*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
26-AUG-2026
08:07 AM
Dkt. 21 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I
---o0o---STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALIKA K. AMASIU,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
APPEAL FROM THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 2FFC-XX-XXXXXXX)
AUGUST 26, 2026
DEVENS, C.J., McKENNA, EDDINS, AND GINOZA, JJ., AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE NAKAMOTO, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY GINOZA, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal addresses whether the statute of
limitations was tolled where Respondent/Plaintiff the State of
Hawai‘i (State) charged Petitioner/Defendant Alika K. Amasiu
(Amasiu) with Assault in the First Degree in two successive
information charging documents.
The case arises out of an alleged assault on November
27, 2014, by Amasiu of his then infant son. Five days before *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
the three-year limitations period expired, the State filed the
first felony information (First Information) in the Circuit
Court of the Second Circuit (Circuit Court), charging Amasiu
with Assault in the First Degree, in violation of Hawai‘i Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 707-710 (2014).1 About a month later, the State
filed a second felony information (Second Information) for the
same charge in the Family Court of the Second Circuit (Family
Court). After filing the Second Information, the State moved to
dismiss the first one, which the Circuit Court granted.
Trial was scheduled in Family Court and continued
multiple times over the next three years. Then, Amasiu moved to
dismiss the Second Information based on statute of limitations
grounds. He claimed the statute of limitations had not been
tolled by the First Information because the Circuit Court did
not have jurisdiction over the case and the First Information
was not served to commence the prosecution. The Family Court
denied the motion to dismiss but granted Amasiu’s request to
file an interlocutory appeal.2 The Intermediate Court of Appeals
(ICA) affirmed the Family Court. We granted Amasiu’s request
for certiorari.
1 At the time of the alleged offense in this case, HRS § 707-710(1) provided: “A person commits the offense of assault in the first degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes serious bodily injury to another person.” The offense is a class B felony, which has a three-year statute of limitations. HRS § 707-710(2); HRS § 701-108(2)(d) (2014).
2 The Honorable Richard T. Bissen, Jr. presided.
2
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
We first hold that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction
when the First Information was filed and was authorized to make
the probable cause determination. HRS § 603-21.5 (2016);3 HRS
§ 806-84(g) (2014) (an information “shall be filed in the
circuit court”); HRS § 806-85(a) and (d) (2014) (“[T]he court
having jurisdiction shall review the information and its exhibit
to determine whether there is probable cause” and “[a]s used in
this section, ‘court having jurisdiction’ . . . mean[s] the
circuit court”).4 Under HRS § 571-14(a)(1) (2018),5 family
3 HRS § 603-21.5(a)(1) provides:
(a) The several circuit courts shall have
jurisdiction, except as otherwise expressly provided by
statute, of:
(1) Criminal offenses cognizable under the laws of
the State, committed within their respective
circuits or transferred to them for trial by
change of venue from some other circuit
court[.]
4 HRS § 806-85(a) and (d) provide:
(a) When an information is filed, the court having
jurisdiction shall review the information and its exhibit
to determine whether there is probable cause to believe
that the offense charged was committed and that the
defendant committed the offense charged.
(d) As used in this section, “court having
jurisdiction” and “court” mean the circuit court; provided
that the chief justice may by order authorize district
court judges to make probable cause determinations, set
bail, and direct the issuance of arrest warrants, as
provided by this section.
(Emphases added.)
5 When the offense alleged here occurred, HRS § 571-14(a)(1), governing family court jurisdiction over adults, provided:
(a) Except as provided in sections 603-21.5 and 604-8, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction:
3
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
courts have exclusive jurisdiction “[t]o try any offense
committed against a child by the child’s parent[,]” (emphasis
added), but this did not invalidate the filing of the First
Information in the Circuit Court or the finding of probable
cause in that court. Although the ICA held the Circuit Court
had jurisdiction, its reasoning was different.
Second, we hold that District Court Judge Blaine J.
Kobayashi (District Judge Kobayashi) was authorized to make the
probable cause determination on the First Information. HRS
§ 806-85 not only authorizes the Circuit Court to make probable
cause determinations on an information, but HRS § 806-85(d)
provides that “the chief justice may by order authorize district
court judges to make probable cause determinations[.]” Former
Chief Justice Ronald T.Y. Moon issued such an order in 2005,
pursuant to this statutory authority.
