[Cite as Freedom Roofing, Windows & Siding, L.L.C. v. Jomaa, 2026-Ohio-3315.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SANDUSKY COUNTY
Freedom Roofing, Windows & Siding, Court of Appeals No. S-25-044 LLC
Appellee
Trial Court No. 25 CV 654
v.
Kaleb Jomaa, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: August 25, 2026
*****
Andrew R. Mayle, Richard R. Gillum, Benjamin G. Padanilam, and
Nichole K. Papageorgiou, for appellee.
Peter A. Dewhirst, and Lacey Riley, for appellant.
*****
SULEK, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Kaleb Jomaa, appeals a judgment of the Sandusky County Court
of Common Pleas granting appellee, Freedom Roofing, Windows & Siding, LLC’s
motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining him from breaching the noncompete agreement entered into between the parties. Because the judgment granting the
preliminary injunction is not a final appealable order, the appeal is dismissed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In October 2023, Freedom, a residential and commercial roofing, windows,
and siding company, hired Jomaa as a project estimator. In February 2024, Freedom
promoted Jomaa to Director of Sales. That Fall, looking to expand to other geographic
locations Freedom’s Expansion Committee discussed implementing a noncompete
agreement for top level management, including Jomaa. Jomaa was a member of the
Expansion Committee and was present during discussions involving the time restriction
and geographic radius of the noncompete. On October 21, 2024, Jomaa signed the
agreement, which stated that its purpose was to “protect the Company’s legitimate
business interests and confidential information.” The agreement precluded Jomaa from
post-employment competition with Freedom for a period of nine months and within “50
miles of any operating Freedom Roofing, Windows, and Siding location[.]”
{¶ 3} In February 2025, Jomaa requested unpaid leave due to “heightened
anxiety.” Returning to work after 30 days, Freedom assigned him the job title of Branch
Sales Manager. The job had fewer responsibilities, though his compensation and bonus
potential remained unchanged. Jomaa resigned on March 17, 2025.
{¶ 4} Approximately two weeks following his resignation, Salinas Construction
and Repairs, LLC employed Jomaa in a sales position. It is undisputed that Salinas is a
direct competitor of Freedom and their operations are within 50 miles of each other.
2.
{¶ 5} Following unsuccessful cease and desist letters, on July 15, 2025, Freedom
commenced this action against Jomaa, Salinas Construction, and Salinas’ “founder and
proprietor” Kevin Salinas raising two claims. Against Jomaa, Freedom alleged that he
breached the noncompete agreement and as to Salinas Construction and Salinas, that they
tortiously interfered with the noncompete agreement by willfully ignoring its terms.
Freedom requested that the trial court enjoin Jomaa from breaching the noncompete
terms for nine months, minus the time between his resignation and employment with
Salinas. As to Salinas Construction and Salinas, Freedom requested they be enjoined
from employing Jomaa.
{¶ 6} Jomaa filed an answer and raised the counterclaims of hostile work
environment and constructive discharge. In essence, Jomaa attributed his anxiety and
panic disorder diagnoses to the working conditions at Freedom and claimed that he had to
resign to protect his mental health. Salinas Construction and Salinas filed a separate
answer generally denying the claims.
{¶ 7} Freedom moved to dismiss Jomaa’s counterclaim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6),
contending that his hostile work environment claim was insufficient because he failed to
allege that he was part of a protected class and that constructive discharge is not an
independent cause of action. Opposing the motion, Jomaa argued that Freedom
discriminated against him based on his mental health status and that he asserted his
constructive discharge claim in conjunction with the hostile work environment claim. He
requested leave to amend his counterclaim to set forth his protected class status.
3.
{¶ 8} Freedom also moved for a preliminary injunction requesting that the court
enforce the terms of the noncompete during the pendency of the case. Jomaa opposed the
motion and the court held a hearing on October 6, 8, and 30, with the parties submitting
post-hearing memoranda. On November 20, 2025, the trial court granted the preliminary
injunction noting that “the terms of the non-compete provisions [are] reasonable in scope,
duration, and geographical limitation” and ordered that “[b]ased on the continuous nature
of the violation of the non-compete the duration shall commence upon the issuance of
this Order.”
{¶ 9} This appeal followed.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 10} Jomaa raises three assignments of error on appeal:
I. The trial court committed reversible error when it granted
Plaintiff/Appellee’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
II. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to meet the
specificity requirements of Civ.R. 65(D) in its November 20, 2025,
Decision, Judgment Entry.
III. The trial court committed reversible error when [it] did not require any
security in its November 20, 2025, Decision, Judgment Entry.
