Judgment rendered August 26, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.
No. 57,070-CA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
SHA’LETHEA LASHAY JACKSON Plaintiff-Appellant
versus
TRAVIS TRAVELL DONAHUE, SR. Defendant-Appellee
*****
Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2024-3778
Honorable Frederick D. Jones, Judge
*****
FAMILY JUSTICE CENTER Counsel for Appellant By: Brittany Sullivan Lenard
ARTHUR GILMORE JR. Counsel for Appellee
*****
Before COX, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.
ELLENDER, J.
Sha’Lethea Jackson appeals a judgment that awarded her ex-husband,
Travis Donahue, joint custody of the couple’s three minor children, granted
Donahue unsupervised visitation with them, and declined to apply the Post
Separation Family Violence Relief Act (“PSFVRA”). We amend the
judgment solely to clarify the assessment of costs, but in all other respects we
affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 13, 2024, police were called to the couple’s home, at 1710
Rogers Street in Monroe, regarding a domestic incident. Officers arrived and
arrested Jackson on charges of domestic abuse battery child endangerment for
battering Donahue in the presence of the minor children; she was taken to jail
and a temporary protective order was issued, but the criminal charge was
eventually dropped, the state finding “insufficient information” to proceed.
On October 18, after bonding out of jail, Jackson filed a petition for
protection from abuse alleging that on October 12 Donahue, who she claimed
was intoxicated at the time, choked her, hit her, and punched her in the head
in the presence of the minor children. In her petition, she detailed a history of
physical attacks and intoxication, some involving just her and some involving
the children. Jackson’s petition was granted, and a temporary restraining
order was issued.
After a hearing officer (“HO”) hearing on November 14, the HO found
Donahue had a drinking problem that often resulted in physical altercations
between him and Jackson. The HO granted Jackson’s protective order but
awarded Donahue supervised visitation of the children. The order was to be
valid through November 15, 2025.
On March 6, 2025, Jackson filed this petition for divorce and incidental
matters pursuant to La. C.C. art. 103(5). She alleged she and Donahue had
been married since 2019, had three minor children, had been living separate
and apart since October 14, 2024, and, citing the most recent protective order
and Donahue’s abusive behavior, she requested divorce under La. C.C. art.
103(5). Alleging Donahue had a history of physical abuse toward her and the
children, abused alcohol regularly, and sexually assaulted her, Jackson
requested sole custody pursuant to the PSFVRA, La. R.S. 9:341 et seq., with
Donahue to have supervised visitation only after completing an alcohol abuse
program, batterer’s intervention program, and sexual perpetrator’s program.
In the alternative, she prayed for joint custody with her as domiciliary parent
and Donahue to have only supervised visitation. She also prayed for
continued use of the matrimonial domicile, under R.S. 9:374, and an order for
Donahue to continue making the mortgage payments; she attached a letter
from the lender showing Donahue was behind on payments. Finally, she
asked for certification to proceed in forma pauperis.
Shortly after this, on March 31, Donahue was ordered in a separate
support enforcement matter to pay child support of $1,390.76 per month.
Donahue responded to Jackson’s petition for divorce with an answer
and reconventional demand. The answer alleged Jackson had obtained the
protective order of November 14, 2024, through fraudulent means and false
information; she was not entitled to a divorce under Art. 103(5) because she
was the perpetrator of all physical violence in their home; and he often had to
protect himself and the children from her outbursts. Donahue requested joint
or shared custody with himself as domiciliary parent. He also disputed her
claimed financial need, asserting she was voluntarily underemployed. The
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reconventional demand alleged Jackson initiated the physical alternation on
October 12, 2024, resulting in her arrest and detention for domestic abuse
battery child endangerment on October 13, and he was never given the
opportunity to have the protective order issued as a result of those charges; he
prayed for the protective order against him to be dissolved.
