United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 25-1556
DUKE ST. VAUGHN KEITH BROMFIELD,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,*
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Dunlap, Lynch, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Patrick N. Long and Patrick Long Law Firm, P.C. on brief for
petitioner.
Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
Holly M. Smith, Assistant Director, and Krishana Patel, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, on brief for
respondent.
August 25, 2026
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2),
Attorney General Todd Blanche is automatically substituted for
former Attorney General Pamela J. Bondi as respondent.
DUNLAP, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Duke St. Vaughn Keith
Bromfield ("Bromfield"), a citizen of Jamaica, appeals from the
Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") affirmance of the
Immigration Judge's ("IJ") denials of his two applications for
relief in his removal proceedings. Bromfield's first application
sought an adjustment of status while the second sought asylum,
withholding of removal, or protection pursuant to the United
Nations Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). Upon consideration,
we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the agency's
discretionary denial of Bromfield's application for an adjustment
of status. Likewise, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency's
determination that Bromfield's asylum application was untimely and
that he did not qualify for an exception to the filing deadline.
We therefore dismiss the petition as to the adjustment of status
and asylum application denials. Further, for the reasons
explained below, we deny the remainder of Bromfield's petition for
review.
I.
Bromfield, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was admitted
to the United States as a non-immigrant visitor on a B-2 tourist
visa on September 30, 2004, and, though he was only authorized to
remain in the United States until March 29, 2005, he has not left
the country since. On March 28, 2009, he was arrested by the U.S.
Border Patrol in Vermont and charged as removable pursuant to a
- 2 -violation of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA"). He
was released from custody on April 20, 2009, and around that time
he hired an attorney, Sheri Murray, to represent him in immigration
court.
Bromfield married a U.S. citizen in May 2009, and on
July 9, 2009, Bromfield's then-wife filed an I-130 petition to
seek lawful status for Bromfield. The Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") initiated removal proceedings by filing a Notice
to Appear with the New York immigration court on July 16, 2009,
and Bromfield successfully moved to change venue to Boston,
Massachusetts. On April 1, 2010, Bromfield conceded his
removability under Section 237(a)(1)(B) of the INA and indicated
he planned to apply for an adjustment of status and voluntary
departure. But after Bromfield and his wife divorced on May 5,
2010, Bromfield requested that the I-130 petition be withdrawn.
On May 12, 2010, Bromfield was indicted in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Hampshire on one count of
false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) and one
count of false representation of a Social Security number in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B), after providing false
information on his application for a U.S. passport. Specifically,
he was indicted for indicating falsely that he was born in the
U.S. Virgin Islands.
- 3 -Bromfield married another U.S. citizen on May 22, 2010;
years later, in 2018, this marriage would also end in divorce. On
June 30, 2010, his second wife filed a new I-130 petition on
Bromfield's behalf. DHS initially denied the I-130 petition,
noting that Bromfield's back-to-back marriages to different U.S.
citizens raised an inference of marriage fraud that the petition
did not overcome. Bromfield's wife appealed the denial, and an
IJ in the Boston immigration court administratively closed the
case for removal against Bromfield for false statements and false
representation pending that appeal. Ultimately, on January 7,
2013, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services granted the I-130
petition based on Bromfield's second marriage. Bromfield's case
was then re-calendared before the immigration court, where he
sought to adjust his status.
At a hearing on June 30, 2015, DHS asserted that
Bromfield was not eligible for an adjustment of status because he
had fraudulently represented himself as a U.S. citizen born in the
U.S. Virgin Islands when applying for a passport. Bromfield,
through Attorney Murray, conceded ineligibility for an adjustment
of status for that reason; after receiving a continuance to
research whether any other forms of relief were available for
Bromfield, Bromfield's counsel returned to court in November 2015,
did not represent that Bromfield was eligible for any other forms
of relief, and stated that Bromfield would not accept voluntary
- 4 -departure. Accordingly, the immigration court ordered Bromfield
removed to Jamaica, denied the application for adjustment of
status, and denied a waiver of Bromfield's conviction. Though she
reserved the right to appeal, Attorney Murray did not file a notice
of appeal to the BIA on behalf of Bromfield.
In January 2016, Bromfield and his brother, Cavkil
Bromfield ("Cavkil"), approached Attorney Murray to discuss
applying for fear-based relief, but Attorney Murray declined to
file the application for such relief, indicating it would be more
advantageous to wait. Later, Cavkil again reached out to Attorney
Murray, who informed him she was on vacation; Bromfield then
retained different counsel by September 19, 2016, and that
attorney filed a motion to reopen on September 27, 2016.
