IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-CA-00049-COA
DAVID LEVON CLARK APPELLANT
v.
TIFFANY GENDRON BELK APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/03/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MARK ANTHONY MAPLES
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: HAROLD O. GRISSOM JR.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: TIFFANY GENDRON BELK (PRO SE) NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CUSTODY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/25/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Two parents sought custody over their two daughters. The eldest daughter had been
sent to go live with her father after a series of conflicts with her mother and sister, after
which the father sought custody of both girls. The chancery court ultimately granted physical
custody of the eldest to the father and the youngest to the mother.
¶2. The father appeals, arguing he should have custody of both; the mother did not crossappeal. Bound as we are by our deferential standard of review, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3. Tiffany Belk and David Clark are the biological parents of two girls—Claire and Gabby.1 Claire was born in 2009 and Gabby in 2012. Tiffany and David were never married
and separated well before this case began. There had never been a court-ordered custody
arrangement.
¶4. At the time relevant to this appeal, Tiffany was living in Ocean Springs and David
was living in Pensacola, Florida. Both daughters had lived exclusively with Tiffany since
they were born. Over their lives, they would only have sporadic visitation with their father.
¶5. At the time this custody action was initiated, Claire was 13 years old and in 8th grade.
Gabby was 10 years old and in 6th grade. Claire began experiencing behavioral issues while
in elementary school. The problems continued for several years, becoming progressively
worse over time.
¶6. In early 2023, Tiffany reached her breaking point after at least two incidents involving
the police. In one incident, there was a squabble between Tiffany and Claire over the
teenager’s phone. The two of them were screaming at each other which resulted in calls to
the sheriff’s department. In the second incident, Claire allegedly threatened her family with
a knife. From her mother’s viewpoint, this threatened not just Tiffany, but also Claire’s little
sister Gabby, as well as others in Tiffany’s home. Police were called again.
¶7. As a result of these incidents, Tiffany reached out to the girls’ father for help.
Consequently, David brought Claire to live with him in Pensacola. Gabby remained with her
mother in Ocean Springs.
¶8. Less than a month later, David initiated this custody action. In his first petition, David
1
We use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of minor children. Custody of Claire is ultimately not at issue here.
2
sought permanent physical custody of both daughters. His second petition requested
temporary custody over both girls while the case proceeded through chancery court. Tiffany
then filed a competing motion seeking both permanent and temporary custody of Claire and
Gabby as well.
¶9. After an initial hearing, the chancery court awarded David temporary physical custody
of Claire, with temporary physical custody of Gabby remaining with her mother. The court’s
order also granted David temporary visitation with Gabby, but explicitly held “the Defendant
[Tiffany] is not awarded any visitation until further order of the court.” The chancellor
further specified, “during all visitation at [David’s] home, the minor children shall be
supervised at all times due to threats of violence between the children that have occurred.”
Lastly, in the temporary custody order, the chancellor required that “[Claire] shall have a
psychological evaluation immediately.”
¶10. Less than 2 months later, the chancery court held a “hearing for review of the prior
order of the court” and entered an Amended Temporary Order. The split in custody between
the parents remained the same, but the chancery court changed the visitation terms to allow
Tiffany and David to have both girls together for a week each. The chancellor also noted
“[Claire] may need [to] have a second p[sy]chological evaluation at the mother’s discretion.”
¶11. The custody trial took place over 3 days, with the first two days occurring
consecutively in May, and the final day occurring much later in August. During trial, the
chancery court heard testimony from Tiffany, David, and David’s wife Leigh Anne Clark.
¶12. The chancery court subsequently entered its final order on the custody issue, which
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we will discuss more fully below. The order included an analysis of all the Albright factors.
Seven of the twelve factors were found neutral. Four factors were found to be in favor of
Tiffany, including continuity of care and parenting skills.
