No. 800 August 26, 2026 453
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LAURIE DANIALLE MARLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Douglas County Circuit Court
23CR10954; A182291
Steve H. Hoddle, Judge.
Submitted May 9, 2025.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Andrew D. Robinson, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the briefs for
appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Hellman, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Affirmed.
454 State v. Marlin
HELLMAN, J.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction on one
count of forgery in the second degree (Count 1), ORS 165.007,
which was merged with one count of criminal possession of
a forged instrument in the second degree (Count 2), ORS
165.017, raising two assignments of error. In a combined
argument, defendant argues that the trial court erred when
it denied her motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts, because the state’s evidence was insufficient to establish that the alleged crimes occurred in Oregon and that she knew
that the check in question was forged. We conclude that
there was sufficient evidence to defeat a motion for judgment
of acquittal on both issues. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. FACTS
In February 2023, defendant attempted to cash a
check at an Umpqua Bank location. The check was written on
R’s account and listed R’s address in Myrtle Creek, Oregon.
The teller believed that the check looked altered, so she called R. The teller then told defendant she was unable to cash the
check. The teller kept the check and defendant left. At trial, R confirmed that he had signed the check but testified that “[t] here’s been some changes[,]” including to the payee and the
amount. A few days after defendant had attempted to cash
the check, a Douglas County Sheriff’s deputy went to defendant’s home to interview her about the check. Defendant told
him that she had received the check from a friend, E, and that she had previously cashed checks for E without any issues.
For that conduct, the Douglas County District Attorney’s
Office charged defendant with forgery in the second degree
and criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second
degree. The trial was held in Roseburg, Oregon.
At the conclusion of the state’s case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. Counsel argued that,
“There was no testimony this happened in Douglas
County, Oregon at all. There was certainly nothing to show
an intent to injure and defraud or that [defendant] knew
that it was forged. This is speculation on top of speculation.
And I believe a judgment of acquittal on both Counts 1 and
2 is appropriate.”
Cite as 352 Or App 453 (2026) 455
On the issue of whether the conduct occurred in Oregon,
the trial court observed that the state no longer had to
prove venue in Douglas County. Defense counsel agreed but
argued that “Oregon still is” something that the state had
to prove.
In response, the state pointed to the fact that the
deputy testified that he “works for the Douglas County
Sheriff’s Office * * * which is located here and he’s doing his work here.” The state started to argue that “[w]e don’t typically investigate crimes outside of—,” but the trial court
interrupted, stating, “Well, I get that but that’s not in evidence. So I mean we’re confined to what the evidence is[.]”
On the issue of defendant’s intent and knowledge, the
state argued that “passing a bad check is intent to defraud.
How else are you gonna pass a bad check?” The trial court
responded that the state “still need[ed] to present the jury
with some evidence that she knew” and questioned “what
evidence, if any, points to the fact that she would know.”
In response, the state pointed to defendant’s “actions after
the check was kept,” including that she drove off instead
of trying to talk to the teller. The state also argued that
“intent seems like a fundamentally tricky thing to prove,”
to which the trial court responded that “that doesn’t lower
your burden.”
The trial court ultimately denied the motion for
judgment of acquittal, ruling that
“* * * [A]s to the Oregon piece, and, and, and I would
certainly hear more, more argument but at this point with
venue being gone as one of the elements, and, and in my
pre-Jury Instructions it’s still in there but the State does
not have to prove venue. The, the jurisdictional piece, while
I’m sure it’s there, certainly there’s no evidence of it in trial.
“But at, at, at this point at [judgment of acquittal] I’m
going to, I, I’m not going to, I’m not going to grant a judgment of acquittal on the Oregon piece at this point[.]”
The trial court did leave open the possibility that the issue
of whether the conduct occurred in Oregon could be revisited, stating that:
456 State v. Marlin
“* * * [I]f there is some sort of authority out there * * * we
can certainly pull that back. But at this point being in the
middle of a jury trial * * * without clear authority I’m not
going to grant the judgment of acquittal on that case.”
On the intent and knowledge issue, the trial court summarily concluded that “in the light most favorable to the State,
* * * a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt” that the elements of the crime were established. The trial
court also indicated that it would make a further record on
the motions after the close of the evidence.
Thereafter, defendant testified in her own defense.
She explained that her friend E reached out to her around
4:00 p.m. and asked her to cash a check for him before the
bank closed at 5:00 p.m. Defendant also introduced a text
exchange between herself and E, regarding the check, in
which E told defendant that the check would be made out
to her, and it was coming from his friend J’s father. In that
exchange, defendant asked some questions about the check
because, as she testified, she wanted to “cover [her] bases”
and know “more about it, and what [she] was doing, and who
it was for, and that type of thing.” Defendant picked up E “[i] n Tri City,” and he directed her to an Umpqua Bank location
about three or four miles away.