III. Analysis
{¶ 11} Jomaa’s assignments of error relate to the trial court’s order granting
Freedom’s motion for a preliminary inunction pending final determination on the merits
of the appeal. Freedom first contends, however, that the appeal should be dismissed
because the order was not final and appealable. We agree.
4.
{¶ 12} Under Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, a trial court’s
judgment can be immediately reviewed by an appellate court only if it constitutes a “final
order” in the action. Taxiputinbay, LLC v. Put-in-Bay, 2021-Ohio-191, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.),
citing Deyerle v. City of Perrysburg, 2004-Ohio-4273 (6th Dist.), ¶ 3. If, however, a trial
court’s order is not final, then an appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review the
matter, and the matter must be dismissed. Id., citing Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20 (1989).
{¶ 13} A preliminary injunction is considered a provisional remedy, R.C.
2505.02(A)(3), and is generally not appealable unless it meets the following criteria
under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4):
(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or
reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:
(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both
of the following apply:
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional
remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing
party with respect to the provisional remedy.
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective
remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues,
claims, and parties in the action.
See Doe v. Columbus, 2026-Ohio-1095, ¶ 11-12.
{¶ 14} Under the first prong, R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a), an appealing party must show
that “there was no further opportunity to petition the court for the remedy being sought,
and there existed nothing further for the trial court to decide with respect to the
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provisional remedy.” (Cleaned up.) Id. at ¶ 14. The preliminary injunction granted in
this case facially satisfies this prong as there is nothing further for the trial court to decide
with respect to it. However, because Freedom claims that Jomaa continues to violate the
terms of the noncompete, it is uncertain what additional actions may be taken by the trial
court.
{¶ 15} Next, under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b), an appealing party must also
demonstrate that by waiting until a final judgment is issued as to all claims and parties,
the party would be denied a meaningful or effective remedy. This requirement
acknowledges that there are certain exceptions to the substantial interest in avoiding
piecemeal litigation. Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 2016-Ohio-8000, ¶ 22.
{¶ 16} In Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost, 2022-Ohio-4540 (1st. Dist.), the First
Appellate District identified three classes of caselaw interpreting the “meaningful or
effective remedy” requirement including:
(1) cases holding that a preliminary injunction does not meet the standard
of R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) when the plaintiff ultimately seeks a permanent
injunction; (2) cases recognizing that preservation of the status quo
generally fails to satisfy the requirements of finality; and (3) cases
illustrating the “unringing” of the bell concept.
Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶ 17} Here, as to the first class of caselaw, Freedom’s complaint sought
temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctive relief preventing Jomaa from working
for Salinas or any company that would violate the terms of the noncompete. The
noncompete is, however, by its nature limited in duration.
6.
{¶ 18} The second class of caselaw involves the appealability of injunctions issued
to preserving the status quo during litigation. In Quinlivan v. H.E.A.T. Total Facility
Solutions, Inc., 2010-Ohio-1603, ¶ 5 (6th Dist.), this court observed:
“[C]ourts have found that “‘a preliminary injunction which acts to maintain
the status quo pending a ruling on the merits is not a final appealable order
under R.C. 2505.02.’” Hootman [v. Zock], 2007-Ohio-5619, at ¶ 16,
quoting E. Cleveland Firefighters, IAFF Local 500 v. E. Cleveland, 8th
Dist. No. 88273, 2007-Ohio-1447, ¶ 5; Deyerle v. Perrysburg, 6th Dist. No.
WD-03-063, 2004-Ohio-4273, ¶ 15. Although ‘status quo’ has apparently
not been defined by the General Assembly or by Ohio courts in the context
of preliminary injunctions, the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that ‘[t]he
status quo to be preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last, actual,
peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.’
Postma v. Jack Brown Buick, Inc. (1993), 157 Ill.2d 391, 193 Ill.Dec. 166,
626 N.E.2d 199, 202. The holdings of cases decided in Ohio courts evince a
similar precedent for determining the status quo. See Hootman, 2007-Ohio5619, at ¶ 17 (finding that the trial court was maintaining the status quo by
ordering parties to remove an obstruction from a drainage ditch pursuant to
a preliminary injunction order); Neamonitis v. Gilmour Academy, 8th Dist.
No. 92452, 2009-Ohio-2023, ¶¶ 11-12 (finding that the trial court was
maintaining the status quo by ordering a school, via temporary restraining
order, to reinstate a student it had expelled, and then granting preliminary
injunction indefinitely extending the temporary restraining order); but, see,
Neamonitis, 2009-Ohio-2023, at ¶ 22 (Kilbane, P.J., dissenting).”