¶13. As for David, the chancellor found his long, steady period of self-employment favored
him. And “any other factors Relevant to the Parent-Child Relationship or the Child’s Best
Interest,” the catch-all factor, was found to “highly favor[] David,” as well. This was due
to an event that dramatically unfolded during trial, which the chancery court explained:
A major issue in this litigation has been [Claire]’s access to social media,
whether [Claire] and/or Tiffany were truthful with David about the child’s
presence on social media, and the method of communication between the child
and Tiffany while in David’s custody. Three days after the second day of trial,
in an emergency filing, David discovered Tiffany and [Claire] had been in
communication with each other through various forms of social media behind
David’s back. It came to the [c]ourt’s attention that the minor child had either
an iPhone or a flip phone, had two accounts on Instagram, and five e-mail
accounts.
¶14. All of this was “unknown” to the child’s father. While David was left in the dark,
Tiffany knew to some extent what was going on, as did others who were “allied” with the
mother and daughter. During the trial, one of the mother’s “friends who was in the courtroom
texted another minor child” with a message for Claire “to delete all of her social media
accounts.”
¶15. Once this became known to the father—and ultimately, the chancery court—the
chancellor took the situation extremely seriously. “The issue of honesty between the parents
and child had been a major issue” the court recounted, and found this was another example
of how Tiffany was undermining David despite the court’s order placing temporary custody
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of Claire with him. The chancery court found “Tiffany chose to manipulate the child into
maintaining a secret and deceitful line of communication,” and determined this continued
pattern of conduct by the mother would be weighed in favor of the father.
¶16. The chancery court awarded legal custody of both daughters to both parents. But as
to physical custody, the chancellor ultimately determined that David would take physical
custody of Claire, where she had been since the temporary order was entered, and Gabby
would stay with Tiffany. Since the girls were being separated, the court ordered that “David
and Tiffany shall exercise visitation so that the sisters are together as much as possible.”
¶17. David filed a post-trial motion seeking modification of the chancellor’s order, arguing
“the court erred in the awarding of physical custody of the youngest child [Gabby] to the
mother, Tiffany.” The chancery court entered a blanket judgment of denial.
¶18. Aggrieved, David appeals the chancery court’s ruling awarding custody of Gabby to
Tiffany. Tiffany responds in opposition; however, she does not cross-appeal the chancellor’s
decision granting custody of Claire to David.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶19. Our “standard of review concerning child custody is limited.” Embrey v. Young, 337
So. 3d 247, 254 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). “Matters involving child custody are within the
sound discretion of the chancellor.” Smith v. Bellville, 301 So. 3d 678, 682 (¶8) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2020). And “[t]he chancellor has the ultimate discretion to weigh the evidence the way
he sees fit.” McLellan v. McLellan, 397 So. 3d 860, 867 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024).
¶20. This Court “will not disturb a chancellor’s judgment when supported by substantial
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evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly
erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Embrey, 337 So. 3d at 254 (¶23)
(quoting Woodham v. Woodham, 17 So. 3d 153, 156 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). In other
words, “findings of fact made by the chancellor may only be disturbed if they are not
supported by substantial, credible evidence.” Ellis v. Ellis, 952 So. 2d 982, 989 (¶15) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2006).
¶21. Ultimately, “the issue is not whether this Court ‘agrees with the chancellor’s ruling’
but only whether ‘substantial evidence’ supports the chancellor’s ruling.” McLellan, 397 So.
3d at 867 (¶25) (quoting Hammers v. Hammers, 890 So. 2d 944, 950 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App.
2004)). “So long as there is substantial evidence in the record that, if found credible by the
chancellor, would provide support for the chancellor’s decision, this Court may not intercede
simply to substitute our collective opinion for that of the chancellor.” Id. (quoting Hammers,
890 So. 2d at 950 (¶14)).
DISCUSSION
¶22. David raises three issues on appeal, and the most extensively developed is his
argument that the chancery court erred in its Albright analysis. See Albright v. Albright, 437
So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983). Specifically, he “believes the [c]hancery [c]ourt was in error
in not awarding him the Albright factors of (1) Parenting Skills, (2) Willingness & Capacity
to Provide Primary Child Care, (3) Stability of the Home Environment, (4) Moral Fitness,
(5) Child’s Preference, and (6) Health of the Parents.”