Bromfield also filed an I-589 Application for Asylum and Request
for Withholding of Removal. In addition, he filed a complaint
with the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers alleging that
Attorney Murray provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to act with reasonable diligence and denying Bromfield his
rights to appeal and apply for fear-based relief.
At Bromfield's hearing in support of his application for
relief, Bromfield testified that he was afraid to return to Jamaica
because he believed he would be targeted by gangs, as his brother
Cavkil had been a police officer in Jamaica working on a
specialized unit targeting gang members. Bromfield recalled that
- 5 -when he was 14 or 15 years old, he was playing with friends by a
river in Jamaica when he was approached by armed gang members who
"told [him] that they wanted [his] brother and if they cannot get
him they're going to get the next best thing," impliedly
threatening to harm Bromfield in his brother's stead. Bromfield
described another incident in which gang members stormed through
his school brandishing firearms and yelling that Bromfield's
brother was not going to stop them. He further claimed that gang
members, while looking for his brother, had tied up and beaten
Bromfield's parents and kidnapped his aunt, holding her for ransom.
Cavkil testified about his work as a police officer in Jamaica and
stated that his house had been shot at on multiple occasions and
that he believes he would be killed if he returned to Jamaica.
After reviewing the evidence presented, on March 3,
2023, the IJ denied Bromfield's applications for relief. At the
outset, the IJ rejected Bromfield's request to adjust his status,
noting his convictions for "various federal offenses, including
passport fraud," and concluded that Bromfield was ineligible for
waiver. The IJ further noted that Bromfield was "no longer married
to his U.S. citizen spouse," as he and his second wife had divorced
in 2018, and that, even if Bromfield had been eligible to adjust
status, he "would have denied such application as a matter of
discretion." As the IJ determined, Bromfield's "convictions in
- 6 -federal court are significant and serious; the negative
equities . . . outweigh the positive."
Turning to Bromfield's other claims, the IJ determined
that Bromfield was not credible based on inconsistencies in
Bromfield's and his brother's testimony and affidavits, as well as
Bromfield's evasive demeanor. Accordingly, he concluded that
Bromfield's "asylum and withholding applications [we]re not
supported by credible testimony, nor sufficient independent
evidence to establish eligibility." The IJ also found Cavkil's
testimony not credible.
The IJ went on to make additional findings in the
alternative. As to Bromfield's asylum claim, the IJ concluded
that the application was untimely because Bromfield failed to file
it within one year of his arrival in the United States, see 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), and instead waited to apply until twelve
years after his entry. He further found that Bromfield's filing
delay could not be excused by any "changed circumstances" that
materially affected Bromfield's eligibility for asylum nor any
"extraordinary circumstances" that directly related to the delay
in the filing of the application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
The IJ also rejected the asylum claim on the merits.
Because "the record fail[ed] to establish that [Bromfield] either
expressed a political opinion or that one was imputed to him," the
IJ concluded Bromfield failed to establish past persecution or
- 7 -valid fears of future harm based on an imputed political opinion.
In addition, he rejected Bromfield's argument that he had suffered
past harm and feared future harm based on membership in a proposed
particular social group ("PSG") of the "immediate family of police
officers who have resisted corruption and gang activity," because
this group was "not defined with particularity" and "the
evidentiary record d[id] not establish that the proposed PSG [was]
considered or recognized by Jamaican society to be a distinct
social group." The IJ further concluded Bromfield failed to
"m[e]et his burden to establish a subjective fear of future
persecution" -- specifically, of being targeted by gang members
because his brother had worked as a police officer in a specialized
gang task force -- because his testimony was not credible.
Finally, the IJ rejected Bromfield's withholding of
removal and CAT claims. Because Bromfield failed to prove that
his life or freedom would be threatened in Jamaica on account of
his membership in a PSG or his political opinion, he failed to
establish eligibility for withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). After examining whether
Bromfield met the requirements for CAT relief based on reliable,
independent evidence in the record, the IJ concluded "that he ha[d]
not met his burden to establish that it [wa]s more likely than not
he would be tortured in Jamaica by, at the instigation of, or with
- 8 -the acquiescence of a public official or one acting in an official
capacity" and denied his application for CAT protection.