Third, we hold that prosecution by information
“commences” when the applicable court makes a finding of
probable cause. Under HRS § 806-9 (2014), provisions for
(1) To try any offense committed against a child by
the child's parent or guardian or by any other
person having the child’s legal or physical
custody, and any violation of section 707-726,
707-727, 709-902, 709-903, 709-903.5, 709-904,
709-905, 709-906, or 302A-1135, whether or not
included in other provisions of this paragraph
or paragraph (2)[.]
(Emphasis added.)
4
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
prosecution by indictment apply to prosecutions by information.
In turn, HRS § 701-108(5) (2014)6 specifically addresses the
statute of limitations and provides that prosecution by
indictment commences when an indictment is “found.” In this
regard, the ICA incorrectly stated the filing of the information
commenced the prosecution in this case. However, District Judge
Kobayashi made a probable cause finding on the same day the
First Information was filed. The prosecution commenced timely
and the statute of limitations was tolled while the case was in
the Circuit Court. See HRS § 701-108(6)(b) (2014).7
For the reasons in this opinion, which differ from the
ICA’s summary disposition order, we affirm the ICA’s Judgment on
Appeal, which affirmed the Family Court’s order denying Amasiu’s
motion to dismiss.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Circuit and Family Court Proceedings
On November 22, 2017, five days before the three-year
statute of limitations for first-degree assault would have
expired, the State filed the First Information in the Circuit
Court asserting that Amasiu intentionally or knowingly caused
6 HRS § 701-108(5) provides: “A prosecution is commenced either when an indictment is found or a complaint filed, or when an arrest warrant or other process is issued, provided that such warrant or process is executed without unreasonable delay.” (Emphases added.)
7 HRS § 701-108(6)(b) provides: “The period of limitation does not run: . . . (b) During any time when a prosecution against the accused for the same conduct is pending in this State[.]”
5
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
serious bodily injury to his son, thereby committing the offense
of Assault in the First Degree in violation of HRS § 707-710(1).
On the same day, District Judge Kobayashi of the District Court
of the Second Circuit, determined there was sufficient evidence
to support a finding of probable cause for the First
Information. District Judge Kobayashi set bail at $50,000 and
issued an arrest warrant. That arrest warrant was not served on
Amasiu.
About a month later, on December 21, 2017, the State
filed the Second Information in the Family Court on the same
charge. On the same day, District Family Court Judge Adrianne
N. Heely (District Judge Heely), determined there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding of probable cause. District Judge
Heely set bail at $50,000 and issued an arrest warrant. This
arrest warrant was served on Amasiu.
The day after the probable cause finding on the Second
Information, the State moved ex parte to recall the Circuit
Court’s arrest warrant and to dismiss the First Information
without prejudice, which the Circuit Court granted. The first
warrant was recalled before it was served on Amasiu.
A jury trial was scheduled in Family Court but then
continued multiple times. Then, on May 16, 2021, almost threeand-a-half years after he was charged, Amasiu moved to dismiss
6
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
this case in the Family Court. He argued the First Information
did not toll the statute of limitations, and thus the Second
Information was filed outside the limitations period and must be
dismissed.
During a hearing, the Family Court orally denied
Amasiu’s motion and later issued an Order Denying Motion to
Dismiss, making the following Findings of Fact (FOF):
1. At the hearing on the Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss for Violation of Statute of Limitations, the
Defendant presented no witnesses, presented no evidence,
nor requested that the Court take judicial notice of any
facts. However, it was undisputed in the pleadings
submitted, and the arguments made at the hearing that the
Defendant was charged by way of felony information with a
single count of Assault in the First Degree on November 22,
2017;
2. The November 22, 2017, felony information alleged
that the Defendant intentionally or knowingly caused
serious bodily injury to his then four-month[-]old son on
November 27, 2014;
3. The Honorable Blaine Kobayashi, Judge of the
District Court of the Second Circuit found probable cause
to support the November 22, 2017, felony information and
issued a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest. The November
22, 2017, Felony Information alleged subject-matter
jurisdiction in the Circuit Court;
4. On December 21, 2017, the State filed a
subsequent felony information for the same charge, arising
out of the same conduct, alleged to occur on the same date
and against the same victim, but alleging subject-matter
jurisdiction in the Family Court of the Second Circuit;
5. The Honorable Adrianne Heely found probable cause
to support the December 21, 2017, felony information and
ordered the issuance of a warrant for the Defendant’s
arrest;
6. On December 22, 2017, the State filed an ex-parte
motion to dismiss the November 22, 2017, felony information
and recalled the bench warrant before it was served on the
Defendant;
