Judgment rendered August 26, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.
No. 57,072-JAC
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA
IN THE INTEREST OF
C.Y.
L.Y.
*****
Appealed from the
Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 5113
Honorable Amy Burford McCartney, Judge
*****
CARMOUCHE, BOKENFOHR, Counsel for Appellant, BUCKLE & DAY S.Y., Father By: John N. Bokenfohr
Amy Gardner Day
PAMELA R. MOSER Counsel for Appellee, Assistant District Attorney State of Louisiana
STATE OF LOUISIANA, DCFS Counsel for Appellee, By: Kimberly Smith State of Louisiana
ACADIANA LEGAL SERVICE Counsel for Appellees, CORPORATION C.Y. and L.Y., Minor By: Tyresia L. Earls Children LAW OFFICES OF J. DHU THOMPSON Counsel for IntervenorsBy: Madison E. Crusan Appellees,
T.S. and W.S.,
Grandparents
P. MICHAEL DAVIS Counsel for Appellee,
T.H., Mother
*****
Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.
MARCOTTE, J.
This Rule 5 appeal arises from the 42nd Judicial District Court, Parish
of DeSoto, the Honorable Amy Burford McCartney presiding. The father,
Samuel Yount, appeals a judgment of disposition by the trial court
adjudicating his minor children as children in need of care and adopting a
case plan placing the children with their maternal aunt. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The minor children at issue in this matter, C.Y. (DOB 08/03/2010)
and L.Y. (DOB 10/04/2016), are the biological children of Mr. Yount and
Tracey Hightower. Mr. Yount and Mrs. Hightower were previously
married, and their divorce was finalized in July 2021. Custody of the two
minor children is being litigated in the First Judicial District Court, Caddo
Parish, Louisiana.
On September 9, 2025, the State of Louisiana through the Department
of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) received a report involving
alleged sexual abuse of C.Y. The report stated that C.Y.’s stepfather, Sean
Hightower, “waxes the child’s vagina, comments on the color of her vagina,
and anus.” The report further alleged that C.Y. masturbates in front of Mr.
Hightower, and that Mrs. Hightower was aware of and/or a passive
participant in the abuse. The report also included allegations that C.Y. was
provided alcohol by the Hightowers. C.Y. underwent an emergency forensic
interview at the Gingerbread House but made no disclosures.
During an interview with Rebecca Phillips, an investigator in the
DCFS Child Welfare Unit, C.Y. reported that she and her 18-year-old friend
sometimes walk around the Hightowers’ house nude and that the two minors were provided with alcohol on Labor Day, causing both minors to vomit.
L.Y. made no disclosures during his interview with Ms. Phillips. Mr. and
Mrs. Hightower each made several admissions of inappropriate behavior
involving C.Y. that occurred in their home. On September 15, 2025, the
DeSoto Parish Sheriff’s Office advised that Mrs. Hightower had admitted to
witnessing her husband sexually abuse C.Y.
On September 16, 2025, an instanter order was entered in this matter
and the minor children were placed in the temporary custody of DCFS. The
instanter order was supported by an affidavit from Ms. Phillips, which
outlined the allegations and investigations mentioned above. DCFS placed
the children in the care of their maternal aunt, Melissa Kennington.
In the time leading up to removal, Mr. Yount appeared unannounced
at the office of DCFS where he revealed the custody battle over the children
in the First Judicial District Court, causing him to have heavily restricted,
supervised access to C.Y. and L.Y., and his lack of a meaningful relationship
with either child. A continued custody hearing was convened on September
17, 2025, where both parents stipulated there was probable cause to believe
the children were in need of care at the time of their removal based upon the
information contained within the affidavit submitted by DCFS. Mr. Yount
wished to testify, which brought to the court’s attention the estranged
relationship between him and his children as well as the restrictive
conditions of sight and sound supervision previously placed on his
communications with C.Y. and L.Y. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court found probable cause that the minors were children in need of care at
the time of their removal, continued them in the custody of DCFS, and set
the matter for a Time to Answer hearing.