Jackson answered the reconventional demand. She admitted the
physical altercation that took place October 12, 2024, but argued Donahue
started it, not her; she also admitted she had been arrested and charged as
alleged, but the state dropped those charges for lack of evidence. She denied
making any fraudulent claims to obtain a protective order and urged
Donahue’s violent history was documented by multiple protective orders. She
also alleged Donahue was not exercising any supervised visitation under the
current protective order. In support, she attached copies of the District
Attorney’s letter of November 15, 2024, declining the charges against her,
and of an earlier protective order, dated June 4, 2020, and effective through
December 4, 2021, against Donahue.
ACTION OF THE HEARING OFFICER
The parties proceeded to a hearing before the HO on June 12, 2025.
The HO issued a detailed and comprehensive report setting out findings.
Pertinent to this appeal, the HO found the PSFVRA was not applicable: both
parties appeared to be bad actors, neither caused any bodily injury to the
other, and their history, while volatile, did not justify finding either had a
history of perpetrating family violence. Considering the best-interest standard
of La. C.C. art. 134, the HO determined Jackson could not show it was in the
best interest of the children that she have sole custody. However, in light of
Donahue’s obvious issues with alcohol, the HO recommended joint custody
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with Donahue receiving supervised visitation, every other weekend and with
the paternal grandfather supervising the visits. The HO also recommended
dismissing Donahue’s request to dissolve the protective order against him,
thereby leaving it in place, and splitting the costs equally between the parties.
Both sides objected to the recommendation. Jackson argued the
paternal grandfather was an inappropriate choice to supervise visitation; she
had proved Donahue’s history of family violence, by showing two previously
issued protective orders; this activated the PSFVRA, making the paternal
grandfather ineligible to serve as supervisor and excluding Donahue from
supervised visitation until he completed the batterer’s intervention and
alcohol abuse programs. She reiterated her request for sole custody and,
finally, she did not object to splitting the costs.
Donahue argued he was never given the opportunity to show the merits
of his own requested protective order, to cross-examine his accusers, or to
present evidence in his defense. He objected to naming Jackson domiciliary
parent and to granting him only supervised visitation, as contrary to the
children’s best interest, and to giving Jackson use of the matrimonial
domicile, as she had abandoned that house in October 2024.
While a hearing on the objections was pending, Jackson filed a rule to
hold Donahue in contempt for failing to leave the matrimonial domicile as
ordered.
ACTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
A hearing on the objections was held before the district court on
October 8, 2025. The parties both testified, attempting to paint the most
negative picture of the other parent they possibly could; both obviously
struggled to control themselves when dealing with each other. Jackson’s
4
testimony, and that of her witnesses, focused on Donahue’s drinking problem;
Donahue focused on his desire to take an active role in the lives of his
children. Counsel for Jackson argued for the application of the PSFVRA to
the case; counsel for Donahue merely asked for joint custody.
The court granted Jackson her requested divorce under Art. 103(5) but
left the interim protective order in effect pending a final ruling on custody and
visitation. The court continued the contempt rule.
Jackson then filed another rule to hold Donahue in contempt, this time
for failing to pay the mortgage on the matrimonial domicile; she also asked
the court to extend the protective order because of his continued alcohol
abuse.
The district court issued its judgment on December 22, 2025. It
specifically rejected Jackon’s argument to apply the PSFVRA, finding two
protective orders insufficient to require application of the Act. The judgment
granted Donahue visitation with the children every other weekend, with the
first four visits to be supervised by the paternal grandfather. It prohibited
both parents from using illegal drugs or consuming excessive amounts of
alcohol while they exercised physical custody of the children. It named
Jackson domiciliary parent and granted her exclusive use of the former
matrimonial domicile; it ordered Donahue to ensure the mortgage was paid as
directed by the lender. Jackson moved for an appeal on February 2; it was
granted with a waiver of costs.
SUBSEQUENT ACTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Two days after Jackson moved for appeal, the district court heard her
motions for contempt. Despite receiving notice of the hearing, neither
Donahue nor his attorney was present.
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The court found Donahue in contempt for failing to move out of the
matrimonial domicile and cast him with all costs associated with the contempt
rule, $750 in attorney fees, and $1,625 for rental reimbursement to Jackson.
