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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 25-13267
Non-Argument Calendar
JEREMY ELLIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,
Defendant,
SHERIFF, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY FLORIDA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-02508-KKM-CPT
Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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After his termination from the Hillsborough County,
Florida, Sheriff’s Office, plaintiff Jeremy Ellis brought many
employment-related claims against the Sheriff of Hillsborough
County (the “Sheriff”) in his official capacity. Ultimately, only two
claims went to trial—Ellis’s retaliation claims brought under
(1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and
(2) Florida law. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Ellis and
awarded him damages. The Sheriff appealed.
On appeal, the Sheriff argues that the district court
(1) abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial
because the district court erred in instructing the jury that an
employer may not terminate an employee for statements written
in an EEOC charge even if they are false; and (2) erred in denying
his renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law because Ellis
presented insufficient evidence of causation. After careful review,
we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case has a lengthy history. In 2007, the Hillsborough
County Sheriff’s Office (“HCSO”) hired Ellis as a community
service officer. In 2010, the HCSO promoted Ellis to detention
deputy. Ellis held that position until his termination in
August 2022.
In November 2022, Ellis filed his initial complaint. The
procedural history includes (1) multiple amended complaints;
(2) the district court’s summary judgment order; (3) Ellis dropping
and renumbering certain claims; and (4) the parties’ agreement
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25-13267 Opinion of the Court 3
about how to dispose of other claims. In March 2025, the case
proceeded to trial on only Ellis’s two retaliation claims against the
Sheriff in his official capacity.
Both claims at trial alleged that the HCSO terminated Ellis
in retaliation for filing his charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Florida Commission
on Human Relations (“FCHR”). Ellis’s EEOC and FCHR charges
are contained in the same document, so we refer to them as the
EEOC charge. Ellis’s first claim asserted that the HCSO’s actions
violated Title VII, and his second claim asserted the HCSO’s
actions violated the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), Fla.
Stat. § 760.10.
We recite the trial evidence. Then we analyze the claims
together because the same legal framework governs retaliation
claims under both Title VII and the FCRA. See Howard v. Walgreen
Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Because retaliation
claims under the FCRA are substantively similar to Title VII
retaliation claims, we use the same analysis for both claims.” (citing
Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir.
1998))); see also Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 948 F.3d 1318, 1325
(11th Cir. 2020) (“[B]ecause the FCRA is based on Title VII,
decisions construing Title VII apply to the analysis of FCRA
claims.” (citing Harper, 139 F.3d at 1387, 1389-90)).
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II. TRIAL EVIDENCE
A. Plaintiff Jeremy Ellis
Ellis testified first. In 2007, Ellis began working for the
HCSO in a civilian position. In 2010, he became a detention officer
after completing academy training.
1. December 2021 EEOC Charge
In December 2021, Ellis filed his EEOC charge. Ellis’s
charge stated that the HCSO: (1) “discriminated against [him] and
retaliated against [him] because of [his] disability and need for a
reasonable accommodation”; and (2) “discriminated against [him]
because of [his] religion and need for an accommodation” to wear
a beard.
Ellis’s EEOC charge further stated that he had “never had
any issues at work until [he] received word that [he] was going to
receive a substandard performance evaluation.” Upon hearing
this, Ellis told superiors that he had a “debilitated state of mind,”
causing him to struggle at work.
At trial, Ellis explained these statements in his EEOC charge
by (1) clarifying that he meant he was distracted and could not
complete goals due to a lack of focus; (2) acknowledging that he
received feedback from supervisors; and (3) emphasizing that he
had not been formally disciplined or investigated when he filed the
December 2021 EEOC charge.
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Ellis acknowledged that his EEOC charge mistakenly stated
he started in 2007 as a detention officer (as opposed to 2010). Ellis
attributed his mistake to a typographical error.
On February 7, 2022, Ellis received a notice of his right to
sue from the EEOC. Because his work conditions had improved,
Ellis did not file a lawsuit in the 90-day window.
2. May 2022 Notice of Investigation and Pay Suspension
Then, on May 10, 2022, the HCSO notified Ellis in writing
that it had initiated an internal investigation and suspended him
without pay in connection with his EEOC charge. The HCSO said
that in his EEOC charge Ellis (1) falsified an official document (the
EEOC charge); and (2) publicly disparaged the HCSO.