Bromfield appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ
applied the wrong circuit's law and had clearly erred by making
adverse credibility determinations and failing to appropriately
consider emergency conditions. The BIA adopted and affirmed the
IJ's decision and dismissed the appeal. It determined that the
IJ "did not clearly err in finding the respondent not credible
upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances,"
including the "multiple inconsistencies between [his] testimony,
his affidavit, and other record evidence as well as his convictions
for making false statements and making false representation of a
social security number." It further held there was no factual or
legal error in the IJ's findings that Bromfield's asylum
application was time-barred and no extraordinary or changed
circumstances excused his untimeliness, that he was ineligible to
adjust his status, that his proposed PSG was not cognizable, and
that Bromfield did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution
for asylum purposes. The BIA also noted that Bromfield had "not
challenged the [IJ]'s denial of protection under the CAT" and so
he had "waived" that issue. This appeal followed.
- 9 -II.
A. Standard of Review
We acknowledge the limits on our jurisdiction. Pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), "no court shall have jurisdiction to
review . . . any individual determination or to entertain any
other cause or claim arising from or relating to the implementation
or operation of an order of removal pursuant to section
1225(b)(1)," id. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i), or "a decision by the
Attorney General to invoke the provisions of such section," id.
§ 1252(a)(2)(A)(ii). Moreover, pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B), we lack "jurisdiction to review . . . any
judgment regarding the granting of relief under
section . . . 1182(i)," which permits the Attorney General to
discretionarily waive the bar to admission for an immigrant who
has committed fraud or a willful misrepresentation, or under
sections "1229b . . . or 1255" -- governing adjustments of
status -- or "any other decision or action of the Attorney
General . . . the authority for which is specified under this
subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney
General . . . other than the granting of [asylum] relief under
section 1158(a)." Id. § 1252(A)(2)(B)(i), (ii). That said, we
retain jurisdiction to "review . . . constitutional claims or
questions of law," id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), including mixed questions
regarding "the application of a legal standard to undisputed or
- 10 -established facts," Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 225
(2020).
In removal proceedings "where, as here, the BIA embraces
the decision of the IJ, merely adding its gloss to the IJ's
findings and conclusions, we treat the two decisions as one" and,
"[i]n this spirit, we sometimes refer to the combined
decisions . . . as the decision of the agency." Bazile v.
Garland, 76 F.4th 5, 14 (1st Cir. 2023) (citation modified). When
reviewing the agency's decision-making, "we examine the agency's
answers to legal questions de novo and consider whether its factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence." Id. The
"deferential 'substantial evidence' standard" under which we
evaluate the agency's findings of fact "applies equally to asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT claims." Orelien v. Gonzales, 467
F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Guzman v. INS, 327 F.3d 11,
15 (1st Cir. 2003)). "[W]e will not disturb the agency's
determination on a fact-based issue unless the record evidence
compels a reasonable factfinder to make a contrary determination."
Bazile, 76 F.4th at 14 (citation modified); see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).
B. Choice of Law
Before reviewing Bromfield's claims, we must first
address his concern regarding which circuit's law applies.
"Choice of law determinations are questions of law," and we review
- 11 -them "de novo." Robidoux v. Muholland, 642 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir.
2011). Bromfield argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ's
decision because that decision analyzed Bromfield's claims through
the lens of Fourth Circuit case law, and the BIA, while expressly
applying First Circuit law on one issue presented, otherwise
adopted the IJ's decision without expressly indicating how First
Circuit law applied to the other issues presented, instead citing
mostly BIA precedent. Bromfield is correct that First Circuit law
governs his case, but there is no need to remand on that basis
given that the IJ’s decision relied on First Circuit law in the
alternative and the BIA’s decision indicates that it considered
only First Circuit and agency precedent.
For context, as recounted above, Bromfield's proceedings
began in New York, but Bromfield successfully transferred venue to
Boston, which is within our court's jurisdiction. DHS served
Bromfield with a notice to appear before an IJ in Boston,
Massachusetts, and the notice of internet-based hearing that was
sent to Bromfield likewise indicated the court was in Boston. The
IJ appeared at Bromfield's January 27, 2023 hearing via
videoconference from the Immigration Adjudication Center in
Richmond, Virginia. In his March 3, 2023 order, the IJ stated
that Bromfield's case fell "in the jurisdiction of the 4th
Circuit," though he also noted that "even if the Court analyzed
- 12 -[Bromfield]'s claim under the laws of the 1st Circuit, it would
come to the same conclusion."
