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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 24-13159
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARNIVAL CORPORATION,
d.b.a. Carnival Cruise Line,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-24766-KMW
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.
LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
Jane Doe sued Carnival Corporation (“Carnival”) alleging,
among others, claims for negligent hiring and supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13159
sexual assault by a crewmember of a passenger. Before trial, the
district court granted Doe’s partial summary judgment motion for
false imprisonment liability and reserved the issue of damages for
the jury to decide. After a six-day trial, a jury found Carnival liable
for sexual assault but rejected Doe’s negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. The jury awarded approximately $10.25 million in damages.
Carnival now appeals the adverse judgment on the sexual
assault claim and the damages award. Specifically, Carnival challenges various aspects of the trial proceedings, such as the jury’s
inability to consider crucial evidence and the scope of Carnival’s
cross-examination of Doe’s experts with regards to that evidence.
Though procedurally this appeal comes to us after the jury’s verdict, Carnival also argues that the partial summary judgment order
was the root of the errors at trial. Because that order is now appealable, we review it below and consider whether a new trial is
required.
After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument,
we reverse the district court’s partial summary judgment order on
the false imprisonment claim, vacate in part the district court’s
judgment as to the false imprisonment and sexual assault claims,
and remand for a new trial on the false imprisonment and sexual
assault claims.
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24-13159 Opinion of the Court 3
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 1, 2018, Doe, a passenger aboard Carnival’s
Miracle cruise ship, was drinking with friends. After becoming inebriated, Doe found herself separated from her friends and in a
maintenance closet aboard the ship with Fredy Anggara, a crewmember working as a cleaner on board. How she got there, what
happened in the storage closet, and what happened afterwards are
all heavily disputed. But what is undisputed is that after the encounter, Doe immediately told her friend that she was held in the
closet against her will and sexually assaulted by Anggara. Doe also
provided a handwritten statement to Carnival’s security officers
shortly afterwards recording her memory of the encounter.
FBI Special Agents (“SA”) Sarah Andreasen and William
Ortiz responded to the incident. As part of their investigation, the
SAs did not review Carnival’s security footage or Doe’s handwritten statements. But the SAs did interview Doe and Anggara about
what happened. According to SA Andreasen’s handwritten notes
(“FBI Notes”), Doe stated that Anggara locked the doors to the
closet once they were inside but she could not remember if she
consented to the sexual conduct. Doe admitted she was drinking
heavily prior to the encounter. For his part, Anggara stated that
Doe followed him into the closet as he was putting materials away,
asked him to close the door, and initiated the sexual conduct. Anggara claimed that he did not know Doe was inebriated.
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Following the investigation, the FBI Notes were memorialized in two FBI reports titled “Investigation into alleged sexual misconduct aboard the Carnival Cruise Ship ‘Miracle’” and “Liaison
with Carnival Cruise Ship Miracle Chief Security Officer Vikram
Singh” (together, the “FBI Reports”). The FBI Reports recounted
the investigation, SA Andreasen’s conclusion that the sexual encounter was consensual at the time of the event and the fact that a
federal prosecutor declined to prosecute.
On November 18, 2019, Doe filed a lawsuit against Carnival
alleging, among others, general maritime law claims for negligent
hiring and supervision, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment,
and sexual assault of a passenger by a crewmember.
During discovery, Carnival deposed Doe about her recollection of what happened that night. In the main, Doe’s testimony
reflected what she provided in her handwritten statement to Carnival. But Doe could not recall the precise details of the encounter,
such as how she entered the closet, whether she consented to the
sexual conduct that happened inside, and whether Anggara locked
the door or whether she attempted to leave but was stopped from
doing so.
Anggara was not deposed during discovery and was unavailable for trial. Thus, the FBI Notes and Reports were the main
sources for Anggara’s description of the events.