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The state filed a petition on September 29, 2025, alleging the children
should be declared in need of care. Reiterating the allegations contained in
the affidavit against both parents, the state asserted that there was cause to
believe the children could not be protected from neglect or safety threats if
under parental custody. The parents entered denials at the Time to Answer
hearing on October 14, 2025. All counsel agreed to an adjudication hearing
date of November 12, 2025.
DCFS filed an amended report and a proposed case plan into the
record on November 7, 2025. The report contained disclosures from the
minor children that they did not feel comfortable around their father. The
report also indicated that the children did not wish to continue visits and
communications with their father. The case plan had a goal of reunification.
The case plan also asserted that placement with the maternal aunt was the
least restrictive, safest, and most appropriate setting available consistent with
the best interests of the children. Placement with Mr. Yount was explored,
but DCFS determined that he was not the best option at that time.
Included in the proposed case plan were reports from psychologists
working with the children and the family. The first report was from Dr.
Todd Lobrano. Dr. Lobrano prepared the report in conjunction with a courtordered custody evaluation in the First Judicial District Court custody
proceeding on or about January 3, 2023. It contained information regarding
the marriage and divorce provided to him by Mr. Yount and Mrs.
Hightower. Mrs. Hightower expressed concern that Mr. Yount was mentally
abusive to the children, specifically noting concern with Mr. Yount’s
discipline techniques. Mr. Yount expressed concern that Mrs. Hightower
and her family were influencing the children against him. Dr. Lobrano
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recommended that Mr. Yount be awarded supervised visitation in
accordance with the current schedule, with gradual increases to overnight
visitations every other weekend and the removal of supervision upon
completion of counseling and parenting courses.
The second report was from Antoinette Nieves, M.A., L.P.C. Ms.
Nieves began providing counseling services to L.Y. in April 2025.
Caregivers, including Mrs. Hightower and Mrs. Kennington, reported
emotional changes in L.Y. surrounding phone calls and visits with Mr.
Yount, including increased irritability, anger, emotional dysregulation, and
episodes of defecating on himself. On October 28, 2025, Ms. Nieves opined
that L.Y. exhibited significant emotional distress related to recent life
transitions and recommended a comprehensive psychological evaluation and
increased frequency of counseling sessions.
An adjudication hearing was scheduled to be conducted on November
12, 2025, and was continued until January 15, 2026, at the request of defense
counsel. On January 12, 2026, Mrs. Hightower appeared for adjudication at
a special setting requested by the state. Counsel for the state, Mrs.
Hightower, and the children were present. Mr. Yount was not present, but
nothing in the record indicates that counsel for Mr. Yount was notified of the
special setting. Mrs. Hightower entered a stipulation that the children were
in need of care and was advised that her presence was not necessary at the
previously scheduled January 15, 2026, adjudication. The January 15, 2026,
setting was then continued as the state could not obtain service on Ms.
Phillips.
The adjudication hearing for Mr. Yount was conducted on February
10, 2026. The trial court heard the testimony of Ms. Phillips, DCFS
4
Supervisor Kimberly Carlton, and Mr. Yount. The court also had a
discussion in chambers with both children in the presence of all counsel. No
party objected to the in-chambers discussion, nor did any party request the
discussion with the children be on the record.
Following argument of counsel, the court adjudicated the children in
need of care. On February 10, 2026, a petition for third-party intervention
and for visitation was filed on behalf of Tina McMillan-Sweat and Wendell
Dean Sweat, the children’s paternal grandparents. Their petition for
intervention was granted on March 5, 2026.
This matter came before the trial court for a disposition hearing on
March 5, 2026. A final report from DCFS and a proposed case plan,
prepared on or about February 27, 2026, were introduced. The report noted
that Mrs. Hightower was arrested on December 4, 2025, and charged with
molestation of a juvenile and indecent behavior with juveniles. Mr.