The INA provides that petitions for review "shall be
filed with the court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which
the immigration judge completed the proceedings." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(2). Courts of appeal have diverged in how they
interpret the "completed the proceedings" language and,
specifically, which circuit's law an IJ must apply when the IJ
hears the case remotely from a different circuit than that where
the noncitizen appears. Our court had not addressed these
questions until August 2023 -- five months after the IJ issued his
order in Bromfield's case. In Bazile, we held that an IJ
"completes the proceedings" for purposes of § 1252(b)(2) in the
"administrative venue . . . where 'proceedings' commenced when the
charging document was filed (unless a formal change of venue has
been effected)." 76 F.4th at 13 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a)).
Accordingly, under the law of our circuit, the IJ "complete[d] the
proceedings" in Massachusetts, despite appearing via
videoconference from Virginia. Moreover, as we observed in
Bazile, BIA precedent -- specifically, Matter of Garcia, which
issued three weeks after the IJ issued his decision in Bromfield's
case -- "now requires IJs and the BIA to apply the law of the
circuit where administrative venue lies" and where "proceedings
[we]re commenced . . . unless a motion for change of venue has
- 13 -been granted." Id. at 14; see Matter of Garcia, 28 I. & N. Dec.
693, 704 (B.I.A. 2023). Here, administrative venue lies in
Boston, and so under Bazile and Matter of Garcia, the law of our
circuit governs.
Without the benefit of these decisions, the IJ relied on
Herrera-Alcala v. Garland -- a Fourth Circuit decision holding
that the place where the IJ "completed the proceedings" for
purposes of § 1252(b)(2) is "the location of the Immigration
Judge," which here was Virginia -- and concluded that Fourth
Circuit law applied. 39 F.4th 233, 242–43 (4th Cir. 2022).
Bromfield, however, has "a reasonable expectation" that "the same
circuit law that will be used to resolve [his] petition for
review" -- that is, First Circuit law -- "should also [have been]
applied in the underlying proceedings." Matter of Garcia, 28 I.
& N. at 699–700; see Bazile, 76 F.4th at 13 ("[T]he reasonable
expectations of litigants are best served if the choice of law
remains the same as a case moves through the immigration court,
the BIA, and the circuit court."). Given the reasoning of the
decisions under review, we find that this expectation is
sufficiently satisfied here.
We find it sufficient that the IJ applied First Circuit
law in the alternative "to resolve [Bromfield's] petition for
review," see Matter of Garcia, 28 I. & N. at 700, and by adopting
the IJ's decision, the BIA adopted the legal conclusion that "if
- 14 -[it] analyzed [Bromfield's] claim under the laws of the 1st
Circuit, it would come to the . . . conclusion" that the case
fails. The IJ cited two of our court's precedents addressing
whether an applicant has demonstrated a well-founded fear of
persecution for asylum purposes or eligibility for CAT relief or
withholding of removal. See Rebenko v. Holder, 693 F.3d 87, 93–
94 (1st Cir. 2012); Morales-Morales v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 130, 136
(1st Cir. 2017). By adopting the IJ's decision, the BIA adopted
the IJ's alternative analysis of the asylum, CAT, and withholding
of removal claims under the law of our circuit. Bromfield's
concern that the BIA did not expressly cite First Circuit law on
every issue ignores the incorporation of the IJ's decision into
that of the BIA. Moreover, the BIA did expressly cite First
Circuit law regarding the IJ's credibility determination, and it
avoided citing Fourth Circuit law; together, this indicates the
BIA conducted its analysis through the lens of First Circuit,
rather than Fourth Circuit, law.
Thus, this is not a case where "the BIA's de novo review
is meaningless" because it "incorrectly applie[d] the legal
standard," which would require us to "remand so that the petitioner
may obtain meaningful BIA review." See Akinsanya v. Garland, 125
F.4th 287, 297 (1st Cir. 2025). On the contrary, thanks to the
IJ's alternative rationale based on First Circuit law, the BIA's
adoption of that rationale in full, and the BIA's analysis of
- 15 -additional First Circuit case law, Bromfield's "reasonable
expectation" that our circuit's law would be "applied in the
underlying proceedings" has been satisfied. See Matter of Garcia,
28 I. & N. at 699–700; Bazile, 76 F.4th at 13. We therefore
proceed to conduct our own de novo review of the BIA's conclusions
of law, as well as those of the IJ to the extent the BIA adopted
them.