After the close of discovery, Doe filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on her false imprisonment claim, arguing that
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Carnival did not have any evidence to dispute Doe’s allegations of
unlawful detention in the maintenance closet. In response, Carnival cited the FBI Reports for Anggara’s version of the events and
the FBI’s conclusion that the encounter was consensual to show
that there was a dispute of material fact as to whether Doe could
have left the maintenance closet at any time. And in her reply, Doe
argued that the FBI Reports could not be relied on because they
were inadmissible hearsay. 1
While the district court’s decision on Doe’s motion for partial summary judgment was pending, Doe filed a motion in limine
to exclude the FBI Reports in their entirety—including SA Andreasen’s conclusion that the incident was consensual and the fact that
the government declined to prosecute—on the grounds that they
were inadmissible hearsay. In its response, Carnival argued that
the FBI Reports and their factual findings were admissible under
the public records exception to the hearsay rule. And in her reply,
Doe argued that even if the FBI Reports were admissible hearsay,
the statements and factual findings would be unduly prejudicial to
Doe at trial.
On June 26, 2021, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation recommending, in relevant part, that Doe’s motion
1 Carnival also cross-moved for partial summary judgment on Doe’s negligent
infliction claim, which the district court granted. Doe does not cross-appeal
this portion of the partial summary judgment order. Unless otherwise specified, references to the order throughout this opinion refer to the portion addressing Doe’s false imprisonment claim.
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for partial summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim be
granted because Anggara’s statements, as memorialized in the FBI
Reports, were hearsay and did not fall within any hearsay exception. Without Anggara’s statements, the magistrate judge concluded, there was no dispute of material fact that Doe could not
freely leave the maintenance closet. The magistrate judge did not
address whether SA Andreasen’s conclusion that the encounter
was consensual and the fact of the government’s declination to
prosecute were admissible notwithstanding.
Carnival filed an objection to the report and recommendation, arguing in relevant part, that the FBI’s conclusions were admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule.
Carnival distinguished between Anggara’s statements in the FBI
Reports, which constituted double hearsay, and the FBI Reports’
conclusions, which only had one level of hearsay. Carnival argued
that this single-level hearsay meant that the FBI Reports’ conclusions were admissible unless Doe could show that SA Andreasen
was untrustworthy, a burden Doe had not met. So, the FBI’s conclusions, Carnival argued, created a dispute of material fact for
Doe’s false imprisonment claim.
The district court accepted the report and recommendation
in full and precluded Carnival from challenging liability for false
imprisonment at trial. Shortly before trial, the district court
granted Doe’s motion in limine as to the FBI Reports but noted
that the FBI Notes were stipulated into evidence by the parties.
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During the ensuing six-day trial, three evidentiary issues
arose that are relevant to this appeal.
First, at Doe’s request, the trial court admitted the FBI Notes
into evidence. Since there were now two accounts in the record of
what happened that night, Carnival requested that the district
court reconsider its partial summary judgment order on the false
imprisonment claim. Despite recognizing that the two accounts in
the FBI Notes were “diametrically opposed” and created a dispute
of material fact, the district court declined to revisit the summary
judgment order on the grounds that reconsideration would be prejudicial to Doe at that stage of trial.
Second, SA Andreasen testified about her experience investigating sexual assault. SA Andreasen received about five months
of training for investigating criminal situations and primarily investigated violent crimes, such as sexual assaults. Her training involved conducting investigations from start to finish; interviewing
witnesses, subjects of investigation, and victims; and conducting
additional surveillance to further these investigations. SA Andreasen employed this training to conduct shipboard investigations
about seven or eight times prior to her investigation of Doe’s encounter with Anggara.
Because the FBI Reports were excluded, the district court
precluded SA Andreasen from discussing her finding that the encounter was consensual and the government’s declination of prosecution. But because the FBI Notes were stipulated into evidence,
SA Andreasen was allowed to recount who she talked to, what they
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13159
told her, and what she put into her notes. SA Andreasen testified
that Doe could not recall if the entire encounter was consensual
and that Anggara believed that it was.