On the way, defendant asked E additional questions
about the check, and E explained that the check came from
an elderly gentleman for whom he did yard work. The man
had Parkinson’s and was “hurting” so he was unable to take
E to the bank himself. Defendant went through the bank’s
drive-through and handed the check to a teller. The teller
declined to cash the check and told defendant that the bank
had to keep it.
After the defense rested, the trial court asked
defense counsel if he had any additional authority on “the
Oregon issue.” Defense counsel responded that he did not,
and the trial court ruled that “State v. Mills[, 354 Or 350,
312 P3d 515 (2013),] * * * sort of changed the way it was done in that the State no longer had to prove venue. And, and so
I, at this point I am going to deny the motion for a judgment
of acquittal on that.” The trial court provided no further
Cite as 352 Or App 453 (2026) 457
explanation on its ruling on the sufficiency of evidence on
the intent and knowledge elements.
The jury found defendant guilty on both counts.
The trial court thereafter entered a judgment convicting her
on Count 1 and merging Count 2 with Count 1. This appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Territorial Jurisdiction
1. Standard of Review
As we explain in more detail below, whether the
crime took place in Oregon presents a factual issue that
implicates a legal question of subject matter jurisdiction.
ORS 131.205 - 131.235 (defining Oregon’s territorial jurisdiction); State v. Williams, 326 Or App 64, 76, 530 P3d 919
(2023) (concluding that “territorial jurisdiction is a type of subject matter jurisdiction”). We review the trial court’s
decision on subject matter jurisdiction for errors of law.
Williams, 326 Or App at 67.
In this case, that review involves assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Thus, we view the underlying evidence in the light most favorable to the
state to determine whether that evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, permitted the trial court to determine that the state established that the trial
court had subject matter jurisdiction, specifically, territorial jurisdiction. State v. Wallace, 373 Or 122, 125-26, 561 P3d
602 (2024) (stating general standard); see also Williams, 326
Or App at 83 (explaining that “the burden of proving jurisdictional facts in Oregon criminal cases ultimately lies with
the state” (emphasis in original)). In doing so, we review the entire record, not just the evidence that the state presented
in its case-in-chief.1 See State v. Shifflett, 285 Or App 654,
1
This expanded review is often referred to as the “waiver rule” because courts have held that in choosing to put on a defense case, a defendant “waives” the right to hold the state to its burden of proof based on the state’s case-in-chief. State v. Gardner, 231 Or 193, 195, 372 P2d 783 (1962). Under the “waiver rule,” a defendant who wants an appellate court to consider the sufficiency of the state’s case, standing alone, must elect not to present any evidence in their defense. Id. As part of her argument, defendant urges us to abandon the waiver rule or, at the least, to not apply it in the context of territorial jurisdiction. Although the waiver 458 State v. Marlin
659, 398 P3d 383 (2017) (“[W]hen a defendant moves for a
judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s case-in-chief, and then presents evidence in his defense, we consider the
whole record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict against the defendant.”); State v.
Schneider, 229 Or App 199, 201, 211 P3d 306 (2009) (holding that we “consider the whole record” to assess the sufficiency of the evidence, even when the defendant moved for a
judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s case); State v. Lamphere, 233 Or 330, 331-32, 378 P2d 706 (1963) (in
reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, “the appellate
court will consider all the evidence and will not reverse the
trial court if the record as a whole contains sufficient evidence to support a verdict against [the] defendant”).
2. Territorial Jurisdiction in General2
ORS 131.215(1) provides that “a person is subject to
prosecution under the laws of this state for an offense that
the person commits by the conduct of the person” if “[e]ither
the conduct that is an element of the offense or the result
that is an element occurs within this state.” “This state”
means “the land and water and the airspace above the land
and water with respect to which the State of Oregon has
legislative jurisdiction.” ORS 131.205. Those statutes reflect the common-law understanding that “Oregon courts’ jurisdiction over criminal offenses is limited by Oregon’s territorial boundaries.” Williams, 326 Or App at 73-74. The question of “territorial jurisdiction” is “a type of subject matter jurisdiction,” id. at 76, on which the state carries the burden of proof, id. at 83; see also State v. Hill, 277 Or App 751, 766, 373 P3d 162, rev den, 360 Or 568 (2016) (“[T]he burden of
rule, which originated in civil law, is arguably inconsistent with the state’s burden of proof in a criminal case and is an outlier to the rule that we review a trial court’s decision on the basis of the record that was before the trial court at the time that it made its ruling, defendant’s arguments do not provide a basis for us—as an intermediate appellate court—to deviate from nearly 70 years of precedent and directly controlling Supreme Court authority.