The HCSO’s internal investigation revealed, inter alia, that
Ellis had a drinking problem. Ellis attended a pre-disciplinary
hearing in which he described his drinking and that it contributed
to his error as to his 2007 start date as a detention officer. However,
Ellis testified that (1) he never recalled going to work while under
the influence of alcohol; and (2) he attended rehab for his drinking.
Embarrassed about being an alcoholic, Ellis was not
forthcoming about his drinking problem. For example, during an
interview with Detective Denbigh as part of the HCSO’s 2022
internal investigation, Ellis did not tell Denbigh that his
misstatement on the EEOC charge—regarding his 2007 start date
as a detention officer—was likely also caused by his drinking. Ellis
did not think he was being untruthful by not telling Denbigh about
his drinking. Additionally, earlier in January 2022 (before the
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internal investigation), Ellis had completed an HCSO health form
because the HCSO ordered him to undergo a medical evaluation
after filing his EEOC charge. On that HCSO form, Ellis
untruthfully stated he had one alcoholic drink per month.
3. August 2022 Termination
In a written “Notice of Discipline Form,” the HCSO
terminated Ellis with an effective date of August 16, 2022. That
Notice did not mention Ellis’s drinking or alcoholism. Rather, the
Notice explicitly stated that Ellis’s false statements in his EEOC
charge motivated the termination, along with his failure to give
notice of a change of address. Because of the HCSO’s focus on
Ellis’s EEOC charge, we quote its termination reasons in full, as
follows:
The REASON for the action is:
On December 21, 2021, Detention Deputy Jeremy
Ellis submitted under oath a Charge of
Discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging he was
discriminated against and retaliated against by [the
HCSO] because of his disability, religion, and his need
for a reasonable accommodation. The EEOC Charge
of Discrimination publicly criticized [the HCSO] in
writing, and Deputy Ellis knowingly utilized false
information to make the claim. Deputy Ellis’
administrative investigation revealed his date of hire
as a detention deputy was falsely notated within the
EEOC Charge of Discrimination. Deputy Ellis had
seven performance appraisals and evaluations
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documenting issues at work, refuting his claim of
never having issues at work. Deputy Ellis admitted
those statements to the EEOC were not true. No
evidence was found that Deputy Ellis informed [the
HCSO] about a disability or requested an
accommodation for a disability. Additionally, there
was no evidence that Deputy Ellis was discriminated
against or retaliated against due to a disability.
During Deputy Ellis’ administrative interview, he
advised that he considered his ADHD a disability but
did not request a reasonable accommodation for his
disability other than “needing to go home” when he
requested and being allowed to do so. The
administrative investigation also revealed Deputy
Ellis failed to notify [the HCSO] of a change of address
from his listed residential address. Deputy Ellis’
actions caused him to violate HCSO Rules and
Regulations 3.1.06 (Notification of Correct Address
and Phone Number), 4.1.09 (Public Disparagement),
and 4.8.04 (Falsification of Official Documents). As a
result of Deputy Ellis’ administrative investigation,
he was dismissed from [the HCSO] effective August
16, 2022.
Ellis appealed his termination to the Sheriff’s Complaint
Review Board, which consisted of two individuals selected by Ellis,
two individuals selected by the HCSO, and one individual selected
by the four other board members. The Complaint Review Board
agreed to terminate Ellis.
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After the Complaint Review Board’s decision, Ellis’s
termination was reviewed by the Sheriff’s Disciplinary Review
Board, consisting of two colonels in the HCSO. Ellis gave a
statement to the Disciplinary Review Board, in which he stated he
was “inebriated” when he wrote his EEOC charge. By
“inebriated,” Ellis said he meant “[t]ipsy, alcohol in my
system . . . [i]nebriated, drunk, tipsy, they’re all the same.”
Ellis then appealed his termination to the Sheriff or, in the
Sheriff’s absence or by his designation, the Chief Deputy. Ellis met
with then-Chief Deputy Donna Lusczynski, who sustained Ellis’s
termination.
Ellis rested, presenting no other witnesses.
