FILED
Aug 25 2026, 8:39 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Posey County Council,
Appellant-Respondent
v.
Kim Cross,
Appellee-Petitioner
August 25, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-MI-2804
Appeal from the Posey Superior Court
The Honorable Travis L. Clowers, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
65D01-2401-MI-6
Opinion by Judge Weissmann
Chief Judge Tavitas concurs in result with a separate opinion.
Judge Foley concurs.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 1 of 32
Weissmann, Judge.
[1] This appeal arises from a dispute about the salary of Posey County’s prison
matron (matron). Long after the Posey County Sheriff (Sheriff) ranked two
positions on his staff—matron and jail commander—as equivalent, he
repeatedly asked the Posey County Council (Council) to pay the matron the
same salary as the jail commander as required by Indiana law. The Council
continued to pay the matron less, prompting Kim Cross—the current matron—
to bring this lawsuit. Cross sought the higher salary, including back pay, and
the trial court entered summary judgment in her favor.
[2] The Council appealed, contending that only the Council—not the Sheriff—had
authority to rank the matron equal to the jail commander and that, in any
event, Cross’s claim was barred by laches and waiver. Because Indiana law
assigns the Sheriff—not the Council—the authority to determine the matron’s
rank and requires the matron’s pay to be equal to that of identically ranked
positions within the Sheriff’s Department, we affirm.
Facts
[3] The Posey County Sheriff’s Department employs both a jail commander and a
matron. When the Sheriff took office in 2019, he identified confusion about the
rankings and responsibilities of the Department’s various positions. In response,
the Council requested he resolve that confusion by creating an organizational
chart depicting the Department’s structure. The chart reflected that the matron
was below the chief deputy sheriff in rank but that she headed one of the three
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 2 of 32
Department sections depicted on the chart. The chart listed no specific ranks,
but the matron and the jail commander were side by side on the chart, although
in different sections of the Department.
[4] Later, in August 2020, the Sheriff appointed Kim Cross to replace the outgoing
matron. Cross’s duties were those assigned to the prior matron: (1) receiving,
searching, and caring for female prisoners and juvenile detainees under the age
of 14, as statutorily required; (2) performing any additional duties the Sheriff
assigned; (3) supervising the front office, jail kitchen, and jail laundry; (4)
handling bonds received after business hours; (5) maintaining Inmate Trust
Account and Inmate Commissary Account financial records; and (6)
maintaining the sex offender registry.
[5] From the time Cross was hired in 2020 through July 2023, the Council set her
salary using a matrix system that did not reflect her as being equal in rank,
grade, or position to the jail commander. At “Sheriff’s school” in December
2022, Cross learned from other matrons that matrons are statutorily entitled to
the same pay as equally ranked Sheriff’s Department employees. App. Vol. II,
p. 52. She informed the Sheriff, who then began notifying the Council of its
statutory obligation. In exchanges that he described as “heated,” the Sheriff
communicated on multiple occasions that Cross held the same rank, grade, and
position as the jail commander and was required to be paid the same. Id. at 53.
[6] The Council continued to pay Cross less than the jail commander. On July 11,
2023, the Council passed a salary ordinance setting the jail commander’s salary
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 3 of 32
at $60,743 plus longevity pay and setting the matron’s salary at $50,235 with no
provision for longevity pay.
[7] Cross filed a complaint for mandate against the Council in January 2024, and
the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The Council claimed that
unlike the matron, the jail commander is a certified law enforcement academy
graduate with arrest powers and jailer certifications who supervises all jail staff
and manages jail operations. The Council pointed out that Cross holds a high
school diploma, has no law enforcement certification, and performs duties
centered on female inmates and jail support functions. The Council designated
no evidence rebutting Cross’s calculation of damages.
[8] The trial court granted Cross’s motion for summary judgment but denied the
Council’s. It found no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cross holds
the same rank, grade, or position as the jail commander. It therefore determined
that Cross is statutorily entitled to the same pay. The court entered judgment of
$36,115.96 against the Council as of October 3, 2025, plus prejudgment interest,
and ordered the Council thereafter to pay Cross the same salary, including
longevity pay, as the jail commander. The Council appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[9] We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard
as the trial court. Aegean LLC v. Taggart Ins. Ctr., Inc., 263 N.E.3d 171, 175 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “Summary judgment is appropriate if the
designated evidence establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists and
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 4 of 32
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing
Indiana Trial Rule 56(C)). In conducting this review, we liberally construe all
evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. But the Council,
as the party appealing the trial court’s summary judgment determination, bears
the burden of persuading this Court that the ruling was erroneous. S.E. ex rel.
Glaser v. City of Carmel, 198 N.E.3d 1209, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).
[10] The Council raises two primary issues on appeal. First, it contends that only the
county fiscal body may declare a matron to be of the same rank, grade, or
position as the jail commander and that the two positions are not equivalent in
any way. Second, the Council asserts that laches and waiver bar Cross’s claim.
