IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-CA-00369-COA
CAMERON DEANDRE BRACEY APPELLANT
v.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/18/2025
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOSEPH H. LOPER JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MONTGOMERY COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: FRANK G. VOLLOR
TRACIE DIANE HERRING
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: ROBERT J. DAMBRINO III
WESLEY CLAYTON PINSON
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL
INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART - 08/25/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., EMFINGER AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.
WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Cameron Bracey alleged that the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department caused
him to be charged with forgery and arrested based solely on a cursory internet search for the
name of the payee on a forged check. Bracey sued Montgomery County for malicious
prosecution and false arrest/imprisonment under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA),
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1 to -23 (Rev. 2019). The circuit court granted the County’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Bracey’s malicious prosecution claim was
barred by sovereign immunity under the MTCA and that Bracey’s false arrest/imprisonment claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
¶2. We affirm the dismissal of Bracey’s malicious prosecution claim. However, we
conclude that Bracey may pursue his false arrest/imprisonment claim under the MTCA, that
the claim is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and that Bracey has alleged
sufficient facts to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings on that claim.
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings on
Bracey’s false arrest/imprisonment claim.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
¶3. Edwin Taylor & Son Logging (“Taylor & Son”) is a business located in Duck Hill,
Mississippi. In April or May 2023, Taylor & Son was notified that a duplicate check for
$5,047.31 had been drawn on its account with the Bank of Kilmichael and deposited in an
account at First Tennessee Bank in Memphis. The check was payable to “Cameron Bracey.”
Taylor & Son reported the forged check to the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department.
¶4. In response to Taylor & Son’s report, the sheriff’s department allegedly conducted a
“cursory investigation” consisting of only a “cursory social media scan and internet search”
for an individual with a similar name. The sheriff’s department identified Cameron Bracey,
a twenty-two-year-old Jackson State University student and Vicksburg resident. The
sheriff’s department then had Edwin Taylor, the sole proprietor of Taylor & Son, sign a
criminal affidavit accusing Bracey of forgery.
1
Because we review an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the complaint’s factual allegations must be taken as true. Broadband Voice LLC v. Jefferson County, 348 So. 3d 305, 307 (¶10) (Miss. 2022).
2
¶5. Bracey had never been associated with or employed by Taylor & Son, he had no
access to its checks, and he had no connection to the Memphis bank account in which the
forged check was deposited. Nonetheless, the Montgomery County Justice Court issued a
warrant for Bracey’s arrest. On July 2, 2023, he was arrested and detained in Vicksburg and
transported to Montgomery County. On July 4, 2023, for reasons that are unclear, a justice
court judge set bail at $100,000. Bracey paid $10,075 to a bail bondsman to secure his
release and a $4,000 retainer to a criminal defense attorney. Bracey also lost his job as a
result of his arrest. Bracey’s preliminary hearing was continued at the State’s request, and
in September 2023 the justice court bound the case over to the grand jury. The prosecution
ended in March 2024 when a Montgomery County grand jury returned a “No Bill.”
¶6. In June 2024, Bracey served Montgomery County with a notice of claim pursuant to
the MTCA. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (Rev. 2019). In October 2024, Bracey sued
the County under the MTCA in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. The complaint
asserted claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest/false imprisonment.2
¶7. The County filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that both claims
were barred by sovereign immunity under the MTCA and that because the claims were not
covered by the MTCA, they were also barred by the one-year statute of limitations found in
Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-35 (Rev. 2019).
¶8. The circuit court granted the County’s motion, holding that sovereign immunity barred
2
Bracey filed a separate complaint in the Montgomery County Circuit Court that asserted the same two claims against Taylor & Son. Bracey filed a motion to consolidate the two cases, but the circuit court did not rule on that motion.
3
Bracey’s malicious prosecution claim and that the statute of limitations barred his false
arrest/false imprisonment claim. Bracey filed a notice of appeal.