B. Chief Deputy Joseph Maurer
The defendant Sheriff first presented testimony from Joseph
Maurer, the current Chief Deputy of Enforcement Operations in
the HCSO. At the time of the relevant events, Chief Deputy
Maurer was a colonel serving under then-Chief Deputy
Lusczynski.
Chief Deputy Maurer testified that Ellis violated the HCSO’s
rules (1) against publicly disparaging the HCSO by including three
false statements of fact in his EEOC charge; and (2) that employees
needed to provide their correct address, which Ellis had not done.
The first rule violation was the most serious. Chief Deputy
Maurer explained that integrity and honesty were important values
for the HCSO, and untruthfulness in any form was a serious
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matter. Maurer testified that he cared whether Ellis was truthful,
not that he had filed an EEOC charge.
The investigatory and disciplinary process raised further
concerns. Chief Deputy Maurer was concerned by Ellis’s
comments at the pre-disciplinary hearing regarding his drinking,
depression, and trouble remembering dates. During that hearing,
Ellis had an aggressive demeanor and was not remorseful or
apologetic. Moreover, Maurer testified that Ellis lied multiple
times throughout the internal investigation, causing Maurer to lose
trust in him. Maurer added: “there’s no recovering from that.”
That said, Chief Deputy Maurer testified about issues
relating to the integrity of the investigation and disciplinary process
itself. First, HCSO policy requires a detective to “interview all
identifiable witnesses before they interview the accused.” To that
end, Detective Denbigh signed her report confirming she had not
violated anyone’s rights guaranteed under Florida law, including
that she had interviewed every identifiable witness. But that
confirmation was not true because Denbigh did not interview the
two HCSO employees identified as problematic in Ellis’s EEOC
charge.
Second, Chief Deputy Maurer did not initiate an
investigation into Denbigh for making false statements because he
had not felt that Denbigh had been untruthful. Third, Denbigh did
not investigate whether the individuals Ellis complained of in his
EEOC charge were acting in a discriminatory manner and focused
on only Ellis’s inaccuracies in his EEOC charge. Fourth, as to the
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second rule violation, Maurer testified he never recommended
terminating anyone else for not updating their address.
C. Chief Deputy Donna Lusczynski
The Sheriff next presented this testimony from former Chief
Deputy Donna Lusczynski, who sustained Ellis’s termination from
the HCSO.
After reviewing the internal investigation, Chief Deputy
Lusczynski was not concerned that Ellis had filed an EEOC charge,
as that was “an employee’s right.” She believed that Ellis had
violated HCSO policy by lying in the EEOC charge.
Particularly, Chief Deputy Lusczynski was concerned that
Ellis lied about three material facts: (1) when he became a sworn
detention officer (in 2010, not 2007); (2) that he had no
performance issues; and (3) that he had a disability. Lusczynski
thought Ellis lied about when he became a sworn officer to
lengthen his tenure and did not believe it was a simple mistake
because the significance of being sworn-in was memorable.
Chief Deputy Lusczynski also testified that Ellis made
inconsistent statements during the HCSO’s internal investigation,
such as not telling Detective Denbigh that his drinking may have
caused his mistaken date in the EEOC charge.
Chief Deputy Lusczynski was bothered by Ellis not
acknowledging his untruthfulness and by his lack of remorse or
apology at the Disciplinary Review Board hearing. Lusczynski was
also concerned that Ellis stated he was intoxicated the day he filed
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the EEOC charge and that he worked the same day. On the other
hand, none of Ellis’s supervisors ever told Lusczynski that Ellis had
reported to work inebriated.
Chief Deputy Lusczynski also gave testimony that
corroborated Chief Deputy Maurer’s testimony about the issues
with the investigation. First, Lusczynski was identified in Ellis’s
EEOC charge but was never interviewed by Detective Denbigh.
Second, Denbigh was never investigated for making untruthful
statements. Third, Lusczynski never recommended an HCSO
employee for termination because they failed to update their
address.
Chief Deputy Lusczynski did not think that Ellis’s conduct
was curable such that he could work for the HCSO again because
Ellis’s credibility would be questionable going forward.
The Sheriff rested his defense. Ellis presented no further
evidence.
D. Rule 50 Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law
After the Sheriff rested, plaintiff Ellis made a Rule 50 motion
for judgment in his favor as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.
