After hearing from defense counsel and
the defendant, who explained that he was concerned
with defense counsel’s competence relating to counsel’s
failure to obtain certain body camera footage from the
state,5 the court denied counsel’s motion. The court
2
The defendant also stated that he was “under extreme emotional distress” at the time of the plea hearing and that he was not listening during the trial court’s canvass. The court found that these assertions were without merit, and, on appeal, the defendant acknowledges that the record does not support them.
3
The court recognized that the defendant did not raise any claims with respect to his guilty pleas to the other charges. On appeal, the defendant makes clear that his claims relate only to his guilty plea to assault in the first degree.
4
In particular, defense counsel represented that the defendant “appear[ed] likely to persist in a course of conduct [that] counsel . . . believes is fraudulent.”
5
Although the state had produced body camera footage for the defendant, he had raised his concerns regarding additional body camera
State v. Acevedo
explained that it was apparent that the defendant merely
was attempting to delay the resolution of his case and
that no substantial reason or exceptional circumstances
existed to justify the appointment of new counsel. The
court determined that any breakdown in communication between defense counsel and the defendant was
“solely and fully [the defendant’s] responsibility” and
that defense counsel “has continued to express to this
court and demonstrated by his actions his willingness
to represent [the defendant] fully and competently as
required by law.” With respect to the defendant’s claim
about the body camera footage, the court stated: “It is my understanding, based on communications that I’ve had
with [the prosecutor] and [defense counsel], that there
is no body camera footage. It never existed in the first
place.” Finally, the court noted that the defendant had
not raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the September 24, 2024 hearing when the court asked
him to identify all the grounds that he wished to advance in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
The court then denied the defendant’s oral motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. The court, citing numerous portions of the plea canvass that specifically referenced the charge of assault in the first degree, found
the defendant’s purported understanding that he was
pleading guilty to assault in the second degree “to be
wholly and entirely without merit.” Similarly, regarding
the defendant’s claim that he believed he would receive
a sentence of a term of incarceration not to exceed ten
years, the court noted that the transcript of the plea
canvass was “replete with references . . . that the agreed upon sentence . . . would involve fifteen years’ incarceration.” Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no basis for allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea. After denying the defendant’s motion, the court
proceeded to sentence the defendant to a total effective
footage at several prior proceedings, including when he was represented by different counsel. It bears noting that, as the court recognized, several other attorneys previously had entered appearances on behalf of the defendant during the course of his case and then subsequently withdrew.
State v. Acevedo
term of fifteen years of incarceration in accordance with the plea agreement. This appeal followed.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly
denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to assault
in the first degree. Specifically, he argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion because he
demonstrated that (1) he did not understand the nature
of the charges or the sentence that would be imposed as
a result of the plea, and (2) the plea resulted from the
denial of the effective assistance of counsel. We are not persuaded.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review and
relevant legal principles. Practice Book § 39-26 provides in relevant part: “A defendant may withdraw his or her
plea of guilty . . . as a matter of right until the plea has been accepted. After acceptance, the judicial authority
shall allow the defendant to withdraw his or her plea upon proof of one of the grounds in [Practice Book §] 39-27.
A defendant may not withdraw his or her plea after the
conclusion of the proceeding at which the sentence was
imposed.”
“[O]ur standard of review is abuse of discretion for
decisions on motions to withdraw guilty pleas brought
under Practice Book § 39-27. . . . [Section 39-27] specifies circumstances under which a defendant may withdraw
a guilty plea after it has been entered.6 [O]nce entered, a guilty plea cannot be withdrawn except by leave of the
court, within its sound discretion, and a denial thereof is reversible only if it appears that there has been an abuse 6
Practice Book § 39-27 provides: “The grounds for allowing the defendant to withdraw his or her plea of guilty after acceptance are as follows:
“(1) The plea was accepted without substantial compliance with Section 39-19;
“(2) The plea was involuntary, or it was entered without knowledge of the nature of the charge or without knowledge that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed;
“(3) The sentence exceeds that specified in a plea agreement which had been previously accepted, or in a plea agreement on which the judicial
State v. Acevedo
of discretion. . . . The burden is always on the defendant to show a plausible reason for withdrawal of a plea of
guilty. . . .
“In determining whether the trial court [has] abused
its discretion, this court must make every reasonable
presumption in favor of [the correctness of] its action. . . . Our review of a trial court’s exercise of the legal discretion vested in it is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did.” (Footnote added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Lynch, 193 Conn. App. 637, 657–58, 220 A.3d
163 (2019), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 914, 229 A.3d 729
(2020).