7. On December 26, 2017, the Honorable Joseph E.
Cardoza, Judge of the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit,
approved the State’s motion to dismiss the November [22],
7
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
2017, felony information without prejudice, and ordered the
recall of original warrant issued;
8. The Court has jurisdiction to preside over this
matter[.]
The Family Court made the following Conclusions of Law
(COL):
1. The statute of limitations for the charge of
Assault in the First Degree, a class B felony, is three (3)
years. HRS § 701-108 (2)(d);
2. Section 701-108 of the Hawai‘i Revised Statutes
provides that a prosecution is commenced “either when an
indictment is found or a complaint filed, or when an arrest
warrant or other process is issued, provided that such
warrant or process is executed without unreasonable delay.”
HRS § 701-108(5);
3. Pursuant to section 701-108(6)(b) of the Hawai‘i
Revised Statutes, the period of limitation does not run
“[d]uring any time when a prosecution against the accused
for the same conduct is pending in this State.” HRS § 701-108 (6)(b);
4. The family courts are divisions of the circuit
courts of the State of Hawai‘i and are not deemed to be
other courts as that term is used in the Hawai‘i State
Constitution. HRS § 571-3;
5. The several judges of the second, third an[d]
fifth circuits are judges of the family courts when
exercising jurisdiction under chapter 571 of the HRS. HRS
§ 571-4;
6. A judge appointed to the circuit court of the
second circuit serves as both circuit and family court
judge. As such, judges of the second circuit appropriately
have authority over both circuit and family court matters.
[Adams v. State], 103 Hawai‘i 214, 222, 81 P.3d 394, 402
(2003);
7. A prosecution commences and is considered
“pending” when a charging document is filed, regardless of
whether the charging document is deficient. State v.
Armitage, 132 Hawai‘i 36, 51-52, 319 P.3d 1044, 1059-1060
(2014).
8. The Court finds that the prosecution was
commenced in this case when the November 22, 2017, Felony
Information was filed, regardless of whether it was
deficient;
8
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
9. The Court finds that the Circuit Court properly
exercised jurisdiction over the case and that the statute
of limitations was tolled from the filing of the felony
information on November 22, 2017, to the filing of the
December 21, 2017, felony information;
10. The Court further finds that the Felony
Information in this case was not executed without
unreasonable delay[.]
The Family Court denied Amasiu’s motion to dismiss.
It then granted his request for an interlocutory appeal.
B. ICA Proceedings
In his interlocutory appeal to the ICA, Amasiu
asserted that the Family Court erred by ruling that the First
Information tolled the statute of limitations even though it was
filed in a court that lacked jurisdiction, it was dismissed
before it was served, and a district court judge made a probable
cause determination without authority to do so.
The ICA affirmed the Family Court’s Order Denying
Motion to Dismiss. State v. Amasiu, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2024
WL 4799710 (Haw. App. Nov. 15, 2024) (SDO).
The ICA first addressed Amasiu’s argument that because
he was not served with the First Information, it did not
commence prosecution and did not toll the statute of
limitations. Id. at *2. Amasiu asserted that “information”
should be considered “other process” under HRS § 701-108(5),
which states: “A prosecution is commenced either when an
indictment is found or a complaint filed, or when an arrest
9
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
warrant or other process is issued, provided that such warrant
or process is executed without unreasonable delay.” Id.
The ICA determined that under HRS § 806-9, which
provides that all laws applying to prosecutions upon indictments
apply to information charging, a charge by information is not
“other process.” Id. The ICA stated a prosecution by
information commences when the information is filed with the
circuit (or family) court. Id.
The ICA explained:
In prosecuting a felony by information, the written
information must be “signed by a legal prosecuting officer
and filed in the court having jurisdiction thereof . . . .”