Ellis argued that he established that his termination was unlawful
retaliation because the HCSO’s Notice admitted the HCSO
terminated Ellis because of statements in his EEOC charge. The
district court reserved ruling on Ellis’s motion. Later, after the jury
found in Ellis’s favor, the district court denied Ellis’s Rule 50
motion as moot.
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The Sheriff also made his own Rule 50 motion for judgment
in his favor. The Sheriff argued that Ellis had not established
but-for causation between his EEOC charge and termination
because the HCSO also terminated Ellis due to (1) inconsistent and
false statements he made during the HCSO’s own internal
investigation; and (2) Ellis’s drinking.1 The district court denied the
Sheriff’s Rule 50 motion, finding that there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to find but-for causation.
E. Jury Instructions
In discussing the jury instructions, the Sheriff objected to the
district court’s proposed instruction that the law does not permit
an employer to consider the contents of an employee’s EEOC
charge in deciding to terminate the employee. Ellis agreed with
the district court’s characterization that this was a correct
statement of law under our binding precedent in Pettway v. Am. Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969). 2 Subsequently, the
district court gave this jury instruction as to causation, stating an
employer may not terminate an employee for false statements in
an EEOC charge, as follows:
For the third element, you must decide whether [the
HCSO] terminated Mr. Ellis because of Mr. Ellis’
1 The Sheriff made these arguments when opposing Ellis’s Rule 50 motion,
then readopted them to make his own Rule 50 motion.
2 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to
October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)
(en banc).
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protected activity. Put another way, you must decide
whether Mr. Ellis’ protected activity was the main
reason for [the HCSO]’s decision.
To determine that [the HCSO] took an adverse
employment action because of Mr. Ellis’ protected
activity, you must first find that, all the things
remaining the same, [the HCSO] would not have
taken the action had Mr. Ellis not engaged in the
protected activity.
[The Sheriff] claims that [the HCSO] did not
terminate Mr. Ellis because of Mr. Ellis’ EEOC charge
and that it terminated Mr. Ellis for violating [HCSO]
policies based on statements by Mr. Ellis in his Charge
and statements and conduct by Mr. Ellis during [the
HCSO]’s internal review process.
An employer may not terminate an employee because of
anything written in an EEOC charge, regardless of whether
an employer believes the content of the EEOC charge is true
or false. But an employer may terminate an employee
for any other reason, good or bad, fair or unfair, and
you may not substitute your own judgment for [the
HCSO]’s judgment, even if you do not agree with it.
(Emphasis added).
F. Verdict
The jury (1) found that the Sheriff terminated and retaliated
against Ellis because of his EEOC charge; and (2) awarded him
$125,000 for lost wages and $125,000 for mental and emotional
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anguish. The district court entered final judgment for these sums
against the Sheriff in his official capacity.
After the jury’s verdict, the Sheriff renewed his Rule 50
motion for judgment as a matter of law. In the alternative, the
Sheriff moved for a new trial or remittitur under Rule 59. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59. The district court denied both motions. The Sheriff
timely appealed.
III. SHERIFF’S RULE 59 MOTION BASED ON PETTWAY
JURY INSTRUCTION
On appeal, the Sheriff contends that the district court
erroneously relied on Pettway to instruct the jury as follows: “An
employer may not terminate an employee because of anything
written in an EEOC charge, regardless of whether an employer
believes the content of the EEOC charge is true or false.” The
Sheriff argues the district court erred in denying his Rule 59 motion
because of this erroneous jury instruction. The Sheriff asserts that
subsequent Supreme Court precedent abrogated Pettway and
its progeny.
After review, we conclude that Pettway remains binding
Circuit precedent. Therefore, the district court properly relied on
Pettway to instruct the jury. 3 We review our prior-panel precedent
rule and then Pettway.
3 We review a district court’s jury instructions for an abuse of discretion as to
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A. The Prior-Panel Precedent Rule
Under this Court’s prior-panel precedent rule, a prior panel’s
holding is binding unless it has been overruled or abrogated by the
Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc. Sabal Trail
Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Cnty., 59 F.4th 1158,
1164 (11th Cir. 2023). As such, “[w]e are bound to apply the
precedent of a prior panel even if we are convinced that the prior
panel is mistaken about the proper analysis.” United States v.
Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2009). This includes
overlooking or misinterpreting Supreme Court precedent. Sabal
Trail Transmission, LLC, 59 F.4th at 1174 (“[U]nder our
prior-precedent rule, even if our Court ‘overlooked’ a
reason—including a Supreme Court case—we remain bound by
our prior precedent.”); United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 942 (11th
Cir. 2016) (“[T]here is never an exception carved out for
overlooked or misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent.”).
Accordingly, this Court has “categorically reject[ed] any
exception to the prior panel precedent rule based upon a perceived
defect in the prior panel’s reasoning or analysis as it relates to the
law in existence at that time.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292,
1303 (11th Cir. 2001).
To abrogate a prior-panel precedent, a subsequent Supreme
Court decision must “be clearly on point and clearly contrary” to
the instructions misstated the law or misled the jury. Caradigm USA LLC v.
PruittHealth, Inc., 964 F.3d 1259, 1277 n.12 (11th Cir. 2020).
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that precedent. TL90108 LLC v. Ford, 147 F.4th 1351, 1359 (11th Cir.
2025) (quoting Edwards v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 97 F.4th 725, 743 (11th
Cir. 2024)). This Court’s prior precedent remains binding “[i]f the
Supreme Court ‘never discussed our precedent and did not
otherwise comment on the precise issue before the prior panel.’”
Id. at 1359-60 (quoting Jennings v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 108 F.4th
1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2024)). “[T]he Supreme Court decision ‘must
demolish and eviscerate each of’” the prior decision’s rationales,
and “merely weaken[ing] the holding of an earlier panel is not
sufficient to abrogate that holding.” Id. at 1360 (quoting Jennings,
108 F.4th at 1304).
With this background, we turn to Pettway and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338
(2013), on which the Sheriff relies.
B. Pettway and Nassar
In the 1969 Pettway decision, the former Fifth Circuit held
that an employer could not terminate an employee for allegedly
false statements made in an EEOC charge. Pettway, 411 F.2d
at 1007. The Court specifically concluded that an “[e]mployee can
suffer no detriment by virtue of having filed charges with EEOC
which also contain false or malicious statements. By utilizing
EEOC machinery he is exercising a protected right.” Id. In Pettway,
the employer candidly admitted to discharging its employee
because the employee made “false and malicious accusations”
about the employer in a letter to the EEOC, which the Court
considered an EEOC charge. Id. at 1002, 1007-08. Causation was
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not an issue in Pettway. The Court ordered that relief be granted
to the employee because the employer admitted terminating its
employee based on the EEOC charge. See id. at 1007-08.
Nonetheless, the Sheriff contends that Pettway “predates the
development of modern Title VII jurisprudence,” and has “been
implicitly overruled and/or [is] not consistent with Title VII’s
statutory text or purpose.” The Sheriff relies mainly on Nassar
where the Supreme Court faced the task of “defin[ing] the proper
standard of causation for Title VII retaliation claims.” Nassar, 570
U.S. at 346. In particular, the Nassar issue was whether such
retaliation claims should be analyzed under a motivating factor
standard or a but-for causation standard. Id. at 343, 346-47. After
thoroughly analyzing the statute, the Supreme Court concluded
that but-for causation is the proper standard for Title VII retaliation
claims. Id. at 351-360, 362-63.
The Sheriff argues that the Supreme Court’s requirement of
but-for causation in Nassar directly conflicts with Pettway. Nassar,
however, did not discuss Pettway or the “precise issue” of the scope
of protection afforded to those filing an EEOC charge such that it
could be said that Nassar “demolish[ed]” Pettway’s rationale.
See TL90108 LLC, 147 F.4th at 1359-60; Nassar, 570 U.S. at 351-63;
Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1007.
Undoubtedly, many aspects of Title VII litigation changed in
the forty-four years between Pettway and Nassar, but Pettway was
not premised on the lack of but-for causation, later required by
Nassar. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352; Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1007.
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Pettway instead answered the narrower and materially different
question of whether an employer may fire an employee for making
“false” or “malicious” statements in an EEOC charge. See Pettway,
411 F.2d at 1007.
We thus reject the Sheriff’s attempt at stretching Nassar to
disregard Pettway. “Obedience to a Supreme Court decision is one
thing, extrapolating from its implications a holding on an issue that
was not before that Court in order to upend settled circuit law is
another thing.” Main Drug, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 475
F.3d 1228, 1230 (11th Cir. 2007).