C. Adjustment of Status
Bromfield argues that the IJ's finding him ineligible
for an adjustment of status was legally erroneous for two reasons.
First, he argues that by treating his divorce from his second wife
(which occurred in 2018 after Attorney Murray's purportedly
ineffective assistance of counsel) as invalidating his
application, the IJ failed to place him in the same position he
would have been in but for his prior attorney's ineffective
assistance, as he argues Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637
(B.I.A. 1988), requires. Second, he argues that the IJ
misinterpreted the waiver requirements. Neither argument
persuades us.
Bromfield's Lozada argument founders because it
oversimplifies the IJ's rationale for rejecting his application
for an adjustment of status. While the IJ did note in passing
that Bromfield was "no longer married to his U.S. citizen spouse,"
this was not the core of the IJ's reasoning; rather, the IJ denied
- 16 -Bromfield an adjustment of status primarily because Bromfield had
made a false claim of U.S. citizenship, which made him ineligible
regardless of his marital status. Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), "[a]ny alien who . . . has falsely
represented[] himself . . . to be a citizen of the United States
for any purpose or benefit under this chapter . . . is
inadmissible." It was for this reason that the IJ originally
rejected Bromfield's application for an adjustment of status on
November 18, 2015, when Bromfield was still married. By doing so
again for the same reason when Bromfield reopened his case, the IJ
avoided treating Bromfield differently based on circumstances that
occurred after his counsel's complained-of conduct.
Bromfield's waiver arguments are similarly unavailing.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we lack "jurisdiction to
review . . . any judgment" by the Attorney General to deny
discretionary relief that might otherwise be available "under
section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255." See generally
Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 338, 347 (2022) (emphasizing that
this section prohibits review of any judgment under the enumerated
provisions, "not just discretionary judgments or the last-in-time
judgment," and "clearly indicate[s] that judicial review of fact
determinations is precluded in the discretionary-relief context").
Here, the IJ held that even if Bromfield were eligible to adjust
status, "the Court would have denied such application as a matter
- 17 -of discretion" because Bromfield's "convictions in federal court
[we]re significant and serious" and "the negative equities . . .
outweigh[ed] the positive." This is a purely discretionary
decision that we lack jurisdiction to review. See Mele v. Lynch,
798 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2015); see Moreno v. Garland, 51 F.4th
40, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2022). We therefore dismiss Bromfield's
petition as to adjustment of status.
D. Asylum
As a general rule, asylum seekers must apply for asylum
within one year of their arrival in the United States, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(B); however, the agency may consider untimely
applications where an applicant "demonstrates to the satisfaction
of the Attorney General either the existence of changed
circumstances which materially affect the applicant's eligibility
for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in
filing." Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (emphasis added). Bromfield does
not contest that the asylum application he filed in 2016, twelve
years after arriving in the United States in 2004, was untimely.
Instead, he argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ's
decision that the one-year bar applied because the changed
circumstances in the Jamaican political landscape making the One
Order gang more powerful and the extraordinary circumstance of his
prior attorney's misconduct should have excused the untimeliness
of his asylum application.
- 18 -We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination
that Bromfield's untimely application was not excused because, as
the agency aptly observes, "whether an applicant established an
exception to the one-year deadline for filing an asylum application
is a question statutorily dedicated to the Attorney General's
discretion and does not involve a mixed question of fact and law."
Bromfield's contention that the extraordinary and changed
circumstances determinations present mixed questions runs counter
to our precedent: our court has made clear that the determination
of whether extraordinary or changed circumstances exist "to the
satisfaction of the Attorney General" "is an unreviewable
discretionary judgment." Zapet-Alvarado v. Bondi, 152 F.4th 329,
336 (1st Cir. 2025) (emphasis added), cert. denied sub nom.
Zapet-Alvarado v. Blanche, No. 25-1081, 2026 WL 1855098 (U.S. June
29, 2026). Accord Real v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 147 F.4th 361, 368
(3d Cir. 2025); A.P.A. v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 104 F.4th 230, 241 (11th
Cir. 2024). In effect, Bromfield is asking us to "second-guess
the agency's assessment of the merits of the 'extraordinary
circumstances' claim" and the changed circumstances claim. Lordes
v. Mukasey, 288 F. App'x 712, 715 (1st Cir. 2008). This we cannot
do. See id. We thus defer to the agency's determination that the
asylum application's untimeliness is not excused and do not reach
the merits of the asylum claim.