ANALYSIS
¶9. We review an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. King, 921 So. 2d 268, 270 (¶10) (Miss. 2005). “A Rule 12(c)
motion is similar to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Id. at 271 (¶10). Therefore, “the allegations in the complaint must
be taken as true, and the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond any
reasonable doubt that the non-moving party will be unable to prove any set of facts in support
of the claim which would entitle the non-movant to relief.” Id.
I. Malicious Prosecution
¶10. The County argues that Bracey’s claim for malicious prosecution is barred by
sovereign immunity under the MTCA. We agree.
¶11. “The MTCA statutorily replaced the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity.”
Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Oliver, 235 So. 3d 75, 81 (¶24) (Miss. 2017). The MTCA waives
“the immunity of the state and its political subdivisions from claims for money damages
arising out of the torts of such governmental entities and the torts of their employees while
acting within the course and scope of their employment.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5(1)
(Rev. 2019). However, the MTCA also provides that a governmental entity does not
“waive[] immunity for any conduct of its employee if the employee’s conduct constituted
fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense other than traffic violations.”
4
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5(2) (emphasis added).
¶12. In Oliver, the plaintiff sued the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC)
for malicious prosecution after UMMC law enforcement officers filed criminal charges
against him. See Oliver, 235 So. 3d at 77-79 (¶¶4-12). However, the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by sovereign immunity:
[B]ased on the clear language of Section 11-46-5(2), . . . the MTCA does not
apply to a malicious-prosecution claim against a governmental entity and its
employees in their official capacity.
Under Section 11-46-5(2), torts in which malice is an essential element are not
within the course and scope of employment. Thus, these intentional torts are
outside the scope of the MTCA’s waiver of immunity, and the MTCA does not
apply. Rather, any legal action against a governmental employee for these
intentional torts must necessarily proceed against him or her as an individual.
Malice is an essential element of malicious prosecution. This means, to prove
UMMC’s officers committed malicious prosecution, Oliver must prove the
officers acted with malice. If he meets this burden, then necessarily he has
proven they were acting outside the course and scope of their employment for
purposes of the MTCA.
For UMMC, this means, as a matter of law, it cannot be liable, and sovereign
immunity cannot be considered to have been waived for the alleged malicious
conduct of its officers.
Id. at 82-83 (¶¶29-32) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
¶13. Here, the result is the same. To prove that the County (the sheriff’s department)
committed malicious prosecution, Bracey must prove that its employees acted with “malice.”
If Bracey meets that burden, then necessarily he will prove that the employees were acting
outside the scope of their employment for purposes of the MTCA, in which case the MTCA
does not apply. This means, as a matter of law, that the County has not waived immunity and
5
cannot be held liable with respect to Bracey’s malicious-prosecution claim. Id.
¶14. Bracey attempts to avoid Oliver’s clear holding by arguing that section 11-46-5(2)
should be read narrowly to provide immunity only for conduct that constitutes “factual”
“malice” in the sense of “ill will, animosity and a desire to do harm for harm’s sake.”
(Quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts Div. 7, ch. 29, Introductory Note (1977)). Bracey
argues that the statute’s reference to “malice” should not be interpreted to apply to “artificial
and legal” “malice,” which can include any “act that necessarily results in harm to another
and done without privilege.” (Quoting id.). The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that
“malice in the law of malicious prosecution is a term used in an artificial and legal sense.”
Oliver, 235 So. 3d at 83 (¶36) (quoting Strong v. Nicholson, 580 So. 2d 1288, 1293 (Miss.
1991)). In this context, “malice” “connotes a prosecution instituted primarily for a purpose
other than that of bringing an offender to justice.” Id. (quoting Strong, 580 So. 2d at 1293).
Bracey argues that section 11-46-5(2) does not bar his claim against the County because it
only depends on proof of “malice” in an “artificial and legal sense,” not real or “factual”
malice.