¶23. David further argues it was “error to split [the daughters] up and instead have them
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travel every weekend to and from Pensacola wherein they can’t participate in extra-curricular
activities each Friday nor church on Sundays.”
¶24. Last, he argues that the chancery court erred “in ordering that all orders NOT
consistent with the Court’s . . . Judgment of Custody . . . SHALL REMAIN in full force and
effect.”
¶25. Finding no abuse of discretion in the chancellor’s findings, we affirm.
I. Whether the chancery court erred in awarding physical custody of
Gabby to Tiffany.
¶26. As an initial matter, we point out that a significant portion of David’s argument on
appeal focuses on the issue of Tiffany’s credibility. He essentially asks this Court to make
its own credibility determinations and re-weigh the evidence.
¶27. However, it is well established in our caselaw that “[t]he chancery court is ‘vested
with the responsibility to hear the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and determine
ultimately what weight and worth to afford any particular aspect of proof.’” Hackler v.
Hackler, 296 So. 3d 773, 778-79 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Garner v. Garner, 283
So. 3d 120, 140 (¶84) (Miss. 2019)).
¶28. “The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony, as well as the
interpretation of evidence where it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, are
primarily for the chancellor as the trier of facts.” Embrey, 337 So. 3d at 258 (¶42) (quoting
Myers v. Myers, 270 So. 3d 1060, 1065 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018)). Accordingly, “this
Court is not in the position to assign credibility to the evidence presented[.]” Hackler, 296
So. 3d at 778-79 (¶35).
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¶29. “The relationship of parent and child is not for the benefit of the parent but for the
child.” Hendrix v. Whitt, 373 So. 3d 778, 787 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Matthew
Thompson, Mississippi Divorce, Alimony & Child Custody § 14.2 (2018)).
¶30. In the chancery court’s “original determinations of the custody of a minor child, the
child’s best interest and welfare is the ‘polestar consideration[.]’” Id. (quoting Latham v.
Latham, 357 So. 3d 1157, 1161 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)). The point is for the chancellor
to “identify the custody arrangement that would be in the child’s best interest—not to
determine what is in either parent’s best interest or which parent is the better person.”
Embrey, 337 So. 3d at 256 (¶29) (emphasis added) (quoting Vassar v. Vassar, 228 So. 3d
367, 375 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)).
¶31. The chancery court evaluates the child’s best interests by applying the Albright factors
to each parent’s circumstances. Id. In essence, chancellors must use these factors to ask
which parent would better serve the needs of the impressionable and maturing child. See
Matthew Thompson, Mississippi Divorce, Alimony & Child Custody § 12:2 (“the needs of
the child as an impressionable and maturing person being prepared for his or her role in
society must be given serious and conscientious consideration”).
¶32. The Albright factors include:
(1) the child’s age, health, and sex; (2) the parent with the continuity of care
prior to the separation; (3) the parent with the best parenting skills and the
willingness and capacity to provide primary child care; (4) the parents’
employment and the responsibilities of that employment; (5) the parents’
physical and mental health and age; (6) the emotional ties of the parent and
child; (7) the parents’ moral fitness; (8) the child's home, school, and
community record; (9) the child’s preference at the age sufficient to express
a preference by law; (10) the stability of the parents’ home environments and
8
employment; and (11) other factors relevant to the parent-child relationship.
Hendrix, 373 So. 3d at 787-88 (¶33) (citing Albright, 437 So. 2d at 1005).
¶33. “We review the chancellor’s application of the Albright factors for abuse of discretion,
giving deference to the weight []he assigned each factor.” Baird v. Baird, 434 So. 3d 284,
291 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting McLellan, 397 So. 3d at 867 (¶27)). Crucially,
“[t]his Court does not reweigh the Albright factors.” Id. (emphasis added). Instead, “we
review the evidence and testimony presented at trial to ensure the chancery court’s ruling was
supported by credible evidence.” Id.