We conclude that the applicable statutes require that Cross receive pay equal to
that of the similarly ranked jail commander and that neither laches nor waiver
applies. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Cross Is Statutorily Entitled to Equal Pay
[11] Cross contends she is entitled by statute to the same salary as the jail
commander because the Sheriff equally ranked the two positions. The Council
disagrees, arguing the positions differ too substantially in duties, training, and
authority to be considered equivalent and that the Sheriff had no authority to
make that determination in the first place.
[12] Indiana Code § 36-8-10-5 (Matron Statute) frames this dispute. It provides:
(a) Each sheriff shall appoint a prison matron for the county. The
sheriff shall set the qualifications for that position. Except as
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 5 of 32
provided in subsection (b), the sheriff has complete hiring
authority over the position of prison matron.
(b) A prison matron who was a county police officer appointed
under section 10(b) of this chapter immediately before being
hired as prison matron is entitled to the discipline and removal
procedures under section 11 of this chapter before:
(1) being reduced in grade to a rank below the rank that the
person held before being hired as prison matron; or
(2) removal from the department.
***
(e) The prison matron and assistant matrons:
(1) are members of the department;
(2) have the powers and duties of members of the
department; and
(3) are entitled to the same salary that other members of
the department of the same rank, grade, or position are paid.
Ind. Code § 36-8-10-5.
[13] The dispute in this case is over the meaning of “complete hiring authority,” as
used in the Matron Statute. “[S]tatutory interpretation is a question of law
reviewed de novo on appeal.” Tidd v. Est. of Tidd, 257 N.E.3d 846, 850 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2025). “The first task when interpreting a statute is to give its words their
plain meaning and consider the structure of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 851.
“If no ambiguity in the language exists, delving into legislative intent is
unnecessary.” Id. Instead, a clear and unambiguous statute must be applied as
written. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 6 of 32
A. “Complete Hiring Authority” Is Ambiguous
[14] Both parties treat the Matron Statute as unambiguous, although they offer
disparate interpretations of it. “[T]he parties’ disagreement about a [statutory]
provision is not conclusive of ambiguity[] but is merely evidence that an
ambiguity may exist.” S.W. Allen Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Fort Wayne, 142
N.E.3d 946, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis in original). This is because
questions of law are beyond the power of agreement by the parties. Pond v.
McNellis, 845 N.E.2d 1043, 1055 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
[15] In determining whether statutory language is ambiguous, the court must first
“determine whether the legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on
the point in question.” Young v. Hood’s Gardens, Inc., 24 N.E.3d 421, 424 (Ind.
2015). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court need not apply any
rules of construction other than to require that words and phrases be taken in
their plain, ordinary, and usual sense. Id. at 424-25. “Only when a statute is
susceptible to more than one interpretation is it deemed ambiguous and open to
judicial construction.” In re Adoption of J.E.H., 859 N.E.2d 388, 390 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006).
[16] The Council maintains that “complete hiring authority” means the Sheriff can
appoint but not rank the matron. Cross contends “complete hiring authority”
necessarily includes ranking authority.
[17] The legislature has not expressly defined “complete hiring authority.” That
term also does not appear elsewhere in the Indiana Code. And our appellate
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 7 of 32
courts have used this phrase only in the context of the Matron Statute or related
statutes without specifically defining it. See, e.g., Thompson v. Hays, 867 N.E.2d
654, 658 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Murray v. Hamilton Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 690
N.E.2d 335, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Young v. Williamson, 497 N.E.2d 612, 616
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986). When courts have used the shorter phrase “hiring
authority” in contexts irrelevant to this appeal, they generally have used it to
identify the official or entity vested with the power to hire, rather than as a
description of the scope of powers that accompany hiring authority. See, e.g.,
McDermott v. Bicanic, 550 N.E.2d 93, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Such usage is of
no help here. The question before us is not who may hire the matron, but rather
what that authority entails as it relates to the power to fix rank, grade, or
position.
[18] “[W]hen a statutory term is undefined, the legislature directs us to interpret the
term using its plain, or ordinary and usual, sense.” Rainbow Realty Grp., Inc. v.
Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168, 174 (Ind. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
Ind. Code § 1-1-4-1 (providing rules for statutory construction). The usual
meaning of a statute’s non-technical wording is provided by the words’ ordinary
and accepted dictionary definitions. Bd. of Dirs. of Bass Lake Conservancy Dist. v.
Brewer, 839 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 2005).
[19] “Complete” is defined as “having all necessary parts, elements, or steps” and
“total, absolute” and “brought to an end.” Complete, Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/complete (last
visited July 27, 2026) [https://perma.cc/E2Z2-78G8]. The definition of
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 8 of 32
“hiring” includes “to engage the personal services of for a set sum.” Hiring,
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/hiring (last visited July 27, 2026) [https://perma.cc/3WZFQKKL]. Finally, “authority” is defined as “power to influence or command
thought, opinion, or behavior” or “persons in command.” Authority, MerriamWebster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/authority (last visited July 27, 2026)
[https://perma.cc/D296-BGQE].