¶15. The problem with Bracey’s argument is that it is directly foreclosed by precedent. In
Oliver, the Supreme Court held that governmental entities have sovereign immunity and
cannot be held liable for acts by their employees constituting malicious prosecution. Id. at
82-83 (¶¶29-32). The Oliver Court did not qualify this clear holding. The circuit court and
this Court are, of course, bound to follow Mississippi Supreme Court precedent. Carr v.
State, 942 So. 2d 816, 817 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, the circuit court did not
6
err by dismissing Bracey’s malicious-prosecution claim.
¶16. We note, as the Supreme Court noted in Oliver, that the MTCA does not preclude
malicious-prosecution claims against individual employees in their individual capacities.
Id. at 83 (¶33); see also Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42 (2022) (recognizing that
individuals may be sued and held liable for malicious prosecution under the Fourth
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Governmental employees who commit acts constituting
malicious prosecution are not considered to be acting within the course and scope of their
employment and, thus, may be sued individually. Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-5(2). However,
Bracey did not sue any county employees in their individual capacities. This suit is against
the County only, and the County cannot be held liable for malicious-prosecution claims based
on the acts of its employees.
II. False Arrest/Imprisonment
A. Statute of Limitations
¶17. Bracey argues that the circuit erred by dismissing his false arrest/imprisonment claim
pursuant to section 15-1-35’s one-year statute of limitations. “Traditionally, false arrest and
false imprisonment have been considered to be the same tort.” Phillip McIntosh, False
Arrest, in 5 Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 41:27, at 320 (Jeffrey Jackson et al. eds.,
3d ed. 2023). Since “[a] person who is falsely arrested . . . is, at the same time, falsely
imprisoned,” “an unlawful arrest may give rise to a cause of action for either false arrest or
false imprisonment.” 8 American Law of Torts § 27:2, at 413 (Stuart Speiser et al. eds.
2018). For purposes of this appeal, we perceive no difference between the torts. Therefore,
7
we analyze Bracey’s false arrest/imprisonment claim as a singular claim.3
¶18. In general, it is clear that a false arrest/imprisonment claim is subject to section 15-1-35’s statute of limitations. Section 15-1-35 provides that “[a]ll actions for assault, assault
and battery, maiming, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, or menace, and all actions for
slanderous words concerning the person or title, for failure to employ, and for libels, shall
be commenced within one (1) year next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.”
(Emphasis added). In City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson, 562 So. 2d 1212 (Miss. 1990), the
Supreme Court held that section 15-1-35 applies to the tort of “false arrest as we know it
today” because it is the equivalent of “the tort of malicious arrest, as enumerated in the
statute.” Id. at 1218. The circuit court reasoned that the statute of limitations barred
Bracey’s false arrest/false imprisonment claim because Bracey filed suit more than one year
after the claim accrued.4
¶19. However, Bracey sued the County under the MTCA. The MTCA provides that “any
claim made or suit filed against a governmental entity or its employee to recover damages
for any injury for which immunity has been waived under this chapter shall be brought only
under the provisions of this chapter, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the
contrary.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7(1) (Rev. 2019) (emphasis added). The final clause
3
On appeal, Bracey argues that “[f]alse arrest and false imprisonment are one tort,” and the County similarly states that “any apparent distinction between a claim of false arrest and false imprisonment is inconsequential.”
4
A “complaint for false arrest and false imprisonment accrues on the date of arrest.” Brooks v. Pennington, 995 So. 2d 733, 738 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (brackets omitted) (quoting Parker v. Miss. Game & Fish Comm’n, 555 So. 2d 725, 727 (Miss. 1989)). There is no dispute that Bracey filed suit more than one year from the date of his arrest.
8
of section 11-46-7(1) is sometimes referred to as a “‘notwithstanding’ clause.” Miss.
Gaming Comm’n v. Imperial Palace of Miss. Inc., 751 So. 2d 1025, 1029-30 (¶18) (Miss.
