In the Matter of Brooks

In the Matter of Curtis Brooks, Case No. 549, Sept. Term, 2025, Opinion filed on August 26, 2026, by Berger, J.

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT – WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – COVERED

EMPLOYEE – SITE OF EMPLOYMENT

Pursuant to § 9-203(a)(2) of the Labor and Employment Article, an individual is a covered employee when he or she is working for the employer “outside of [Maryland] on a casual, incidental, or occasional basis if the employer regularly employs the individual within this State.”

In the context of professional football, following the reasoning provided in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 197 Md. App. 463 (2011) and Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants, 428 Md. 270 (2012), a professional football player who has not physically completed any of his job duties in Maryland may nevertheless be a covered employee because he expected to be “regularly employed” in Maryland as a professional football player.

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No. C-16-CV-24-002437

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 549

September Term, 2025

IN THE MATTER OF CURTIS BROOKS

Berger,

Tang,

Kenney, James A., III

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Berger, J.

Filed: August 26, 2026

* Ripken, J. did not participate in the Court’s

decision to designate this opinion for publication

pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1.

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal

Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State

Government Article) this document is authentic.

2026.08.26

'00'04- 14:32:38

Gregory Hilton, Clerk

This case arises following the denial of a workers’ compensation claim filed by

Curtis Brooks (“Mr. Brooks”), appellee, against Pro-Football, LLC t/a the Washington

Commanders1 (“Appellant”). Mr. Brooks is a professional football player who was hired

by Appellant on August 3, 2023. On August 6, 2023, Mr. Brooks ruptured his left Achilles

tendon during a training camp practice. Mr. Brooks filed a workers’ compensation claim

with the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission (“MWCC”) on March 7, 2024.

The MWCC disallowed the claim, finding that Mr. Brooks was not a covered employee in

Maryland. Mr. Brooks appealed, and the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

reversed the decision of the MWCC, finding that Mr. Brooks was a covered employee.

This appeal followed.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Appellant presents one question for our review, which we have recast and rephrased

as follows:2

Whether the circuit court erred in determining that Mr. Brooks

was a “covered employee” in Maryland.

For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s

County.

1

The record below indicates that the employer’s name is “Washington Football, Inc.” The proper employer is “Pro-Football, LLC, t/a the Washington Commanders.”

2

Appellant phrased the question as follows:

Whether the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County erred in

finding that the Claimant was a “covered employee” in

Maryland under Maryland Code Ann., LABOR &

EMPLOYMENT § 9-203.

BACKGROUND

Appellant, Pro-Football, LLC t/a the Washington Commanders (“the Commanders”

or “the Team”), is a professional football team in the National Football League (“NFL”).

Pro-Football, LLC owns and operates the Washington Commanders football team.3 The

Commanders play home football games at Northwest Stadium (formerly known as FedEx

Field) in Landover, Maryland. During the NFL’s 18-week regular season, each NFL team

plays 17 games and has one bye week. Prior to the start of the season, each team also plays

three preseason games. Over the course of preseason and the regular season, each team

plays a total of ten games at home and ten games away. The Team conducts preseason

training camp and regular season practice and training at facilities located in Ashburn,

Virginia.

When a player is hired by an NFL team, he is required to sign the standard NFL

Player Contract.4 Although each team may begin the preseason training camp with up to

90 players, before the regular season begins, each team must cut down to a maximum of

53 players on the active roster who will be called upon to play in games. Cuts may be

made at any time during preseason training. Any players who are cut have their NFL Player

Contract terminated. Some of the players who are cut may instead be assigned to the team’s

practice squad, at which point the player signs a distinct Practice Player Contract.

3

Notably, Pro-Football, LLC t/a the Washington Commanders is a Maryland limited liability company.

Appellant notes that this is the only contract allowable at this point of the NFL

4

League Year pursuant to the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement.