HRS § 806-82 (2014).[8] Furthermore, “[t]he information
shall be filed in the circuit court[.]” HRS § 806-84(g)
(2014); see Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 7(h)(1)
(“An indictment or information shall be filed in the
circuit court.”). And the “family courts shall be
divisions of the circuit courts of the State.” HRS § 571-3
(2018).
Therefore, when reading HRS § 701-108(5) (prosecution
commences when indictment found) in pari materia with HRS
§§ 806-9 (laws regarding indictment apply to information),
806-82 (informations are filed in court), 806-84(g)[9]
(informations shall be filed in circuit court), and 571-3
(family courts are divisions of circuit courts), we
construe a prosecution by information as commencing when
the information is filed with the circuit (or family)
court.
Id. (some alterations in original) (emphasis added).
8 HRS § 806-82 provides: “Criminal charges may be instituted by written information signed by a legal prosecuting officer and filed in the court having jurisdiction thereof when the charge is a felony for which charging by written information is permitted by section 806-83.”
9 HRS § 806-84(g) provides: “The information shall be filed in the circuit court, and may be filed under seal with leave of court on good cause shown. All exhibits in support of the information shall be filed under seal in the circuit court.”
10
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Amasiu next asserted that the First Information did
not toll the statute of limitations because under HRS § 571-14(a)(1) and HRS § 806-82 (2014), the Family Court had exclusive
jurisdiction over his case, and thus the Circuit Court did not
have jurisdiction. Id. at *3. It appears the ICA determined
the Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the First Information
under HRS § 603-21.5, and that under HRS § 571-3 (2018),
family courts are divisions of the circuit courts. Id. The ICA
stated, “[b]ecause the family courts are divisions of the
circuit court, any potential jurisdictional defect in filing the
First Felony Information in circuit court for purposes of
tolling the statute of limitations was immaterial,” and cited
State v. Pedro, 149 Hawai‘i 256, 263 n.2, 488 P.3d 1235, 1242 n.2
(2021). Amasiu, 2024 WL 4799710 at *3. The ICA did not
directly address the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court
under HRS § 571-14(a)(1).
Finally, Amasiu argued that District Judge Kobayashi
was not authorized to make the probable cause determination on
the First Information, and thus the First Information did not
toll the statute of limitations. Id. The ICA disagreed, noting
that under HRS § 806-85(d), when the charge is by information,
the chief justice may authorize district court judges to make
probable cause determinations. Id. The ICA explained that in
11
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
2005, then Chief Justice Moon issued an order authorizing the
district judges in the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits
to make probable cause determinations. Id. at *3 (citing In re
Info. Charging, (Haw. Feb. 15, 2005) (order),
https://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/sct_various_orders/order21.p
df [https://perma.cc/EHT9-PSBN]). The ICA concluded District
Judge Kobayashi was properly authorized to make the probable
cause determination in the Circuit Court, and the statute of
limitations tolled. Id. at *4.
The ICA affirmed the Family Court’s Order Denying
Motion to Dismiss. Id.
C. Application for Certiorari
Amasiu applied for certiorari, presenting one
question: “Does an Information charging an offense under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court that is reviewed for
probable cause and signed by a District Court judge, filed in
the Circuit Court, and dismissed before being served toll the
statute of limitations[?]”
We accepted certiorari.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Statutory Interpretation
Statutory interpretation is a question of law
reviewable de novo. . . . In reviewing questions of
statutory interpretation, we are guided by the following
principles:
12
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
First, the fundamental starting point for statutoryinterpretation is the language of the statute itself.
Second, where the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its
plain and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the
task of statutory construction is our foremost
obligation to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained
primarily from the language contained in the statute
itself. Fourth, when there is doubt, doubleness of
meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an
expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists.
State v. Castillon, 144 Hawai῾i 406, 411, 443 P.3d 98, 103 (2019)
(citation omitted).
When there is ambiguity in a statute, the meaning of the
ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context,
with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may
be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning.
Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in
determining legislative intent, such as legislative
history, or the reason and spirit of the law.
State v. Abihai, 146 Hawai῾i 398, 406, 463 P.3d 1055, 1063 (2020)
(citation omitted).
