[Cite as State v. Anderson, 2026-Ohio-3329.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-260023
TRIAL NO. B-2502948
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. :
JUDGMENT ENTRY
QUENTIN ANDERSON, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 8/26/2026.
Pursuant to App.R. 30, the clerk is directed to send all parties, or their counsel if represented, a copy of the court’s judgment and note such action on the docket.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Anderson, 2026-Ohio-3329.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-260023
TRIAL NO. B-2502948
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. :
OPINION
QUENTIN ANDERSON, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 26, 2026
Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott Heenan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Angela W. Chang, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee.
[Cite as State v. Anderson, 2026-Ohio-3329.]
NESTOR, Judge.
{¶1} A fundamental right of American democracy is freedom from
warrantless search and seizure. In certain circumstances, police who search without
a warrant do so in good-faith reliance on existing law that allows them to invade that
freedom. Before Ohio legalized recreational marijuana in 2023, case law allowed
warrantless automobile searches based on the smell of marijuana alone. In 2025, in
State v. Gray, 2025-Ohio-4607 (1st Dist.), this court concluded that pursuant to the
legalization, the smell of marijuana alone could no longer be the basis of a warrantless
search.
{¶2} This case involves a pre-Gray search that took place in the gray area of
marijuana jurisprudence between 2023 and 2025. Cincinnati police officers stopped
defendant-appellee Quentin Anderson’s car for equipment violations. After smelling
burnt marijuana, officers searched the car and found bags of marijuana. Anderson
was charged with trafficking in and possession of marijuana.
{¶3} Anderson moved to suppress the evidence found during the warrantless
search. The trial court granted his motion to suppress. The State now appeals. We
conclude that the trial court should determine in the first instance whether the goodfaith exception applies to the warrantless automobile search in this case.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶4} On June 11, 2025, Cincinnati Police Officer Vincent Bley conducted a
traffic stop in College Hill. The driver of the car was defendant-appellee Quentin
Anderson. The interaction was captured on officers’ body-worn camera footage
(“BWC”), which was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing. The following
facts were gleaned at the hearing.
{¶5} Officer Bley initially stopped Anderson’s car for equipment violations,
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
specifically, a broken mirror and excessive window tint. Officer Bley testified that
upon approaching Anderson’s car, he “was hit with a strong odor of burnt marijuana.”
After informing Anderson that he was stopped for equipment violations, Officer Bley
told Anderson that he could smell marijuana and asked Anderson if he had been
smoking. Anderson replied that he had not.
{¶6} Officer Bley asked Anderson if officers could search his car. Anderson
said no, and did not give consent to search.
{¶7} Anderson could not find his driver’s license, but provided Officer Bley
with his social security number. Officer Bley returned to his cruiser to run Anderson’s
information. While in his cruiser, Officer Bley discussed the stop with another officer,
Officer Koch-Hutchinson. Officer Koch-Hutchinson agreed with Officer Bley’s
conclusion that Anderson’s car smelled like burnt marijuana and opined that he
thought it would be reasonable to search Anderson’s car.
{¶8} Officer Bley returned to Anderson’s car and instructed Anderson to get
out of the car. Anderson complied, but repeated that he did not provide consent to
search. Officer Koch-Hutchinson told him that they did not need his consent to search
because the smell of marijuana gave them probable cause.
{¶9} Officer Bley performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus test to determine if
Anderson was impaired.1 While Officer Bley is performing the test, another officer,
Officer Grassow, can be seen on the BWC crouching down at the driver’s seat door of
Anderson’s car. Officer Grassow then informed Officer Bley that he had found a scale
under the driver’s seat.
{¶10} Officer Bley then attempted to handcuff Anderson. Anderson ran. As
1 The record does not reflect the results of this test.
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Officer Bley apprehended Anderson, Officer Koch-Hutchinson searched the car and
found bags of marijuana.
{¶11} Anderson was indicted for trafficking in marijuana in violation of R.C.
2925.03(A)(2), a fourth-degree felony, and possession of marijuana in violation of
R.C. 2925.11(A), a fifth-degree felony.
{¶12} Anderson moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing that the search was
unconstitutional pursuant to this court’s recent holding in Gray that “the odor of
marijuana alone is no longer sufficient to establish probable cause to search a vehicle
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” Gray, 2025-Ohio-4607
(1st Dist.).
{¶13} Importantly, the search of Anderson’s car occurred on June 11, 2025.
Our decision in Gray was released on October 3, 2025, four months after this search
took place.
{¶14} In opposing the motion to suppress, the State argued that the basis of
the search was not just the smell of burnt marijuana, but also plain view of the scale,
Anderson’s exhibited signs of impairment, and his hasty flight.
{¶15} The trial court granted the motion to suppress, reasoning that under
Gray, “the odor of burnt marijuana, without additional indicia of illegal conduct, does
not establish probable cause to search a vehicle.” In its findings of fact, the trial court
noted that “[t]he record does not reflect impaired driving prior to the stop, . . .
observations of slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, loss of balance, or smoke emanating
from the vehicle.” It also rejected the State’s arguments regarding plain view of the
scale, Anderson’s flight, and the inventory exception.
{¶16} The State now appeals.
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II. Analysis
{¶17} In one assignment of error, the State alleges that the trial court erred in
granting Anderson’s motion to suppress.
A. Assignment of Error
{¶18} Our review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress “presents
a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. We accept
the trial court’s factual findings as long as they are supported by competent, credible
evidence. State v. Rogers, 2022-Ohio-4535, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.). We then independently
determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id.