2

Curtis Brooks played as a defensive tackle for the University of Cincinnati football

team until 2021. Mr. Brooks was selected by the Indianapolis Colts in the sixth of seven

rounds of the 2022 NFL Draft. He was transferred to the Colts’ practice squad and was

ultimately released by the Colts in December 2022. Mr. Brooks was signed to the

Tennessee Titans practice squad in January 2023, and then signed the standard NFL Player

Contract with the Titans for the 2023 NFL season. Mr. Brooks was cut from the Titans in

July 2023 during preseason training.

Mr. Brooks signed the standard NFL Player Contract with the Commanders on

August 3, 2023 at the training facility in Ashburn, Virginia. The terms provided that “this

contract covers 1 football season(s), and will begin on the date of execution, and end on

the last day of the 2023 League Year, unless extended, terminated, or renewed as specified

elsewhere in this contract.” The contract further provided:

Club [Appellant] employs Player [Mr. Brooks] as a skilled

football player. Player accepts such employment. He agrees

to give his best efforts and loyalty to the Club, and to conduct

himself on and off the field with appropriate recognition of the

fact that the success of professional football depends largely on

public respect for and approval of those associated with the

game. Player will report promptly for and participate fully in

Club’s official mandatory minicamp(s), official preseason

training camp, all Club meetings and practice sessions, and all

preseason, regular season and postseason football games

scheduled for or by Club.

The contract additionally provided provisions pertaining to injury and workers’

compensation:

INJURY. Unless this contract specifically provides otherwise,

if Player is injured in the performance of his services under this

contract and promptly reports such injury to the Club physician

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or trainer, then Player will receive such medical and hospital

care during the term of this contract as the Club physician may

deem necessary, and will continue to receive his yearly salary

for so long, during the season of injury only and for no

subsequent period covered by this contract, as Player is

physically unable to perform the services required of him by

this contract because of such injury. If Player’s injury in the

performance of his services under this contract results in his

death, the unpaid balance of his yearly salary for the season of

injury will be paid to his stated beneficiary, or in the absence

of a stated beneficiary, to his estate.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION. Any compensation paid to

Player under this contract or under any collective bargaining

agreement in existence during the term of this contract for a

period during which he is entitled to workers’ compensation

benefits by reason of temporary total, permanent total,

temporary partial, or permanent partial disability will be

deemed an advance payment of workers’ compensation

benefits due Player, and Club will be entitled to be reimbursed

the amount of such payment out of any award of workers’

compensation.

Mr. Brooks began practicing with the Commanders immediately at the Team’s

practice training facility in Virginia. On August 6, 2023, three days after beginning his

employment with the Team, Mr. Brooks sustained a ruptured left Achilles tendon during

practice. Mr. Brooks was never on the active roster for the Commanders, and never played

a game in Maryland. Mr. Brooks filed a workers’ compensation claim with the MWCC on

March 7, 2024. The MWCC held a hearing on May 14, 2024, and on May 17, 2024, issued

an Order finding that Mr. Brooks “is not a covered employee under Maryland law,” and

disallowed the claim. Mr. Brooks appealed to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s

County. Mr. Brooks and Appellant filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding

whether Mr. Brooks was a “covered employee.”

4

The Commanders’ Senior Vice President of Football Operations, Rob Rogers,

offered deposition testimony on May 6, 2025. During his deposition testimony, Mr. Rogers

explained that, during the 2023-2024 NFL season, the Team expected to have four or five

defensive tackles on the active roster and one on the practice squad. Mr. Rogers testified

that there were seven other individuals in contention for these spots as well, and that it was

“unlikely” that Mr. Brooks would make the active roster or the practice squad. When

examined by counsel for Mr. Brooks, the following ensued:

[COUNSEL FOR MR. BROOKS]: At no time before Mr.

Brooks signed his contract, did you tell him that you did not

think he was going to make the team, did you?

[MR. ROGERS]: No.

Mr. Rogers acknowledged that Mr. Brooks would have likely played in the preseason

games, two of which were home games in Maryland,5 but likened the games to a “tryout.”