See Taxiputinbay at ¶ 17-19 (taxi company’s last uncontested status prior to enactment of
the amended ordinance was operating licensed taxi cabs and the injunction allowing the
company to continue operating the taxicabs preserved the status quo); All Foils, Inc. v.
Kulik, 2026-Ohio-2534, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 19} Where a noncompete agreement is involved, the status quo is maintained
where the preliminary injunction prevents a defendant from violating the noncompete
obligations. Medpace Inc. v. ICON Clinical Research, LLC, 2023-Ohio-4552, ¶ 29 (1st
Dist.). In Medpace, the employer sought a permanent injucnction against competitors,
7.
recruiters, and former employees of a research facility relating to an alleged breach of the
employees’ noncompete agreement. The trial court entered a cease-and-desist order
pending litigation. Id. at ¶ 4. The defendants appealed the order. Id. at ¶ 6-7.
{¶ 20} The appellate court first determined that the order was a preliminary
injunction, though labeled otherwise and, thus, a provisional remedy under R.C.
2505.02(A)(3). The court then observed that
[a]n order maintaining the status quo returns the parties to their last legally
uncontested status. Here, Medpace claims that Defendants are tortiously
interfering with its contractual and business relationships by coaching its
employees on how to breach their contractual obligations to Medpace
(among other things). Therefore, the order returns the parties to the status
quo by preventing Defendants from “hiring, soliciting, and/or recruiting
Medpace Inc.’s employees” subject to active noncompete obligations. The
trial court likewise described its order as “intended to maintain the status
quo among the parties during the pendency of this litigation.” Although the
trial court’s label is not dispositive, we agree that the function of this
preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo, which further militates
against a conclusion that the order is final and appealable.
Id. at ¶ 29.
{¶ 21} Here, as in Medpace, the last peaceable status is the period prior to Jomaa
breaching the noncompete agreement with Freedom which he helped draft and signed.
This preserves “the contractual rights of the party who argued that its rights were
infringed upon during the pendency of the litigation.” Id. at ¶ 32.
{¶ 22} Finally, in the third category of cases courts recognize that an order may be
final and appealable if “‘the proverbial bell cannot be unrung.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State
v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 451 (2001). “Ohio courts have generally limited this
inquiry to ‘situations that would irreparably change the party’s position between
8.
provisional remedy and final judgment.’” Id., quoting Preterm-Cleveland, 2022-Ohio4540, at ¶ 24. These types of cases generally include the potential release of confidential
information or trade secrets, or involve personal liberty interests such as the forced
administration of medication. Id., citing Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Levin, 2008-Ohio6197 and Muncie.
{¶ 23} Rejecting the “unringing of the bell” argument the Medpace court noted:
Defendants’ alleged harm falls outside the scope of this inquiry. While they
insist that the trial court’s order prevents people from seeking greener
employment pastures elsewhere, the individuals at hand all signed
noncompetition agreements and any restriction on their ability to consider
other employment is temporary in nature. Nothing irretrievable will be
lost, nor will anything irreversible transpire. Yes, if the preliminary
injunction is ultimately reversed, certain parties will be negatively impacted
during the period between the preliminary injunction and appellate
vindication. But this is the case with any preliminary injunction (which is
exactly why courts impose bond requirements). Therefore, this strand of
Ohio caselaw does not provide a pathway to immediate appellate review.
{¶ 24} Id. at ¶ 27. See Wells Fargo Ins. Serv. USA, Inc. v. Gingrich, 2012-Ohio677 (12th Dist.) (preliminary injunction not a final order where the company presented no
evidence that money damages at the conclusion of the case would not provide sufficient
compensation for any loss).
{¶ 25} As in Medpace, the “bell cannot be unrung” argument is not persuasive
under these facts. The noncompete’s restriction on Jomaa’s reemployment is of a limited
duration and recompense for any loss or damages is available. Moreover, Jomaa has
counterclaims pending which may provide for additional damages.
{¶ 26} Because Jomaa’s assignments of error are based on a nonfinal order, they
are moot and not well-taken.
9.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 27} Upon due consideration, Jomaa’s appeal of the Sandusky County Court of
Common Pleas’ judgment granting a preliminary injunction is dismissed for lack of a
final appealable order. Pursuant to App.R. 24, Jomaa is ordered to pay costs.
Judgment dismissed
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, J.
JUDGE
Juergen A. Waldick, V.J.1
CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
1
Judge Juergen A. Waldick, Third District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
10.