Hightower was also arrested on December 4, 2025, and charged with
molestation of a juvenile, indecent behavior with juveniles, and sexual
battery. The case plan goal remained reunification.
The trial court accepted the state’s recommendation that the children
remain in DCFS custody and adopted the proposed case plan. A written
disposition judgment memorializing the trial court’s ruling was signed on
March 26, 2026. Specifically, the trial court found that DCFS had made
reasonable efforts to prevent removal and reunify the family and that the
case plan was in the best interests of the children and was the least restrictive
disposition available. DCFS and the parents were ordered to comply with
the case plan.
Mr. Yount now appeals.
5
DISCUSSION
Procedural Due Process
Mr. Yount argues that the child in need of care proceedings in this
matter violated his procedural due process rights to the care, custody, and
control of his children. He claims that the investigation performed by DCFS
was flawed and that DCFS and Mrs. Kennington have been unwilling to
facilitate a relationship between him and his children. Mr. Yount also
claims that the trial court’s actions in this matter have effectively overridden
the orders of the First Judicial District Court and constitute a de facto
termination of his visitation rights.
Mr. Yount contends that the delay in the child in need of care
proceedings happened due to the state’s inability to effect service of a
subpoena on Ms. Phillips, and that this delay violated his rights vis-à-vis his
children and damaged any potential reunification efforts with them. Mr.
Yount also complains that the state was permitted to introduce new and
previously unpled allegations of abuse against him during both the
adjudication and disposition hearings. He claims that it was not alleged that
his children did not feel safe with him until DCFS proposed an amended
case plan on November 7, 2025. Mr. Yount asserts that these vague
allegations, not even contained in the petition, were insufficient to permit
him to prepare a defense. Mr. Yount further complains that the trial court’s
reasons for judgment clearly indicate that it considered its “talk” with the
children in chambers that was not recorded or transcribed for the record.
The state asserts that the child in need of care proceedings in this
matter did not violate Mr. Yount’s procedural due process rights because he
was present and testified at the continued custody hearing. The state further
6
notes that both parents stipulated to probable cause that the children were in
need of care at the hearing.
It is well established within Louisiana that the trial courts in juvenile
matters are in a unique position. The trial court hears the evidence presented
and evaluates the credibility of the witnesses. As such, the decision of a trial
court is entitled to great deference. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840 (La.
1989). The health, safety, and best interest of the child is the paramount
concern in all child in need of care proceedings. La. Ch. C. art 601; State in
Int. of Z.P., 52,354 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/18), 255 So. 3d 727.
Here, the record reveals that Mr. Yount was provided timely notice of
the continued custody hearing as evidenced by his appearance at the hearing.
Mr. Yount was also provided a meaningful opportunity to be heard as
evidenced by his extensive testimony at that hearing.
Mr. Yount’s argument that the delay in the child in need of care
proceedings damaged any potential reunification efforts made by him is
belied by the actions of his counsel. In fact, the principal reason for delay in
the proceedings was caused by Mr. Yount’s counsel’s requesting a
continuance due to his planned vacation to the Bahamas. Moreover, when
the state was unable to effectuate service on Ms. Phillips for the continued
trial date, Mr. Yount’s counsel informed the court that he “certainly” did not
have an objection to a further continuance. We also note that this is a father
who went over a year without contact or support and sporadically
maintained a one-hour visitation schedule twice a month for approximately
four years. Claiming that a delay in the proceedings harmed his
reunification efforts appears to be unsubstantiated.
7
Regarding Mr. Yount’s argument that the trial court overrode the
custody order from the First Judicial District Court, Mr. Yount is simply
incorrect on the law and appears to conflate the purpose of a child in need of
care proceeding with a custody determination. We agree that the trial court
has overridden the orders in the custody litigation but note that this is
required by black letter law, specifically La. Ch. C. art. 303(A)(2), which
grants courts exercising juvenile jurisdiction “exclusive original jurisdiction”
over child in need of care proceedings.