¶34. Here, “[t]he transcript reflects that at trial, the chancellor heard evidence and
testimony about the children’s physical and emotional health, school and community record,
as well as each party’s parenting style, mental and physical health, home environment,
employment, and continuity of care from the time periods before and after the entry of the
temporary order.” Baird, 434 So. 3d at 292 (¶23).
¶35. Our review of the final order reveals that the chancellor performed a complete
Albright analysis and addressed all 12 factors. The chancellor found the majority of the
factors were neutral: age, health, and sex of the child; willingness and capacity to provide
primary child care; employment responsibilities; physical and mental health and age of the
parents; emotional ties between parent and child; moral fitness; and the home, school and
community records of the child.
¶36. The chancellor then found 4 factors favoring Tiffany, and 2 factors favoring David.
For Tiffany: continuity of care; parenting skills; child’s preference; and “home stability.”
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Conversely, the chancellor found the “employment stability” factor “favors David,” and the
catch-all provision of “other factors relevant” to the child’s best interests “highly favors
David.”
¶37. In essence, the chancellor found both David and Tiffany to be fit and capable parents;
neither were deemed unfit. The chancellor then made the discretionary decision that
awarding Tiffany custody of Gabby, separately from Claire, was in the best interests of
Gabby.2
¶38. We address David’s challenges to specific factors in turn, as they relate to custody of
Gabby at issue.
1. Parenting Skills
¶39. “David maintains this is manifestly wrong and/or clearly erroneous” for the chancellor
to find this factor favors Tiffany. David argues:
Tiffany was befriending the children rather than effectively parenting them.
Tiffany’s parenting was one which not only looked away from bad conduct but
went so far as to endorse and encourage bad conduct. She also engaged in a
pattern of secreting and encouraged clandestine conversations between her and
the child since she knew it would be adverse to her in this custody litigation.
Tiffany has . . . condone[d] and encourage[d] the child to deceive and lie to the
father . . . . Tiffany would communicate with the child at inappropriate
times[,] . . . while the child was at school and during the middle of the night
or early morning hours even on school nights. Tiffany was failing to teach her
children to have any respect for authority or authority figures in their lives.
2
The temporary order, which was entered approximately a year before trial, awarded Tiffany physical custody of Gabby and David physical custody of Claire, and granted David visitation with Gabby. Both parties testified that they were never married and that in the years before the entry of the temporary order, the parties were separated and living in different states. During this time, Tiffany primarily cared for both girls. The chancellor acknowledged this testimony in his final order.
10
¶40. As such, David asserts that “[w]hen comparing the parenting skills of the parents, it
is clear that the David’s parenting skills far exceed that of Tiffany and this factor should be
awarded heavily to the father.”
¶41. The parenting skills “factor ‘encompasses a parent’s ability to provide physical care,
emotional support, discipline, and guidance.’” Scott v. Le, 373 So. 3d 1067, 1073 (¶27)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law
§ 12.03[4][a], at 389-90 (3d ed. 2020)).
¶42. The chancellor determined that the parenting skills factor favored Tiffany. The
chancellor considered the fact that:
Tiffany confirmed she has been the parent until recently to take the children
to doctor or dental visits, attend school functions and teacher conferences,
rather than David.
Tiffany has a good relationship with the children. Tiffany works one job, and
at times has worked two jobs. Tiffany lives with her husband, their two
younger sons, and her two elderly aunts. Tiffany explains her family helps with
these girls when they are together.
The chancellor also specifically found that “David and Tiffany offered many examples of the
lack of proper parenting the other parent has. The [c]ourt noted the ability of David and
Tiffany to communicate with each other has been very strained.”
¶43. The evidence in the record shows that Tiffany gave testimony about her parenting
skills. The trial transcripts reflect:
[Court]: And the records indicate dad is strict and mom not so much. Is
that a fair statement from the counseling records, Mom?