[20] Taken together, these definitions reveal that the plain language of “complete
hiring authority” yields two possible interpretations: (1) “complete hiring
authority” means full control over the terms of employment, including rank of
the matron because the Sheriff sets the “qualifications” for the matron, rank
determines pay, and hiring is for a “set sum” (essentially, Cross’s position); and
(2) “complete hiring authority” refers to only full power to control the hiring
process of the matron but does not explicitly encompass broader employment
powers over that position such as the ability to rank and to promote after hiring
(essentially, the Council’s position). When the language of a statute is subject to
two interpretations, it is ambiguous, requiring us to resort to the rules of
statutory interpretation to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.
Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. 2012).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 9 of 32
B. The Sheriff Determines the Matron’s Rank
[21] The Council claims the Matron Statute does not authorize the Sheriff to
determine the matron’s rank for salary purposes. In its view, “complete hiring
authority” under subsection (a) of the Matron Statute is limited to the power to
appoint; that is, the Sheriff chooses the matron but does not determine the
matron’s rank. The Council also argues that rank equivalency under subsection
(e)(3) of the Matron Statute is based on objectively comparing the duties and
qualifications of the two positions. Ind. Code § 36-8-10-5(e)(3).
[22] In furthering this interpretation, the Council focuses on the language of Indiana
Code § 36-8-10-10(a) (Approval Statute). That statute specifies:
Except for the position of chief deputy, the position of prison
matron, and in a county with a population of more than fifty
thousand (50,000), temporary administrative ranks or positions
established and appointed by the sheriff, the sheriff, with the
approval of the [merit] board, shall establish a classification of
ranks, grades, and positions for county police officers in the
department.
Ind. Code § 36-8-10-10(a).
[23] The Council reads the Approval Statute as stripping the Sheriff of ranking
authority over the chief deputy and matron. The Council further claims that its
own general compensation authority over county employees, provided by
Indiana Code § 36-2-5-3 (Compensation Statute), gives the Council the final
word on the relative worth of each position within the Sheriff’s Department.
The Compensation Statute provides in relevant part:
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 10 of 32
The county fiscal body shall fix the compensation of officers,
deputies, and other employees whose compensation is payable
from the county general fund, county highway fund, county
health fund, county park and recreation fund, aviation fund, or
any other fund from which the county auditor issues warrants for
compensation. This includes the power to:
(1) fix the number of officers, deputies, and other employees;
(2) describe and classify positions and services;
(3) adopt schedules of compensation . . . .
Ind. Code § 36-2-5-3(a).
[24] The essence of the Council’s argument is that the Compensation Statute—a
general statute—applies to the chief deputy and matron because the specific
statutes—the Matron Statute and the Approval Statute—specifically exclude
those positions from ranking by the Sheriff or the merit board.
[25] In response, Cross argues that the Matron Statute authorizes the Sheriff to
determine the matron’s rank. She contends the Approval Statute is consistent
with that interpretation because the Approval Statute acknowledges that the
chief deputy and matron ranks are not subject to the ranking provisions
applicable to employees who fall within the merit board’s purview. Essentially,
her view is that the legislature’s recognition in both the Matron Statute and the
Approval Statute that the Sheriff has “complete hiring authority” over the
matron and chief deputy shows the legislature’s intent to simply end the shared
authority generally exercised by the Sheriff and merit board and leave to the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 11 of 32
Sheriff alone the hiring and ranking authority for the matron and chief deputy
positions.
[26] We agree with Cross. The Council’s reading of the applicable statutes fails
because it is inconsistent with: (1) the prior versions of the relevant statutes and
the context in which they evolved; and (2) the rule of statutory interpretation
that requires that the Approval Statute and its neighboring statutes, including
the Matron Statute, be construed consistently.
1. Prior Versions of Relevant Statutes and Their Context
[27] In determining legislative intent underlying an ambiguous statute, “we examine
the entire statute, prior versions, changes made, and the reasons for making
them.” Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 446 N.E.2d 1337,
1339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). The prior versions of the Matron Statute and the
Approval Statute are informative as to both the meaning of the phrase
“complete hiring authority” and the matron exception that appear in both
statutes. Ind. Code §§ 36-8-10-5(a), -10(a).
[28] When the merit system for certain public employees first went into effect in
1961, members of the “county police force”—including the matron and chief
deputy—were both hired and promoted through that system. Murray, 690
N.E.2d at 340. “For each rank, grade, and position . . . the sheriff, with the
approval of the [merit] board, was required to set reasonable standards of
qualifications, and fix the prerequisites of training, education, and experience.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 12 of 32
Id. (citing Acts 1961, ch. 285, § 5, which enacted the earliest version of the
Approval Statute).
[29] The sheriff, with the approval of the board, accomplished this task by
“devis[ing] and administer[ing] examinations designed to test applicants as to
the qualifications required for the respective ranks, grades, or positions.” Id.
“Only those applicants who in the opinion of the sheriff and the board best met
the prescribed standards and prerequisites could be appointed.” Id. In 1971, the
General Assembly made merit boards for county police forces mandatory in all
counties. Id. (citing P.L. 241-1971); see Ind. Code § 36-8-10-1 (providing “[t]his
chapter applies to all counties”).