Because the Sheriff does not cite any en banc decision of this
Court or decision from the Supreme Court that is clearly on point
and contrary to Pettway, it remains binding precedent in this
Circuit. The prior-panel precedent rule precludes a panel of this
Court from overturning Pettway, and it has not been undermined
to the point of abrogation.
The Sheriff raises no other issues with the jury instructions.
The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it
properly relied on Pettway to instruct the jury.
IV. SHERIFF’S RULE 50 MOTION BASED ON
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Next, the Sheriff argues that the district court erred in
denying his renewed Rule 50 motion because (1) the Sheriff
articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons—Ellis’s drinking and
lying during the HCSO’s internal investigation—for terminating
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Ellis’s employment; and (2) Ellis failed to carry his burden to show
these reasons were pretextual and not the cause of his termination.
As table setting, we discuss Rule 50, the elements of a
retaliation claim, and how the Sheriff’s pretext arguments under
McDonnell Douglas4 play no role in post-trial motions. We then
analyze whether the trial evidence sufficiently created a jury issue
as to Ellis’s retaliation claims.
A. Rule 50 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) states that, if a party
has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court
determines that a reasonable jury would not have a legally
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on the issue, then
the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law
against the party on the claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
Rule 50(b) provides that a party may renew a denied Rule 50(a)
motion after trial. Id. R. 50(b). 5
4 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5 This Court reviews de novo the denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a
matter of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. St. Louis Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Rockhill Ins. Co., 5 F.4th 1235, 1242
(11th Cir. 2021). “Rule 50 motions should be granted ‘only when the plaintiff
presents no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for
him on a material element of his cause of action.’” Id. (quoting Howard v.
Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 2010)).
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B. Elements of Ellis’s Retaliation Claims
Title VII has opposition and participation clauses. The
anti-retaliation provision of Title VII provides that it “shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of [its] employees” because an employee (1) “has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice”
under Title VII (the “opposition clause”); or (2) “has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII (the “participation clause”).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). This case concerns the
participation clause.
The participation “clause protects proceedings and activities
which occur in conjunction with or after the filing of a formal
charge with the EEOC.” E.E.O.C. v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d
1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000). Even false statements made in the
context of an EEOC charge are protected under the participation
clause.6 Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1007 (holding that an employer could
not fire an employee for statements in his EEOC charge, despite
the employer believing they were false or malicious); see Total Sys.
Servs., 221 F.3d at 1175 (stating that although “false statements
made in the context of an EEOC charge (per the participation
6 In his renewed Rule 50 motion in the district court, the Sheriff “respectfully
disagree[d]” with the district court’s Pettway jury instruction but did “not
challenge that instruction for purposes of this motion.” The Sheriff did object
to the Pettway jury instruction at trial, and his Rule 59 motion for a new trial
was based in part on the Pettway jury instruction.
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clause) are protected and cannot be grounds for dismissal, . . . this
extreme level of protection for untruth is not afforded to false
statements made under the opposition clause” (citing Pettway, 411
F.2d at 1007, then citing Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th
Cir. 1990) (“Accusations made in the context of charges before the
[EEOC] are protected by statute; charges made outside of that
context are made at the accuser’s peril.”))).
Further, to establish a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must
show that (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal
link between the protected activity and the adverse action. Howard
v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010). “Claims of
retaliation can be supported with either direct or circumstantial
evidence.” Lapham v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.4th 879, 889 (11th
Cir. 2023).
Here, filing an EEOC charge is unquestionably a statutorily
protected activity. It is also undisputed that Ellis’s termination was
an adverse employment action. The only Rule 50 issue is thus
causation.
To establish causation in a Title VII retaliation case, the
plaintiff must show that “the desire to retaliate was the but-for
cause of the challenged employment action.” Booth v. Pasco Cnty.,
757 F.3d 1198, 1207 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nassar, 570 U.S.
at 352). “Stated another way, a plaintiff must prove that had []he
not complained, []he would not have been fired.” Jefferson v. Sewon
Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924 (11th Cir. 2018).
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22 Opinion of the Court 25-13267
“Often, events have multiple but-for causes.” Bostock v.
Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 656 (2020). Even so, “a defendant
cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that
contributed to its challenged employment decision.” Id. If the
illicit motive “was one but-for cause of that decision, that is enough
to trigger the law.” Id. Thus, if the defendant presents legitimate,
nonretaliatory reasons for the adverse action, “[t]he crucial
question” for the jury is not whether these proffered reasons for
the adverse action “were well-grounded but whether they actually
motivated the [employer].” Booth, 757 F.3d at 1207.
C. The Sheriff’s Pretext Arguments
The Sheriff couches his appellate arguments in the
McDonnell Douglas analytical framework. However, in Title VII
retaliation cases, this framework (including its pretext-burden
shifting) “plays no role at trial” and is “inapplicable on post-trial
motions.” Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752, 760 (11th Cir. 2025).
That is because “the entire evidentiary picture goes further than
pretext” and “focusing on the defendant’s justification can lead
both litigants and the court down a rabbit hole that obfuscates the
plaintiff’s affirmative claim.” Id. at 761-62 (citation modified).
Instead, “we ask whether the defendant intentionally
retaliated against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s protected
activity.” Id. at 762 (citing Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th
1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 2023)). We therefore focus our attention on
the whole trial record to determine whether Ellis presented
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the Sheriff
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25-13267 Opinion of the Court 23
retaliated against him for filing his EEOC charge that had false
statements.
D. Analysis of Trial Evidence
Considering the trial evidence in the light most favorable to
Ellis, we conclude that sufficient evidence created a jury question
as to whether Ellis’s EEOC charge was the but-for cause of his
termination.
For starters, there was direct evidence of but-for causation.
The HCSO’s Notice stated that Ellis was terminated because his
“EEOC Charge of Discrimination publicly criticized [the HCSO] in
writing, and Deputy Ellis knowingly utilized false information to
make the claim.” And under our Circuit precedent, an employer
may not terminate an employee because of anything written in
their EEOC charge regardless of whether the employer believes
the charge is false. Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1007. The Sheriff’s
admission that Ellis’s termination was based on his EEOC charge
thus establishes the requisite causal link.
Chief Deputy Lusczynski’s and Chief Deputy Maurer’s
testimonies further support the causal link by showing that Ellis’s
EEOC charge was the driving force behind beginning the HCSO’s
internal investigation and eventually terminating Ellis.
We recognize that at trial the Sheriff articulated and
presented evidence of legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for
terminating Ellis. Specifically, the Sheriff relies on Chief Deputy
Lusczynski’s trial testimony to argue that the HCSO terminated
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24 Opinion of the Court 25-13267
Ellis because (1) he lied about a litany of facts in the HCSO’s own
internal investigation and (2) it had concerns about his drinking. 7
The jury’s task, however, was not to decide whether these
proffered reasons for Ellis’s termination “were well-grounded.”
Booth, 757 F.3d at 1207. Rather, the jury’s job was to determine
whether those reasons “actually motivated” the HCSO to
terminate Ellis. Id. In that regard, the HCSO did not mention
those reasons in its August 2022 Notice terminating Ellis.
Lusczynski even testified that no one had expressed concern about
Ellis’s drinking before the investigation. The jury therefore had a
sufficient evidentiary basis to find that while these may have been
“well-grounded” reasons to terminate Ellis, they did not “actually
motivate[]” the HCSO to terminate Ellis. Id.
At bottom, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to find that (1) Ellis’s EEOC charge was a but-for cause of his
termination; and (2) thus, the HCSO’s termination of Ellis was in
retaliation for filing his EEOC charge. We therefore affirm the
district court’s denial of the Sheriff’s renewed Rule 50 motion.
7 The Sheriff does not argue that Ellis’s failure to notify the HCSO of a change
in his address independently served as grounds for his termination. In fact, the
HCSO’s Internal Affairs case file for Ellis noted that failure to provide a correct
address was only “subject to reprimand.” That is consistent with trial
testimony from both Chief Deputy Lusczynski and Chief Deputy Maurer that
they never recommended an HCSO employee for termination solely because
they failed to update their address.
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V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of the
Sheriff’s renewed Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law
and his Rule 59 motion for a new trial based on the jury
instructions.
AFFIRMED.