- 19 -E. Withholding of Removal
Finally, we arrive at Bromfield's withholding of removal
claim.1 An otherwise removable alien who applies for withholding
of removal bears the burden of establishing that it is "more likely
than not" that his "life or freedom would be threatened in the
proposed country of removal on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion," and he may satisfy this burden through credible testimony
regarding past or likely future persecution. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(b); see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Zapet-Alvarado, 152
F.4th at 337. Bromfield argues that the BIA erred in denying his
application for withholding of removal on the grounds that his
testimony was not credible and that he failed to present a
cognizable PSG. Upon review, we affirm the BIA's finding that
Bromfield was not credible, as substantial evidence of
inconsistent testimony supports this factual determination.
Further, we affirm the BIA's determination that Bromfield's
proposed PSG was not cognizable.
1 We note, briefly, that Bromfield has not petitioned our
court for review of the denial of his application for CAT relief.
Nor could he: as the agency observes, because Bromfield failed to
raise a challenge to the IJ's denial of his application for CAT
relief before the BIA below, Bromfield has forfeited that claim.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring exhaustion).
- 20 -1. Credibility
Immigration courts are tasked with assessing the
credibility of testimony offered in support of applications for
relief, and to do so, they evaluate "the totality of the
circumstances, and all relevant factors." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(4)(C). Such factors include the applicant's and
witness's "demeanor, candor, or responsiveness," as well as "the
inherent plausibility of [their] account[s], the consistency
between [their] written and oral statements . . . , the internal
consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such
statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements." Id. Credibility
determinations are factual findings for which we defer to the
agency "as long as they are supported by reasonable, substantial,
and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole."
Molina-Diaz v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2021) (citation
modified).
Here, the IJ's finding, which the BIA adopted, that
Bromfield was "not credible upon consideration of the totality of
the circumstances and all relevant factors" is sufficiently
supported by record evidence showing multiple inconsistencies
between Bromfield's testimony and affidavit and the testimony of
other witnesses. For example, Bromfield's affidavit attached to
his September 2016 motion to reopen made no mention of the incident
- 21 -at the river about which he testified. Bromfield testified
inconsistently about whether his aunt, cousin, or both had been
kidnapped, and when asked on cross-examination why his written
statement indicated that his cousin was kidnapped rather than his
aunt as he had testified, Bromfield attributed this to a "mix-up"
in his statement. Further, Bromfield's testimony that one of his
attackers during the river incident may have had a gun in a plastic
bag was inconsistent with the testimony of his brother Cavkil that
the attackers had been "waving guns." Bromfield's testimony that
gang members ran armed through his school was also inconsistent
with Cavkil's affidavit, which did not mention the brandishing of
firearms. The IJ also noted that Bromfield's demeanor undermined
his credibility; he was evasive, non-responsive, and blamed his
counsel for discrepancies in his testimony and written statement.
See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)(listing "demeanor,
candor, [and] responsiveness" and "the consistency between the
applicant's . . . written and oral statements" as credibility
factors).
"Since the IJ has the best vantage point from which to
assess the witnesses' testimonies and demeanors, we accord
significant respect to [this] . . . determination[]"and "will not
upset the agency's credibility determination unless [Bromfield]
can show the record evidence, considered as a whole, would compel
a reasonable factfinder to make a contrary determination." See
- 22 -Mam v. Holder, 566 F.3d 280, 283 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation
modified). He cannot do so; indeed, he concedes as much by failing
on appeal to challenge the IJ's findings and instead focusing his
argument on what he claims is sufficient independent evidence
establishing that he faced a well-founded fear of future
prosecution, "notwithstanding any credibility issues."
"Because the IJ can disregard or discount evidence he
finds incredible, an adverse credibility determination can prove
fatal to a claim for . . . withholding of removal if the applicant
cannot meet his burden of proof without relying on his own
testimony," and "[s]uch is the case here." Melhem v. Gonzales,
500 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation modified). The
independent, supposedly corroborating evidence to which Bromfield
directs us consists of third-party reports describing the general
political condition in Jamaica and evidence of Bromfield's
brother's police service, neither of which suffices to indicate a
clear threat to Bromfield specifically. "Generalized country
conditions reports that do not shed light on the asylum applicant's
particular situation are ordinarily not enough to establish fear
of future persecution." Rodrigues v. Garland, 124 F.4th 58, 66
(1st Cir. 2024). Bromfield's reports are no different.