[30] The merit system changed further after two federal appellate decisions in the
early 1970s limited the use of political motivation as a ground for discharging
public employees. First, in 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit determined that the First Amendment generally barred
dismissals of non-policymaking civil service employees solely for their political
beliefs or affiliations. Illinois State Emps. Union, Council 34, Am. Fed’n of State,
Cnty., and Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973). But the Seventh Circuit recognized “the public
executive’s right to use political philosophy or affiliation as one criterion in the
selection of policy-making officials” and that “considerations of personal loyalty,
or other factors besides determination of policy, may justify the employment of
political associates in certain positions.” Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 13 of 32 [31] Then, in January 1975, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s decision
dismissing a claim by noncivil service employees of an Illinois sheriff, who
allegedly dismissed or threatened to dismiss them on partisan grounds in
alleged violation of the First Amendment. Burns v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133 (7th
Cir. 1975) (hereinafter Burns I). The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari on October 6, 1975. Elrod v. Burns, 423 U.S. 821 (1975).
[32] In its later decision in January 1976, the United States Supreme Court carved
out an exception to the First Amendment’s general ban on politically motivated
dismissals of noncivil service public employees. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
371-73 (1976) (hereinafter Burns II). “[T]o insure that policies which the
electorate has sanctioned are effectively implemented,” the Court determined
that partisan-based dismissals are limited to “policymaking positions.” Id. at
372.
[33] In April 1975—after Lewis and Burns I recognized potentially broader authority
by elected officeholders over staff in policymaking positions—the Indiana
General Assembly amended several of the merit board statutes. “[A]t the
request of the Indiana Sheriff’s Association, the [S]heriffs were first given
‘complete hiring authority’ over the positions of chief deputy and prison
matron” through an amendment to the Approval Statute. Murray, 690 N.E.2d
at 340 (citing P.L. 164-1975, § 1); Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1975) (a predecessor to
the current Approval Statute). The pre-amendment version of the Approval
Statute subjected the matron, the “first deputy” (now known as the chief
deputy), and virtually all other “county police force” employees to the merit
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 14 of 32
system’s hiring and ranking requirements implemented by the Sheriff in
conjunction with the merit board. Id. at 340-41; see Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6
(1971).
[34] After the 1975 amendments, the Approval Statute excluded the matron and the
chief deputy from the merit board requirements by granting the Sheriff
“complete hiring authority” over them. Id. at 340-41; Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6
(1975) (“The sheriff shall, with the approval of the merit board, except for the
positions of first deputy and matron over which the sheriff has complete hiring authority,
establish a classification of ranks, grades and positions for county policemen in
the department . . . .”) (emphasis added). Other than the addition of this
“complete hiring authority” clause, the legislature left intact the existing
language of the Approval Statute. P.L. 164-1975, § 1.
[35] In conjunction with the amendment to the Approval Statute in 1975, the
legislature also amended the statutes relating to the matron. The amended
version of Indiana Code § 11-5-4-6 (1975)—with the new language italicized—
specified: “The prison matron and her assistants shall be appointed by the
sheriffs in the several counties as provided for in this chapter, and except for the
matron position for which the sheriff sets the qualifications, the assistants shall meet the
qualifications set forth in IC 1971, 17-3-14-6 [the prior Approval Statute].” P.L. 164-1975, § 2.
[36] The practical effect of this amendment was to allow the Sheriff to
independently determine the minimum qualifications of the matron position.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 15 of 32
Previously, the Sheriff set the qualifications for the matron in conjunction with
the merit board, and together, they were required to hire the person who best
met those qualifications. Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1971); Ind. Code § 11-5-4-6
(1971). The joint Sheriff-merit board determination of qualification
requirements in effect before 1975 still applied to the matron’s assistants,
however. Ind. Code § 11-5-4-6 (1975).
[37] In sum, as a result of these amendments, the Sheriff no longer hired the chief
deputy and matron in conjunction with the merit board but, instead,
independently determined the minimum qualifications for those positions and
who should occupy them. Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1975); Ind. Code § 11-5-4-6
(1975). Cross essentially maintains the statutory language ultimately resulting
from this legislative action, which largely removed the merit board’s authority
over the matron and chief deputy, left intact the Sheriff’s existing authority to
hire and rank those two positions. Intrinsically, as to those two positions, the
Sheriff was left alone to do what the Sheriff previously did jointly with the merit
board. The Matron Statute and the Approval Statute have not changed since
those 1975 amendments in any manner significant to this analysis.
[38] The Council, on the other hand, essentially treats the language resulting from
these amendments as divesting both the Sheriff and the merit board of ranking
authority over the matron and chief deputy but retaining the Sheriff’s hiring
authority over those positions. The Council’s argument is inconsistent with the
evolution of these statutes that we have just related and the context of these
statutory changes.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 16 of 32 [39] The Indiana Sheriff’s Association requested the legislative changes shortly after
the Seventh Circuit in Lewis effectively recognized that “public executives” had
greater authority under the First Amendment over “policy-making positions.”
473 F.2d at 574. Although the United States Supreme Court made clear in
Burns II that whether a position qualifies as “policymaking” is fact sensitive,
427 U.S. at 368, the chief deputy seems a particularly strong candidate for that
description, and the matron might also qualify.