The court heard arguments on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on

May 13, 2025. The circuit court noted that “it is a question of law as to whether or not Mr.

Brooks was an employee at the time of his injury.” The court then issued its oral ruling:

And the term of the contract covers one football season.

And it has several requirements of, you know, publicity and

employment and specifically injury. And whether or not . . .

he was an employee. And at the time of this injury, which I

believe as indicated or agreed on by the parties, that this

occurred on August 6. Was that correct? Okay.

And so the question is was he an employee? And

reading through the contract, and the Court has to rely on the

plain language of the contract, there is nothing to indicate, and

The Commanders played two preseason games at FedEx field on August 21, 2023

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and August 26, 2023.

5

I have been told by the employer that if Mr. Brooks was to

remain on the team I guess after the cut period -- sorry, I am

not the football person -- then this contract would remain in

effect. That there is not a second contract that says, okay, you

have gone through training camp. This is now your contract

for the period of the season starting with the pre-season games

up until hopefully the Super Bowl.

And it doesn’t say any of that. This is just a contract for

a season. And at the time, on August 6 of 2023, he was an

employee of this football team.

And quite honestly, there was an argument about, well,

you know, consistent and predictable. But what this contract

says is that he is employed by the Commanders for the 2023

NFL season.

And so the Court is going to find that the commission

erred. As a matter of law, I am going to remand this matter

back for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s

finding.

Appellant noted this timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In workers’ compensation cases, “[w]e review a trial court’s grant of a motion for

summary judgment de novo, without deference to the legal decisions of the Commission

or circuit court.” Norman-Bradford v. Balt. Cty. Pub. Schs., 237 Md. App. 235, 240 (2018)

(citing Long v. Workers’ Ins. Fund, 225 Md. App. 48, 57 (2015)). “[W]hen we set out to

interpret a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, we construe its provisions

‘liberally, where possible, in order to effectuate the broad remedial purpose of the statutory

scheme.’” Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants, 428 Md. 270, 282 (2012) (quoting Uninsured

Employers’ Fund v. Danner, 388 Md. 649, 659 (2005)).

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We do not review the factual findings of the Commission or the circuit court; rather,

“we are called upon to determine whether each respective tribunal was legally correct in

its construction and application of § 9-203.[6]” Id. To that effect, “we do not interpret the

Workers’ Compensation Act in a vacuum; rather, we review the Commission’s

interpretation of a statute it enforces.” Id. Accordingly, we “grant a degree of deference

to the Commission’s interpretation” of its own Workers’ Compensation Act. Id. at 283.

“‘We are under no constraint, however, to affirm an agency decision premised solely upon

an erroneous conclusion of law.’” Id. (quoting Thomas v. State Ret. & Pension Sys., 420

Md. 45, 54-55 (2011)).

DISCUSSION

I. The circuit court did not err in finding that Mr. Brooks was a covered

employee.

Appellant contends that the circuit court erred when it found that Mr. Brooks was a

“covered employee” under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act. “When an

individual seeks to secure workers’ compensation coverage for an injury sustained on the

job, the first question to be resolved is whether he or she is a ‘covered employee.’”

McCants, 428 Md. at 280 (quoting W.M. Schlosser Co. v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund,

414 Md. 195, 206 (2010)). “Whether an individual is a ‘covered employee’ depends on

whether the individual is an employee of the employer, [LE] § 9-202(a); and on the site of

the employment, see [LE] § 9-203.” Id. There is no doubt that at the time of his injury,

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Maryland Code (1991, 2009 Repl. Vol.) § 9-202(a) of the Labor and Employment Article (“LE”).

7

Mr. Brooks was Appellant’s employee. Accordingly, this appeal necessarily focuses on

the site of employment.

LE § 9-203 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided, an individual is a

covered employee while working for the employer of the

individual:

(1) in this State;

(2) outside of this State on a casual, incidental, or

occasional basis if the employer regularly employs the

individual within this State; or

(3) wholly outside the United States under a contract of

employment made in this State for the work to be done

wholly outside of the United States.