2
Establishing territorial jurisdiction (that the crime occurred in the state of Oregon) is different from establishing venue (that the crime occurred in a particular county), which the state no longer must prove as a material allegation. See Mills, 354 Or at 351 (overruling case law and holding that the Oregon Constitution does not require venue as alleged in a charging document to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
Cite as 352 Or App 453 (2026) 459
proving jurisdictional facts in Oregon criminal cases ultimately lies with the state.”).3
3. Application
The first step in a territorial jurisdiction analysis is
to determine the applicable “conduct that is an element” or
“result that is an element” of the offense, as stated in ORS
131.215. Here, as charged in Count 1, the state had to prove
that defendant “utter[ed] a written instrument which [she]
knew to be forged” and did so “with [the] intent to injure
or defraud.” ORS 165.007(1)(b). The “written instrument”
alleged was the check. See ORS 165.002(1) (defining a written instrument as “any paper, document, instrument, article
or electronic record containing written or printed matter or
the equivalent thereof, whether complete or incomplete, used
for the purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying or recording information or constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right, privilege or identification, which is capable of being
used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person”).
The “utterance” alleged was defendant’s tender of the check
to the bank teller. See ORS 165.002(7) (defining “utter” as
meaning “to issue, deliver, publish, circulate, disseminate,
transfer or tender a written instrument or other object to
another”). For Count 2, the state had to prove that defendant
“possesse[d] a forged instrument” and that she “kn[ew] it to
be forged” and had the “intent to utter” it. ORS 165.017(1). A “forged instrument” is a “written instrument which has been
falsely made, completed or altered.” ORS 165.002(8). Here,
the alleged forged instrument was the check.
Thus, for Count 1, the state had to prove that when
defendant tendered the check to the teller, she did so in
Oregon. Similarly, for Count 2, the state had to prove that
when defendant possessed the check, she did so in Oregon.
The second step of the analysis is to determine
whether the evidence established that the relevant conduct
3
We note that in Williams, we identified the state’s burden of proof for establishing territorial jurisdiction as either beyond a reasonable doubt or a preponderance of the evidence, with most jurisdictions having concluded that the standard is beyond a reasonable doubt. 326 Or App at 84. We did not resolve the question in Williams, and we do not need to do so here, because we ultimately conclude that the evidence was sufficient under either standard. 460 State v. Marlin
occurred in Oregon. Here, there was no direct testimony
at trial that the acts of possession and tender occurred in
Oregon. As a result, we are left to assess whether the inferences that can be drawn from the evidence can meet the
state’s burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction.4
The relevant evidence on the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction is as follows: (1) the address listed on the check was in Myrtle Creek, Oregon; (2) E texted defendant around
4:00 p.m. and wanted to get to the bank before 5:00 p.m.;
(3) defendant picked up E in Tri City, which was three or
four miles from the bank; (4) defendant tried to cash the
check at Umpqua Bank; (5) after the bank teller would not
cash the check, the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office conducted the investigation into defendant’s possible criminal
conduct; (6) the case was charged and prosecuted by the
Douglas County District Attorney’s Office; and (7) the trial
took place in Roseburg, Oregon.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the state, including reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from it, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient
to establish that defendant’s conduct occurred in Oregon.
State v. Stutte, 339 Or App 87, 95, 568 P3d 247 (2025) (“A
reasonable logical probability that follows from a stated narrative or historical fact is a reasonable inference.”). Jurors are permitted to use their common sense and experiences
when evaluating the evidence, State v. Hines, 84 Or App 681,
683-84, 735 P2d 618, rev den, 303 Or 590 (1987); State v.
Campbell, 348 Or App 306, 310-11, 590 P3d 612 (2026), and
these jurors were so instructed. It is thus reasonable that
these jurors, who were residents of Douglas County, Oregon,
4
We observe that the state created an incredibly thin record in this case. At trial, the prosecutor failed to introduce any direct evidence on the issue in his case-in-chief. After the trial court rejected his attempt to rely on facts not in the record about the jurisdiction of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office, the prosecutor failed to make any other arguments about the sufficiency of the record on the jurisdictional issue. Moreover, even after being put on notice that defendant was challenging territorial jurisdiction, the prosecutor failed to adduce direct evidence of that fact, through a simple question to any witness or otherwise. On appeal, the state puts forth a conclusory three-sentence argument on the issue, which relies only on the Myrtle Creek address, the pickup location in “Tri City,” and the involvement of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office. That argument did not aid in our analysis. We caution that, in another case, this kind of overall minimal presentation would likely be insufficient to achieve the state’s goals. Cite as 352 Or App 453 (2026) 461
and who were hearing the case in Roseburg, Oregon, would
understand that “Tri City” referred to the town in Douglas
County, Oregon. It is also reasonable that these jurors could
conclude that the Umpqua Bank was in Oregon, given the
time (under one hour) and distance (three to four miles) that
defendant traveled between picking up E in Tri City and
arriving at the bank before it closed.