[40] The chief deputy is the sheriff’s second in command, and the matron position
appears to have always had responsibility for all female prisoners and juvenile
detainees under the age of 14. See Ind. Code § 11-5-4-1(d) (1972); Ind. Code §
11-5-4-3 (1972) (The matron “shall be jailer in charge of the female department
of the jail and other prisons and detention centers in the county where such
prisoners are confined . . . .”). Thus, both are potentially policymaking
positions over which elected officeholders have greater authority. See Upton v.
Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling that Sheriff’s deputies in
small police departments who are closely connected to the Sheriff possess
decision-making roles); Dimmig v. Wahl, 983 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1993) (ruling
that Sheriff was entitled to fire deputies based on political considerations); but
see Kolman v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling that Upton and
Dimmig did not create per se rule that chief deputies necessarily inhabit a
decision-making job to which First Amendment protections against partisan
firing do not apply).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 17 of 32 [41] In this context, the timing of the amendments also suggests that the legislature
was acting to increase, rather than limit, the Sheriff’s authority over the chief
deputy and matron positions. By the time the General Assembly acted in 1975,
the federal courts had already begun recognizing that public executives possess
broader authority over politically sensitive, non-merit positions: the Seventh
Circuit said as much in Lewis in 1972 and reaffirmed it in Burns I in January
1975. The amendments followed within months of Burns I, and their
chronological proximity to those decisions supports inferring that the legislature
legislated within that emerging backdrop. See Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting
Change v. Baldwin, 714 N.E.2d 135, 140 (Ind. 1999) (legislative intent may be
gleaned from an amendment enacted shortly after a controlling decision).
[42] What came afterward confirms that the legislature read the trend correctly. The
Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Burns II explained “the need for political
loyalty of employees . . . to the end that representative government not be
undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of . . . policies . . .
presumably sanctioned by the electorate.” 427 U.S. at 367. This is the same
interest that seemingly distinguishes the chief deputy and matron from rankand-file merit employees. See also Grossart v. Dinaso, 758 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th
Cir. 1985).
[43] And the Seventh Circuit later recognized in Upton that a state legislature “may
choose to adjust state laws to protect some level of party affiliation or
participation.” 930 F.2d at 1218. This is precisely what the 1975 amendments
did. That the principle endured and was later described as one that legislatures
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 18 of 32
could implement does not supply the 1975 legislature's intent, but it confirms
that reading the amendments as a deliberate expansion of the Sheriff's authority
is consistent with the doctrine's settled trajectory.
[44] The Council’s claim that the legislature removed the Sheriff’s ranking authority
through the amendment of the Approval Statute in 1975 is inconsistent with
this inferred legislative intent. Given the timing of the Indiana Sheriff’s
Association’s request, the Association more likely sought more, not less, control
over the chief deputy and matron as key policymaking positions distinguishable
from the other positions within the statutory merit system. The courts had
awarded Sheriffs greater authority over policymaking positions, so it is
reasonable to infer that the Association asked the legislature to essentially
follow the courts’ lead by leaving hiring and ranking decisions for the chief
deputy and matron positions exclusively to the Sheriff.
2. The Council’s Reading Conflicts With the Rules of
Statutory Construction
[45] Even if the evolution of the relevant statutes and context of the 1975
amendments are insufficient to vitiate the Council’s argument, the rules of
statutory construction do. “We ‘generally presume that all statutory language is
used intentionally’ so that ‘[e]ach word should be given effect and meaning
where possible’ . . . and not treated as ‘mere surplusage.’” In re Howell, 27
N.E.3d 723, 726 (Ind. 2015) (quoting both AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Ott, 785 N.E.2d
1068, 1079 (Ind. 2003) and Martin v. Martin, 495 N.E.2d 523, 524-25 (Ind.
1986)). We also are mindful of not only what the statute says, but “‘what it does
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 19 of 32
not say.’” ESPN v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind.
2016) (quoting Day v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 812 (Ind. 2016)).
[46] Both the Matron Statute and the Approval Statute create exceptions to merit
system requirements for the matron and chief deputy positions—merit system
requirements long applicable to virtually all other positions within the Sheriff’s
Department. “Statutes relating to the same general subject matter ‘are in pari
materia [on the same subject] and should be construed together so as to produce
a harmonious statutory scheme.’” Klotz v. Hoyt, 900 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2009)
(quoting Sanders v. State, 466 N.E.2d 424, 428 (Ind. 1984)). “Harmonization
requires a court to construe both statutes and examine the legislative intent
closely.” Kibbey v. State, 733 N.E.2d 991, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
[47] The Approval Statute provided for rank, grade, and position classifications to
be made by the Sheriff, with the approval of the board, until the Statute’s
amendment in 1975. Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1971). Likewise, until 1975, the
Matron Statute subjected both the chief deputy and the matron to merit system
requirements. Id.; Ind. Code §§ 11-5-4-3, -6 (1972). After the 1975 amendments,
the Matron Statute never expressly stripped the Sheriff’s pre-1975 ranking
authority, and it never expressly transferred that authority to the Council.
[48] Indiana courts recognize “a presumption that the legislature in enacting a
particular piece of legislation has in mind existing statutes on the same subject.”
