[Cite as Braxton v. ODJFS, 2026-Ohio-3323.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
TONTRENCE BRAXTON C.A. No. 31696
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
JOB & FAMILY SERVICES, et al. COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
CASE No. CV-2025-01-0027
Appellees
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 26, 2026
SUTTON, Judge
{¶1} Appellant Tontrence Braxton appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, this Court affirms.
I.
Relevant Background Information
{¶2} This appeal concerns the denial of unemployment compensation benefits to Ms.
Braxton. Ms. Braxton was employed by Appellee Gardner Pie Company, Inc. In August 2024,
Ms. Braxton quit her job with Gardner Pie. Ms. Braxton then applied for unemployment benefits.
On her application, the reason she gave for quitting was “working conditions.” Appellee Director
of the Ohio Department of Job & Family Services (“ODJFS”) determined Ms. Braxton was not
eligible for unemployment benefits because she had quit her job without just cause.
{¶3} After Ms. Braxton exhausted her administrative remedies, in which the denial of
unemployment benefits was affirmed at each step, she appealed the decision of the Unemployment
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Compensation Review Commission to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to
R.C. 4141.282.
{¶4} According to the briefing schedule set by the trial court, Ms. Braxton’s merit brief
was due on or before July 7, 2025. On July 3, 2025, Ms. Braxton filed her brief and then on July
11, 2025, Ms. Braxton filed an amended brief, apparently to cure deficiencies in the original brief
she filed. ODJFS moved to strike the amended brief as untimely and moved to dismiss the appeal
because Ms. Braxton failed to timely file an appropriate merit brief. The trial court struck Ms.
Braxton’s amended merit brief as untimely and dismissed Ms. Braxton’s appeal because she
“failed to file a brief that expresses her arguments with legal support.” The trial court then affirmed
the administrative decision based on the administrative record.
{¶5} Ms. Braxton has appealed, raising three assignments of error for our review, which
are set forth below verbatim. All three assignments of error were set forth together in Ms.
Braxton’s brief and not separately argued.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
“The duty of the Appellant Court is not to make factual findings or determine the
credibility of the witnesses; rather, the court “is to determine whether the decision
of the Board is supported by the evidence in the record.” (Citations omitted) Irvine
v. State Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 19 Ohio St. 3d 15, 18, 482 N.E.2d 587
(1985). “This duty is shared by all reviewing Courts, from the first level of review
in the Court of Common Pleas, through the final Appeal in this Court Tzangas at
696.” (Emphasis added) Kappan v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2013- Ohio4964 At 14. When the Judge entered an Order drawn off of conduct in the nature
of fraud, hence; bringing about a shift in the direction of the valid contextual focus
of the proceedings from a factual question involving the “omission of evidence” to
a theoretical one theorized that movant sought to add evidence to the (UCRC’S)
“Transcript of the Record of the Proceedings” as defined by R.C. 4141.282(F)(1)
(Duty of the Commission) and Adm. Code 4146-17-01(A) (Availability of Info.
Contained in Rev. Comm. File). The Judge acted without authority and-orjurisdiction because the Order misapplied the law hence void, and fails to apply the
appropriate standard of review and standard of procedure mandated by R.C. Ch.
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4141 (Unemployment Compensation) and R.C. 4141.282(H) (Review by the Court
of Common Pleas) to address the conflict of law involving (UI) claims from the
(ODJFS) for (UI) being Administratively Appealed that the omission of evidence
from the (UCRC’s) “Transcript of the Record of the Proceedings” raises. Which is
a denial of Due Process and erred when it DELAYED and DENIED movants
motion under Civ. P. 60(B) (Relief from a Judgment or Order) to dismiss.
(Emphasis in original.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
De novo review requires a reviewing Court to examine an issue afresh and to
substitute it’s judgement for that of the first level of review. This Appeal brought
from the Court of Common Pleas at it’s on set presented before the Judge issue
where conflict exists in the form of a question of law involving the omission of
evidence from the (UCRC’s) “Transcript of the Record of the Proceedings”
compliance with the statutory mandate of R.C. 4141.282(F)(1) (Duty of the
Commission), and; actions of the Director excluding certain content that only upon
being petitioned via a “Motion to Produce Documentation.” Submits content that
was entered as evidence by another party to the (ODJFS) unemployment
proceedings to now movant. In and of itself is a matter requiring the application of
laws relative to it that the Judge disregarded and wrongly applied thereby entering
a decision that is not supported by the evidence: which not only denied movant Due
Process but is also considered not mere error but rather void.