(b)(1) An individual is not a covered employee while working

in this State for an employer only intermittently or

temporarily if:

(i) the individual and employer make a contract of hire

in another state;

(ii) neither the individual nor the employer is a resident

of this State;

(iii) the employer has provided workers’ compensation

insurance coverage under a workers’ compensation

or similar law of another state to cover the individual

while working in this State;

(iv) the other state recognizes the extraterritorial

provisions of this title; and

(v) the other state similarly exempts covered employees

and their employers from its law.

LE § 9-203(a)-(b)(1).

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First, Appellant contends that to be a covered employee, Mr. Brooks’s employment

must have been “consistent and predictable.” Appellant argues that Mr. Brooks’s

employment in Maryland was not consistent and predictable because he had only been

employed by the Commanders for three days prior to his injury, had never played a game

for the Commanders, and was not expected to be signed to the active roster for the 2023-2024 football season. Therefore, Appellant argues, Mr. Brooks was not “likely to play

games in Maryland on a consistent and predictable basis.” Furthermore, Appellant argues

that because the entirety of Mr. Brooks’s career with the Commanders was a “football

tryout” in Virginia, his employment outside of Maryland was not merely on a “casual,

incidental, or occasional basis.”

Mr. Brooks contends that at the time of his injury, Mr. Brooks had entered into a

contract to be employed as a skilled football player with the Commanders. Mr. Brooks

argues that the express purpose of his employment was to play professional football games

in Maryland. Mr. Brooks further maintains that regardless of whether he had actually

played a game in Maryland at the time of his injury, that did not affect the purpose of his

employment. Furthermore, although Mr. Brooks’s performance for the Commanders took

place entirely at practices in Virginia, practice for skilled football players work for the

Team is incidental.

Maryland courts have analyzed LE § 9-203 as it pertains to football players in two

particularly instructive cases. First, in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, this Court considered a

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workers’ compensation claim filed by Thomas Tupa, a punter for the Redskins7 football

team. 197 Md. App. 463, 466 (2011). Mr. Tupa signed a four-year contract with Appellant

in 2004. Id. at 468. Mr. Tupa completed the 2004-2005 season without injury. Id. On

August 19, 2005, Mr. Tupa sustained an injury to his back during his pre-game warmup

for a preseason game at FedEx Field -- now Northwest Stadium. Id. Mr. Tupa filed a

workers’ compensation claim with the MWCC and prevailed. Id. at 467. The circuit court

affirmed the MWCC’s decision. Id.

On appeal,8 Appellant argued that the MWCC lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr. Tupa’s

claim because, among other issues, he was not a “covered employee” under LE § 9-203(a)(1). Id. at 470. Particularly, Appellant contended that Mr. Tupa did not work

7

The Team retired this name in July 2020 and began a process to adopt a new name. Statement From The Washington Football Team (July 13, 2020), https://www. commanders.com/news/washington-redskins-retiring-name-logo-following-review. The Team briefly played under the temporary name “Washington Football Team,” before permanently changing the Team’s name to the “Commanders” in February 2022. The Washington Football Team is now the Washington Commanders (February 2, 2022) https://www.commanders.com/news/the-washington-football-team-is-now-thewashington-commanders. The same Maryland corporation, Pro Football, Inc. -- now ProFootball, LLC -- has owned and operated the Team throughout.

8

The Team also alleged that the circuit court erred in determining that Maryland had jurisdiction because the NFL Player Contract signed by Mr. Tupa included a forum selection clause requiring players to bring any workers’ compensation claims in Virginia. Id. at 467. This Court held that this would contravene Maryland’s public policy. Id. at 477-78. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “[LE] § 9-104(a) in plain, unambiguous language, precludes an agreement which exempts an employer from the duty of paying workers’ compensation benefits which are otherwise due under the Maryland statute. . . . A holding that forum selection clauses constitute an exception to [LE] § 9-104 would contravene basic principles concerning the interpretation of statutes.” Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 428 Md. 198, 207 (2012). Despite the Supreme Court’s holding that such a provision is void, the standard NFL Player Contract continues to include this forum selection clause.