E. Chicago Police Dep’t v. Bynum, 826 N.E.2d 22, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
(quoting County Council of Bartholomew Cnty. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 20 of 32
Bartholomew Cnty, 400 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)); see also
Thompson v. Mossburg, 139 N.E. 307, 310 (Ind. 1923) (ruling that when the
legislature amends a statute but retains existing language, the reenactment does
not show a legislative intent to make any change in the law in the untouched
language); accord Sutton v. State, 101 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ind. 1951) (“The
unchanged portions of the statute are not to be considered as repealed and reenacted . . . [but] are continued in force, with the same meaning and effect after
the amendment that they had before.”). Thus, when the legislature largely
removed the merit board’s ranking authority over the matron and chief deputy
positions but did not expressly remove the Sheriff’s existing ranking authority
over those positions, that silence may reasonably be construed as continuing the
Sheriff’s authority to rank. Compare Ind. Code § 17-3-14-6 (1971) and Ind. Code
§ 17-3-14-6 (1975).
[49] The Indiana Attorney General reached the same conclusion as we have when
examining an analogous provision granting Sheriffs distinct hiring authority
over special deputies: “determination of their rank, demotion and promotion, if
any, would be controlled by the [S]heriff.” 1985 Ind. OAG No. 29, 1985 WL
69029, at *4. Although the Attorney General’s opinions “are without
precedential effect and are not binding on this [C]ourt,” they occasionally are
considered by this Court when conducting independent statutory analysis.
Thompson, 867 N.E.2d at 659 n.9 (noting an Attorney General opinion but
reaching different conclusion); see also Ind. State Personnel Bd. v. Martin, 338
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 21 of 32
N.E.2d 743, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (finding Attorney General’s opinions to
be “persuasive” in light of limited precedent on issue).
3. The Council’s General Compensation Authority Does
Not Grant It Ranking Authority
[50] The Council claims it has ranking authority over the matron under the
Compensation Statute and Indiana Code § 36-8-10-4(b) (Salary Statute). As
previously explained, the Compensation Statute grants the Council the power
to “describe and classify positions and services” and to “adopt schedules of
compensation.” Ind. Code § 36-2-5-3(a). Similarly, the Salary Statute specifies
that “[t]he [merit] board may recommend the number and salary of the [county
police force] personnel, but the county fiscal body shall determine the budget
and salaries.” Ind. Code § 36-8-10-4(b).
[51] Those two provisions grant the fiscal body authority to set salaries and classify
positions and services. See, e.g., Colen v. Ohio Cty., 890 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008) (finding county was authorized to pay Sheriff under Indiana Code §
36-2-5-3). But in Pike County v. State ex rel. Hardin, 469 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1984), this Court confirmed: “even though the [county] officials have
the general authority to fix the prison matron’s compensation or salary, they are
nevertheless required by statute to fix it in an amount equal to other deputy
sheriffs and police officers.” Although Pike County involved an earlier version of
the Matron Statute, that version similarly called for equal pay between the
matron position and other positions within the Sheriff’s Department. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 22 of 32 [52] As previously noted, statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in
pari materia and should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious
statutory scheme. Campbell/Hausfield/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson, 109 N.E.3d 953,
958 (Ind. 2018). The general compensation authority granted to counties
reflected in the Compensation Statute and the Salary Statute, the specific pay
mandate for matrons in the Matron Statute, and the ranking provision in the
Approval Statute may be construed harmoniously.
[53] The general statutes—the Compensation Statute and the Salary Statute—
specify that the Council may set salaries and classify positions and services. Ind.
Code §§ 36-2-5-3(a), 36-8-10-4(b). The specific statutes—the Matron Statute and
the Approval Statute—establish the Sheriff’s sole authority to classify the rank,
position, grade, and qualifications of the matron. Ind. Code §§ 36-8-10-5, 36-8-10-10. These statutes ensure the Sheriff sets ranks and the Council sets the rate
of pay based on those ranks in accordance with the Council’s own classification
of county positions and statutory mandates.
[54] But even if the Matron Statute and Approval Statute cannot be harmonized
with the Council’s compensation authority statutes and an ambiguity exists in
these statutes as to their meaning, our rules of statutory construction assist in
resolving this conflict. When the legislature has dealt with the same subject
matter in a detailed manner in one statute but a general manner in other
statutes, the detailed statute prevails. Kibbey, 733 N.E.2d at 996. The Matron
Statute and Approval Statute are more detailed than these county compensation
statutes and therefore control. See id. The Sheriff determines the matron’s rank,
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 23 of 32
and the Council pays the matron the same as other Sheriff’s Department
personnel of the same rank.
[55] To rule otherwise would produce an absurd result. The Sheriff here would
participate in ranking every person on his staff except two of the people upon
whom the Sheriff would rely most to carry out his obligations: the chief deputy
(the Sheriff’s second-in-command) and the matron (responsible for all female
prisoners and juvenile detainees under 14, the commissary, and the sex offender
registry). The rules of statutory construction bar this result. See Sales v. State, 723
N.E.2d 416, 420 (Ind. 2000) (“The legislature is presumed to have intended the
language used in the statute to be applied logically and not to bring about an
unjust or absurd result.”). The Council’s general compensation authority does
not supersede the Matron Statute’s grant of ranking authority to the Sheriff.