The court did not hold Donahue in contempt for failing to pay the mortgage,
finding that Jackson did not provide any evidence that it was in fact
delinquent. Jackson’s counsel acknowledged having no appropriate evidence
but stated she would file another rule, with the proper documentation.1
The court issued a judgment with written reasons on March 25, 2026,
largely mirroring its December 22 judgment, but including an in-depth
discussion of why the PSFVRA was not applicable to this case. Pursuant to
an order from this court, the district court issued an amended judgment stating
the parties received joint custody of the children, with Jackson designated the
domiciliary parent. Jackson appealed.
THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
Jackson designated five assignments of error but has argued only four.2
First, she urges the district court erred in failing to apply the provisions of the
PSFVRA, La. R.S. 9:361 et seq., and in failing to determine that Jackson met
the burden of proof required to establish abuse. Her next two assignments
challenge findings that stem from the court’s ruling with respect to the
PSFVRA: the court erred in awarding joint custody and dissolving the
requirement of supervised visitation on Donahue’s part; the court erred in
failing to find Donahue successfully completed a court-monitored domestic
1
The record does not show any subsequent filing.
2
Her fourth assignment of error, urging the court failed to conduct a timely hearing for contempt and, thus, caused her undue hardship, is not argued in the text of the appellate brief. Assignments not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned. URCA Rule 2-12.4; State in Interest of JM, 13-2573 (La. 12/9/14), 156 So. 3d 1161; State in Interest of KAS, 53,613 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/23/20), 303 So. 3d 688.
6
abuse intervention program, or a treatment program for sexual abusers, or that
he was not abusing alcohol or using illegal substances. Her fifth assignment
complains the judgment failed to address the issue of court costs, and owing
to her pauper status she should be allowed to proceed without payment of
costs.
Donahue submits the district court’s written reasons for judgment are
sound and supported by the record.3
APPLICABLE LAW
In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court shall award custody
of a child in accordance with the best interest of the child. La. C.C. art. 131;
Hodges v. Hodges, 15-0585 (La. 11/23/15), 181 So. 3d 700. If the parents
agree who is to have custody, the court shall award custody in accordance
with their agreement unless the provisions of R.S. 9:364 apply or the best
interest of the child requires a different award. La. C.C. art. 132. Subject to
the provisions of R.S. 9:364, in the absence of agreement, the court shall
award custody to the parents jointly; however, if custody in one parent is
shown by clear and convincing evidence to serve the best interest of the child,
the court shall award custody to that parent. Id.; Hodges v. Hodges, supra.
Relevant factors to be considered in determining the best interest of the child
are listed in La. C.C. art. 134.4
3
Donahue also argues the appeal is premature because the district court did not render a definitive judgment of divorce; pursuant to this court’s order of June 9, 2026, the district court filed an amended judgment with proper decretal language. We therefore deem the appeal timely.
4
These include: (1) The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Ch. C. art. 603, which shall be the primary consideration; (2) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child; (3) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child; (4) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs; (5) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity
7
The district court has great discretion in child custody cases based on
its better opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses; hence, that
court’s determination of custody issues is afforded great weight and will not
be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.
McCormic v. Rider, 09-2584 (La. 2/12/10), 27 So. 3d 277; Harris v. Rogers,
56,915 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/15/26), __ So. 3d __.
In cases involving a history of committing family violence, as defined
in R.S. 9:362, or domestic abuse, as defined in R.S. 46:2132, including sexual
abuse, as defined in R.S. 14:403, whether or not a party has sought relief
under any applicable law, the court shall determine an award of custody or
visitation in accordance with R.S. 9:361 and 364. La. C.C. art. 134 (B);
Merrells v. Doray, 53,551 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/8/20), 299 So. 3d 208, writ
denied, 20-01003 (La. 9/8/20), 301 So. 3d 30. The court may only find a
history of committing family violence if the court finds that one incident of
family violence has resulted in serious bodily injury or the court finds more
than one incident of family violence. La. C.C. art. 134 (B); Merrells v.