10

regularly in Maryland because he worked “primarily” in Virginia and only “intermittently”

in Maryland since he only played 10 games per year in Maryland. Id. at 471. The parties

stipulated to facts that stated:

The Redskins’ principal business is fielding a team to play in

NFL games. All of the Redskins home games are played in

Maryland. The Redskins employ players for the principal

purpose of competing in NFL games. The incident occurred at

FedEx Field in Landover, Maryland. The Redskins practice in

Virginia. Practice for players is designed to prepare them to

play in games.

This Court noted that “[t]he regular or casual/intermittent nature of an individual’s

employment in Maryland is a fact-dependent determination that must be made on a caseby-case basis.” Id. at 472. This Court noted that despite the fact that Mr. Tupa “likely

spends more time at the practice facility in Virginia than he spends playing in games at

FedEx Field or elsewhere,” “the purpose of [Tupa’s] employment was to play in

professional football games at FedEx Field in Maryland and at various other stadiums

around the country.” Id. at 473. Accordingly, the site of employment inquiry “requires

more than simply tallying up the quantity of time the employee spends in each jurisdiction.”

Id. Thus, “because the purpose of Tupa’s employment was to play in games, not to

practice,” all of the time he spent in Virginia “was geared towards improving his

performance at the games.” Id.

The Court also noted that “Tupa’s employment in Maryland was consistent and

predictable: eight regular season and two pre-season games every year.” Id. This was

because “Tupa signed a contract obligating him to perform in all of the Redskins’ games

for four years, as long as he was physically able to do so.” Id. at 474. “In sum, Tupa was

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regularly employed in Maryland because he had an ongoing relationship with his employer,

a Maryland corporation, for the purpose of playing in football games, more of which took

place in Maryland than in any other state.” Id.9

The Supreme Court of Maryland again entered the workers’ compensation arena to

consider whether a football player was a “covered employee” in Pro-Football, Inc. v.

McCants. 428 Md. 270. Mr. McCants was employed by the Team as a wide receiver

between 2002 and 2004. Id. at 273. Over three football seasons, Mr. McCants played in

18 games in Maryland and 16 games in other states. Id. at 275. Mr. McCants filed workers’

compensation claims for six injuries sustained on four separate occasions during the 2003-2004 football season. Id. at 276. The injuries were allegedly sustained during 1) a home

game at FedEx Field; 2) an away game in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 3) an away game in

Buffalo, New York; and 4) during a practice session at the practice facilities in Virginia.

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This Court also noted:

Because we conclude that Tupa’s employment in Maryland

was regular and not incidental, LE § 9-203(b)(1) does not

apply. Although we need not decide whether Tupa would

otherwise be excluded under Section 9-203(b)(1), we note that

the statute requires that “neither the individual nor the

employer [be] a resident of this State.” LE § 9-203(b)(1)(ii).

Pro Football is incorporated in Maryland and is therefore

domiciled in this state. The corporation also conducts most of

its revenue-generating activities, professional football games,

in Maryland. Therefore, Pro Football is a Maryland resident

and, even if we concluded that Tupa’s employment in

Maryland was only incidental, he would not be excluded from

coverage under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act.

Id.

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Id. The MWCC dismissed all of Mr. McCants’s out-of-state workers’ compensation claims

for lack of jurisdiction and only considered the claim for the injury sustained at the home

game in Maryland. Id. at 277.

The circuit court affirmed the MWCC, and Mr. McCants appealed. Id. at 279. This

Court reversed the decision, holding that Mr. McCants was a covered employee. Id.