Third, Doe’s two experts testified about Carnival’s security
protocols and the damages Doe suffered, respectively. Both experts relied on the FBI Reports for their analyses in their expert reports. But because the FBI Reports were excluded from evidence,
the district court precluded Carnival from asking about the reports
during cross-examination, even for purposes of impeachment.
At the conclusion of trial, the district court charged the jury
with the following on Doe’s false imprisonment claim:
False imprisonment is unlawful restraint of a person
against their will, the gist of which is the unlawful detention of that person, and the deprivation of their liberty. The only issue for your determination on the
matter of false imprisonment is whether the false imprisonment caused plaintiff damages and, if so, what
amount.
Dkt. No. 320 at 151:12–17.
As to Doe’s sexual assault claim, the district court charged
the jury with the following:
Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
1. Fredy Anggara participated in the sexual act with
plaintiff;
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2. The sexual act was committed without plaintiff’s
consent; and
3. Fredy Anggara did these acts knowingly.
“Consent” means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary
consent and does not include coerced submission.
Consent does not mean the failure by an alleged victim to offer physical resistance to the offender. Moreover, there is no consent if a person is incapable of
appraising the nature of the conduct.
Dkt. No. 320 at 147:24–148:1–5, 11–15.
The jury concluded that Anggara sexually assaulted Doe but
found in favor of Carnival on Doe’s negligence and intentional infliction claims. In total, the jury awarded approximately $10.25
million to Doe.
Carnival timely filed the present appeal. Doe, however, did
not cross appeal the jury’s verdicts for Carnival. 2
2 Because Doe does not cross-appeal the jury’s verdicts for Carnival, she has
waived reconsideration of these issues and the new trial on remand will not
relitigate her negligence and intentional infliction claims. See Nurse “BE” v. Columbia Palms W. Hosp. Ltd. P’ship, 490 F.3d 1302, 1308 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007);
Peat, Inc. v. Vanguard Rsch., Inc., 378 F.3d 1154, 1165 n.5 (11th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1292 n.7 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J.,
concurring) abrogation in part recognized by United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d
1297, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005).
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a grant of partial summary judgment.
LaCourse v. PAE Worldwide Inc., 980 F.3d 1350, 1355 n.5 (11th Cir.
2020) (quoting Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306
(11th Cir. 1999)). Summary judgment on a claim is appropriate “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when
‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.’” Bowen v. Manheim Remarketing, Inc., 882
F.3d 1358, 1362 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In our review of the district court’s
grant of summary judgment, we draw “all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to [the non-moving party].” Id. (quotation
omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
At the outset, we recognize the exceptional procedural posture of Carnival’s appeal. After three years of discovery, a six-day
jury trial, and significant time and expense incurred by the parties
from litigating sensitive issues, we are asked to vacate the jury’s
sexual assault verdict and the accompanying $10.25 million judgment award on two grounds. First, that the district court erred by
granting partial summary judgment in favor of Doe. And second,
that this error was inextricably entangled with the claims and defenses presented at trial and a new trial is required.
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But such is the nature of our limited appellate jurisdiction
over interlocutory appeals. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, appellate
courts have “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States.” To be appealable (with exceptions not relevant here), a district court’s order must be final. S.S.
ex rel. A.S. v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 43 F.4th 1165, 1169–1170 (11th
Cir. 2022) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d
1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000)).
“A final decision is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Positano Place at Naples I Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. Empire Indemn.
Ins. Co., 84 F.4th 1241, 1248 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted).
For example, “[i]f an order disposes of fewer than all the claims of
all the parties or contemplates further substantive proceedings, it is
not final.” Aguirre v. Seminole Cnty., 158 F.4th 1276, 1291 (11th Cir.
2025) (citing Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244,
1245–46 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)). Moreover, “a district court
order is not final … if it does not dispose of all of the plaintiff’s prayers for relief.” S.S. ex rel. A.S., 43 F.4th at 1170 (quotation omitted);
see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 742 (1976).