Those facts distinguish this case from Williams, for
example, because there was no evidence that some or all of
the criminal conduct took place close to a state border, such
that defendant could have crossed it in the time that it took
her to drive to the bank.5 Thus, this is not a case in which
the jury would have had to rely on impermissible speculation or inference stacking to determine that the bank was in
Oregon. Cf. State v. Means, 213 Or App 268, 272-74, 160 P3d
1001 (2007), abrogated on other grounds by Mills, 354 Or 350
(in the context of a venue challenge, determining that testimony that unauthorized credit card charges originated in
“Overlook, in Portland” was insufficient to establish venue
in Multnomah County because there was “no evidence showing where Overlook is in relation to Multnomah County, or
even that it is a neighborhood” and reliance on that evidence
would be “little more than guesswork”); State v. Tirado,
118 Or App 294, 296-97, 846 P2d 1201 (1993), abrogated
on other grounds by Mills, 354 Or 350 (in the context of a
venue challenge, concluding that it would require impermissible inference stacking to establish venue in Jackson
County where there was only evidence that the defendant
was stopped on “Avenue ‘G,’ one-half mile from the White
City Veteran’s Administration Domiciliary” and arrested on
“Highway 62”). We find support for our conclusion in other
cases involving venue challenges, which permitted jurors
to use common sense and experience to draw direct inferences about the location of a crime. See e.g., State v. Davis, 248 Or App 263, 270, 273 P3d 251 (2012), rev den, 354 Or
656 (2013), abrogated on other grounds by Mills, 354 Or 350
5
In Williams, the defendant had traveled across the Oregon-Washington border during the 3.5-hour window within which the criminal conduct occurred. 326 Or App at 66. Because the record therefore demonstrated that the conduct “may have taken place” in Washington, we concluded that the state had failed to establish that the Oregon trial court had territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 86. 462 State v. Marlin
(in the context of a venue challenge, determining that the
jury could reasonably infer that Medford was located in
Jackson County); State v. Jones, 240 Or 129, 135, 400 P2d
524 (1965), abrogated on other grounds by Mills, 354 Or 350
(in the context of a venue challenge, determining that it was
a reasonable inference that “the Union county about which
the officer testified was the Union county in Oregon in which
the jurors lived and the case was being tried”).
Because there was sufficient evidence from which
a jury could determine that the criminal conduct occurred
in Oregon, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s
motion for judgment of acquittal on the question of territorial jurisdiction.
B. Mental State
1. Standard of Review
As we explained above, in considering a challenge to
the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we view the
underlying evidence in the light most favorable to the state.
Wallace, 373 Or at 125-26. Where a defendant challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence as to an essential element
of a crime, our task is to determine whether that evidence,
including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it,
could permit a rational factfinder to find the essential element proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lupoli, 348
Or 346, 366, 234 P3d 117 (2010). And that review includes
the entire record, not just the evidence that the state presented in its case-in-chief. Shifflett, 285 Or App at 659.
2. Application
To prove second-degree criminal possession, the
state had to establish that defendant knew that the check
was forged. ORS 165.017(1). To prove second-degree forgery,
the state had to prove that defendant intended to defraud
or injure someone and that she knew that the check was
forged. ORS 165.007(1)(b). The state can prove mental state
via circumstantial evidence. State v. Rogers, 301 Or App
393, 398, 457 P3d 363 (2019).
Here, the check was in evidence. The name on the
“pay to” line was blurred, and it appears that two different
Cite as 352 Or App 453 (2026) 463
pens were used to write on the check. The memo line on
the check reflected “balance due on acc[oun]t,” which was
inconsistent with the reason for the check that E told defendant. Moreover, E told defendant two potentially conflicting reasons for getting the check: that it was money from a
friend’s father and that it was payment for yard work from
an elderly person. Defendant was suspicious of the check
and asked questions, both in the text exchange and during
the drive to the bank, about the origin of the check. After
defendant gave the check to the teller and the teller refused
to cash it or return it, defendant drove away without engaging with the teller. Those facts would permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that defendant possessed the required
intent and knowledge for her second-degree criminal possession and forgery verdicts. The trial court did not err in
denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
Affirmed.