Nor does the Matron Statute conflict with the Council’s compensation
authority.
C. Duties Are No Longer the Standard
[56] Having established that the Sheriff determines the matron’s rank, grade, and
position, the remaining question is what standard governs that determination.
[57] The Council contends that “‘rank,’ ‘grade,’ and ‘position’ are relational
concepts” that “necessarily require[] some objective comparison of . . .
qualifications, authority, training, chain of command, and responsibilities.”
Reply Br., p. 16. Under that reading, the Sheriff’s organizational chart and
affidavit are not enough. The Council argues the positions would have to be
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 24 of 32
objectively compared, and when they are, the differences between the matron
and the jail commander demonstrate they are not equivalent.
[58] This argument invites this Court to apply a standard that the legislature
deliberately abandoned more than 50 years ago and never restored. The original
1971 statute conditioned salary parity on comparable duties by specifying that
the matron was entitled to equal pay only “for like work.” Ind. Code § 11-5-4-3
(1971) (“The Prison Matron and her assistant or assistants shall be paid such
compensation or salaries as other deputy Sheriffs and police officers are paid for
like work.”).
[59] Under that standard, the Council’s argument would have force. A matron
seeking parity reasonably had to show her work was comparable to that of the
officer whose pay she sought. But in 1972, the legislature deleted “for like
work” from the statute. Ind. Code § 11-5-4-3 (1972) (“The Prison Matron and
her assistant or assistants shall be paid such compensation or salaries as other
deputy Sheriffs and police officers are paid.”). This Court interpreted this
change to mean that matrons thereafter were entitled to equal compensation
“regardless of their respective duties.” Johnson v. Wabash Cnty., 391 N.E.2d
1139, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
[60] The Council argues that Johnson does not control. As the Council notes, Johnson
predates the statutory recodification and amendments that led to the
introduction in the Matron Statute of “rank, grade, or position” as the measure
of equivalency. See Ind. Code § 17-3-6.3-3 (effective October 1, 1980, and
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 25 of 32
providing that “the prison matron . . . shall be paid the same salary as other
members of the county police force with the same rank, grade, or position are
paid”); Ind. Code § 36-8-10-5 (1982) (providing that “the prison matron . . . [is]
entitled to the same salary that other members of the department of the same
rank, grade, or position are paid”).
[61] But Johnson remains relevant—not for the specific statutory language it
construed but for its determination of the legislative intent underlying the
deletion of the “for like work” language in 1972. The Johnson Court determined
that the legislature made a deliberate choice to remove the duty comparison
from the parity analysis. Johnson, 391 N.E.2d at 1143. And nothing that the
legislature has done or that the courts have said since suggests any movement
away from that choice.
[62] As this Court has recognized, these statutory amendments “leave no doubt that
the legislature intended to clarify its determination that a matron and [a] deputy
of the same rank, grade, and position receive the same salary.” Pike Cnty., 469
N.E.2d at 1193. The shift from “for like work” to “same rank, grade, or
position” replaced a duty-based test with a rank-based one. When the Council
points to differences in duties, training, certification, and chain of command
between the matron and jail commander positions, it is making the comparison
the legislature removed in 1972. But when the legislature deletes language from
a statute—such as “for like work”—the deletion generally is presumed to be
intentional. Id. at 1194.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 26 of 32 [63] We therefore conclude that the matron’s pay turns on rank as determined by the
Sheriff, not on a comparison of duties.
D. The Council’s Designated Evidence Does Not Create a
Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to the Matron’s Rank
[64] The Sheriff determined that Cross holds the same rank as the jail commander.
This determination is consistent with an organizational chart the Sheriff created
at the Council’s request in 2019—before Cross was hired or any dispute over
her pay arose. The Sheriff confirmed that determination through an affidavit
and deposition testimony that were among Cross’s designated evidence in
support of her motion for summary judgment. Other designated evidence
showed the Sheriff also communicated his determination of Cross’s rank to the
Council on multiple occasions before this lawsuit was filed in what he described
as “heated” exchanges. App. Vol. II, p. 53.
[65] The Council’s designated evidence included an affidavit detailing the
differences between the duties of the jail commander and matron positions and
between the personal accomplishments of Cross and the current jail
commander. The affidavit noted that the jail commander “is a certified law
enforcement academy graduate with arrest powers and jailer certifications”
while Cross “has only a high school diploma and different law enforcement
training.” Id. at 139. The jail commander supervises all jail staff, oversees
scheduling, training, and discipline, and manages jail operations, according to
the affidavit. The affidavit generally classified Cross’s duties as centering on
female inmate care and administrative support. The Council contends that a
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 27 of 32
factfinder could conclude from this evidence that the two positions are not
equivalent and that summary judgment therefore was improper.