Mr. Yount’s assertion that he was blindsided by the abuse allegations
rings hollow because the DCFS report submitted three months prior to the
adjudication hearing included statements from the children that they do not
feel safe or comfortable in Mr. Yount’s presence. They also reported
experiencing nightmares involving their father harming them or other family
members.
From the very onset of this matter, abuse was indeed alleged. C.Y.
expressed to the DCFS investigator that she does not have a relationship
with her father and that she suffers from anxiety and depression due to the
abuse she encountered when she was around him. In a counseling letter
submitted by Ms. Nieves dated October 25, 2025 – four months prior to the
adjudication hearing – it was recommended that Mr. Yount’s visitation plan
be reevaluated to prioritize L.Y.’s emotional safety and stability, due to his
increased anxiety and behavior regression as a result of scheduled
visitations. To later claim surprise at abuse allegations strains credulity. We
do not find that these circumstances constitute a violation of Mr. Yount’s
due process rights. This assignment of error is without merit.
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Child in Need of Care Adjudication
Mr. Yount contends that the trial court’s adjudication of the
minor children as children in need of care was manifestly erroneous because
the state failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the minor
children were in need of care or that any of the grounds enumerated in La.
Ch. C. art. 606(A) were applicable to him as the non-offending parent. He
asserts that there was no evidence that the children were victims of abuse
perpetrated by him or that the children’s welfare would be seriously
endangered if left within his custody and control. Mr. Yount also notes that
there were no allegations of neglect or failure to provide the necessary food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, or supervision by him.
The state argues that the trial court’s adjudication of the minor
children as in need of care was not manifestly erroneous. The state asserts
that the testimony of Ms. Phillips and Ms. Carleton alone was sufficient to
independently support the trial court’s finding, but in addition to their
testimony, Mr. Yount himself gave statements to DCFS that supported the
trial court’s ruling.
Title VI of the Louisiana Children’s Code, i.e., La. Ch. Code arts. 601
to 725.6, sets forth the statutes regarding children in need of care. Louisiana
Children’s Code article 601 states the purpose of this Title is:
[T]o protect children whose physical or mental health, welfare,
and safety is substantially at risk of harm by physical abuse,
neglect, or exploitation and who may be further threatened by
the conduct of others, by providing for the reporting of
suspected cases of abuse, exploitation, or neglect of children;
by providing for the investigation of complaints; and by
providing, if necessary, for the resolution of child in need of
care proceedings in the courts.
9
La. Ch. C. art. 601 adds that “[t]he health, welfare, safety, and best
interest of the child shall be the paramount concern in all proceedings
pursuant to this Title.”
La. Ch. C. art. 606(A) provides the grounds by which a child can be
adjudicated a child in need of care. The main factor in La. Ch. Code art.
606(A) that is applicable to this case is:
(1) The child is the victim of abuse perpetrated, aided, or
tolerated by the parent or caretaker, by a person who
maintains an interpersonal dating or engagement
relationship with the parent or caretaker, or by a person
living in the same residence with the parent or caretaker as a
spouse whether married or not, and his welfare is seriously
endangered if he is left within the custody or control of that
parent or caretaker.
Adjudication of a child in need of care is warranted when a parent
shows a repeated pattern of placing a child at risk. State ex rel. L.M., 46,078
(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/26/11), 57 So. 3d 518; State in Int. of A.A., 52,388 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 261 So. 3d 124, writ denied, 18-2060 (La. 1/28/19),
263 So. 3d 429. At the adjudication hearing, the state bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is a child in need
of care. La. Ch. C. art. 665; State ex rel. L.B., 08-1539 (La. 7/17/08), 986
So. 2d 62. It is not the duty of the state to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, by clear and convincing evidence, or to disprove every
hypothesis of innocence. State ex rel. L.M., supra; State in Int. of A.A.,
supra. It is well settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a trial court’s
findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are
clearly wrong. In re A.J.F., 00-0948 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So. 2d 47; State ex
rel. L.M., supra. In a manifest error review, it is important that the appellate
court not substitute its own opinion when it is the trial court that is in the
10
unique position to see and hear the witnesses as they testify. Id. Where
there is conflicting testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and
reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even
when the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are
as reasonable as those of the trial court. Id. If the trial court’s findings are
reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the appellate court
may not reverse, even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of
fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. State ex rel. L.M.,
supra; State in Int. of A.A., supra.