Although Mr. McCants spent significant time in Virginia, this did not determine the issue

because “practicing is incidental to the main purpose of [the] employment: to play in

football games.” Id. Accordingly, Mr. McCants “was regularly employed in Maryland

because he had an ongoing relationship with his employer, a Maryland corporation, for the

purpose of playing in football games, more of which took place in Maryland than in any

other state.” Id. The Team sought review by the Maryland Supreme Court. Id. at 280.

The Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s determination that Mr. McCants was a

covered employee, remanding to the MWCC to proceed with the out-of-state claims. Id.

at 288. The Court noted that in order for Mr. McCants to be a covered employee, the

primary question was whether Mr. McCants “was ‘regularly employ[ed]’ in Maryland such

that, in this case, his activity in Virginia is ‘causal, incidental, or occasional’ within the

meaning of § 9-203(a)(2).” Id. at 282.

First, the Court noted that it had previously considered whether an individual is

regularly employed in Maryland:

Chief Judge Bell, writing for the Court in McElroy Truck

Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek, explained the test by which we

determine the nature of an individual’s employment for the

purposes of § 9–203(a)(2):

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[W]e have consistently held that the decision in

any case was to be determined by its peculiar

facts and circumstances. What has resulted has

been the development of an elastic test for

determining whether an employee is “casual” or

“regular,” with the factors to be considered being

the nature of the employer’s work, the scope and

purpose of the hiring and the duration of the

employment, whether it is occasional, incidental,

accidental, or a usual concomitant of the

employer’s business.

375 Md. [574, 586-87 (2003)] (quotation marks and citations

omitted). Other factors that may inform the determination

include “whether the employment arrangement contemplat[ed]

a regular presence in the particular jurisdiction,” “the

consistency of the claimant’s work in the particular

jurisdiction,” and “representations made by the employer as to

where the claimant would be working.” Hodgson v. Flippo

Construction Company, Inc., 164 Md. App. 263, 269 (2005)

(alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 283-84.

The Court continued, noting that “[m]any of these factors do not shed light on

whether [Mr. McCants] was regularly employed in this State during his time with the

Redskins.” Id. at 284. After explaining that Mr. McCants had signed a three-year contract,

practiced consistently in Virginia and played half of his games in Maryland, the Court

noted that Mr. McCants’s “contract also contemplated [Mr. McCants’s] presence in both

Virginia and Maryland, stipulating that [Mr. McCants] was required to attend both practice

sessions and football games.” Id. Therefore, “[e]ssentially, the only factors that can

determine whether [Mr. McCants] was regularly employed in Maryland are the nature of

his work and whether that work (whether in Maryland or Virginia) was incidental to the

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Redskins’ business. Put more simply: was [Mr. McCants] ‘regularly working’ when he

was practicing in Virginia or when he was playing games in Maryland?” Id.

Citing, in part, this Court’s decision in Tupa, the Supreme Court noted:

The purpose of a football player’s employment with a

professional football team is to play in professional football

games. It is not, as Petitioner seemingly contends, to practice.

Football practice is a means to an end—better performance in

football games—it is not an end unto itself. Put another way,

professional football organizations do not sign “skilled football

players” so those players can lift weights and watch game film.

The players are signed, and required to attend practice in

Virginia, so they can perform well in games to achieve wins

and earn revenue for the team. The nature of a football player’s

employment, then, is defined by the games in which he

participates, not the admittedly important, yet nonetheless

ancillary, practices he attends.

Id. at 286-87. Accordingly, the Court held that Mr. McCants was a covered employee in

Maryland because he was working for the Team and “[h]is contract contemplated that, if

healthy, he would play in 24 regular season games and six pre-season games in Maryland

over the three years of his employment.” Id. at 287. Therefore, Mr. McCants’s “practice

time in Virginia is a subordinate, ancillary consequence of his employment with the team,

existing only because [Mr. McCants] is required to perform in football games.” Id.