1999). “A statute containing a ‘notwithstanding’ clause is effective regardless of other
statutes to the contrary.” Id. (emphasis added). The MTCA has its own statute of
limitations. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3)(a)-(b). The MTCA also has a one-year statute
of limitations, but its one-year period is tolled or extended for additional periods if the
plaintiff serves a timely pre-suit notice of claim. Id.; see Moton v. City of Clarksdale, 367
So. 3d 979, 983 (¶12) (Miss. 2023). Here, there is no dispute that Bracey timely served the
County with a notice of claim. In addition, there is no dispute that Bracey then filed suit
within the period prescribed by the MTCA’s statute of limitations.
¶20. Nonetheless, the County argues that Bracey’s false arrest/imprisonment claim is
“barred by one-year statute of limitations period provided in [section] 15-1-35” because that
claim is “not covered by the MTCA.” In other words, the County argues that because the
MTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for false arrest/imprisonment claims, Bracey’s
claim is barred by the non-MTCA statute of limitations. However, if the County truly retains
sovereign immunity for such claims, then Bracey’s claim is barred for that reason alone—and
the statute of limitations is irrelevant.
¶21. The County does not dispute that Bracey filed suit within the time prescribed by the
MTCA, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3). Again, the County simply contends that section 11-46-11(3) is inapplicable because Bracey’s claim is barred by sovereign immunity under the
MTCA. And for his part, Bracey does not dispute that he filed suit outside the one-year
9
period prescribed by section 15-1-35. Indeed, Bracey does not argue that he has any viable
claim against the County or its employees other than under the MTCA.5 Therefore, neither
statute of limitations is material to the disposition of this appeal. Rather, the dispositive
question is simply whether Bracey’s false arrest/imprisonment claim is barred by sovereign
immunity under the MTCA. Accordingly, we address that issue.
B. Sovereign Immunity
¶22. As noted above, the MTCA provides that a governmental entity does not “waive[]
immunity for any conduct of its employee if the employee’s conduct constituted fraud,
malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense other than traffic violations.” Miss.
Code Ann. § 11-46-5(2) (emphasis added). Therefore, the Mississippi Supreme Court has
held that a governmental entity does not waive immunity and cannot be held liable for “torts
in which malice is an essential element” of the claim. Oliver, 235 So. 3d at 82-83 (¶¶30-32).
The County argues that Bracey’s claim for false arrest/imprisonment is barred by sovereign
immunity because malice is an essential element of that claim.
¶23. However, in Foster v. Noel, 715 So. 2d 174, 180 (¶32) (Miss. 1998), the Supreme
Court specifically held that section 11-46-5(2) did not bar a claim for false arrest. In Foster,
the manager of a grocery store reported to Yazoo City police that two men had shoplifted
steaks from the store and left in a truck. Id. at 175-76 (¶¶2-3). The manager recognized one
of the men and identified him by name and gave police the truck’s license plate number. Id.
A police officer later identified the truck’s owner—a female, Jacqueline Noel—and had the
5
As noted above, Bracey did not assert any individual-capacity claims against any county employees.
10
manager sign an affidavit accusing Noel of the theft. Id. at 176 (¶3). The officer then
obtained a warrant for Noel’s arrest, and Noel was arrested a few months later. Id. at (¶¶3-4).
Noel sued the city for “false arrest” under the MTCA. Id. at (¶¶6-7). Following a bench
trial, the trial court found the City liable because it had obtained a warrant and caused Noel’s
arrest despite the complainant’s statements that two men shoplifted the steaks. Id. at 178
(¶21). On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against the City. Id. at 175 (¶1).
As relevant here, the Supreme Court stated:
Yazoo City finds no refuge in [section] 11-46-5(2) which provides in pertinent
part:
For the purposes of this chapter an employee shall not be
considered as acting within the course and scope of his
employment and a governmental entity shall not be liable to be
considered to have waived immunity for any conduct of its
employee if the employee’s conduct constituted fraud, malice,
libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense other than
traffic violation.
Here, Noel sued Yazoo City for false arrest, not slander or any of the other
torts mentioned in the above statute.