{¶19} The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government. U.S. Const., amend. IV. Warrantless searches and
seizures “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
{¶20} One exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
warrantless searches is the “automobile exception.” State v. Jackson, 2022-Ohio4365, ¶ 28, citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). Under the
automobile exception, officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if they
have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity. Id.
{¶21} In 2000, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “the smell of marijuana,
alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable
cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement.” State v. Moore, 2000-Ohio-10, ¶ 6. Eighteen years later, the Court
reaffirmed the notion that the smell of marijuana alone establishes probable cause to
search a car in State v. Vega, 2018-Ohio-4002, ¶ 15.
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{¶22} However, in 2023, the people of Ohio voted to legalize recreational
marijuana. State v. Sawyer, 2026-Ohio-2913, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). Based on this shift in
Ohio law, this court held in Gray that “the smell of marijuana is no longer
automatically indicative of criminal activity, as it was at the time that Moore and Vega
were decided.” Gray, 2025-Ohio-4607, at ¶ 61 (1st Dist.). Given that it is still illegal
to smoke marijuana in a car, we explained that the smell of marijuana was a relevant
factor in determining probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at ¶
47, 61. But under the totality of the circumstances, additional indicia of illegal activity,
such as “smoke emanating from the vehicle, impaired driving, or other signs of
impairment” would increase the likelihood that an officer had probable cause to search
a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at ¶ 62.
{¶23} Here, the trial court found, and we agree, that the search of Anderson’s
car was unconstitutional under Gray. However, Gray was not published, and
therefore, was not binding precedent, at the time of the search.
{¶24} In Gray, we did not need to consider whether the good-faith exception
applied because the State failed to raise it below. Id. at ¶ 66. Here, the State argues,
in the trial court and in this court, that the officers acted in good-faith reliance on
binding appellate precedent in conducting the search.
{¶25} The good-faith exception is an exception to the exclusionary rule of the
Fourth Amendment. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment may not be used at trial. State v. Johnson, 2014-Ohio-5021,
¶ 40. In Johnson, the Ohio Supreme Court discussed the exclusionary rule, reasoning
that “the exclusionary rule’s ‘sole purpose is to deter future violations of the Fourth
Amendment.’” Id., quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-237 (2011). But
excluding reliable evidence serves no deterrent purpose when officers act in good faith.
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See id. Therefore, “‘searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding
appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.’” Id. at ¶ 42, quoting
Davis at 232.
{¶26} The search of Anderson’s car took place during a period of evolving
marijuana jurisprudence. As noted above, prior to Ohio’s legalization of recreational
marijuana, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the smell of marijuana alone was
sufficient probable cause to search a vehicle. Moore, 2000-Ohio-10, at ¶ 6; Vega,
2018-Ohio-4002, at ¶ 15.
{¶27} But, after recreational marijuana was legalized, appellate districts in
Ohio began to signal a shift from Moore and Vega. Nine months prior to the search
of Anderson’s car, the Second District decided State v. Tomlin, 2024-Ohio-4710 (2d
Dist.). Tomlin concerned a traffic stop that occurred before Ohio legalized recreational
marijuana. Id. at ¶ 25. In finding that the officer had probable cause to search the car,
the Tomlin court held “[b]ecause non-medical marijuana was still illegal in Ohio at the
time of the traffic stop in this case, we need not address whether the legalization of
marijuana has invalidated” Moore’s principle that the smell of marijuana alone
provides sufficient probable cause to search. Id. “For purposes of this case,” the court
explained, “Moore remains valid and applicable.” Id.
{¶28} By expressly limiting its reliance on Moore to pre-legalization, Tomlin
suggested that the validity of Moore after legalization was an open question.
{¶29} The Fifth District had also released an opinion indicating that the
legalization of recreational marijuana was changing how the smell of marijuana factors
into the probable cause analysis a few months prior to the search in the instant case.
See State v. Duch, 2025-Ohio-1162, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.) (“We see no reason why the odor
of burnt marijuana should not be subject to the same analysis as the odor of alcohol.”).
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The Duch court ultimately held that the search at issue was supported by sufficient
probable cause. Id. at ¶ 28. But critically, the court noted that “the odor of burnt or
raw marijuana alone, would not be sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion to
expand the scope of the initial traffic stop in order to conduct field sobriety tests.” Id.
at ¶ 27.
{¶30} Based on this shift in the case law, the question is whether the goodfaith exception applies to the search at issue in this case. On one hand, Moore and
Vega have not been expressly overruled. But on the other hand, a year and a half after
recreational marijuana was legalized, a reasonable police officer might be expected to
recognize that the legal landscape governing searches based on the odor of marijuana
was changing.
{¶31} We cannot make that determination today. The trial court, in its order,
did not address the application of the good-faith exception to this search. “‘When a
trial court does not consider one of the arguments raised in support of a motion, but
grants the motion solely on the basis of the second argument, the first argument is not
properly before the court of appeals.’” Reid v. Reese, 2023-Ohio-4815, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.),
quoting Marra v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 2007-Ohio-356, ¶ 62 (7th Dist.); see State v.
Richardson, 2012-Ohio-1232, ¶ 47 (2d Dist.) (remanding the matter to the trial court
for consideration of the good-faith exception); State v. Mendell, 2010-Ohio-6107, ¶ 17
(2d Dist.) (same). The answer to that question depends in part on the status of the law
at the time of the search, the policy position adopted by the relevant agencies involved
in training the police, and the experience and training of the officers involved in the
stop.
III. Conclusion
{¶32} We sustain the assignment of error, reverse the trial court’s judgment,
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and remand the cause for the trial court to conduct a hearing to consider the goodfaith exception in the first instance.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
BOCK, P.J., and MOORE, J., concur.
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