After a thorough review of this record, we do not find the trial court’s
adjudicating C.Y. and L.Y. as children in need of care rises to a level of
manifest error. The record shows the state proved C.Y. and L.Y. as children
in need of care by a preponderance of the evidence through the testimony of
Ms. Phillips and Ms. Carleton and through statements made by Mr. Yount
himself. For instance, Mr. Yount gave information to DCFS, unsolicited,
that he “was not a great parent at one time and there was some alleged
abuse.” According to testimony from Ms. Carleton at the adjudication
hearing, Mr. Yount admitted to abuse of both C.Y. and L.Y. while he was in
the home of Ms. Hightower. Mr. Yount also testified extensively during his
case in chief. Mr. Yount acknowledged that in years prior, supervised visits
were necessary because C.Y. was scared of him. Mr. Yount admitted the
children had been resistant to visits with him in the years prior to their
removal, including when he elected to “pause” visits with his children and
relocate to San Antonio, Texas. He conceded both children have, prior to
their removal by DCFS, told him they do not want to live with him. Mr.
Yount acknowledged the “pause” as well as the limited supervised visits
11
were his own idea because the visits were not “actually beneficial for them,”
leading the trial court to agree that Mr. Yount is estranged from his children.
Mr. Yount admitted to a prior criminal conviction in 2018, wherein Ms.
Hightower, C.Y., and L.Y. had been the named victims. Mr. Yount
conceded that his relationship with C.Y. and L.Y. was “nonexistent.” This
led the trial court to conclude there had been no meaningful relationship
between the children and Mr. Yount in years. The trial court also had an inchambers discussion with both children in the presence of all counsel. No
party objected to the in-chambers discussion, nor did any party request the
discussion with the children be on the record. Regardless, Mr. Yount’s own
testimony supports the findings of the trial court. We find the state has
carried its burden and that there is no evidence to warrant setting aside the
trial court’s finding C.Y. and L.Y. as children in need of care. This
assignment of error has no merit.
Placement of the Minor Children
Mr. Yount argues that the trial court’s judgment approving the
recommended case plan and placement of the minor children with their
maternal aunt was manifestly erroneous because the state failed to meet its
burden of proving that the case plan was the least restrictive placement or
was in the best interest of the children. He claims that public policy
prohibits a child from being placed in the custody of a family member of
their abuser. Mr. Yount argues that Mrs. Kennington, as the sister of Mrs.
Hightower, one of the children’s abusers, and as a party who denies that
Mrs. Hightower was involved in the children’s abuse, is an inappropriate
placement for his children and is not the “least restrictive, most family-like,
safe” setting available.
12
The state argues that the trial court’s judgment of disposition
approving the DCFS case plan and recommended placement of the minor
children was in their best interest and was the least restrictive placement.
The state notes that the determination of placement was based on whether
the children could safely be placed with the father considering all
circumstances, not simply his status as a non-offending parent. The state
also points out that the children have been placed with their maternal aunt
and uncle in DeSoto Parish, their home parish, since their removal.
La. Ch. C. arts. 673 and 675(A) provides that a case plan is required
after a child is placed in DCFS custody and shall be designed to achieve
placement in the least restrictive, most family-like, and most appropriate
setting available, and in close proximity to the parents’ homes, consistent
with the best interest and the special needs of the child. La. Ch. C. art. 681
provides that when a child has been adjudicated in need of care, “the health,
welfare and safety of the child shall be the paramount concern.” If the child
cannot safely remain in or return to the custody of the parent – even a “nonoffending” parent – the court may place the child elsewhere. La. Ch. C. art.