Meanwhile, the letter from a police sergeant regarding Cavkil's
police service and noting the "great risk" and general "threat" to
"members of [police] families" does not compel us to find that
- 23 -Bromfield, specifically, is at risk of harm in Jamaica when viewed
in light of the record as a whole; another witness who had multiple
family members involved in Jamaican law enforcement testified to
regularly returning to Jamaica without incident. Accordingly,
Bromfield's evidence in the record is insufficient to compel us to
reverse the agency's credibility determination.
2. Particular Social Group
The IJ's decision as to withholding of removal is also
supportable on the independent ground that Bromfield failed to
identify a cognizable PSG. Whether Bromfield's proposed PSG of
"immediate family of police officers who have resisted corruption
and gang activity" is cognizable under the INA "is a question of
law that we review de novo." See Hernandez-Mendez v. Garland, 86
F.4th 482, 490 (1st Cir. 2023). For a proposed PSG to be
cognizable, it must be "(1) composed of members who share a common
immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and
(3) socially distinct within the society in question." Id.
(quoting Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 238, 244 (1st Cir. 2015)).
A PSG "must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective."
Montoya-Lopez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 71, 83 (1st Cir. 2023).
Moreover, the proposed PSG must be "generally recognized in the
community as a cohesive group." Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105,
109 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d
21, 26 (1st Cir. 2010)).
- 24 -Bromfield's proposed PSG fails to satisfy this standard.
The proposed PSG -- "immediate family of police officers who have
resisted corruption and gang activities" -- "represents a 'large,
diffuse portion of society with characteristics simply too
amorphous to readily distinguish the boundaries of membership,'"
because the characteristic of resisting corruption and gang
activity is not clearly defined and could, as the agency points
out, encompass a wide range of activities from refusing to accept
bribes to actively investigating gang members. See Montoya-Lopez,
80 F.4th at 83 (quoting Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 9, 15
(1st Cir. 2012)). Bromfield's proposed PSG thus lacks definite
boundaries. Further, Bromfield has pointed to no record evidence
establishing that Jamaican society recognizes as a discrete group
the families of officers who have, in some way, resisted gangs and
corruption. See Larios, 608 F.3d at 109.2
2 We are unpersuaded that the out-of-circuit case law
Bromfield cites for the proposition that police officers and their
families are socially distinct enough to constitute a PSG justifies
contours as indefinite as those of the PSG Bromfield proposes here.
Unlike the "particular social group of former police officers" the
court found "conceivable" in Sanjaa v. Sessions, being the
immediate family member of a police officer who has resisted
corruption and gang activity is not a well-defined characteristic.
863 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). It is
instead open to interpretation. Although in R.R.D. v. Holder the
proposed PSG of "honest former law-enforcement agents in Mexico"
included indefinite language, the government did not contest its
specificity. 746 F.3d 807, 809-10 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Both the IJ
and the BIA . . . thought that . . . if criminal organizations
target[ed] all honest law-enforcement officers, [the petitioner
would] be entitled to asylum.").
- 25 -The vague "resisted corruption or gang activity"
language in Bromfield's proposed PSG resembles language in
putative PSGs that our court has rejected. In Alvarado-Reyes v.
Garland, we held that a proposed PSG of "Salvadoran men who resist
gang recruitment" was overbroad, because whether a person
displayed resistance was largely subjective and not defined. 118
F.4th 462, 472–73 (1st Cir. 2024). Similarly, in Mendez-Barrera,
we explained that a putative PSG of "young women recruited by gang
members who resist such recruitment" was not cognizable because it
was unclear "who may be considered 'young,' the type of conduct
that may be considered 'recruit[ment],' and the degree to which a
person must display 'resist[ance],'" and these "ambiguous group
characteristics" were "largely subjective" and "fail[ed] to
establish a sufficient level of particularity." 602 F.3d at 27
(first two alterations in original). The same is true here.
"Given [Bromfield's] loose description of the group, it is
virtually impossible to identify who is or is not a member," and
so the proposed PSG "is not sufficiently particular to be legally
cognizable." See id.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the petition to
review the adjustment of status and asylum application denials for
lack of jurisdiction, and we deny the remainder of the petition
for review.
- 26 -