The defendant first contends that he did not understand the nature of the charges or the sentence that would be imposed because of an exchange between the court and
the parties at the start of the June 27, 2024 hearing, prior to the plea canvass. During that exchange, the court had
inquired whether the defendant was subject to a five year mandatory minimum sentence as a result of a sentence
enhancement on the charge of assault in the first degree. Despite some brief initial confusion about the issue, the prosecutor clarified that the defendant was not subject to a five year mandatory minimum or a sentence enhancement because that enhancement was associated with the
charge of assault in the second degree and did not apply
to the charge to which the defendant was entering his
Alford plea. Moreover, that brief exchange was immediately followed by the court’s thorough canvass and colloquy, during which the court repeatedly made clear that
the terms of the plea agreement included the charge of
assault in the first degree and a sentence of fifteen years authority had deferred its decision to accept or reject the agreement at the time the plea of guilty was entered;
“(4) The plea resulted from the denial of effective assistance of counsel;
“(5) There was no factual basis for the plea; or
“(6) The plea either was not entered by a person authorized to act for a corporate defendant or was not subsequently ratified by a corporate defendant.”
State v. Acevedo
of incarceration, and the defendant repeatedly indicated
that he understood the court’s explanation of the plea
agreement. See, e.g., State v. Anthony D., 320 Conn.
842, 858–59, 134 A.3d 219 (2016) (considering trial
court’s thorough plea canvass in rejecting defendant’s
claim that court improperly denied defendant’s motion
to withdraw his guilty plea).
The defendant also contends that his plea resulted from
the denial of the effective assistance of counsel. In support of this contention, the defendant argues that he was unable to make a fully informed decision to plead guilty
due to defense counsel’s failure to obtain and review body camera footage. The court, however, expressly found
that such body camera footage did not exist. Moreover,
the transcript of the plea canvass reveals that, if the
defendant were dissatisfied with his representation by
defense counsel, he had ample opportunity to explain to
the court that he was not being adequately represented.
See id., 859–60. The defendant instead expressly confirmed that he was satisfied with the advice that he had
received from defense counsel. Accordingly, we conclude
that the court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea
to assault in the first degree.
II
The defendant also claims that the court improperly
denied defense counsel’s motion to withdraw his appearance. We are not persuaded.
The following legal principles pertain to our resolution of the defendant’s claim. “A motion to withdraw
appearance is governed by Practice Book § 3-10 which
provides in subsection (a) that [n]o motion for withdrawal of appearance shall be granted unless good cause
is shown and until the judicial authority is satisfied that reasonable notice has been given to other attorneys of
record and that the party represented by the attorney
was served with the motion and the notice required by
this section . . . . The standard of review regarding a
State v. Acevedo
motion to withdraw as counsel is abuse of discretion. The standard of reviewing both a motion by a defendant to
discharge counsel and a motion by counsel to withdraw
is the same. . . . It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether a factual basis exists for appointing
new counsel and, absent a factual record revealing an
abuse of that discretion, the court’s refusal to appoint
new counsel is not improper. . . . Such a request must be supported by a substantial reason and, [i]n order to work a delay by a last minute discharge of counsel there must
exist exceptional circumstances. . . .
“In evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion . . . [an appellate court] should consider the following factors: [t]he timeliness of the motion; adequacy of
the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and
whether the attorney/client conflict was so great that it had resulted in total lack of communication preventing
an adequate defense. . . . Discretion means a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or
defeat the ends of substantial justice. . . . It goes without saying that the term abuse of discretion . . . means
that the ruling appears to have been made on untenable
grounds. . . . In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we must make every reasonable
presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Randolph, 227 Conn. App. 732, 741–42, 322
A.3d 1080, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 920, 325 A.3d 218
(2024).
Our review of the record supports the court’s determination that no substantial reason or exceptional circumstances existed to justify the appointment of new
counsel following the defendant’s guilty plea and prior
to sentencing. The court observed, inter alia, that the
defendant was adequately represented by defense counsel at the time he entered his guilty plea and defense
counsel was prepared to continue to represent him at
sentencing. See State v. Marrero-Alejandro, 159 Conn.
State v. Acevedo
App. 376, 405, 122 A.3d 273 (2015) (observing that “no
substantial reason existed to justify the appointment
of new counsel during jury selection, much less ‘exceptional circumstances,’ ” because “trial counsel appeared
to communicate effectively [with the defendant] during
jury selection” and counsel “was willing and prepared
to represent the defendant at trial”), appeal dismissed,
324 Conn. 780, 154 A.3d 1005 (2017). In sum, under the
circumstances presented, neither defense counsel nor
the defendant expressed sufficient reason necessitating counsel’s withdrawal from the case. Accordingly,
we conclude that the court’s denial of defense counsel’s
motion to withdraw his appearance was not an abuse of
its discretion.
The judgment is affirmed.