Id. at 180 (¶32). Foster’s holding—that a claim for false arrest is viable under the MTCA
and is not barred by section 11-46-5(2)—is directly on-point here.
¶24. The County argues that Foster has been overruled by Oliver, 235 So. 3d at 82-83
(¶¶29-32), and Zumwalt v. Jones County Board of Supervisors, 19 So. 3d 672, 688 (¶¶81-84)
(Miss. 2009), which hold that section 11-46-5(2) applies not only to the specific torts
mentioned in the statute but also to torts that require “malice” as an essential element. For
two reasons, we disagree with the County’s argument.
11
¶25. First, as an intermediate appellate court, we are generally bound to follow Supreme
Court decisions that are directly controlling “until the Supreme Court itself has overruled
those decisions.” Brown v. State, 336 So. 3d 134, 146 (¶37) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020), cert.
denied, 316 So. 3d 202 (Miss. 2021). The Supreme Court has not overruled Foster.
Therefore, we are bound to follow it.
¶26. Second, under a long line of Mississippi Supreme Court decisions, “malice” is not an
essential element of the tort of false arrest or imprisonment. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that “[t]he tort of false imprisonment has only two elements: (1) detention of
the plaintiff and (2) that such detention was unlawful.” Wallace v. Thornton, 672 So. 2d 724,
727 (Miss. 1996) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., Serv. Cos. Inc. v. Est. of Mautrice Vaughn,
169 So. 3d 875, 879 (¶13) (Miss. 2015); Alpha Gulf Coast Inc. v. Jackson, 801 So. 2d 709,
720 (¶28) (Miss. 2001); Morgan v. Greenwaldt, 786 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (¶11) (Miss. 2001);
Whitten v. Cox, 799 So. 2d 1, 9 (¶12) (Miss. 2000); Lee v. Alexander, 607 So. 2d 30, 35
(Miss. 1992); Thornhill v. Wilson, 504 So. 2d 1205, 1208 (Miss. 1987); State ex rel. Powell
v. Moore, 252 Miss. 471, 475, 174 So. 2d 352, 354 (1965). The Court has emphasized that
“the second element of the tort turns on” the objective “reasonableness of the defendants’
actions, not their intent.” Wallace, 672 So. 2d at 727. Moreover, the Court has specifically
noted that malice is not an element of false arrest or imprisonment—in contrast with
malicious prosecution, which requires proof of malice. Parker, 555 So. 2d at 728-29.
Because “malice” is not an essential element of false arrest or imprisonment, such claims are
not barred by section 11-46-5(2).
12
¶27. Despite this line of cases, the County argues that “malice” is an essential element of
a claim for false arrest or imprisonment under City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson, 562 So. 2d
1212 (Miss. 1990). Specifically, the County points to that opinion’s statement that “[f]alse
arrest is an intentional tort, arising when one causes another to be arrested falsely,
unlawfully, maliciously and without probable cause.” Id. at 1218 (emphasis added).
¶28. However, we do not believe that the Supreme Court intended to modify the elements
of the tort, as enumerated in years of precedent, in City of Mound Bayou. See McIntosh,
supra ¶17 (concluding that the opinion’s mention of “maliciously” was “dicta”—“simply an
aberration best forgotten”—and did not modify the elements of the tort). Indeed, in cases
decided after City of Mound Bayou, the Court has continued to state that the tort of false
imprisonment “has only two elements,” not including malice. Wallace, 672 So. 2d at 727;
Morgan, 786 So. 2d at 1042 (¶11). We conclude that the long line of cases pre- and postdating City of Mound Bayou correctly enumerate the two elements of the tort of malicious
prosecution and that “malice” is not an element. Therefore, section 11-46-5(2) does not bar
all claims for false arrest or imprisonment.6
6
The County also argues that Bracey’s false arrest or imprisonment claim is barred because Bracey alleged in his complaint that the sheriff’s department “maliciously” caused him to be arrested and prosecuted. The relevant allegation is found in the malicious prosecution count of the complaint, not the false arrest or imprisonment count. A plaintiff is entitled to plead in the alternative. M.R.C.P. 8(e)(2). Moreover, the claim should be dismissed on a motion for judgment on the pleadings only if Bracy “will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle [him] to relief.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 921 So. 2d at 271 (¶10) (emphasis added). Since it is possible for Bracey to prevail on a claim for false arrest or imprisonment without also proving that members of the sheriff’s department acted with “malice,” the claim cannot be dismissed as a matter of law on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Oliver, 235 So. 3d at 82-83 (¶31).