Dotray, supra.
Whenever the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a
parent has subjected any of his or her children or stepchildren to family
of that environment; (6) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes; (7) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child; (8) The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity of any party; (9) The mental and physical health of each party – evidence that an abused parent suffers from the effects of past abuse by the other parent shall not be grounds for denying that parent custody; (10) The home, school, and community history of the child; (11) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference; (12) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party, except when objectively substantial evidence of specific abusive, reckless, or illegal conduct has caused one party to have reasonable concerns for the child’s safety or well-being while in the care of the other party; (13) The distance between the respective residences of the parties; and (14) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.
8
violence, as defined in R.S. 9:361, or domestic abuse, as defined in R.S.
46:2132, or in other circumstances not applicable to this case, the court shall
allow only supervised visitation between the abusive parent and the abused
child or children until such parent proves by a preponderance of the evidence
at a contradictory hearing that the abusive parent has successfully completed a
court-monitored domestic abuse intervention program, as defined in R.S.
9:362, since the last incident of domestic violence or family abuse. La. R.S.
9:341 (A); Hollingsworth v. Semerad, 35,264 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/31/01), 799
So. 2d 658.
Under the PSFVRA, there is created a presumption that no parent who
has a history of perpetrating family violence, as defined in R.S. 9:362, or
domestic abuse, as defined in R.S. 46:2132, or other specific conduct not
applicable to this case, shall be awarded sole or joint custody of the children.
La. R.S. 9:364 (A). The court may find a history of perpetrating family
violence if the court finds that one incident has resulted in serious bodily
injury or the court finds more than one incident of family violence. Id.; Smith
v. Holloway, 53,352 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/20), 289 So. 3d 647. When
determining whether a parent has a history of perpetrating family violence,
the court must review the total circumstances of the family, which may
include the frequency and severity of the incidents, whether the violence
occurred in the presence of the children, and to what extent there existed
provocation for any violent act. Lewis v. Lewis, 34,031 (La. App. 2 Cir.
11/3/00), 771 So. 2d 856; Marshall v. Thurman, 25-309 (La. App. 5 Cir.
9/24/25), 423 So. 3d 211, writ denied, 25-01266 (La. 11/12/25), 420 So. 3d
710.
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Should a history of family violence be proved to exist, such that
application of the PSFVRA is mandated, failure to apply the provisions of
R.S. 9:361 et seq. is reversible legal error, requiring a de novo review of the
record. Lewis v. Lewis, supra. However, the district court’s determination on
matters of child custody and domestic abuse is entitled to great weight and
will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Brown,
54,699 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/22), 345 So. 3d 513, and citations therein;
Durand v. Rose, 22-0300 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/15/22), 366 So. 3d 484, writ
denied, 22-01727 (La. 1/18/23), 353 So. 3d 127. A factual finding that the
record does not support application of the PSFVRA is entitled to great weight.
Wilson v. Brown, supra; Dazet v. Nicolini, 26-154 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/21/26),
__ So. 3d __.
DISCUSSION
Jackson has framed application of the PSFVRA as the center of her
argument: because she proved an incident of abuse, she contends, the district
court was mandated to apply the PSFVRA and deny all visitation to Donahue.
Of course, the district court’s findings in a child custody case are entitled to
great discretion, as is that court’s finding that the evidence does not support
applying the PSFVRA. McCormic v. Rider, supra; Harris v. Rogers, supra;
Wilson v. Brown, supra; Dazet v. Nicolini, supra.
On this record, we are unable to find the district court abused its great
discretion. The court carefully outlined the long and conflicting testimony:
Jackson claimed Donahue had a history of calling her derogatory names,
choking her after arguments, pushing her head into walls or windows, verbal
and physical attacks on the children, particularly the elder boy, favoring the
younger boy over the elder boy, attempting to force Jackson into sexual acts,
10
beating or neglecting pets, and making demeaning remarks about Jackson’s
family. The court also acknowledged she had obtained two protective orders
against Donahue. On the other hand, the court noted, Donahue denied all
accusations and, further, he claimed that Jackson had a violent temper, was
vengeful and manipulative, needed anger management treatment, had a
history of physical aggression toward him, and caused chaos in the home with
outbursts of anger in which she destroyed the children’s and family’s
possessions.