The district court’s partial summary judgment order “on the
issue of [false imprisonment] liability” is not an order that “can ever
be considered ‘final’” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. See
Gen. Telev. Arts, Inc. v. S. Ry. Co., 725 F.2d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 1984)
(quotation omitted); see also Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 663 F.2d
1031, 1032 (11th Cir. 1981). Indeed, the order itself contemplated
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that the damages for false imprisonment liability were subject to
jury determination and Doe’s remaining negligence, intentional infliction, and sexual assault claims required further substantive proceedings. See Wetzel, 424 U.S. at 744 (holding that a grant of partial
summary judgment is not final “where assessment of damages or
awarding of other relief remains to be resolved”). If Carnival appealed the order at the time it was issued, we would have dismissed
the premature appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Davis v. Legal
Servs. Ala., Inc., 19 F.4th 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2021) (dismissing
cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was premature).
After trial and the accompanying final judgment order, the
partial summary judgment order merged into the final judgment
and became reviewable on appeal. See Lind v. UPS, Inc., 254 F.3d
1281, 1284 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001); 10A C.A. Wright, A. Miller & M.K.
Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2715 (4th ed. 2013) (“[A] partial summary judgment determining that a certain issue or issues related to
the claims or defenses are to be deemed established for the trial of
the case generally is not appealable until after the case has been
tried.”). With the assurance of our jurisdiction in mind, see S.S. ex
rel. A.S., 43 F.4th at 1169, we turn now to the district court’s partial
summary judgment order.
A. Partial Summary Judgment
At summary judgment, Carnival cited SA Andreasen’s conclusions in the FBI Reports as evidence that there was a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Doe was detained against her
will. The FBI Reports included a summary, based on the FBI
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Notes, of Doe and Anggara’s statements to SA Andreasen, and SA
Andreasen’s conclusions that the encounter was consensual and
that the government declined to prosecute. But instead of considering whether the latter were admissible under the public records
exception to hearsay, the district court excluded the reports in their
entirety. 3
The public records exception to the hearsay rule states that
“[a] record or statement of a public office” that “sets out … factual
findings from a legally authorized investigation” is “not excluded
by the rule against hearsay.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A). 4 Admissible
factual findings will nevertheless be excluded if the opponent
3 Doe argues that Carnival waived the public records exception when it did
not raise it in response to her partial summary judgment motion. But Carnival
raised this exception in its response to Doe’s motion in limine and in its objection to the report and recommendation. See McGroarty v. Swearingen, 977 F.3d
1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2020); Smith v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc., 106 F.4th 1091,
1097 (11th Cir. 2024). By accepting the report and recommendation and granting Doe’s motion in limine, the district court considered the public records
exception in the first instance and the admissibility of the FBI Reports’ conclusions under that exception is thus properly before us. Cf. Access Now, Inc. v.
Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).
4 Doe does not dispute that the FBI Reports were the result of a “legally authorized investigation” and though she briefly argues that the conclusions in
the report were not “factual findings,” she presents conclusory assertions and
cites no case law in support. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d
678, 681(11th Cir. 2014). Doe’s failure to adequately brief this argument, thus,
means that she has abandoned it. See id. at 682 (“A party fails to adequately
‘brief’ a claim when [s]he does not ‘plainly and prominently’ raise it[.]”). USCA11 Case: 24-13159 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 08/25/2026 Page: 14 of 19
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“show[s] that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(B). “To evaluate trustworthiness, courts are to look at a nonexhaustive list of
four factors: the timeliness of the investigation, the investigator’s
skill/experience, whether a hearing was held, and possible bias.”
Crawford v. ITW Food Equip. Grp., LLC, 977 F.3d 1331, 1347 (11th
Cir. 2020) (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 167 n.11
(1988)). The burden of demonstrating a lack of trustworthiness
falls on Doe as the party opposing admission. Id. (citing Fed. R.
Evid. 803(8)(B)).
To start, when a public record “contains multiple levels of
hearsay, each level must satisfy an exception to the hearsay rule.”