[66] The Council’s affidavit does not create a genuine issue of material fact because
it relates only to the two positions’ day-to-day work and to the personal
accomplishments of the current occupants of those positions. Alleged
dissimilarities in work do not determine Cross’s pay or rank, as explained in
Section I(C). Moreover, personal accomplishments relate to the people
occupying the positions, not to the positions themselves. Positions are ranked,
and people are hired for the positions. Personal accomplishments of the current
occupants of those positions therefore do not determine the position’s rank.
Moreover, the Sheriff has sole authority to determine the matron’s
qualifications and to hire the matron—authority that the Council does not
challenge. See Ind. Code § 36-8-10-5(a).
[67] The affidavit does not otherwise challenge the matron’s rank, which is
dispositive of her pay under the Matron Statute. See Ind. Code § 36-8-10-5(e)(3).
“A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case.”
Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Gaboury v. Ireland
Rd. Grace Brethren, Inc., 446 N.E.2d 1310, 1313 (Ind. 1983)). Any dispute as to
whether Cross’s duties equate to those of the jail commander is not material
because it does not impact the outcome of this pay dispute. The Sheriff’s
unrebutted rank determination controls in this case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 28 of 32
II. Neither Laches nor Waiver Bars Cross’s Claim
[68] The Council argues that Cross slept on her rights by accepting a lower salary for
years before filing suit in January 2024. It claims she is therefore barred by
laches from asserting her right to the increased pay. The Council also argues
that Cross waived her claim, at least as to retroactive relief, “[b]y knowingly
accepting the salary attached to the position, continuing to work under that
compensation structure, and failing to assert any legal challenge for years.”
Appellant’s Br., p. 39.
[69] “Laches is an equitable defense that stops a person from asserting a claim she
would otherwise be entitled to assert.” Ryan v. Janovsky, 999 N.E.2d 895, 901
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013). It requires: (1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known
right; (2) implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing
conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse
party. Id. A mere lapse in time is insufficient to show laches. Id. Instead, the
party claiming laches must show an unreasonable delay that causes prejudice or
injury. Id. The Council’s claim of waiver requires “the voluntary and
intentional relinquishment of a known right, claim, or privilege” by Cross.
Rokita v. Tully, 235 N.E.3d 189, 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).
[70] The elements of laches and waiver are not met here. Cross did not know she
had the right to higher pay until other matrons shared that information with her
at Sheriff’s school in December 2022. Once Cross learned of her right to the
increased pay, she acted promptly. Cross shared this information with the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 29 of 32
Sheriff upon her return from Sheriff’s school, and the Sheriff notified the
Council of the need to increase her pay. The Sheriff had repeated exchanges
with the Council about it throughout 2023. Cross filed suit in January 2024—
approximately 13 months after first learning of her right to the increased pay.
[71] Given Cross’s prompt action to enforce her right to the increased pay and the
ongoing attempts to ensure the Council paid her correctly, no genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether Cross voluntarily or intentionally relinquished
a known right. For similar reasons, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether Cross inexcusably delayed asserting her right to the higher pay by filing
her claim against the Council in January 2024.
[72] We also note that, as to the prejudice component of laches, the Council claims
only a negative impact on its budgetary affairs. Any such prejudice was selfinflicted. The Council opted not to pay Cross at the statutorily mandated rate
for years after the Sheriff informed it of that obligation. For these reasons, the
trial court did not err in denying summary judgment to the Council on that
basis. See Pike Cnty., 469 N.E.2d at 1196 (declining to apply laches and waiver
under circumstances similar to this case).
Conclusion
[73] The Matron Statute requires the Council to pay the prison matron the same
salary as other Sheriff’s Department personnel who hold the same rank. Since
1975, the Sheriff has possessed authority to determine the matron’s rank, and
he exercised that authority before any dispute arose. He repeatedly relayed his
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 30 of 32 determination to the Council. The Council had no authority to override that
determination by: (1) substituting the duty comparison that the legislature
abandoned in 1972 for the Sheriff’s rank determination; or (2) invoking its
general compensation authority, which complements but does not supersede
the Matron Statute and the Approval Statute. Because the trial court correctly
granted summary judgment to Cross, we affirm that judgment.
Tavitas, C.J., concurs in result with a separate opinion.
Foley, J., concurs.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Chad J. Sullivan
Joshua A. Claybourn
James L. Baker
Jackson Kelly PLLC
Evansville, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Erin Bauer
Barber & Bauer, LLP
Evansville, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 31 of 32
Tavitas, Chief Judge, concurring in result.
[74] I respectfully concur in result. The majority finds Indiana Code Section 36-8-10-5 (the Matron Statute) to be ambiguous. I conclude, however, as the trial
court apparently did, that the Matron Statute is unambiguous when read
together with Indiana Code Section 36-8-10-10(a) (the Approval Statute) and
Indiana Code Section 36-2-5-3(a) (the Compensation Statute). Accordingly, I
conclude that the Sheriff had the authority to determine the Matron’s rank.
Because I find the Matron Statute to be unambiguous, I would not reach the
legislative history, which the majority extensively discusses. Despite my
disagreement with the majority’s analysis, I would, however, reach the same
result and would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Cross.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-MI-2804 August 25, 2026 Page 32 of 32