B. Jurisdiction
“The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law
that [this court] review[s] de novo under the right/wrong
standard.” State v. Adam, 97 Hawai‘i 475, 481, 40 P.3d 877, 883
(2002) (citation omitted). “[Q]uestions regarding subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of a cause of
action.” Schwartz v. State, 136 Hawai‘i 258, 263, 361 P.3d 1161,
1166 (2015) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets
omitted).
13
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
C. Motion to Dismiss
This court has stated:
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss an indictment
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The trial court
abuses its discretion when it clearly exceeds the bounds of
reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice
to the substantial detriment of a party litigant. The
burden of establishing abuse of discretion is on appellant,
and a strong showing is required to establish it.
State v. Pitolo, 144 Hawai‘i 100, 105, 436 P.3d 1183, 1188 (2019)
(citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
Similar to his arguments in the ICA, Amasiu contends
the three-year statute of limitations was not tolled by the
First Information because: (1) the State filed it in the Circuit
Court when the Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction; (2)
District Judge Kobayashi did not have authority to make a
probable cause determination because of the Family Court’s
exclusive jurisdiction; and (3) the First Information had to be
served for it to toll the statute of limitations. Amasiu
asserts that because the First Information did not toll the
statute of limitations, the State filed its Second Information
outside of the three-year statute of limitations and it must be
dismissed. He argues the ICA gravely erred in affirming the
Family Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.
14
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
We conclude Amasiu’s motion to dismiss was properly
denied by the Family Court and we affirm the ICA’s judgment on
appeal, but for reasons different from the ICA.
A. The Circuit Court’s Jurisdiction Over the First Information
HRS Chapter 603 governs circuit courts. HRS § 603-21.5(a)(1) states in relevant part:
(a) The several circuit courts shall have
jurisdiction, except as otherwise expressly provided by
statute, of:
(1) Criminal offenses cognizable under the laws of
the State, committed within their respective
circuits or transferred to them for trial by
change of venue from some other circuit
court[.]
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, “except as otherwise expressly provided by
statute,” the Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the First
Information under HRS § 603-21.5(a)(1) because Amasiu was
charged with a criminal offense “cognizable under the laws of
the State” and allegedly committed within the Second Circuit.
Next, however, HRS Chapter 571 governs family court
jurisdiction over adults. HRS § 571-14(a)(1) states, in
relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in sections 603-21.5 and 604-8, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) To try any offense committed against a child by
the child’s parent or guardian or by any other
person having the child’s legal or physical
custody[.]
15
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
(Emphases added.) This provision applies to cases like this,
involving an offense allegedly committed against a child by the
child’s parent. But it also appears at first blush that HRS
§ 603-21.5(a) and HRS § 571-14(a) have exceptions applicable to
each other and, if so, it is unclear how to apply these statutes
to this case.
Of note, however, HRS § 603-21.5(b) specifies certain
matters over which the circuit courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts.10 In order to give effect to
the exceptions in both HRS § 603-21.5(a)(1) and HRS § 571-14(a)(1) so that neither is rendered superfluous, we construe
10 When the offense alleged here occurred, HRS § 603-21.5(b) provided:
(b) The several circuit courts shall have concurrent
jurisdiction with the family court over:
(1) Any felony under section 571-14, violation of an
order issued pursuant to chapter 586, or a violation
of section 709-906 when multiple offenses are charged
through complaint or indictment and at least one
other offense is a criminal offense under subsection
(a)(1);
(2) Any felony under section 571-14 when multiple
offenses are charged through complaint or indictment
and at least one other offense is a violation of an
order issued pursuant to chapter 586, a violation
of 709-906, or a misdemeanor under the jurisdiction
of section 604-8;
(3) Any violation of section 711-1106.4; and
(4) Guardianships and related proceedings concerning
incapacitated adults pursuant to article V of chapter
560.
(Emphasis added.)
16
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
the phrase in HRS § 571-14(a)(1) — “[e]xcept as provided
in sections 603-21.5” — as referring to the concurrent circuit
court jurisdiction set out in HRS § 603-21.5(b). See State v.