Id. at 1348. The district court was correct in excluding the portion
of the FBI Reports recounting Anggara’s version of the events as
inadmissible hearsay. Such “statements made by third persons under no business duty to report may not [be admitted]” because double hearsay, or “[h]earsay within hearsay subject to an exception[,]
is not admissible.” See United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260,
1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). And “placing otherwise
inadmissible hearsay statements by third-parties into a government
report does not make the statements admissible.” Id. (quotation
omitted). But “entries in a police report which result from the officer’s own observations and knowledge may be admitted[.]” Id.
(quotation omitted). SA Andreasen’s own conclusion that Doe’s
encounter with Anggara was consensual and knowledge of the
government’s decision not to prosecute, thus, required their own
Rule 803(8) analysis. See Crawford, 977 F.3d at 1348.
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Doe argues that SA Andreasen’s conclusions from her perfunctory investigation were not trustworthy. In support, Doe argues that SA Andreasen’s investigation was incomplete because she
should have, but did not, view Carnival’s security footage and the
handwritten statement Doe provided to Carnival. In addition, Doe
alleges that SA Andreasen failed to reconcile the numerous drinks
Doe admitted she consumed with Anggara’s statements that he did
not think Doe was intoxicated.
We conclude that Doe has not met her burden of demonstrating that the FBI Reports’ conclusions could not be trusted. In
her briefs, Doe concedes that the FBI’s investigation was timely.
Indeed, the SAs interviewed Doe and Anggara mere hours after the
encounter and the FBI Reports were prepared shortly after.
Though Doe alleges that SA Andreasen lacked skill and was biased,
she does so in conclusory fashion. Doe also notes that no hearing
was held but fails to explain why a hearing would be performed in
the ordinary course of the FBI’s investigation into alleged sexual
assault or would have otherwise been appropriate in this context.
Instead, Doe suggests that the conclusions were untrustworthy because SA Andreasen’s investigation deviated from how Doe herself
would have investigated the incident.
None of the reasons Doe proffers, however, overcomes the
“assumption that a public official will perform [her] duty properly”
and the “reliability gained from regularly conducted activities generally.” Carrizosa v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 47 F.4th 1278, 1297
(11th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328, 335
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(6th Cir. 1993)). Indeed, the record weighs against Doe’s position.
At trial, SA Andreasen testified that she received five months of
training for investigating violent crimes, including sexual assaults.
As part of her training, she was taught to conduct investigations
from start to finish by interviewing witnesses, subjects of investigation, and victims, and learned when additional surveillance is necessary to further an investigation. Without supporting evidence to
the contrary, Doe has not met her burden of showing that the factual findings in the FBI Reports were untrustworthy; SA Andresen’s conclusions were thus admissible as a hearsay exception.
Doe argues in the alternative, that SA Andreasen’s conclusions are inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403. Though the fact of
the government’s declination of prosecution is likely unduly prejudicial, see Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Gosdin, 803 F.2d 1153, 1160 (11th
Cir. 1986), there is no indication that the consensual-encounter
conclusion is any more prejudicial than other evidence Doe may
find unfavorable. To the contrary, this evidence is highly probative
because it was the only counterfactual in the record and serves as
the basis for reversing partial summary judgment. See United States
v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1247 (11th Cir. 2011). Indeed, at the summary judgment stage, “a district court may consider a hearsay
statement … if the statement could be reduced to admissible evidence at trial” and “[t]he most obvious way that hearsay testimony
can be reduced to admissible form is to have [SA Andreasen] testify
directly to the matter at trial,” as she has already done below. See
Jones v. UPS Grnd. Frght., 683 F.3d 1283, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2012);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). We thus reject Doe’s argument and—in
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“look[ing] at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission,” Lopez, 649 F.3d at 1247—at the summary judgment stage, we
conclude that the consensual-encounter conclusion is not barred
by Rule 403. See Jones, 682 F.3d at 1293–94.