682 similarly states that a child shall not be removed from parental custody
unless “continuation in the home would be contrary to the health, welfare
and safety of the child.” Louisiana courts have applied these principles to
deny custody to “non-offending” parents when placement with them would
not be in the child’s best interest. See State in Int. of P.P., 23-38 (La. App. 3
Cir. 6/21/23), 368 So. 3d 250. In State in Int. of P.P., supra, the court
emphasized the determination was based on whether the child could safely
be placed with the father considering all circumstances, not simply his status
as a non-offending parent. In other words, the analysis focuses on the
13
child’s safety in the placement, not the parent’s status as “non-offending.”
Existing relationships and bonds are critical factors in placement decisions.
State ex rel. T.M., 03-929 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/24/04), 869 So. 2d 339.
To reverse a trial court’s permanency plan determination, an appellate
court must find from the record that the trial court’s finding is clearly wrong
or manifestly erroneous. State in Interest of C.S., 49,955 (La. App. 2 Cir.
3/18/15), 163 So. 3d 193. The factors to be considered by the trial court
when determining a child’s best interests are located in La. C.C. art. 134(A).
The following nonexclusive factors applicable in this case are:
(1) The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by La.
Ch. C. art. 603, which shall be the primary consideration.
(2) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each
party and the child;
(7) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the
welfare of the child;
(8) The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal
activity of any party;
(11) The reasonable preference of the child;
(14) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child
previously exercised by each party.
Here, the record is clear that any positive emotional ties the minor
children have toward Mr. Yount are nonexistent. This is likely due to the
reported abuse they have suffered at his hands. There was a period of time
when Mr. Yount completely abandoned his children, thereby tarnishing any
relationship he could have had with them. There are reported instances
where he has spanked C.Y. in excess that left bruises on her body. The
record also shows that Mr. Yount admittedly slapped C.Y. across the face
and left a handprint on her cheek. During another incident when Mr. Yount
14
and Mrs. Hightower were in yet another domestic dispute, L.Y., who was
around four or five years old at the time, hid in a closet and called his
maternal aunt for help because he was afraid. It appears from the record that
Mr. Yount’s children are reluctant to engage with him due to his volatile
nature and history of abuse.
The children have been placed with their maternal aunt and uncle in
DeSoto Parish since their removal, relatives with whom they have a close
relationship and who live in the home parish of the children. Mr. Yount
resides in Haughton, Bossier Parish, in a home where neither child has lived
or spent a significant amount of time. Additional considerations of
placement with Mr. Yount would require the children to enroll in schools
they have never attended and live in an unfamiliar town. Mr. Yount testified
that the children would do online schooling instead of remaining in DeSoto
Parish schools; limited opportunities would then exist for the children to
make new friends or engage in school-sponsored activities. According to
Mr. Yount, C.Y. has met his teenage stepdaughter, with whom she would be
forced to share a bedroom at his home, only once in the three years since he
has remarried. Furthermore, testimony was received from DCFS that in
their current placement with Ms. Kennington, the children are safeguarded
against all forms of abuse, specifically emotional abuse.
Accordingly, we find ample evidence that placement of the minor
children in Mr. Yount’s home at this time would be contrary to their health,
welfare, and safety, and that continuation in their maternal aunt’s home is
the least restrictive, most family-like, and most appropriate setting available.
We do note that the case plan adopted by the trial court affords Mr. Yount a
path to reunification with his children; we simply cannot find manifest error
15
in the trial court’s decision that placement with him at this time is not in the
children’s best interest. This assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, the trial court’s judgments adjudicating the
minor children as children in need of care and adopting a case plan placing
the children with their maternal aunt are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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