[Tiffany]: I have rules, but I have different kind of rules. I’m more about
values and integrity. . . . I have, like, bedtime and what time
you’re allowed to do stuff. I just wasn’t physical with her. It was
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more like punishing, like, taking away a phone or taking away
privileges, like, watching TV or - - like that.
[Tiffany]: I have rules, that’s literally why I had originally sent her [Claire]
there [to David’s house], because she wasn’t obeying the rules.
There was also evidence to support finding that Tiffany’s husband and her great aunts take
care of the children when Tiffany works late and is not home.
¶44. “Substantial deference is given to a chancellor’s findings, as the chancellor ‘has the
ultimate discretion to weigh the evidence the way he sees fit in determining where the child’s
best interest lies.” Stuckey v. Stuckey, 341 So. 3d 1030, 1037 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)
(quoting Stewart v. Stewart, 309 So. 3d 44, 84 (¶128) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)). We find no
error in the court’s reasoning.
2. Willingness and Capacity to Provide Primary Care
¶45. Next, David argued the chancellor erred by finding “simply that ‘Both parents seek
custody,’” because “[t]he fact that both parents seek custody ignores the ‘capacity’ to provide
for the children.” He alleges that “Tiffany lacks any true willingness and ability to provide
the primary care for the children as the children are in control while under the custody of the
mother.” He asserts “[w]e can’t ignore the fact that the [c]ourt considered the husband and
aunt as part of the reason” Tiffany was favored.
¶46. Here, the chancery court found that “Both parents seek custody” and determined that
this factor was equal between Tiffany and David.
¶47. “This Court is not permitted to reweigh the evidence to make our own independent
determination.” Ingram v. Ingram, 419 So. 3d 991, 995-96 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025). And
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“[a]fter our review of the record, we find no clear error or abuse of discretion in the
chancellor’s consideration of th[is] factor[.]” Id.
3. Stability of the Home Environment
¶48. Next, David claims error under this factor because “[t]he only facts the [c]ourt relied
on to make this determination is the fact that both parents had lived in three different
locations over the course of the children’s lives.” He contends that “[a]lthough the parents
living in differing locations is part of this factor (which are equal between these two parents),
what goes on in that home also plays a very significant part of this factor.”
¶49. According to him, “there is no stability in the mother’s home and [Gabby] is likewise
subjected to that same living environment in the mother’s home,” whereas “[his] home
provides a much more stable environment and effective parenting which serves both
children’s best interest.”
¶50. “When weighing the stability of the home environment, our courts have considered
numerous factors which contribute to a favorable home environment.” Tilley v. Gibbs, 387
So. 3d 64, 79 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Montgomery v. Montgomery, 20 So. 3d
39, 46 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)).
¶51. The chancery court’s order reflects that the court bifurcated this factor into two parts,
separating stability of the home from stability of employment. The chancellor’s findings
regarding the circumstances of David’s and Tiffany’s homes included, respectively:
David lived in his home in Pensacola for the past two years. Previously he was
in Raymond, Mississippi, previously two years in Clinton, Mississippi.
Tiffany has resided in her current home with the family members identified
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[husband Daniel, their two sons, and her two great aunts] for eight years.
Tiffany previously lived in St. Martin for one year, and in Shreveport for five
to six years.
¶52. The record reflects evidence to support the chancellor’s findings of fact. Given our
very limited standard of review, we find no error in the court’s finding.
4. Employment of Each Parent
¶53. David asserts that the chancellor “correctly determined that this factor favored [him].”
Nevertheless, he argues “Tiffany’s work history has likewise not been beneficial for the
minor children. Working primarily as a waitress she has worked varying hours which take
her away from home at night leaving it up to the stepfather and elderly aunt to parent[.]”
¶54. Here, the chancery court made findings of fact that “Tiffany has worked in the food
service business for several years. During this litigation, she took a lab tech job in a dental
clinic. Prior to the last hearing, she ended that employment and is back in the food service
industry. She prefers to work days and usually can do so, although some nights are made
available to her.”