Having concluded that SA Andreasen’s consensual-encounter conclusion was admissible, we also conclude that at the summary judgment stage there was a dispute of material fact as to
whether Doe was confined in the maintenance closet against her
will. “To state a claim for false imprisonment [under maritime
law], a plaintiff must allege a willful detention without [her] consent and without lawful authority.” Maglana v. Celebrity Cruises Inc.,
136 F.4th 1032, 1041 (11th Cir. 2025). 5 Viewed in light most favorable to the non-moving party, Carnival, SA Andreasen’s consensual-encounter conclusion could disprove Doe’s allegation that the
detention was without her consent and lead a reasonable jury to
find in favor of Carnival for Doe’s false imprisonment claim. See
Bowen, 882 F.3d at 1362. False imprisonment liability, thus, was for
the jury as the fact-finder to decide and the district court’s denial of
5 In their briefs below on Doe’s motion for partial summary judgment, Doe
and Carnival disputed whether Florida law or the Restatement of Torts governed Doe’s maritime tort claim for false imprisonment. During the pendency
of this appeal, and after the appeal was fully briefed, we addressed, as a matter
of first impression, the elements of a claim for false imprisonment under general maritime law. See Maglana, 136 F.4th at 1041. Since consent is a defense
to false imprisonment under both the Restatement of Torts, see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35, and Florida law, see Conner v. Florida, 19 So.3d
1117, 1123 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), evidence of Doe’s consent to her encounter
with Anggara creates a dispute of material fact under either legal framework. USCA11 Case: 24-13159 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 08/25/2026 Page: 18 of 19
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that opportunity constitutes reversible error. We next consider the
effect the district court’s erroneous partial summary judgment ruling on the false imprisonment claim had on the trial.
B. Effect on trial
Given the critical relationship between the FBI Reports and
Carnival’s defense, the erroneous grant of partial summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim “could have affected the outcome of the case” in three respects. See FIGA v. R.V.M.P. Corp., 874
F.2d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir. 1989). First, the district court’s analysis
at summary judgment similarly led it to erroneously exclude the
FBI Reports in their entirety from trial. As a result, SA Andreasen
was limited to recounting who she talked to, what they told her,
and what she put into her notes but was unable to testify about her
conclusions resulting from her investigation. And even though
Doe’s experts relied on the FBI Reports in their analysis, Carnival
was precluded from asking the experts about the reports. Second,
the jury was instructed that Carnival was already liable for false imprisonment, which included an instruction that Doe was unlawfully restrained against her will. Such an instruction could lead a
jury to infer that the sexual conduct was similarly against her will.
Third, and along similar lines, proof of consent is a defense for
Doe’s claims for false imprisonment and sexual assault. So, the
FBI’s factual finding that the encounter was consensual is relevant
to both claims, especially since both claims arose out of the same
set of facts and timeline of events. Though SA Andreasen testified
about Doe’s and Anggara’s respective accounts of the events, her
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conclusion from her investigation could have been the deciding
factor for the jury.
We thus conclude that a new trial is warranted for the false
imprisonment and sexual assault claims. FIGA, 874 F.2d at 1533
(“[T]he scope of a new trial may be limited to a single issue when
the issue as to which a new trial is required is separate from all
other issues and the error requiring a new trial does not affect the
determination of any other issue.”). But because Doe did not crossappeal the jury’s negligence and intentional infliction verdicts,
which the jury decided in favor of Carnival, the new trial will not
relitigate those claims of negligence and intentional infliction. See
Peat, Inc., 378 F.3d at 1165 n.5 (11th Cir. 2004); Mekdeci ex rel. Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat’l Lab’ys, 711 F.2d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1983).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the district
court’s grant of partial summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim, vacate in part the judgment of the district court as to
the false imprisonment and sexual assault claims, and remand for a
new trial on the false imprisonment and sexual assault claims, consistent with this opinion.6
REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.
6 We do not address any of the remaining issues raised on appeal by Carnival.