13
C. Independent-Intermediary Doctrine
¶29. In the alternative, the County argues that the “independent-intermediary doctrine” bars
Bracey’s false arrest/imprisonment claim. Specifically, the County argues that it cannot be
held liable because an “independent intermediary”—a justice court judge—issued the warrant
for Bracey’s arrest. The County’s argument relies primarily on federal cases. In Springfield
v. Members 1st Community Federal Credit Union, 106 So. 3d 826 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012),
cert. denied, 105 So. 3d 326 (Miss. 2013), which involved a complaint for malicious
prosecution, this Court discussed the independent-intermediary doctrine as articulated by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but we did not expressly adopt or reject
the doctrine. See id. at 833 (¶¶18-20). Rather, we concluded that the doctrine was
inapplicable in that case because, inter alia, the Fifth Circuit had “expressly determined that
the independent-intermediary doctrine applied to false arrest but not malicious prosecution
claims.” Id. at (¶20). For purposes of this appeal, we assume that the doctrine would apply
to a claim for false arrest or imprisonment under Mississippi common law.
¶30. The Fifth Circuit has held that “if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an
independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision
breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party.” Wilson v.
Stroman, 33 F.4th 202, 208 (5th Cir. 2022). But this doctrine has limits. “[T]he intermediary
must be truly independent. Thus, the initiating party may be liable for false arrest if the
plaintiff shows that the deliberations of that intermediary were in some way tainted by the
actions of the defendant.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). This means that the doctrine does
14
not apply if (1) “it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that
a warrant should issue” or (2) “a warrant affidavit contains false statements or material
omissions made with at least reckless disregard for the truth that were necessary to the
finding of probable cause.” Hughes v. Garcia, 100 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2024) (internal
numbering and quotation marks omitted).
¶31. Here, Bracey alleged that the sheriff’s department caused Edwin Taylor to sign a
criminal affidavit accusing Bracey of forgery. Bracey alleged that the sheriff’s department
made no “investigation or attempt to verify” the identity of the forger other than “a cursory
social media scan or internet search to find a similar name.” Bracey lived in Vicksburg and
had no connection to either Taylor & Son or the Memphis bank where the forged check was
deposited. In short, Bracey alleged that the sheriff’s department caused him to be charged,
arrested, detained, and transported to Montgomery County based solely on a cursory internet
search for the name on the forged check. Bracey alleged that a minimal investigation would
have shown that the affidavit was false. On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
complaint’s factual allegations must be accepted as true. Broadband Voice LLC, 348 So. 3d
at 307 (¶10). At this stage, Bracey has plausibly alleged that the sheriff’s department
recklessly caused Taylor to sign an affidavit falsely accusing Bracey of forgery. Accepting
these allegations as true, they are sufficient to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings
based on the independent-intermediary doctrine. Accordingly, the County is not entitled to
dismissal of Bracey’s false arrest/imprisonment claim on this ground.
CONCLUSION
15
¶32. The County is immune from liability for Bracey’s claim for malicious prosecution.
However, Bracey may pursue his claim for false arrest/imprisonment under the MTCA, and
he has pled sufficient facts to survive the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Therefore, we affirm the order granting judgment on the pleadings in part, reverse it in part,
and remand for further proceedings on Bracey’s false arrest/imprisonment claim.
¶33. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE,
McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.
16