¶55. “Again, the chancellor is the ultimate fact-finder, and we cautiously review the record
to determine whether the chancellor’s finding of fact is supported.” Wilbourn v. Wilbourn,
388 So. 3d 580, 594 (¶49) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). Having reviewed the evidence, we find the
record contains support for the chancellor’s findings under this factor.
5. Moral Fitness
¶56. David argues, “[t]he proof in this case is replete with example after example of the
Tiffany’s dishonesty.” David points out that the counseling “records reflect that [Claire] was
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‘smoking marijuana daily while living in Ocean Springs and her mother’s house, was mostly
unsupervised and also witnessed her mother smoking marijuana regularly.’” He contends that
“[t]his is an environment that neither child should be left in.”
¶57. “Despite the examination of the record and extensive argument that [David’s] counsel
makes of how each Albright factor was proved, it is the chancery court’s findings, not a
party’s argument, that we review.” Hendrix, 373 So. 3d at 795 (¶55).
¶58. Under this factor, the chancery court’s findings subject to our review include:
David has three criminal convictions from 24 years ago. David has one
burglary conviction and two LSD convictions. David is not involved in any
religious fraternal organization or club.
Although David has his criminal convictions, he does appear by his dress, his
appearance and his conversational skills to now be a sober person. He reports
he has paid his debt to society and is no longer involved in any kind of
controlled substance habits.
Tiffany has no criminal convictions. Tiffany attends Church of Cedar Lake for
3 ½ years, previously attended Church of the King for 10 years. Tiffany
reported she thinks now about going to a church located right around the
corner from her home, although she has not made that transfer yet.
Tiffany and David both confirmed [Claire]’s difficulty with being truthful over
the last couple of years. On the other hand, [Gabby] is a very honest, smart
child with no behavioral issues in school or at home.
¶59. David is correct that Tiffany’s behavior was less than ideal. However, the chancery
court specifically addressed her manipulations of her daughter and admonished her for it.
¶60. “[T]he chancellor ‘clearly agonized over his decision’” here, but “the central fact of
the present case seems to be beyond dispute: both [Tiffany] and [David] love and care for
their daughter [Gabby], and there is no basis in the record for concluding that either party is
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[morally] an unfit parent.” Id. at 793 (¶50).
¶61. We find “the evidence presented at trial showed that [Tiffany] possessed
sufficient . . . overall ability to parent.” Ellis, 952 So. 2d at 995-96 (¶¶32-33). Accordingly,
“consideration of her actions and inactions by the lower court was proper.” Id. at 996 (¶33).3
6. Child’s Preference
¶62. “David maintains that the [c]ourt finding that the Albright factor the ‘Child’s
Preference, If The Child Is At Least 12 Years Old’ favors the mother is manifestly wrong
and/or clearly erroneous.” He points out that “[Gabby] was not twelve years of age at the
time of the testimony[.]” And “there is no testimony or other proof before the [c]ourt
regarding that child’s preference other that the self-serving hearsay of the mother.” David
further argues that “there is absolutely no proof that [Gabby] continues to desire to live with
her mother if [Claire] continues to live with her father as the [c]ourt has awarded.”
¶63. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated § 93-11-65:
[I]f the court shall find that both parties are fit and proper persons to have
custody of the children, and that either party is able to adequately provide for
the care and maintenance of the children, the chancellor may consider the
preference of a child of twelve (12) years of age or older as to the parent with
whom the child would prefer to live in determining what would be in the best
interest and welfare of the child.
(Emphasis added). This Court has explained that “the chancellor must consider the child’s
preference when assessing what is in the best interest of the child,” but “[t]his election of
3
Although “[t]his Court is concerned with . . . [Tiffany]’s alleged emotional manipulation of their [eldest daughter], [Claire], as well as placing [Claire] in the middle of their arguments with one another,” ultimately, “our review of the record reveals no manifest error in the chancellor’s finding regarding this factor.” Watts v. Watts, 99 So. 3d 751, 759-60 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
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preference is not outcome determinative of the issue.” Holmes v. Holmes, 958 So. 2d 844,
848 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
¶64. The chancellor’s order stated: “[i]t is reported that both children wish to reside in
Mississippi with their mother.”