Bautista, 86 Hawai‘i 207, 213, 948 P.2d 1048, 1054 (1997)
(“[C]ourts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute”
and “no clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as
superfluous[.]” (citation omitted)). In other words, the Family
Court has exclusive jurisdiction as provided in HRS § 571-14(a)(1), but one exception is where the Circuit Court has
concurrent jurisdiction under HRS § 603-21.5(b).11
With that statutory structure, we must construe the
Circuit Court’s general jurisdiction over criminal offenses
established by HRS § 603-21.5(a)(1), in conjunction with what is
covered by the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court under
HRS § 571-14(a)(1). In this regard, we recognize that HRS
§ 571-14(a)(1) provides exclusive jurisdiction for family courts
“to try” cases like this. But that does not mean family courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects of such cases.
This reading of HRS § 571-14(a)(1) is consistent with the plain
language of that statute and is also consistent with the Circuit
Court’s jurisdiction expressly established for prosecutions by
11 The Circuit Court did not have concurrent jurisdiction in this case under HRS § 603-21.5(b) because, although the offense charged here is under HRS § 571-14, there are not multiple offenses charged as specified by HRS § 603-21.5(b)(1) and (2).
17
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
information under HRS Chapter 806. Specifically, HRS § 806-84(g) states that when an offense is prosecuted by information,
“[t]he information shall be filed in the circuit court[.]”
(Emphasis added.) In turn, HRS § 806-85(a) and (d) establish
the circuit court’s jurisdiction to make the probable cause
determination on an information:
(a) When an information is filed, the court having
jurisdiction shall review the information and its exhibit
to determine whether there is probable cause to believe
that the offense charged was committed and that the
defendant committed the offense charged.
(d) As used in this section, “court having
jurisdiction” and “court” mean the circuit court; provided
that the chief justice may by order authorize district
court judges to make probable cause determinations, set
bail, and direct the issuance of arrest warrants, as
provided by this section.
(Emphases added.)
Here, the Circuit Court had jurisdiction under HRS
§ 806-84(g) when the information was filed in that court. The
Circuit Court also had jurisdiction to make the probable cause
determination under HRS § 806-85(a) and (d).
The above interpretation of the Family Court’s
exclusive jurisdiction “to try” this case under HRS § 571-14(a)(1), in conjunction with the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction
under HRS § 603-21.5(a)(1), HRS § 806-84(g), and HRS § 806-85(a)
and (d), is consistent with the legislative purpose underlying
family courts. HRS § 571-1 (2018), regarding the construction
and purpose of Chapter 571, states in relevant part: “This
chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that children
18
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
and families whose rights and well-being are jeopardized shall
be assisted and protected, and secured in those rights through
action by the court[.]” In short, a key legislative purpose for
HRS Chapter 571 is to protect children through action by the
court. To accept Amasiu’s argument and construe HRS § 571-14(a)(1) to invalidate the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction over the
First Information would conflict with that purpose. It would
also ignore the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction established by HRS
§ 603-21.5(a)(1), HRS § 806-84(g), and HRS § 806-85(a) and (d).
Further, although HRS § 571-14(a)(1) sets out the
family court’s exclusive jurisdiction to try a case like this,
the family court may waive its jurisdiction. HRS § 571-14(a)
(“In any case within paragraph (1) or (2), the court, in its
discretion, may waive its jurisdiction over the offense
charged[.]”).12 This underscores that the circuit court has
jurisdiction over this type of case should a family court waive
its jurisdiction under HRS § 571-14(a).
The ICA’s analysis regarding the Circuit Court’s
jurisdiction was different from the above. See Amasiu, 2024 WL
4799710 at *3. It relied on Pedro, but that case is distinct
12 This language was part of HRS § 571-14(a)(2) when the offense alleged here occurred. HRS § 571-14 has since been amended such that this language is now found under subsection (a)(9). See 2025 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 298, § 11 at 997.
19
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
from the circumstances here. See id. (citing Pedro, 149 Hawai‘i
256, 263 n.2, 488 P.3d 1235, 1242 n.2). In Pedro, this court
noted:
The indictment was filed on June 29, 2018, in the Family
Court of the Second Circuit and the family court arraigned
[the defendant]. But [the defendant] was neither the
parent nor the guardian of his alleged victim, and the
record does not suggest any other basis for the family
court’s jurisdiction under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (“HRS”)
§ 571-14(a)(1). Any potential jurisdictional defect is,
however, immaterial. The Circuit Court of the Second
Circuit had jurisdiction under HRS § 603-21.5, and family
courts are “divisions of the circuit courts of the State .