(Emphasis in original.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
Placed before the Court of Appeals is a matter that it views De novo in addition to
an abuse of discretion. In instances such as this the “standard of review” is to accord
deference to the lower Court’s finding of fact but engage in a De novo review of
the lower Court’s application of those facts to the law. As abuse- of- desecration
doesn’t permit a Appellant Court to simply substitute it’s judgement for that of the
trial Court, so; addressing legal and mixed questions De novo while deferring to
the trial Court’s factual findings: a reviewing Court should accept a trial Court’s
finding of fact if they are supported by competent, credible, evidence. The
proceedings as they rest reflects actions in where the Judge disregarded the
provisions of R.C. 4141.282(H) (Review by the Court of Common Pleas) that
establish statutory mandated standards of review and C.A. 31696 standards of
procedure: to establish a basis to deny appellant’s otherwise valid claim and
sufficient grounds to be granted the relief being sought. Circumstances where an
order drawn off actions in the nature of fraud was those that removed the basis in
which a fair trial could take place, and warranted granting appellant’s Motion
stylized as a Civ. R. 60(B) Motion for a dismissal. There are -nor- were there any
exceptions to the mandates of R.C. 4141.282(F)(1) (Duty of the Commission) and
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the failure of the commission to satisfy the requirements and or offer anything
exculpatory, in addition to; “affirmatively misrepresenting and concealing”
evidence meant that the court didn’t have jurisdiction to act: which establishes it
incorrect for the Court to continue proceeding. As this Administrative Appeal to
the Court of Common Pleas from (ODJFS) for (UI) now rest. Suggests that the
Court-had discretion to define what process the Appellant in an Administrative
Appeal is due, or to permit a concededly unconstitutional proceeding to proceed. In
which neither are consistent with the constitutional guarantees enshrined in the Due
Process and Due Course of Law Clauses and abridged appellant thereof.
(Emphasis in original.)
{¶6} Ms. Braxton’s appellate brief does not comply with App.R. 16(A)(7) and this
Court’s Loc.R. 16(A)(7). App.R. 16(A)(7) provides that an appellant’s brief shall include:
An argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each
assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the
contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on
which appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a summary.
(Emphasis added.) Loc.R. 16(A)(7) provides in relevant part:
Each assignment of error shall be separately discussed and shall include the
standard or standards of review applicable to that assignment of error under a
separate heading placed before the discussion of the issues.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶7} Ms. Braxton’s assignments of error above are not separately discussed under
separate headings in her brief. Therefore, the brief does not comply with App.R. 16(A)(7) or
Loc.R. 16(A)(7).
{¶8} App.R. 12(A)(2) provides in part: “[t]he [C]ourt may disregard an assignment of
error presented for review if the party raising it . . . fails to argue the assignment separately in the
brief as required under App.R. 16(A).” See also State v. Hutchins, 2025-Ohio-2279, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.),
State v. Roper, 2023-Ohio-1738, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.), and Hershberger v. Shelmar Realty, Inc., 2017-Ohio-353, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.).
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{¶9} In addition, this Court is unable to discern the error or errors that Ms. Braxton is
claiming the trial court committed and we will not formulate arguments on her behalf. Where an
appellant fails to develop arguments in support of an assignment of error, this Court will not create
them for her. State v. Omenai, 2024-Ohio-1571, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Franks, 2017-Ohio-7045, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Harmon, 2013-Ohio-2319, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.), citing App.R.
16(A)(7) and Cardone v. Cardone, 1998 WL 224934, *8 (9th Dist. May 6, 1998).
{¶10} Therefore, because Ms. Braxton’s brief does not separately discuss each alleged
error, she has not complied with App.R. 16(A)(7) and Loc.R. 16(A)(7). Accordingly, Ms.
Braxton’s assignments of error are overruled pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2).
III.
{¶11} For the forgoing reasons, Ms. Braxton’s assignments of error are overruled. The
judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
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Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETTY SUTTON
FOR THE COURT
FLAGG LANZINGER, P. J.
CONCURS.
HENSAL, J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
APPEARANCES:
TONTRENCE C. BRAXTON, pro se, Appellant.
BRIAN P. MURPHY, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
KATHLEEN A. FOX, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.