¶65. David is correct as to Gabby’s age—the undisputed evidence shows that Gabby was
only 11 years old when the chancellor received testimony from Tiffany about both girls’
preferences. But the record also shows that Gabby turned 12 years old during the course of
the trial proceedings.
¶66. Here, “[a] reading of the chancellor’s opinion above reveals that he considered many
factors in determining the placement of the children.” Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So. 2d
770, 777 (Miss. 1997). And “[a]lthough the court had no statutory basis for considering
[Gabby]’s preference,” our Supreme Court has held that “this does not make the chancellor’s
decision manifestly wrong.” Id.
7. Health of the Parents
¶67. Lastly, David claims,“[w]hile the Court states the mother, Tiffany doesn’t have any
health issues, it was less than two years ago she reported that she had anxiety, panic attacks
and high blood pressure[.]” He argues that “[e]ven if she had claimed that this was all related
to issues she had with [Claire], then this would further support the fact that she doesn’t have
the capacity to be the primary caretaker of the children.”
¶68. Again, “[d]espite the examination of the record and extensive argument that [David’s]
counsel makes . . . it is the chancery court’s findings, not a party’s argument, that we review.”
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Hendrix, 373 So. 3d at 795 (¶55).
¶69. The chancellor’s findings for this factor include:
David is 44 years of age. David graduated from high school and attended
junior college for two years. David is in good health. David takes thyroid and
blood pressure medicine. David has worked in the tile business for 10 years.
Tiffany is 40 years of age. Tiffany holds a bachelor’s degree in sociology and
non-profit studies. Tiffany is in good physical and mental health and takes no
medication.
¶70. Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the chancellor’s statements or findings
here.
¶71. In conclusion, we affirm the chancery court’s determination as to the Albright factors.
“In doing so, we hew closely to our standard of review, which defers greatly to the trial
court’s findings.” Hackler, 296 So. 3d at 779 (¶40). “[N]ot only did the chancellor have the
benefit of the parties’ words, he alone among the judiciary observed their manner and
demeanor.” Id. (quoting Culbreath v. Johnson, 427 So. 2d 705, 708 (¶41) (Miss. 1983)).
Crucially, “[h]e was there on the scene,’ and ‘smelled the smoke of battle,’ and ‘sensed the
interpersonal dynamics between the lawyers and the witnesses and himself.’” Id. (quoting
Culbreath, 427 So. 2d at 708 (¶41)).
II. Whether the chancellor erred by separating the two siblings.
¶72. For his second issue, David challenges the chancery court’s finding that his youngest
daughter should continue to live with her mother. According to David, the chancery “[c]ourt
initially separated the children due to it being during the school year and the allegations of
threats of [Claire] toward her sister [Gabby].” He argues “[t]hat has been resolved however,”
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as “[Claire] was sent to counseling and it’s reported that there is no viable threat.”
¶73. In further support of his argument, David cites to a case in which our Supreme Court
“discussed the preference to keep siblings together unless there is some overriding reason
they should be separated.” See Sellers v. Sellers, 638 So. 2d 481, 484 (Miss. 1994). The
Sellers Court held: “The Court shall in all cases attempt insofar as possible, to keep the
children together[;]” as “[i]t is well recognized that the love and affection of a brother and
sister at the ages of these children is important in the lives of both of them and to deprive
them of the association ordinarily would not be in their best interests.” Id. Therefore, “in the
absence of some unusual and compelling circumstance dictating otherwise, it is not in the
best interest of children to be separated.” Id.
¶74. First, the aspect of the “separation of the siblings was an issue that the chancellor had
the discretion to weigh as []he saw fit.” Embrey, 337 So. 3d at 259 (¶43). To be clear, “there
was no requirement that the chancellor specifically address the question of siblings and
custody.” Id. (quoting Dunnam v. Dunnam, 270 So. 3d 245, 250 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App.