In our view, Tupa and McCants are instructive in the present instance. Appellant

attempts to distinguish Mr. Brooks’s case from Tupa and McCants due to the limited time

that Mr. Brooks spent employed by Appellant. Mr. Brooks, who had been employed by

Appellant for exactly three days, all of which were practices that took place in Virginia,

had never played in any games for the Team. Appellant characterizes Mr. Brooks’s

employment with the team as a “tryout” and alleges that, based on Mr. Brooks career up to

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the point of his injury, he likely would not have made the Team’s active roster and would

play at most, two preseason games in Maryland. Appellant attempts to distinguish Tupa

and McCants by arguing that both players were “established, active roster players with

established, ongoing relationships with the team, as well as a lengthy history of playing

games in Maryland. Accordingly, Appellant contends that their employment in Maryland

was consistent and predictable,” whereas Mr. Brooks had no history, and likely would not

make the active roster.

Appellant, however, focuses on the “consistent and predictable” language of Tupa,

rather than appropriately emphasizing the “ongoing relationship” between the parties. In

Tupa, the Court specifically noted that Mr. Tupa “was regularly employed in Maryland

because he had an ongoing relationship with his employer, a Maryland corporation, for the

purpose of playing in football games, more of which took place in Maryland than in any

other state.” Tupa, 197 Md. App. at 474. The Court did not define what established that

the employer-employee relationship was “ongoing.” The Court noted that Mr. Tupa’s

contract was a four-year obligation, and that he had played the entire 2004-2005 season;

however, the Court did not conclude that it was specifically Mr. Tupa’s past performance

for the Team that created an ongoing relationship. Id. Rather, an ongoing relationship

could be demonstrated by the mere fact that Mr. Tupa had signed a contract and, at the time

of his injury, was still engaged in an employment relationship the Team.

Likewise, Mr. Brooks had signed a contract binding his employment with the Team

until March 2024. The contract explicitly stated that the Team “employs [Mr. Brooks] as

a skilled football player. [Mr. Brooks] accepts such employment.” Mr. Brooks was

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exclusively employed by the Team and was not permitted to play for any other team during

this time and was also prohibited from engaging in activities that could result in injury.

Just as Mr. Tupa “signed a contract obligating him to perform in all of the Redskins’ games

for four years, as long as he was physically able to do so,” Tupa, 197 Md. App. at 474, Mr.

Brooks’s contract obligated him to “report promptly for and participate fully in Club’s

official mandatory minicamp(s), official preseason training camp, all Club meetings and

practice sessions, and all preseason, regular season and postseason football games

scheduled for or by Club.” At the time of his injury, Mr. Brooks was employed by

Appellant and anticipated remaining his employment by Appellant until March 2024.

Accordingly, Mr. Brooks and Appellant were in an ongoing employment relationship.

Appellant invites us to engage in speculation regarding how many games Mr.

Brooks would have played in Maryland to determine whether Mr. Brooks would have been

covered. We decline to engage in such speculation. Indeed, effectively establishing a

certain number of games that would meet the threshold for “regular” and “predictable”

employment is an inexact estimation. Although McCants notes that “[t]he nature of a

football player’s employment . . . is defined by the games in which he participates,” 428

Md. at 287 -- and Mr. Brooks had not participated in any games for the Commanders -- his

contract contemplated that this would occur. At the time of his injury, Mr. Brooks was

employed by the Team. The specific terms of the contract contemplated this employment

until “the last day of the 2023 League Year.” The contract required Mr. Brooks to practice

in Virginia and participate fully in “all preseason, regular season and postseason football

games scheduled for or by Club.” As McCants instructs, Mr. Brooks’s practice in Virginia

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was incidental to his employment for the Team, which was for the purpose of winning

football games, more of which would have taken place in Maryland than anywhere else.

For these reasons, the circuit court did not err in finding that Mr. Brooks was a

“covered employee” in Maryland and remanding to the MWCC for further proceedings

consistent with that determination. We, therefore, affirm.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY

AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY

APPELLANT.

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