. .” HRS § 571-3.
149 Hawai‘i at 263 n.2, 488 P.3d at 1242 n.2 (emphasis added).
Pedro presented the inverse situation from this case.
There, an indictment was filed in family court and there was no
basis for family court jurisdiction under HRS § 571-14(a)(1).
However, the circuit court had jurisdiction under HRS § 603-21.5, and because family courts are divisions of the circuit
courts under HRS § 571-3, the filing in family court was
immaterial. In short, the filing in family court was deemed
equivalent to filing in circuit court. Here, Amasiu contends
filing the First Information in the Circuit Court was invalid
because he asserts the Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction
over the entire case. Not only are the circumstances in Pedro
different, but as explained above there was no jurisdictional
defect because the Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the First
Information when it was filed and to make a probable cause
determination.
20
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
It is worth noting, however, that the principles
discussed in Pedro mean the Second Information was properly
filed in the Family Court, and the Family Court had jurisdiction
to make the probable cause determination on the Second
Information. Under HRS § 571-3, “[t]he family courts shall be
divisions of the circuit courts of the State[.]” Thus, because
HRS § 806-84(g) provides that an information be filed in circuit
court, and HRS § 806-85(a) and (d) provide that a circuit court
has jurisdiction to make the probable cause determination on an
information, the family courts can act pursuant thereto as
divisions of the circuit courts.
For the above reasons, the Circuit Court had
jurisdiction over the First Information.
B. The ICA correctly determined that District Judge Kobayashi
had authority to make a probable cause determination on the
First Information.
Amasiu argues that District Judge Kobayashi did not
have authority to make a probable cause determination on the
First Information in the Circuit Court. He argues the Family
Court had exclusive jurisdiction and a judge authorized to
preside in the Family Court needed to make the probable cause
determination. We reject this argument. The ICA correctly
determined that District Judge Kobayashi was authorized to make
a probable cause determination.
21
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
The Circuit Court has general jurisdiction over
criminal offenses. HRS § 603-21.5(a)(1). As previously
discussed, HRS § 806-85 governs probable cause for information
charging and subsection (a) states: “When an information is
filed, the court having jurisdiction shall review the
information and its exhibit to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe that the offense charged was committed
and that the defendant committed the offense charged.” HRS
§ 806-85(a) (emphasis added). Subsection (d) then provides: “As
used in this section, ‘court having jurisdiction’ and ‘court’
mean the circuit court; provided that the chief justice may by
order authorize district court judges to make probable cause
determinations, set bail, and direct the issuance of arrest
warrants[.]” HRS § 806-85(d) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to legislation that had been recently adopted
at the time, and would later be codified as HRS § 806-85(d),
then Chief Justice Moon issued an order on February 15, 2005,
stating “that the District Judges of the First, Second, Third,
and Fifth Circuits of the State of Hawai‘i are hereby authorized
to make probable cause determinations, set bail, and direct the
issuance of arrest warrants, as provided by HRS § 806-E.” In re
Info. Charging (emphases added). Chief Justice Moon’s order
22
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
referenced that it was being issued pursuant to Act 62, section
1 of the 2004 Hawai‘i Session Laws, which enacted HRS § 806-E(d).
Id.
The ICA correctly noted:
The referenced HRS § 806-E(d) is identical to HRS § 806-85(d), which defines “court having jurisdiction” and
“court” as the circuit court, “provided that the chief
justice may by order authorize district court judges to
make probable cause determinations, set bail, and direct
the issuance of arrest warrants, as provided by this
section.”
Amasiu, 2024 WL 4799710 at *3 n.7.
Thus, the ICA correctly determined District Judge
Kobayashi had authority under HRS § 806-85(a) and (d), and Chief
Justice Moon’s order. Id. at *3-4.
In sum, contrary to Amasiu’s argument, District Judge
Kobayashi had the authority to make the probable cause
determination in his November 22, 2017 Order in the Circuit
Court, which commenced prosecution and tolled the statute of
limitations.
C. Under HRS § 701-108(5), prosecution by information
commences when the court makes a probable cause finding.