2018)).
¶75. Second, “[i]t is not a separate Albright factor but a question which the chancellor may
consider along with the best interest of the child.” Id. (quoting Dunnam, 270 So. 3d at 250
(¶19)). And ultimately, “a desire to avoid ‘the separation of siblings should not override a
child’s best interest in a custody determination.’” Id. (quoting Riley v. Heisinger, 302 So. 3d
1243, 1258 (¶60) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)).
¶76. Here, the record established a history of Claire making threats against Tiffany, Gabby,
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and other members of Tiffany’s household. As such, the evidence supports that the chancery
court had some basis for separating the siblings during this volatile period of the older
daughter’s childhood.
¶77. And the record indicates the chancellor took the separation of these two sisters into
consideration when he made his ruling. The trial court’s order expressly directed that the
parents “shall exercise visitation so that the sisters are together as much as possible” and “the
children should be together every weekend, for each holiday and any school breaks.” By
including these directives, the chancellor’s order emphasized the importance of Claire and
Gabby spending time with each other.
¶78. Furthermore, David attempts to use our precedent to apply an automatic custody
award in his favor—that since he was awarded custody of one daughter, he should
automatically obtain custody of the other. But this is not nearly what our law provides.
Instead, as always, our polestar consideration is the best interests of the child. After three
days of trial, the record was replete that it was only Tiffany who had reared the two girls —
and that the continuity of care factor was near exclusive to her, as she was the one who took
the girls to the doctor, to their extracurricular activities, and in all respects for many years
was their sole parent. It is not in dispute that it was Tiffany who had to reach out to David
to help parent, because he was near-absent from the lives of his daughters and had taken no
responsibility for them.
¶79. Meanwhile, David complains that the sisters are separated by the distance of
Pensacola to Ocean Springs — about 2 hours down I-10. But David himself chose to live
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in Clinton and in Raymond during their earliest years, a distance of over 3 hours from his
daughters. The distance may not be ideal, but the modern digital world accommodates
separation more readily than in the past, as the miles between the sisters can be abated by
video chats, group messages, and other forms of communication.
¶80. Therefore, taking the totality of the circumstances presented in the record, we
conclude this was a proper exercise of the chancellor’s discretionary authority and we find
no error.
III. Whether the chancery court erred in its order that other rulings
remain in full force and effect.
¶81. David’s last issue raised is that “the [c]ourt erred in ordering the last Paragraph of
the . . . Judgment of Custody . . . which states . . . all orders not consistent herewith shall
remain in full force and effect.” However, David fails to cite any authority to his argument.
¶82. “The argument shall contain the contentions of appellant with respect to the issues
presented, and the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record relied on.” M.R.A.P. 28(a)(7). “It is the duty of the appellant to provide
authority in support of an assignment of error.” Est. of Roosa v. Roosa, 376 So. 3d 1225,
1229 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Herrin v. Perkins, 282 So. 3d 727, 732 (¶21)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2019)).
¶83. This Court has explained that “[c]itation of some relevant authority—whether from
other jurisdictions or secondary sources—is an important feature of appellate practice.”
Roosa, 376 So. 3d at 1230 (¶16) (quoting Henderson v. Copper Ridge Homes LLC, 273 So.
3d 750, 758 (¶38) (Miss. 2019) (Kitchens, P.J., concurring)). The “[f]ailure to cite authority
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to support an argument renders an issue procedurally barred.” Wackenhut Corp. v. Fortune,
87 So. 3d 1083, 1094 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
¶84. Because no authority is cited, we will not consider this issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
¶85. After review, we find that the chancery court conducted a thorough Albright analysis
and exercised its discretionary authority in granting custody of Gabby to Tiffany. Further, the
split of custody and separation of the siblings was within the chancellor’s discretion. As such,
we find no error and affirm the chancery court’s order.
¶86. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.,
CONCUR.
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