Faced with these conflicting and recriminating claims, the court found
it “probable” that the parties have a volatile relationship and both have
engaged in arguments and verbal expressions of anger; however, the evidence
did not show that either party committed any act which caused serious bodily
injury to the other. The parties’ history of volatility, though undesirable, did
not justify finding that either of them had a history of perpetrating family
violence. The court further found that Jackson obtained her second protective
one day after she was released from jail on a family violence incident, and
then asserted the facts of the same incident to support her protective order
against Donahue. In light of this history, the court was unwilling to apply the
PSFVRA, and that conclusion was well within the court’s great discretion.
We find no factual or legal error in the court’s refusal to apply the PSFVRA,
and Jackson’s first assignment lacks merit.
With this finding, we may quickly address Jackson’s next two
assignments, which contest the court’s failure to order relief in accordance
with the PSFVRA. Without the application of the PSFVRA, there was no
automatic denial of supervised visitation to Donahue under R.S. 9:364 (A)
11
and no automatic requirement that he complete a court-monitored domestic
abuse program or any of the other remedies set out in R.S. 9:341 (A).
Jackson nevertheless contends, in passing, that the court erred in
awarding the parties joint custody. The best interest of the child is the
paramount consideration in any custody litigation, with joint custody being
the preferred regime. La. C.C. art. 132; Hodges v. Hodges, supra.
The district court performed a detailed and comprehensive analysis of
the evidence in light of the factors of Art. 134. The court found some factors
were relatively even for the parties, including the potential for abuse, capacity
and disposition to give love, affection, and spiritual guidance to the children,
the permanence of the family unit, and willingness to encourage a relationship
with the other parent. Other facts favored Jackson, such as the ties between
her and the children, their home, school, and community history, and past
responsibility for caring and rearing. Favoring Donahue was the capacity and
disposition to provide the children’s material needs. On these findings, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson’s claim for sole
custody. However, given both parties’ apparent lack of self-control,
Donahue’s history of abusing alcohol, and the two protective orders against
him, the court found supervised visitation was warranted for the first four
weekends of visitation awarded to him. On this record, we find no abuse of
discretion. The assigned error lacks merit.
By her fifth assignment of error, Jackson urges the district court erred
in failing to recognize her pauper status in the assessment of court costs.
Unlike substantive issues, silence in a judgment as to costs is not a denial of
costs; rather, it authorizes costs to “be paid by the party cast.” La. C.C.P. art.
1920; Danna v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 20-0116 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/24/21),
12
365 So. 3d 679, writs denied, 21-00714, -00713 (La. 10/1/21), 324 So. 3d
1053, 1059. Because she received pauper status, she should be allowed
prosecute or defend without paying costs in advance or as they accrue, La.
C.C.P. art. 5181 (A), to the extent she is the “party cast.”
The amended judgment is indeed silent as to costs. Although it
awarded joint custody, the substance was to make Jackson domiciliary parent
and give Donahue only limited and supervised visitation; the only relief
denied Jackson was sole custody status. Since she mostly prevailed, the
district court would have been within its discretion to assess no costs against
Jackson. However, for the sake of consistency, we will amend the judgment
to state that any costs assessed against Jackson are assessed in accordance
with La. C.C.P. arts. 5188 and 5186.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, the judgment is amended to provide that any
costs assessed against Jackson are assessed in accordance with La. C.C.P.
arts. 5188 and 5186. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Sha’lethea Lashay Jackson is to pay all appellate costs in accordance
with La. C.C.P. arts. 5188 and 5186.
AMENDED AS TO COSTS; AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER
RESPECTS.
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