HRS § 701-108(5) states: “A prosecution is commenced
either when an indictment is found or a complaint filed, or when
an arrest warrant or other process is issued, provided that such
warrant or process is executed without unreasonable delay.”
(Emphasis added.)
23
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
In turn, HRS § 806-9 provides in relevant part:
All provisions of law applying to prosecutions upon
indictments, . . . and to all proceedings in cases of
indictment, whether in the court of original or appellate
jurisdiction, shall in the same manner and to the same
extent as near as may be, apply to information and all
prosecutions and proceedings thereon.
Amasiu argues that an information should be construed
as “other process” under HRS § 701-108(5). He thus asserts that
a prosecution commences when the information is served, so long
as there has been no unreasonable delay. However, Amasiu’s
argument is inconsistent with the plain reading of HRS § 701-108(5). An information should not be considered “other process”
and grouped together with an “arrest warrant.” An indictment,
complaint, and information are alternative methods to initiate a
felony prosecution. Haw. Const. art. I, § 10 (“No person shall
be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury or upon a
finding of probable cause after a preliminary hearing held as
provided by law or upon information in writing signed by a legal
prosecuting officer under conditions and in accordance with
procedures that the legislature may provide[.]”); Moana v. Wong,
141 Hawai‘i 100, 106, 405 P.3d 536, 542 (2017) (stating “a
complaint and preliminary hearing, indictment, and criminal
information are separate, parallel methods by which a felony
prosecution may be initiated” (citations omitted)).
24
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
We interpret the plain language of HRS § 701-108(5),
which specifically addresses the statute of limitations and
provides that prosecution by indictment commences when an
indictment “is found,” along with the requirements of HRS § 806-9. As such, the provisions in HRS § 701-108(5) that apply to
indictments “shall in the same manner and to the same extent as
near as may be, apply to information[.]” HRS § 806-9. The
application of HRS § 806-9 to HRS § 701-108(5) means a finding
of probable cause is required to commence prosecution by
information, because under HRS § 701-108(5), prosecution by
indictment commences when it “is found.” See State v. Abdon,
137 Hawai‘i 19, 21, 27, 364 P.3d 917, 919, 925 (2016) (taking
judicial notice of the date the grand jury found the indictment
and concluding “that the prosecution was timely commenced two
days before the expiration of the statute of limitations[] . . .
when the indictment was found”).
Accordingly, we hold that prosecution commences via
information charging, for statute of limitations purposes, when
an information “is found,” meaning there is a probable cause
finding.
The ICA incorrectly stated that a prosecution by
information commences for statutes of limitations purposes when
the information is filed. See Amasiu, 2024 WL 4799710 at *2.
The ICA based its interpretation on HRS §§ 806-82 and 806-84(g),
25
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
and Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 7(h)(1) (eff.
2012), which provide instructions on the procedure for filing an
information, but do not govern the commencement of litigation
for statutes of limitations purposes. See id. HRS § 806-82
states: “Criminal charges may be instituted by written
information signed by a legal prosecuting officer and filed in
the court having jurisdiction thereof when the charge is a
felony for which charging by written information is permitted
by section 806-83.” HRS § 806-84(g) states in pertinent part
that “[t]he information shall be filed in the circuit court[.]”
HRPP Rule 7(h)(1) states “[a]n indictment or information shall
be filed in the circuit court.”
Notwithstanding the provisions cited by the ICA
related to filing an information, HRS § 701-108(5) is the
specific provision related to statute of limitations and
commencing prosecution for statute of limitations purposes.
Under that statute, as discussed above, prosecution via
indictment and thus also via information, commences when the
indictment or information “is found,” meaning there is a
probable cause finding.
Here, District Judge Kobayashi made a finding of
probable cause on the First Information within the three-year
statute of limitations. The prosecution in this case was timely
commenced. For the reasons in this opinion, the Family Court
26
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
did not abuse its discretion in denying Amasiu’s motion to
dismiss.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing grounds, which differ from the ICA,
we affirm the ICA’s Judgment on Appeal, which affirmed the Family
Court’s order denying dismissal. We remand the case to the
Family Court for further proceedings.
Matthew Nardi, /s/ Vladimir P. Devens for petitioner
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
Arleen Y. Watanabe,
for respondent /s/ Todd W. Eddins
/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
/s/ Henry T. Nakamoto
p
27